The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines.In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia.  Timestamps[00:00] Start[02:31] Why is the South China Sea so important to China? [05:30] Has China overstepped in the South China Sea? [08:54] Reasons for Deepening Sino-Filipino Confrontation[12:05] Beijing’s Reaction to a Reinforced Second Thomas Shoal[13:30] Beijing’s Perception of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty[16:44] Miscalculating American Willingness to Intervene[21:32] Beijing-Manila Provisional Agreement [25:00] Chinese Deadline for the Philippines vis-à-vis the Second Thomas Shoal[27:38] Gauging the Risk of Escalation or Conflict[30:25] Stabilizing and Resolving the Second Thomas Shoal Issue

Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations.  Timestamps[01:39] Shifting Focus of the SCO[03:32] Enlargement of the SCO[05:25] SCO and China’s Foreign Policy[07:22] July 2024 SCO Summit[09:46] Implementation of Agreements[11:38] Sino-Russian Sideline Meeting[13:09] Sino-Russian Competition or Coordination[15:14] Sino-Belarussian Joint Military Drill[16:56] SCO and the War in Ukraine[19:04] Controversial Issues in the SCO[20:26] Tensions Between China and India[21:29] New SCO Member States[23:07] SCO and Chinese Institution Building [25:40] The impact of SCO: Why does it matter?

Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance.  Timestamps[02:00] What is quantum computing?[04:10] Quantum Computing in US-China Competition[05:58] American and Chinese Strengths and Weaknesses[09:36] Possibility of Working with Other Actors[11:56] Status of US-China Scientific Collaboration[14:30] Chinese Technological Self-Sufficiency[17:58] Building a Quantum Technology Supply Chain[22:05] Fostering a Quantum Technology Workforce[25:52] Key Variables of US-China Competition

On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism?To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington. Timestamps[01:18] Reestablishing the Trilateral Leadership Mechanism[06:14] Outcomes and Deliverables of the Trilateral Summit[10:37] 2019 Chengdu Denuclearization Agreement[13:38] China’s Import Ban on Japanese Seafood[18:07] China on US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation[23:58] Warming Russian-North Korean Relations[29:30] Would Xi Jinping express his concerns with Vladimir Putin?

Discusses China's crucial role in supporting Russia's economy through increased trade and energy purchases amidst Western sanctions. Explores the impact of sanctions on Russia and China, highlighting China's resilience in supplying goods to Russia. Analyzes China's economic retaliation strategies against the West and the potential limitations of China's economic support for Russia in the saturated market.

China’s rate of economic growth has slowed markedly in recent years. According to Chinese government statistics, the economy grew by 5.2% in 2023. There are numerous challenges: weak consumer confidence, mounting local government debt, and a real estate market that used to fuel the economy, but is now in a prolonged downturn.Many economists, including some in China, advocate that the government stimulate consumer spending. It is clear, however, that Xi Jinping is pursuing a different strategy. And this was quite clear when Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report last March.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tanner Greer, who argued in a recent article published in Foreign Policy and in his blog, The Scholar’s Stage, that Xi Jinping and the Politburo believe that science and technology are the answer to China’s problems. To quote from the article: “the central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” Tanner is the director of the Center for Strategic Translation. As a journalist and researcher, his writing focuses on world politics and history.  Timestamps[01:43] Historical Narrative Informing China’s Belief in Techno-Industrial Policy[03:47] How does China’s own history fit into this narrative?[06:36] Evidence that Xi Jinping Believes in a Technological Revolution[09:37] How does China assess the global balance of power?[12:26] Three Premises Behind China’s Techno-Industrial Drive[14:08] Influence of Intensifying US-China Technology Competition[17:12] Acceleration of New Quality Productive Forces[19:32] Skepticism of China’s Strategy[26:43] Chinese Intellectuals Writing on Techno-Industrial Policy

In the past few weeks, China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. Newsweek published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing.The Americas Quarterly reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica.And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China’s mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Leland Lazarus. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China. Editorial Correction: Regarding the statement on the price of Huawei's equipment, it is approximately 30% cheaper than Nokia or Ericcson, rather than one-third the price. Timestamps[02:30] China’s Interest in LAC Countries[04:44] Implementation of BRI in LAC Countries[07:23] China’s Investment in Energy Development[09:39] Huawei’s Penetration into LAC Countries[11:57] Role of Perú in Beijing’s Regional Strategy[14:56] China-LAC Cooperation in Space[20:56] Receptivity of China to LAC Countries[25:30] How should the US compete against China in LAC? 

