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Oct 7, 2019 • 1h 2min

[18-6135] Kahler v. Kansas

Kahler v. Kansas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2019.Decided on Mar 23, 2020. Petitioner: James K. Kahler.Respondent: Kansas. Advocates: Sarah Schrup (for the petitioner) Toby Crouse (for the respondent) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed. In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife’s grandmother’s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler’s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “completely lost control.” Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions.” The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Question May a state abolish the insanity defense without violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Yes; due process does not require Kansas to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his crime was morally wrong. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for a 6-3 majority of the Court. The Court acknowledged that for hundreds of years, judges have recognized that a criminal defendant’s insanity at the time of the commission of a criminal act can relieve criminal responsibility. And while the Kansas law at issue does make irrelevant the question of moral incapacity, it still permits mental illness as a defense to culpability if it prevented a defendant from forming the criminal intent required for commission of the crime. The Court has repeatedly declined to adopt one particular version of the insanity defense, and it declined to do so in this case, as well. No single version of the insanity defense has become so ingrained in American law as to be “fundamental,” and states retain the authority to define the precise relationship between criminal culpability and mental illness. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that Kansas did not merely redefine the insanity defense; it “eliminated the core” of a defense “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” He provided several hypotheticals to illustrate his point that Kansas’s version of the insanity defense “requires conviction of a broad swath of defendants who are obviously insane and would be adjudged not guilty under any traditional form of the defense.” As such, he would conclude that Kansas’s law violates a “fundamental precept of our criminal law” and thus is unconstitutional.
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Apr 24, 2019 • 54min

[18-489] Taggart v. Lorenzen

Taggart v. Lorenzen Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2019.Decided on Jun 3, 2019. Petitioner: Bradley Weston Taggart.Respondent: Shelley A. Lorenzen, et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the petitioner) Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, “[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.” Petitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman. Emmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC’s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys’ fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees. In November 2009, shortly before the case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings. After the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart’s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart’s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys’ fees, which led to yet more complicated litigation in state and federal courts. Brown, the attorney for Emmert and Jehnke, filed a petition for attorneys’ fees in state court on behalf of SPBC, Emmert, and Jehnke, against both Berman and Taggart, but limiting fees against Taggart to those incurred after the date of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge. The petition notified the court of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge but argued he could still be liable for attorneys’ fees on the theory that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” While the attorneys’ fee petition was pending in state court, Taggart sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court. Once reopened, Taggart asked the court to hold Brown, Jehnke, Emmert, and SPBC (collectively the “Creditors”) in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge by seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against him in the state court action. The state court ruled that Taggart had “returned to the fray” as a matter of law, so he could be held liable for attorneys’ fees incurred after his bankruptcy. Taggart timely appealed the state-court determination. Subsequently, the bankruptcy court denied Taggart’s motion for contempt, agreeing with the state court that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” On appeal, the district court reversed, finding that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus the discharge injunction barred the claim against him for attorneys’ fees. The district court remanded for a determination whether the Creditors had “knowingly violated the discharge injunction in seeking attorneys’ fees.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found they had knowingly violated the discharge injunction and thus held them in contempt. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) reversed the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt, finding they had a good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorneys’ fee claim. Back in state court, the state appellate court found that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus reversed the state trial court as to its ruling on attorneys’ fees. As a result, the federal district court and the state appellate court both agreed that the Creditors could not pursue attorneys’ fees against Taggart, and the BAP’s ruling freed them from being held in contempt for knowingly violating the discharge injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s opinion, holding that the Creditors did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction and thus could not be held in contempt because they had a subjective good-faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their state-court claim for attorneys’ fees. Question Does the bankruptcy code preclude a finding of civil contempt where a creditor’s believes in good faith that the discharge injunction does not apply? Conclusion The bankruptcy code allows a court to hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The bankruptcy code states that a discharge order “operates as an injunction” and that a court may issue any “order” or “judgment” that is “necessary or appropriate” to “carry out” other bankruptcy provisions. In other, non-bankruptcy contexts, the Court has held that civil contempt is inappropriate where there is “a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.” The Court found no reason that this principle should not apply equally in a bankruptcy context. Thus, civil contempt is appropriate only if the creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order. Because the Ninth Circuit below applied a different standard in determining whether civil contempt was appropriate, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.
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Apr 24, 2019 • 56min

