In June 2020, Indian and Chinese forces engaged in a deadly clash along their disputed border in the Ladakh region. It was the deadliest confrontation since the 1962 war. Subsequently, bilateral ties between India and China deteriorated to their lowest level in decades. In recent months, however, China-India ties have begun to thaw.Last October, India and China struck a border patrol deal. Indian Prime Minister Modi and China’s leader Xi Jinping subsequently met at the BRICS summit in Kazan—their first meeting in five years. That was followed by a round of talks by their top officials just a few weeks ago.To discuss the status and trajectory of India-China relations, including how the second Trump presidency and other geopolitical developments are likely to influence that relationship, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Tanvi Madan. Tanvi is a senior fellow in the Center for Asia Policy Studies in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War.” Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:45] October 2024 Border Patrol Deal[06:40] Impetus for Stabilizing the Sino-Indian Relations[10:50] Assessment of Wang Yi-Ajit Doval Meeting [15:26] Reviving Confident-Building Measures (CBMs)[20:30] Overstating the Thaw in Sino-Indian Relations[25:54] Bilateral Trade Volume and Economic Relations[31:58] India-China Relations Moving Forward

In China’s 14th Five-Year Plan that spans from 2021 to 2025, priority was assigned to development of emerging technologies that could be both disruptive and foundational for the future. China is now a global leader in AI technology and is poised to overtake the West and become the world leader in AI in the years ahead. Importantly, there is growing evidence that AI-enabled military capabilities are becoming increasingly central to Chinese military concepts for fighting future wars.A recently released report provides insights on Chinese perspectives on military use of AI. Published by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), the report illustrates some of the key challenges Chinese defense experts have identified in developing and fielding AI-related technologies and capabilities. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the author of this report, Sam Bresnick, who is a Research Fellow at Georgetown’s CSET focusing on AI applications and Chinese technology policy.  TimestampsB[00:00] Start[01:33] Impetus for the Georgetown CSET Report[03:34] China’s Assessment of the Impacts of AI and Emerging Technologies[06:32] Areas of Debate Among Chinese Scholars[09:39] Evidence of Progress in the Military Application of AI[12:13] Lack of Trust Amongst Chinese Experts in Existing Technologies[14:25] Constraints in the Development and Implementation of AI[18:20] Chinese Expert Recommendations for Mitigating AI Risk[23:01] Implications Taken from Discussions on AI Risk[25:14] US-China Areas of Discussion on the Military Use of AI[28:50] Unilateral Steps Toward Risk Mitigation

China’s push to revise the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022. A few months after Xi Jinping proposed GSI, host Bonnie Glaser did a podcast episode with Manoj Kewalramani to discuss the drivers behind GSI and analyze the initial statements outlining its content. More than 2 ½ years have elapsed since then, and scholars have begun to investigate how China is implementing GSI in various regions around the world. A new report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines how GSI is being operationalized and received in two priority regions of Chinese foreign policy: mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The study draws on field research in both regions. The report is titled “China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia.” The report has three authors: Bates Gill, Carla Freeman and Alison McFarland. Bonnie Glaser is joined by Bates Gill for this episode to discuss the report’s findings. Bates is a senior fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research, a Senior Associate Fellow with the Royal United Services Institute, and associated with USIP.Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:53] Objectives of China’s Global Security Initiative [04:22] GSI as an Additive or a Replacement[07:21] Fieldwork in Southeast and Central Asia[12:06] Concerns about China’s Intentions and Influence[15:24] GSI Initiatives and Sources of Funding[19:58] GSI and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation[23:55] Moscow’s View of GSI [29:27] Implications of GSI for the United States

The BRICS+ summit was held in the Russian city of Kazan this past October. The original BRICS comprised four countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The first meeting that they held was in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011. BRICS has now grown to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The recent summit also invited 13 countries to the group as partner states. Countries that have expressed interest in joining BRICS include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (which is a U.S. treaty ally), and Turkey (which is a member of NATO).As countries in the Global South flock to form an increasingly significant geopolitical bloc in which China has assumed a leading role, it is important to understand how BRICS+ fits into China’s foreign policy strategy and the role that the BRICS mechanism is likely to play going forward. To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center which is based in Berlin. His research focuses on Chinese and Russian foreign policy. Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:37] Behind the Creation of BRICS[04:08] BRICS+ in China’s Foreign Policy Objectives[06:20] Domination of China in BRICS+[09:13] Russian and Chinese Interest in BRICS+[14:16] China and the Expansion of BRICS[18:07] Noteworthiness of the Kazan Declaration[21:10] Possibility of a BRICS Currency[28:11] BRICS+ and U.S. Policy Under Donald Trump[30:26] Responding to BRICS+ and a Multipolar World

