Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 16, 2019.Decided on Jun 10, 2019. Petitioner: Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd..Respondent: Brian Newton. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (for the Unted States, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioner) David C. Frederick (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Respondent Brian Newton worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California’s laws offered Newton no protections. A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal on the pleadings, finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is “applicable” and “not inconsistent” with federal law. California’s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims. Question Does the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act permit the application of state law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law, or whenever state law pertains to the subject matter of the lawsuit and is not preempted by inconsistent federal law? Conclusion The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) permits the application of state law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law; if federal law addresses the issue, state law is inapplicable. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The OCSLA extends “the Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States” to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) “to the same extent as if” the OCS were “an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.” Further, the OCSLA commands that state laws be adopted as federal law on the OCS “to the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” other federal law. Newton argued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that state law is “applicable” whenever it pertains to the subject matter at issue, and it is “inconsistent” only if it is incompatible with the federal scheme—that is, only if it would be preempted under the Court’s ordinary preemption principles. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, favoring instead Parker’s argument that state law is “applicable” only if there is a gap in federal law that needs to be filled and that state law may be “inconsistent” with federal law even if it is possible for a party to satisfy both sets of laws. For example, although the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) generally gives way to more protective state wage-and-hour laws, such state laws are inconsistent with the FLSA when adopting them as surrogate federal law would produce two different standards. The Court found this approach to preemption more persuasive because the two terms “applicable” and “not inconsistent” must be read together and interpreted “in light of the entire statute.” Under this standard, some of Newton’s claims fail for relying on California law rather than federal law. The Court remanded the remaining claims for further consideration in light of this standard.

North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 16, 2019.Decided on Jun 21, 2019. Petitioner: North Carolina Department of Revenue.Respondent: The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust. Advocates: Matthew W. Sawchak (for the petitioner) David A. O'Neil (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice’s descendants as the primary beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice’s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“the Trust”), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed. The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “minimum contacts” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non-contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed. Question Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit states from taxing trusts based on trust beneficiaries’ in-state residency? Conclusion The Due Process Clause prohibits a state from taxing trust income based solely on its beneficiaries' in-state residency. If the income has not been distributed to the beneficiaries and the beneficiaries have no right to demand that income and are uncertain to receive it, the state has no power to tax the trust income. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Due Process Clause permits a state to collect taxes only if there is “some definite link, or some minimum connection” between the state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax. The crux of this question is whether the government’s taxation action is reasonable. In the context of a trust beneficiary, the answer turns on the extent to which the beneficiary controls or possesses the property to be taxed and the relationship of that property to the state. The trust income income at issue in this case does not meet the minimum connection necessary to support the state tax because the beneficiaries did not actually receive any income from the trust during the years in question, nor could they exercise control over it. Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito emphasized that the opinion in this case merely applies existing precedent and leaves unchanged the governing standard and the reasoning applied in earlier cases.

Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2019.Decided on Apr 23, 2019. Petitioner: Emulex Corporation, et al..Respondent: Gary Varjabedian and Jerry Mutza. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the petitioners) Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae) Daniel L. Geyser (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Emulex Corp., a Delaware company that sold computer components, and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc., announced in February 2015 that they had entered into a merger agreement, with Avago offering to pay $8.00 for every share of outstanding Emulex stock, which was 26.4% higher than the value of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Emerald Merger Sub, Inc., initiated a tender offer for Emulex’s outstanding stock in April 2015. (A tender offer is a type of takeover bid in which the offeror publicly offers to purchase a specified amount of the target company’s stock, usually at a price higher than market value.) It is customary for the target company to issue a statement to shareholders recommending that they either accept or reject the tender offer. Before issuing such a statement, Emulex hired Goldman Sachs to determine whether the proposed merger agreement would be fair to shareholders. Goldman Sachs determined that it would be fair, despite a below-average merger premium, and Emulex issued a statement consistent with that determination. Some of the shareholders were unhappy with the merger’s terms and brought a class action lawsuit against Emulex, Avago, Merger Sub, and the Emulex Board of Directors, alleging violations of federal securities laws. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the lead plaintiff’s claim under Section 14(e) did not plead the requisite mental culpability for claims under that section, the separate claim under Section 14(d) failed because that section does not establish a private right of action for shareholders confronted with a tender offer, and its Section 20(a) claim because its first two claims were insufficient. Reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision as to the Section 14(e) claim (but affirmed as to the Section 14(d) claim). Citing the US Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the five other circuits that have interpreted Section 14(e). Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, claims under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) require a showing of negligence, not scienter (intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). Question Did the Ninth Circuit correctly hold, in contrast to the holdings of five other federal appellate courts, that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on the negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer? Conclusion The writ was dismissed as improvidently granted.

