[17-778] Quarles v. United States

Quarles v. United States

Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 24, 2019.
Decided on Jun 10, 2019.

Petitioner: Jamar Alonzo Quarles.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Jeremy C. Marwell (for the petitioner)
• Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months’ incarceration.

Under federal law, a generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles’s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent-upon-entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third-degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary.

Question

Does the generic definition of burglary, established by the US Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), require proof that intent to commit a crime was present at the time of unlawful entry or first unlawful remaining, or only that the defendant formed such intent while “remaining in” the building or structure?

Conclusion

The generic definition of burglary in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) includes, if state law permits it, any unlawful “remaining in” presence in a building or structure “when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.

The Court first looked to the ordinary usage of the phrase “remaining in,” finding that it refers to a continuous activity. Additionally, a majority of state burglary statutes encompassed the “remaining in” concept at the time the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was passed, and all five of the state appellate courts that had addressed the question of timing had embraced the “at any time” position. Finally, the Court considered the purpose of the ACCA—to require enhanced imprisonment terms for repeat “armed career criminals”—would be frustrated if the Court adopted the narrower interpretation requiring intent to be present at the time of the unlawful entry.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurrence to reiterate his view that the Court should revisit its “categorical approach” to the enumerated-offenses clause of the ACCA.