Supreme Court Oral Arguments

General Sauer, a senior government appellate advocate, discusses the complexities of presidential removal authority concerning Governor Cook's mortgage misrepresentations. Mr. Clement, representing Cook, argues for the independence of the Federal Reserve, highlighting the importance of procedural limits on removal. They delve into whether inadvertent errors constitute 'cause' for removal, the standards of judicial review, and the implications of their arguments on the separation of powers, all while the justices challenge and probe the nuances of the case.

In this discussion, Mr. Beck, an appellate counsel representing Jason Wolford, passionately argues that Hawaii's law unfairly limits Second Amendment rights by presuming a ban on carrying firearms on private property open to the public. Ms. Harris, representing the State of Hawaii, counters that the law aligns with historical practices and property rights. They debate the implications of consent rules, the historical context of carrying laws, and the balance between state authority and constitutional protections, offering a compelling insight into a key legal challenge.

In this discussion, Mr. Keneally, lead counsel for M & K Employee Solutions, champions the argument that actuarial assumptions should remain fixed at the valuation date. Mr. Roberts, representing the Trustees, counters by explaining that 'as of' allows for retrospective calculations and customary post-measurement adjustments. Mr. Barber supports these interpretations with insights on long-standing actuarial practices. The debate unpacks complex statutory interpretations and the implications of variable financial assumptions on employer liabilities.

In this discussion, Mr. Zuckerman, counsel for New Jersey Transit, highlights the agency's creation and legal powers, arguing it qualifies as an arm of the State of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity. He contrasts this with Mr. Kimberly, representing the petitioner Cedric Galette, who posits that NJ Transit is a separate entity, lacking such immunity. They explore crucial legal precedents, the implications of corporate status, and the delicate balance between state control and corporate independence, leading to a compelling debate on liability and sovereignty.

Little v. Hecox Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2026. Petitioner: Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, et al.Respondent: Lindsay Hecox, et al. Advocates: Alan M. Hurst (for the Petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Kathleen R. Hartnett (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2020, Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, which categorically barred transgender girls and women from participating on female athletic teams in public schools—from elementary school through college. Prior to the law’s passage, Idaho’s high school athletic association and the NCAA allowed transgender women to compete on women’s teams after a year of hormone therapy. At the time, there were no known instances of transgender girls competing in Idaho athletics under those existing rules. Nonetheless, Idaho lawmakers passed the Act, citing concerns about “fairness” and biological differences attributed to testosterone and other factors. The law allowed any individual to challenge a female athlete’s gender, triggering a mandatory medical verification process that could include analysis of reproductive anatomy, genetic make-up, or testosterone levels. Cisgender women, including those perceived as more masculine, could also be subjected to these checks. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and student at Boise State University who wished to join the women’s cross-country team, filed suit alongside a cisgender high school athlete known as Jane Doe. They alleged that the Act violated their constitutional rights, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hecox had undergone hormone therapy, significantly lowering her testosterone levels, but was still categorically excluded under the law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction blocking the law in August 2020, finding it likely unconstitutional. After several rounds of appeal and remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the injunction as applied to Hecox but remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the scope of the injunction, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Labrador v. Poe. Question May a state, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, categorically require sports participants to compete based on their biological sex, rather than gender identity?

West Virginia v. B.P.J. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2026. Petitioner: West Virginia, et al.Respondent: B. P. J., By Her Next Friend and Mother, Heather Jackson. Advocates: Michael R. Williams (for the Petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Joshua A. Block (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) B.P.J. is a transgender girl who has identified as female since the third grade. At the onset of puberty, B.P.J. began taking puberty blockers and estrogen for medical treatment of gender dysphoria, effectively halting male pubertal development and aligning her physical characteristics with those of cisgender girls. Since her social transition, B.P.J. has consistently lived as a girl at school and participated on girls’ athletic teams. In 2021, West Virginia enacted the “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which requires public school and collegiate sports teams to be designated based on “biological sex” and excludes individuals identified as male at birth from participating on female teams. This law, by its design and effect, prevented B.P.J. from continuing to compete on her school’s girls’ cross-country and track teams. Shortly after the Act took effect, B.P.J., through her mother, sued the West Virginia State Board of Education and other state and county education officials, as well as the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission. She alleged that excluding her from girls’ sports violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. The State of West Virginia intervened to defend the law. Initially, the district court granted B.P.J. a preliminary injunction, allowing her to participate on girls’ teams pending litigation. However, at summary judgment, the district court reversed course and upheld the law, concluding that the classification on the basis of “biological sex” was substantially related to the important government interest in ensuring fairness and opportunity in girls’ athletics. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied B.P.J.’s cross-motion, holding that the exclusion of B.P.J. from girls’ sports did not violate the Constitution or Title IX. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. It held that application of the law to B.P.J. violated Title IX and that factual disputes precluded summary judgment against her equal protection claim. Question Does Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause prohibit a state from assigning students to girls’ and boys’ sports teams based on their biological sex as determined at birth?