The Biden administration maintains that China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and the power to do so. One part of China’s economic statecraft toolkit involves state-directed investments through high profile projects in the Belt and Road Initiative which are funded by loans through Chinese development banks. But the role and impact of Chinese companies that provide equity funding for FDI often receive less attention. Does Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) have illiberal effects on recipient countries. And is this goal part of China’s economic statecraft and foreign policy strategy.To address these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Jan Knoerich. He is the author on a chapter of Chinese FDI on the recent Oxford publication “Rising Power, Limited Influence”, a collection of essays on the effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Dr. Knoerich is a senior lecturer on the Chinese economy for the Lau China Institute at King’s College in London. He is an expert on the Chinese economy, FDI, and international investment law and policy.  Timestamps[01:38] Evolution of Chinese Foreign Investment Strategies[04:48] Chinese Firms Undertaking Foreign Direct Investment[09:16] Impacts of Chinese FDI: Five Dimensions [18:17] Reasons Why Chinese Firms are Viewed with Suspicion[21:06] Impacts of Chinese FDI Projects in Europe[24:59] Evidence of Chinese FDI Exerting Political Influence

When Hong Kong was handed over to China by the United Kingdom 1997, the city was given a mini-Constitution called the “Basic Law.” Article 23 of the Basic Law states that Hong Kong shall enact laws of its own to prohibit various national security offenses. The law did not pass, however, and was scrapped after mass protests in 2003. And in 2020, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a separate national security law on Hong Kong, citing the city’s delay in acting on Article 23. This year on March 19th, Article 23 was passed unanimously by the city’s parliament and it came into effect just days later. The law covers five types of crime: treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny, theft of state secrets, and espionage, sabotage, and external interference. Critics say that Article 23 could lead to even further erosions of civil liberties in Hong Kong.To discuss Article 23 and its implications, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eric Yan-ho Lai. Dr. Lai is a Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, an Associate Fellow at the Hong Kong Studies Hub of the University of Surrey, and a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network.  Timestamps[01:47] Understanding PRC Definitions Used in Article 23[03:37] Why was Article 23 passed now?[05:23] Compressed Timeline for Unanimous Approval[09:05] Shift in Risk Assessment for Multinational Corporations[12:03] Precedents for Targeting Diaspora Communities[14:17] Reactions to Article 23 from the International Community[15:54] What are some concrete actions that could be taken to signal concern?[17:55] Do the PRC and Hong Kong care about international perceptions?[19:36] Implementation of Article 23 Moving Forward[21:28] Passage of Additional Security Legislature[22:57] Forecast for the Future of Hong Kong     

In the past decade, policy toward China has hardened on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments and publics across Europe and in the United States view Xi Jinping as implementing more repressive policies domestically and more aggressive policies abroad. The US and most capitals in Europe see Beijing as seeking to revise the international order in ways that would be disadvantageous to democracies. They agree on the need for de-risking and to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, despite the alignment in transatlantic assessments, cooperation on China remains limited. A new paper by experts from Chatham House and RUSI, leading think tanks in the United Kingdom, analyzes why transatlantic mechanisms have made slow progress, focusing on three domains: economics; security; and the multilateral system and global norms. The paper also offers ways to strengthen cooperation going forward. The title of the report is “Transatlantic China Policy: In Search of an Endgame?” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by one of its authors, Ben Bland who is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics, and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition.  Timestamps[01:46] Why did you pursue this research on transatlantic mechanism?[03:24] Importance of Agreeing on an Endgame[06:30] Consensus and Divergence between the US and Europe[10:10] De-risking: One Word, Many Meanings [15:00] Transatlantic Discussions on European and Indo-Pacific Security[18:40] Can a regional division of labor strategy work?[22:13] China, the Multilateral System, and Global Norms[27:00] Tensions Between EU Multilateralism and Transatlantic Consensus[31:10] What are the next steps for Chatham House?