China is the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, accounting for one-third of global CO2 emissions. One of its biggest sources of emissions is coal, which plays a central role in China’s economy. At the same time, however, China is the world’s leading supplier of renewable energy, largely due to significant government investments in green technologies, including solar manufacturing, batteries, and minerals. In September 2020, China’s leader Xi Jinping announced the goal of achieving peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.” This ambitious pledge, if realized, will be an important step in global efforts to limit global warming.In the past few years, the increasingly competitive and fraught relationship between the United States and China has spilled into the climate domain, threatening the potential for both countries to work together to address climate change. That is the topic of a recent commentary co-authored by Margaret Pearson and Michael Davidson. The paper is titled, “Where are the US and China on addressing climate change?”, and it can be found on the Brookings Institution website. In this episode of China Global, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with one of the authors, Michael Davidson, who is an assistant professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department of the Jacobs School of Engineering at the University of California San Diego. Timestamps[01:57] China’s Approach to Addressing Climate Change[04:26] Considerations Behind China’s Climate Policy [07:37] Doubling Down on Coal Domestically[10:34] Evaluating China’s Progress Toward Carbon Neutrality[14:42] Security and China’s Climate Change Policy[19:13] China’s International Climate Cooperation[22:45] US-China Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action [30:27] The Green Belt and Road Initiative

For many years, China’s nuclear doctrine was widely described as “minimum nuclear deterrence,” which essentially means that it relied on a limited number of nuclear weapons to deter an adversary from attacking. China’s authoritative defense white papers asserted that China sought to maintain a lean, effective and credible deterrent force, was committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursued a defensive nuclear strategy and would never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. In recent years, however, China has begun to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. Beijing is not transparent about its nuclear arsenal or its doctrine, however, which creates uncertainty for the United States and its allies.To help us decipher Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former CIA senior intelligence officer. He is a co-author of a recent report published by the Atlantic Council titled “Adapting US Strategy to Account for China’s Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power.” Episode Highlights[1:55] Key identifiable changes in China’s nuclear forces [3:49] China’s nascent nuclear triad [6:51] The drivers of China’s nuclear expansion [11:00] The recent ICBM test and its implications [14:50] How China might use its nuclear weapons [18:43] Will China change its nuclear declaratory policy[24:59] How China’s relationship with Russia could shape Beijing’s calculous [27:45] How the U.S. and its allies should respond  

Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and co-author of "The Idea of China," discusses the vital role of internal intellectual debates in shaping Chinese policies. She explores the emergence of 'China solutionists' and their task to address both domestic and international challenges under the Communist Party's constraints. The conversation also highlights the significance of understanding recent 'great changes' in China, as well as the country’s efforts to shift narratives from defensive to offensive on the global stage.

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.   Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:38] History of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation [03:56] FOCAC and Chinese Interests in Africa [06:46] Africa in China’s Hierarchy of Relationships[10:28] Sino-American Competition in the Global South [13:20] Takeaways from the Recent FOCAC Summit[18:27] Chinese Military Assistance in Africa[24:27] FOCAC Engagement with Non-Governmental Entities [27:52] African Perceptions of the Efficacy of FOCAC

New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest.A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference.To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy.  Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:46] Introduction to New Caledonia[04:20] China’s Interest and Involvement [07:22] Expansion of the International United Front [11:48] Manifestation Within New Caledonia[16:22] The Belt and Road Initiative in New Caledonia[21:34] Establishing Diplomatic Relations[25:29] China’s Relationship with France[28:29] Recommendations for Outside Powers and Others

Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews.Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is pushing and driving it" (114).Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order.  Timestamps[01:57] What questions was the book seeking to address? [04:29] What do observers get wrong about China’s foreign ministry? [08:22] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Policy Formulation[13:30] Characteristics of Chinese Diplomacy in Southeast Asia[16:50] Relationship Between the Chinese MFA and PLA [20:10] The Role of the International Liaison Department[22:22] Interview Example from Dylan’s Publication[25:04] Policy Implications and Lessons to be Learned[28:43] Changes Since the Publication of the Book[32:15] Predictions for the Future of the China MFA