Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 5, 2025. Petitioner: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.Respondent: Texas. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1300) Brad Fagg (for the Petitioner in No. 23-1312) David C. Frederick (for Respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.) Aaron L. Nielson (for Respondents Texas, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The United States has grappled with nuclear waste storage since the 1940s, initially from weapons development and later from commercial nuclear power. While spent nuclear fuel was originally intended to be reprocessed, this proved impractical, leading Congress to pass the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982. The Act designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the nation’s permanent underground repository and required the Department of Energy to begin accepting waste from states by 1998. However, amid strong opposition and delays, the Obama administration halted work on Yucca Mountain and established a Blue Ribbon Commission, which recommended a consent-based approach to siting storage facilities. Following that shift in policy, Waste Control Specialists (as Interim Storage Partners) applied to build a nuclear waste storage facility in Andrews County, Texas. Despite opposition from Texas's governor and legislature, which passed a law prohibiting such storage, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a license in September 2021. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the license, holding that neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the Nuclear Waste Policy Act authorized the Commission to license private interim storage facilities. Question 1. Can a nonparty challenge a federal agency’s “final order” under the Hobbs Act’s judicial review provision?  2. Do federal nuclear laws allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private companies to store spent nuclear fuel at off-reactor sites?

Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 4, 2025. Petitioner: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc.Respondent: Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners) Catherine E. Stetson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Mexican government sued several U.S. gun manufacturers in federal court, alleging their practices facilitated illegal gun trafficking to Mexican drug cartels, causing harm to Mexico. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was barred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which prohibits certain lawsuits against gun manufacturers. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the PLCAA applied and barred Mexico's claims. Mexico appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that while the PLCAA does apply to lawsuits by foreign governments for harm suffered abroad, Mexico’s lawsuit falls within the statute’s “predicate exception” for claims alleging knowing violations of laws applicable to gun sales. The court found Mexico adequately alleged that the defendants aided and abetted illegal gun trafficking in violation of U.S. laws, and that this proximately caused harm to Mexico. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the causal chain was too attenuated, finding Mexico plausibly alleged direct harm from having to combat well-armed cartels. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Mexico's lawsuit to move forward. Question Can U.S. gun manufacturers be held liable for violence in Mexico under theories of proximate causation and aiding and abetting, based on their domestic production and sale of firearms that are later trafficked to Mexican cartels?

CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2025. Petitioner: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited.Respondent: Antrix Corp. Ltd. Advocates: Aaron M. Streett (for the Petitioner in No. 24-17) Matthew D. McGill (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1201) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves an agreement between two Indian corporations, Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. and Antrix Corp. Ltd. After a dispute arose, Devas obtained an arbitration award from the International Chamber of Commerce against Antrix. Devas then sought to confirm this award in a U.S. district court. Antrix challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction, but the district court confirmed the award, concluding that a minimum contacts analysis was unnecessary under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Antrix appealed the confirmation order, arguing that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction without conducting a minimum contacts analysis. Meanwhile, a group of intervenors, including CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. and others, moved to register the judgment in the Eastern District of Virginia. Both Antrix and Devas challenged this registration order. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plaintiff must prove minimum contacts, and its failure to do so meant it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Antrix. Question Must plaintiffs prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2025. Petitioner: BLOM Bank SAL.Respondent: Michal Honickman. Advocates: Michael H. McGinley (for the Petitioner) Michael J. Radine (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves victims and family members of HAMAS terrorist attacks who sued BLOM Bank SAL for allegedly aiding HAMAS by providing financial services to customers affiliated with the terrorist organization. The plaintiffs brought their case under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), claiming BLOM Bank was liable for aiding and abetting terrorism through these financial services. The plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in January 2019, which the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but clarified that the district court had applied the wrong legal standard for aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA. The plaintiffs then returned to the district court and moved to vacate the dismissal and amend their complaint. The district court denied their motion, and the Second Circuit concluded that the district court had erred by not properly balancing the competing principles of judgment finality (Rule 60(b)) and liberal pleading standards (Rule 15(a)). Question Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)’s stringent standard apply to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint?

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2025. Petitioner: Marlean A. Ames.Respondent: Ohio Department of Youth Services. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioner) Ashley Robertson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) T. Elliot Gaiser (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Ohio Department of Youth Services hired Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, in 2004 and promoted her to Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) in 2014. In 2017, Ames was assigned a new supervisor, Ginine Trim, who is gay. Trim reported to Assistant Director Julie Walburn, and in 2019, Ryan Gies was appointed as the Department's Director. Both Walburn and Gies are heterosexual. In December 2018, Trim gave Ames a generally positive performance evaluation. In April 2019, Ames applied for the position of Bureau Chief of Quality but was not selected. Shortly after, Trim suggested that Ames consider retirement. On May 10, 2019, Ames was demoted from her PREA Administrator position, resulting in a significant pay cut. The Department then promoted Alexander Stojsavljevic, a 25-year-old gay man, to the PREA Administrator position. Later that year, Yolanda Frierson, a gay woman, was chosen as Bureau Chief of Quality. Following these events, Ames filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then sued the Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation and sex. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, holding that Ames lacked evidence of “background circumstances” necessary to establishing her prima facie case for her claim based on sexual orientation, and that Ames lacked evidence of pretext for purposes of her sex-discrimination claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a plaintiff who belongs to a majority group need to demonstrate “background circumstances suggesting that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Esteras v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2025. Petitioner: Edgardo Esteras.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Christian J. Grostic (for the Petitioner) Masha G. Hansford (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In January 2020, Edgardo Esteras began a six-year term of supervised release following imprisonment for drug trafficking offenses. Three years into his supervised release, in January 2023, his probation officer reported violations including domestic violence and firearm possession, though the related criminal charges were dismissed at the victim's request. At a violation hearing, Judge Pearson found that Esteras had possessed a firearm while on supervised release. Concerned that previous sentences had failed to deter him, she imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release with special conditions including anger management and location monitoring. Though Esteras objected to the court’s consideration of certain statutory factors related to punishment, Judge Pearson maintained that she also weighed deterrence and public safety, while acknowledging that some supervision conditions had both punitive and rehabilitative aspects. On appeal, Esteras challenged his sentence on the ground that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question When revoking supervised release and imposing a prison sentence, may a district court consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—namely, “the seriousness of the offense,” “promot[ing] respect for the law,” and “just punishment”—even though these factors are not explicitly referenced in the supervised release statute?