[17-778] Quarles v. United States

Quarles v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2019.Decided on Jun 10, 2019. Petitioner: Jamar Alonzo Quarles.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeremy C. Marwell (for the petitioner) Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months’ incarceration. Under federal law, a generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles’s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent-upon-entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third-degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary. Question Does the generic definition of burglary, established by the US Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), require proof that intent to commit a crime was present at the time of unlawful entry or first unlawful remaining, or only that the defendant formed such intent while “remaining in” the building or structure? Conclusion The generic definition of burglary in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) includes, if state law permits it, any unlawful “remaining in” presence in a building or structure “when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court first looked to the ordinary usage of the phrase “remaining in,” finding that it refers to a continuous activity. Additionally, a majority of state burglary statutes encompassed the “remaining in” concept at the time the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was passed, and all five of the state appellate courts that had addressed the question of timing had embraced the “at any time” position. Finally, the Court considered the purpose of the ACCA—to require enhanced imprisonment terms for repeat “armed career criminals”—would be frustrated if the Court adopted the narrower interpretation requiring intent to be present at the time of the unlawful entry. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurrence to reiterate his view that the Court should revisit its “categorical approach” to the enumerated-offenses clause of the ACCA.
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Apr 23, 2019 • 1h 1min

[18-6210] Mitchell v. Wisconsin

Mitchell v. Wisconsin Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2019.Decided on Jun 27, 2019. Petitioner: Gerald P. Mitchell.Respondent: State of Wisconsin. Advocates: Andrew R. Hinkel (for the Petitioner) Hannah S. Jurss (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222. Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts. Mitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it. Question Does a statute that authorizes a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provide an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement? Conclusion A four-justice plurality of the Court concluded that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant. Justice Samuel Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion. Writing for himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Alito noted that blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment. As such, a warrant is generally required before police may conduct a BAC test, unless an exception applies. The “exigent circumstances” exception allows the government to conduct a search without a warrant “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” The Court has previously held that the fleeting nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone does not automatically qualify BAC tests for the exigent circumstances exception, but additional factors may bring it within the exception. For example, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that “the dissipation of BAC did justify a blood test of a drunk driver whose accident gave police other pressing duties, for then the further delay caused by a warrant application would indeed have threatened the destruction of evidence.” Similarly, a situation involving an unconscious driver gives rise to exigency because officials cannot conduct a breath test and must instead perform a blood test to determine BAC. Under the exigent circumstances exception, a warrantless search is allowed when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” The plurality pointed to three reasons such a “compelling need” exists: highway safety is a “vital public interest,” legal limits on BAC serve that interest, and enforcement of BAC limits requires a test accurate enough to stand up in court. The plurality suggested that on remand, Mitchell can attempt to show that his was an unusual case that fell outside the exigent circumstances exception (perhaps because police conceded that they had time to get a warrant to draw his blood). Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment but would have applied a per se rule under which “the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk, regardless of whether the driver is conscious.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plurality “needlessly casts aside the established protections of the warrant requirement in favor of a brand new presumption of exigent circumstances.” Established precedent should determine the outcome in this case: unless there is too little time to do so, police officers must get a warrant before ordering a blood draw. The dissent also argued that the state statute “cannot create actual and informed consent that the Fourth Amendment requires.”
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Apr 23, 2019 • 55min