Iancu v. Brunetti Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2019.Decided on Jun 24, 2019. Petitioner: Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office.Respondent: Erik Brunetti. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the petitioner) John R. Sommer (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “fuct,” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter (the pronunciation of “fuct” sounds like a vulgar word) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, that section’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. Question Does Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion The Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks infringes the First Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. In Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. __ (2017), the Court held that a prohibition on registration of marks based on their viewpoint violates the First Amendment, and that a provision of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of “disparaging” marks was viewpoint based. A prohibition on the registration of marks that are “immoral” or “scandalous”—at issue in this case—is similarly viewpoint based and therefore violates the First Amendment. The prohibition distinguishes between ideas aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to them, which is the epitome of viewpoint-based discrimination. The Court rejected the government’s proposal that the statute is susceptible to a limiting construction that would remove its viewpoint bias. The language of the statute does not support such a reading and to interpret it as such would be to “fashion a new one.” Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence to highlight the importance of the Court continuing to affirm the principle that the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination. Justice Alito noted that Congress can adopt “a more carefully focused statute” that would prohibit the registration of “vulgar” marks without violating the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Chief Justice argued that while he agreed with the majority that the “immoral” portion of the statute was not susceptible to a narrowing construction but agreed with Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s argument in favor of such a construction with respect to the “scandalous” portion. Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed with the majority as to “immoral” but disagreed as to “scandalous.” Justice Breyer advocated against the categorical approach to First Amendment speech issues and for an approach that considers “whether the regulation at issue works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”  Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Breyer joined. While Justice Sotomayor conceded that the majority’s construction of the statute is a reasonable one, it is not the only reasonable one and erroneously treats “immoral and scandalous” as a “unified standard.” She argued for a narrowing construction of the prohibition on “scandalous” marks to address only “obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.” Such a construction would save the provision and avoid the “rush to register [vulgar, profine, and obscene] trademarks” that the Court’s decision makes probable.

Kisor v. Wilkie Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2019.Decided on Jun 26, 2019. Petitioner: James L. Kisor.Respondent: Robert L. Wilkie. Advocates: Paul W. Hughes (for the petitioner) Noel J. Francisco (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to “reopen” a denial by “submitting new and material evidence.” In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were not associated with his file. Notably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to “reconsider” a previously denied claim in the event that it “receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed. The VA’s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The VA found that the additional documents (Kisor’s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as “relevant” for purposes of this section because it did not “suggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.” In the VA’s view, records are not “relevant” when they are not “outcome determinative.” Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed as well. Question Should Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), be overruled? Conclusion Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)—which direct courts to give deference to an agency’s reasonable reading of its own genuinely ambiguous regulations—are not overruled. Justice Elena Kagan announced the judgment and delivered an opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined.  Chief Justice Roberts joined in part, forming a majority of the Court for those parts. Justice Kagan, writing for the 5-4 majority, first described the history of the case before it arrived before the Court. Then, writing for a four-justice plurality, she described other examples of ambiguous regulations and explained the history of the doctrine of Auer deference. She explained that Auer deference is “rooted in a presumption that Congress would generally want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory ambiguities” because agencies are best equipped to interpret the often-technical regulations at issue. Writing again for the majority, Kagan continued to outline the requirements that must be met for Auer deference to apply: First, a court should not afford an agency Auer deference unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, a determination the court can make only after it has exhausted all the traditional tools of construction. Second, the agency’s reading must be reasonable, under the text, structure, and history of the regulation. Notwithstanding some courts’ interpretation to the contrary, the language “plainly erroneous” from Seminole Rock does not mean that agency constructions of rules are entitled to greater deference than agency constructions of statutes. Third, the regulatory interpretation must be one actually made by the agency; that is, it must be the agency’s authoritative or official position, not merely an ad hoc statement. Fourth, the interpretation must in some way implicate the agency’s substantive expertise, and fifth, it must reflect “fair and considered judgment.” On behalf of the plurality, Kagan went on to address Kisor’s arguments. She explained that Auer is not inconsistent with the judicial review provision of the APA, nor does it circumvent the APA’s rulemaking requirements. Contrary to Kisor’s arguments, Kagan cited empirical evidence to support her position that Auer does not encourage agencies to issue vague and open-ended interpretations of those rules they prefer. Finally, she quickly dispensed of Kisor’s argument that it violates separation-of-powers principles. On behalf of the majority, Kagan wrote that the doctrine of stare decisis cuts strongly against Kisor’s position. There is no “special justification” to reverse Auer, and even if the Court were wrong about its presumption of what Congress would want, Congress can correct it. Applying the principles outlined in the opinion, a redo is necessary for two reasons: The Federal Circuit “jumped the gun” in declaring the regulation ambiguous, and it also “assumed too fast” that Auer deference should apply in the event of genuine ambiguity. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurrence in part to reiterate Justice Kagan’s assertion that overturning Auer and Seminole Rock was not warranted. He also noted that the cases in which Auer deference is appropriate largely overlap with cases in which it would be unreasonable for a court to be persuaded by an agency's interpretation of its own regulation. He pointed out that the gulf between the majority’s position and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is not so great as it may initially appear. Justice Neil Gorsuch penned a separate opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined and Justice Samuel Alito joined in part, concurring in the judgment but highly critical of Justice Kagan’s opinion. On behalf of himself and three other justices, Justice Gorsuch wrote a history of Auer deference, describing the decision and resulting doctrine “an accident.” He went on to explain that Auer is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and the separation of powers principle. On behalf of himself and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch responded to Justice Kagan’s public policy considerations and argued that while the majority gave lip service to stare decisis, it effectively changed the test set forth in precedents—which effectively overrules it in all but name. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. In his opinion, Justice Kavanaugh emphasizes two points: first, he reiterates the Chief Justice’s point that “the distance between” the two main opinions in this case “is not as great as it may initially appear,” and second, he expresses agreement with the Chief Justice that the decision in this case addresses only judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations, and not at all judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes.