Perttu v. Richards Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2025. Petitioner: Thomas Perttu.Respondent: Kyle Brandon Richards. Advocates: Ann M. Sherman (for the Petitioner) Lori Alvino McGill (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Richards, an inmate at Michigan’s Baraga Correctional Facility, sued Resident Unit Manager Thomas Perttu for sexual harassment and retaliation. Richards alleged that Perttu destroyed multiple grievances he attempted to file regarding Perttu's sexual abuse. Additionally, Richards claimed Perttu threatened to kill him if he continued trying to file grievances and wrongfully placed him in administrative segregation. After Perttu moved for summary judgment arguing the inmates failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and Richards cross-moved raising constitutional claims, the district court denied both motions due to factual disputes. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and recommended finding that Perttu proved the inmates failed to exhaust remedies. The district court adopted this recommendation and dismissed the case. Richards appealed, and after requesting supplemental briefing on whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury for exhaustion disputes intertwined with case merits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that it does and reversed the judgment of the district court. Question In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

Gutierrez v. Saenz Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2025. Petitioner: Ruben Gutierrez.Respondent: Luis Saenz. Advocates: Anne E. Fisher (for the Petitioner) William F. Cole (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1998, Ruben Gutierrez was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the robbery and killing of Escolastica Harrison. After multiple appeals and habeas corpus petitions, Gutierrez sought DNA testing of evidence from the crime scene under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 64. Texas courts repeatedly denied his requests, in part because Chapter 64 does not authorize testing when exculpatory results might only affect punishment or sentencing. In 2019, Gutierrez filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cameron County District Attorney Luis V. Saenz and others challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures. Gutierrez argued that Chapter 64 improperly limited the rights granted in another Texas statute (Article 11.071) governing successive habeas applications for death row inmates. The district court agreed, ruling that the interaction between these laws violated procedural due process by making the right to bring a successive habeas application to claim innocence of the death penalty “illusory.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Gutierrez had no standing to make this claim and vacated the district court’s judgment. Question Does a Texas death-row inmate have standing to sue the state over its refusal to grant access to DNA testing under a law that allows such testing only when the person can demonstrate that exculpatory results would have prevented their conviction?

Cunningham v. Cornell University Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Casey Cunningham.Respondent: Cornell University. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioners) Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Cornell University administered two retirement plans for its employees: the Retirement Plan and the TDA Plan. As of 2016, these defined-contribution plans had over 30,000 participants and nearly $3.4 billion in combined net assets. Cornell delegated administrative responsibilities to its Vice President for Human Resources and established the Retirement Plan Oversight Committee (RPOC) to oversee the plans. The plans offered approximately 300 investment options and incurred investment management and recordkeeping fees, with TIAA-CREF and Fidelity Investments serving as both investment providers and recordkeepers. Plaintiffs, representing a class of plan beneficiaries, sued Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries in federal district court, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), including failure to adequately monitor the plans, resulting in the retention of underperforming investment options and excessive fees, as well as engaging in prohibited transactions under 29 U.S.C. § 1106. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims, and the parties reached a settlement on the remaining claim before the court entered final judgment. The plaintiffs challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment on two counts, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court. Question Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA’s provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?

Barnes v. Felix Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Janice Hughes Barnes.Respondent: Roberto Felix, Jr. Advocates: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Charles L. McCloud (for the Respondents) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, supporting Respondent Felix) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix Jr. fatally shot Ashtian Barnes during a traffic stop on the Harris County Tollway. After spotting Barnes’s Toyota Corolla, which had been flagged for toll violations, Felix initiated a stop and Barnes pulled over to the median. When Felix requested documentation, Barnes, who was driving a car rented in his girlfriend’s name, could not produce it and began “digging around” in the car. Claiming he smelled marijuana, Felix questioned Barnes, who then turned off the vehicle and suggested checking the trunk for documentation. Dash cam footage shows that after Barnes opened the trunk and exited the vehicle at Felix’s request, the car’s blinker came back on and the vehicle began to move. Felix, with his weapon drawn, stepped onto the moving car and pressed his gun against Barnes’s head. While holding onto the car frame with his head above the roof—leaving him unable to see inside the vehicle—Felix fired two shots. Barnes’s vehicle stopped, and he was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:57 p.m. Though both the Houston Police Department and Harris County Precinct 5 Constable's Office investigated the incident, a grand jury found no probable cause for an indictment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, focusing exclusively on the two seconds before the shooting when Barnes’s car began moving with Felix holding onto it. The court ruled that because Felix reasonably feared for his life in that moment, his use of deadly force was justified regardless of his previous actions, such as jumping onto the moving vehicle. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?