[17-9560] Rehaif v. United States

Rehaif v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2019.Decided on Jun 21, 2019. Petitioner: Hamid Mohamed Rehaif.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Rosemary T. Cakmis (for the petitioner) Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased. A federal grand jury charged Rehaif with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both. At trial, the government requested a jury instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.” The government also requested the instruction that “[t]he alien’s status becomes unlawful upon the date of the status violation”; Rehaif requested instead the instruction that “[a] person admitted to the United States on a student visa does not become unlawfully present until an Immigration Officer or an Immigration judge determines that [he] ha[s] violated [his] student status.” The district court instructed the jury as requested by the government and overruled Rehaif’s objection. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, citing binding circuit precedent holding that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, as well as precedents from other circuits and lack of action by Congress to alter the law (suggesting the common judicial construction of the law was what Congress intended). Question Does the “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) apply to both the possession and status elements of a § 922(g) crime, or only to the possession element? Conclusion The “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) applies to both the possession and status elements of a § 922(g) crime, under which it is a criminal offense for a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” to possess “any firearm or ammunition.” That is, to convict a defendant of this crime, the government must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he belonged to the relevant class of persons when he possessed it. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. There is a longstanding presumption that “Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Courts apply this presumption of mental state, or “scienter,” even in the absence of any scienter in the statute. The text of § 924(a)(2) provides that “whoever knowingly violates” certain subsections “shall be” subject to certain penalties. Thus, using “ordinary English grammar,” the Court read the statutory term “knowingly” as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime. The Court found further support for its interpretation in the basic principle of criminal law that criminal intent separates wrongful from innocent acts. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Alito criticized the majority for manipulating the statutory text in an unnatural manner to apply the scienter requirement—“knowingly”—to the status element of the crime. Justice Alito argued that the Court has never inferred that Congress intended to impose a mental culpability requirement on an element that concerns the defendant’s own status and should not do so in this case.
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Apr 23, 2019 • 1h 22min

[18-966] Department of Commerce v. New York

Department of Commerce v. New York Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2019.Decided on Jun 27, 2019. Petitioner: United States Department of Commerce, et al..Respondent: State of New York, et al.. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for Petitioners) Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of Respondents, New York, et al.) Dale E. Ho (on behalf of Respondents, New York Immigration Coalition, et al.) Douglas N. Letter (on behalf of the United States House of Representatives, as amicus curiae, in support of the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could cause a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions. As part of its challenge, the challengers sought—and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized—depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross’s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue. On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government’s previous stay application without prejudice, “provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken.” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high-ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed. The government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact-finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below. Before the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction. Question Did the district court err in enjoining the Secretary of Commerce from reinstating a question about citizenship to the 2020 census questionnaire? In an action seeking to set aside agency action, may a district court order discovery outside the administrative record to probe the mental processes of the agency decision maker—including by compelling the testimony of high-ranking Executive Branch officials—when there is no evidence that the decision maker disbelieved the objective reasons in the administrative record, irreversibly prejudged the issue, or acted on a legally forbidden basis? Conclusion The Secretary of Commerce did not violate the Enumeration Clause or the Census Act in deciding to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 census questionnaire, but the District Court was warranted in remanding the case to the agency where the evidence tells a story that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the divided Court. As to the question of standing, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the district court’s finding that reinstating a citizenship question on the census would likely result in noncitizen households responding to the census at lower rates, causing them to be undercounted and subsequently to lose federal funds, constituted a concrete and imminent injury. Writing for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Enumeration Clause permits Congress, and by extension the Secretary of Commerce, to inquire about citizenship on the census questionnaire. In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted the “long and consistent historical practice” of Congress to exercise “broad authority” over the census. Then, the Chief Justice, writing for a 6-3 majority (Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan), held that the Secretary’s decision is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While The Census Act gives “broad authority” to the Secretary to administer the census, his discretion is not without limits. The APA exempts from judicial review agency actions that are discretionary, but “the taking of the census is not one of those areas.” Because the Census Act provides general requirements for agency decisionmaking, the Secretary’s decision is subject to judicial review. Writing for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion in deciding to reinstate the citizenship question. The Chief Justice noted that the Secretary conducted an analysis weighing the value of obtaining more complete and accurate citizenship data against the uncertain risk that reinstating a citizenship question would result in a lower response rate. Because his decision to reinstate the question was reasonable and reasonably explained, it was not “arbitrary and capricious.” Again writing for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Secretary did not violate the Census Act, reversing the district court’s ruling to the contrary. Section 6 of the Census Act authorizes the Secretary to acquire administrative records from other federal agencies and state and local governments and requires him to use that data rather than conducting direct inquiries, to the extent possible. Assuming that § 6 applied, the Chief Justice found that the Secretary complied with it for the same reasons he found the Secretary’s decision not “arbitrary and capricious”—that is, administrative records were insufficient to provide the requested citizenship data. Even if he had not complied with it, his decision would constitute harmless error because “he fully informed Congress of, and explained, his decision.” Finally, writing for himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Chief Justice affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the action to the agency. A court generally is limited to the existing administrative record, but it may inquire into “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers upon a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.” Although the district court was premature in invoking that exception, the Chief Justice agreed with its ultimate conclusion that the decision to reinstate a citizenship question “cannot adequately be explained.” The Chief Justice pointed to evidence “that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision,” and given these “unusual circumstances,” concluded that the district court correctly remanded the action to the agency. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas criticized the Court for its holding, in his characterization, that “the Secretary’s stated rationale did not factor at all into his decision.” Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the Secretary’s decision to add the citizenship question was arbitrary and capricious and therefore violated the APA, regardless of whether the decision was pretextual. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely criticizing the Court for getting involved in the policy question whether a citizenship question should be included on the census and whether the reasons given by the Secretary were his only reasons or his real reasons. He argued that the Court has “no authority to decide whether the Secretary’s decision was rendered in compliance with the . . . APA.”
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Apr 22, 2019 • 1h 2min