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 12, 2026. Petitioner: Chevron USA Incorporated.Respondent: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Aaron Z. Roper (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2013, several Louisiana coastal parishes—including Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish—filed lawsuits in state court against a consortium of oil and gas companies such as BP America Production Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Shell Oil Company, and others. The parishes, joined by Louisiana state agencies and officials, alleged the companies had violated Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA), which requires certain activities within the state’s designated “coastal zone” to comply with an environmental permitting system. Specifically, the parishes claimed the companies engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation in various “Operational Areas” along the Louisiana coast without securing the proper permits or by violating the conditions of the permits they did have. The complaints further alleged that pre-1980 activities (before SLCRMA’s effective date) were not “lawfully commenced,” and thus not exempt under the Act’s grandfather clause. The parishes seek wide-ranging remedies, including damages and restoration of affected coastal lands. The events at issue span decades, with the oil companies’ challenged operations beginning prior to SLCRMA and, in some cases, dating back to World War II. During the war, some defendant companies operated under federal government contracts to refine petroleum products for the war effort, and they argue that some of the crude oil produced in the disputed areas was used to fulfill those contracts. The parishes' claims, however, focus on whether the companies’ activities in the coastal zone were environmentally compliant under Louisiana law, regardless of any federal wartime contracts or regulations. After the initial filing in state court, the oil companies have tried multiple times to remove these cases to federal court, invoking various theories of federal jurisdiction, including the federal officer removal statute, based on their World War II-era federal contracts. Each time, the district courts ruled against removal and remanded the cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet the statutory requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the remand orders, and the companies now seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Question Can an oil company being sued in state court for its World War II-era oil production move its case to federal court simply because the oil was produced to meet federal government contracts for wartime fuel—even if the contract did not specifically direct how to produce the oil?

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2025. Petitioner: FS Credit Opportunities Corp.Respondent: Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners and BlackRock Respondents supporting the Petitioners) Max E. Schulman (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Saba Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Investment funds organized as closed-end mutual funds under Maryland law adopted “control share provisions” that stripped voting rights from shareholders who owned 10% or more of a fund’s shares. These provisions were adopted in response to activist investor Saba Capital, which had been acquiring large positions in underperforming closed-end funds with the goal of unlocking shareholder value through various strategies, including electing new directors and advocating for share buybacks. Saba Capital sued sixteen closed-end funds in June 2023, seeking rescission of these control share provisions. Saba argued that the provisions violated Section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which requires that “every share of stock shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding stock.” Saba brought its lawsuit under Section 47(b) of the ICA, relying on Second Circuit precedent that recognized an implied private right of action for parties seeking to rescind contracts that violate the ICA. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Saba against eleven of the funds (five were dismissed due to forum selection clauses requiring suit in Maryland). The district court held that the control share provisions violated the ICA’s equal voting rights mandate and ordered their rescission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision in a summary order. Question Does Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), create an implied private right of action?

Hamm v. Smith Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2025. Petitioner: John Q. Hamm, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections.Respondent: Joseph Clifton Smith. Advocates: Robert M. Overing (for the Petitioner) Harry Graver (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joseph Clifton Smith was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Alabama. Years later, Smith filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to overturn his death sentence on grounds that he is intellectually disabled and therefore cannot be executed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The central issue in Smith’s case involved determining whether he met the three-prong test for intellectual disability: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifestation of these qualities before age 18. Smith's IQ testing revealed multiple scores—72, 74, 75, 74, and 78—that fell within or near the range associated with intellectual disability when accounting for standard error of measurement. His experts testified that four of his five scores were consistent with mild intellectual disability, while the state’s expert, Dr. King, argued that Smith’s multiple scores placed him in the borderline range just above intellectual disability. After extensive evidentiary hearings featuring competing expert testimony about both Smith’s IQ scores and his adaptive functioning deficits, the district court found Smith intellectually disabled. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted Smith’s habeas petition and vacated his death sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case, asking the Eleventh Circuit to clarify whether its ruling relied solely on the lower end of Smith's IQ score range or on a holistic analysis of all evidence. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit explained that its reasoning was based on a holistic analysis. Question When a capital defendant has taken multiple IQ tests with varying results, how should courts evaluate the cumulative effect of those scores to determine whether the defendant has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning under Atkins v. Virginia?

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2025. Petitioner: National Republican Senatorial Committee.Respondent: Federal Election Commission. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the Respondents, supporting the Petitioners) Roman Martinez (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Marc E. Elias (for the Intervenors) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2022, two Republican party committees—the National Republican Senatorial Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee—along with then-Senator J.D. Vance and then-Representative Steve Chabot, sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The Republican committees asserted that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) unconstitutionally restricts their ability to coordinate campaign advertising with their own candidates. This coordination allows the party and its candidates to unify their political message and spend money more efficiently. For example, in the 2021-2022 election cycle, the senatorial committee spent about $15.5 million and the congressional committee spent about $8.3 million on such coordinated expenditures, which primarily fund political advertising. The plaintiffs argue that developments since a 2001 Supreme Court decision, FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), which upheld these same limits, have rendered that decision obsolete. Specifically, they point to changes in campaign finance law, the rise of “Super PACs,” and shifts in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as reasons the restrictions no longer pass constitutional muster. The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. As required by FECA for constitutional challenges, the district court certified the legal question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the FECA’s limits on coordinated campaign expenditures do not violate the First Amendment and denied both the facial and as-applied challenges brought by the plaintiffs. Question Do FECA limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with “party coordinated communications”?