[18-481] Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media

Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2019.Decided on Jun 24, 2019. Petitioner: Food Marketing Institute.Respondent: Argus Leader Media, d/b/a Argus Media. Advocates: Evan A. Young (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of Petitioner) Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA. Argus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to the contested data, and remanded the case back to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4—which covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”—applied to the information sought. For the purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of “confidential” different from the term’s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the source of the information. There is a circuit split as to what “substantial competitive harm” means. The district court in this case adopted the definition from the DC Circuit, which has held that “competitive harm may be established if there is evidence of ‘actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury.’”  Appling that definition to the facts at hand, the court found speculative the USDA’s claims of competitive injury and entered judgment for Argus. The USDA decided not to appeal the judgment, so petitioner Food Marketing Institute (FMI) intervened and filed the appeal. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Question Does the statutory term “confidential” in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 4, bear its ordinary meaning? Or, if it does not, what constitutes “substantial competitive harm” for the purpose of determining whether information falls within FOIA Exemption 4? Conclusion Where commercial or financial information is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of privacy, the information is “confidential” within the meaning of Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court first looked to whether the Food Marketing Institute had standing to appeal. The Institute would suffer financial injury as a result of disclosure, such injury would be the direct consequence of a judgment ordering disclosure, and a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court in this case would redress that injury. As such, the Court concluded the Institute has standing. At the time FOIA was enacted, the term “confidential” meant “private” or “secret.” For information that is communicated from one party to another, that means that (1) the information is customarily kept private, and (2) the party receiving it has provided some assurance that it will remain private. In this case, it is uncontested that retailers customarily keep private the type of information at issue. Thus, under the plain meaning of the term, the information is “confidential.” In giving the word “confidential” a different meaning in National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the DC Circuit inappropriately relied on legislative history rather than first going to the statute’s text and structure. The concept of “substantial competitive harm” that the DC Circuit developed is based not on statutory language but on testimony of witnesses in congressional hearings on a different bill that was never enacted. Additionally, while true that courts should “narrowly construe” FOIA exemptions, courts cannot arbitrarily constrict Exemption 4 by adding limitations found nowhere in its text. Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer articulated a third condition for finding confidentiality in addition to the two described by the majority: “release of such information must cause genuine harm to the owner’s economic or business interests.” While Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the “substantial competitive harm” rule from the DC Circuit is unworkable, he argued that the majority incorrectly interpreted Exemption 4 as having no harm requirement whatsoever. According to Justice Breyer, “the language permits, and the purpose, precedent, and context all suggest, an interpretation that insists upon some showing of harm.”
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Apr 22, 2019 • 54min

[18-525] Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis

Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2019.Decided on Jun 3, 2019. Petitioner: Fort Bend County, Texas.Respondent: Lois M. Davis. Advocates: Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner) Raffi Melkonian (for the Respondent) Jonathan C. Bond (for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Lois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director’s resignation, her supervisor—who was a personal friend of the director—retaliated against her for making the complaint. Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “previous religious commitment,” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis submitted to the Commission an “intake questionnaire” in which she wrote in the word “religion” next to a checklist labeled “Employment Harms or Actions” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis’s religious discrimination claim with prejudice. Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement (which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived) or merely a prerequisite to suit (and thus subject to waiver). Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), in which the Court held that the Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Question Is Title VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, as three circuits have held, or a waivable claim-processing rule, as eight circuits have held? Conclusion Title VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is a waivable claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. Jurisdictional requirements are generally quite narrow and refer either to the classes of cases a court may hear (as in subject matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise its authority (personal jurisdiction). Claim-processing rules, in contrast, broadly require parties to take certain steps in or prior to litigation. The requirement in Title VII that the complainant exhaust all administrative remedies appears in provisions separate and distinct from the parts of that statute that confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear such claims. The administrative-exhaustion requirement is more similar to other types of rules that the Court has held nonjurisdictional, such as the directions to raise objections in an agency rulemaking procedure before asserting them in court or to follow copyright registration procedures before suing for infringement.
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Apr 17, 2019 • 59min

[18-485] McDonough v. Smith

McDonough v. Smith Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2019.Decided on Jun 20, 2019. Petitioner: Edward G. McDonough.Respondent: Youel Smith. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner) Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae) Thomas J. O'Connor (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) During the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged. After the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal on December 21, 2012. On December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim. The district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough’s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the precedent in that circuit established that the statute of limitations begins to run on a fabrication of evidence claim when the plaintiff has “reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” The Second Circuit acknowledged that Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held otherwise but expressly disagreed with those decisions. Question Was the Second Circuit correct in holding, contrary to the holdings of a majority of other circuits, that the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fabrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of the tainted evidence and its improper use? Conclusion Contrary to the holding of the Second Circuit, below, the statute of limitations for McDonough’s § 1983 fabricated evidence claim began to run when the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor—that is, when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The question of when a claim begins to accrue is presumptively when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. The claimed right here is a constitutional due process right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of a government official’s fabrication of evidence. To determine when accrual begins, the Court considered the analogous tort of malicious prosecution. Under common law, malicious prosecution accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, largely because (1) this policy for accrual avoids parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter (and the resulting possibility of conflicting judgments), and (2) it also avoids collateral civil attacks on criminal judgments. Both of these rationales hold true for McDonough’s fabricated-evidence claim and thus support applying the same accrual rule. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that because McDonough did not identify the specific constitutional right that was violated, the Court should have dismissed the case as improvidently granted.
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Apr 17, 2019 • 59min

[18-431] United States v. Davis

United States v. Davis Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2019.Decided on Jun 24, 2019. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover. Advocates: Eric J. Feigin (for the petitioner) Brandon E. Beck (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause. Question Is the subsection-specific definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)—which applies only in the limited context of a federal criminal prosecution for possessing, using or carrying a firearm in connection with acts comprising such a crime—unconstitutionally vague? Conclusion Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which provides enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a “crime of violence,” is unconstitutionally vague. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The Court recently decided two cases in which it was asked to interpret so-called residual clauses. In Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), the Court held that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. In Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court held that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16 was also unconstitutionally vague. In both of those cases, the Court interpreted the statute to require courts to use a “categorical approach” to determine “whether an offense qualified as a violent felony or crime of violence.” This categorical approach prevented judges from considering how the defendant actually committed the offense and weigh instead only the crime’s “ordinary case.” The residual clause at issue here is nearly identical to the one held to require a categorical approach in Dimaya, and the Court found no good reason to interpret it differently. The phrase “by its nature” compels the categorical approach, and to understand the nearly identical language of 18 U.S.C. § 16 differently would “make a hash of the federal criminal code.” The history of the statute, too, supports this interpretation of the clause, and the Court has never invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance, as the government advocated, to expand the reach of a criminal statute to save it. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, and in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined in part. The dissenters argued that the residual clause in this case is fundamentally different from those struck down in Johnson and Dimaya because those cases involved sentencing based on prior convictions, whereas this one focuses only on current conduct during the presently charged crime. Justices Kavanaugh and Alito (without the Chief Justice) also warned of the dire consequences of the Court’s decision.

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