Rucho v. Common Cause Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2019.Decided on Jun 27, 2019. Appellant: Robert A. Rucho, et al..Appellee: Common Cause, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the appellants) Emmet J. Bondurant, II (for the appellees, Common Cause, et al.) Allison J. Riggs (for the appellees, League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Question Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to pursue their partisan gerrymandering claims? Are the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable? Is North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander? Conclusion Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the Court for sidestepping a critical question involving the violation of “the most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” Justice Kagan argued that by not intervening in the political gerrymanders, the Court effectively “encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction” that “may irreparably damage our system of government.” She argued that the standards adopted in lower courts across the country do meet the contours of the “limited and precise standard” the majority demanded yet purported not to find. This case was consolidated with Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-726, and the Court released a single opinion resolving both cases.

Lamone v. Benisek Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2019.Decided on Jun 27, 2019. Appellant: Linda H. Lamone, et al..Appellee: O. John Benisek, et al.. Advocates: Steven M. Sullivan (for the appellant) Michael B. Kimberly (for the appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes before the Supreme Court. In Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. __ (2018), the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court’s decision under a lenient standard—abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court’s ruling (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable. After the Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. __ (2018)—holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering—the district court in the Maryland case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court. Question Are the various legal claims articulated by the three-judge district court unmanageable? Did the three-judge district court err in granting the plaintffs’ motion for summary judgment? Did the three-judge district court abuse its discretion in entering an injunction despite the plaintiffs’ years-long delay in seeking injunctive relief? Conclusion Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion (consolidated under Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422). Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the Court for sidestepping a critical question involving the violation of “the most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” Justice Kagan argued that by not intervening in the political gerrymanders, the Court effectively “encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction” that “may irreparably damage our system of government.” She argued that the standards adopted in lower courts across the country do meet the contours of the “limited and precise standard” the majority demanded yet purported not to find.

PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2019.Decided on Jun 20, 2019. Petitioner: PDR Network, LLC, et al..Respondent: Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.. Advocates: Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners) Glenn L. Hara (for the respondent) Rachel P. Kovner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner PDR Network is a company that “delivers health knowledge products and services” to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the Physicians’ Desk Reference, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network sent by fax to Carlton & Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 Physicians’ Desk Reference. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer “because you are a member of the PDR Network.” On behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton & Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send “unsolicited advertisement[s].” Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender “willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages. As a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of “unsolicited advertisement” for the FCC’s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (“2006 FCC Rule”), the court found that PDR Network’s fax was not an unsolicited advertisement because it lacked a “commercial aim.” Moreover, the court found that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, the fax would not be an “unsolicited advertisement.” For this reason, the district court granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss. Carlton & Harris appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that the Hobbs Act disallows district courts from considering the validity of orders like the 2006 FCC Rule, and that the district court’s interpretation of the rule is at odds with the plain meaning of its text. Question Does the Hobbs Act require the district court in this case to accept the Federal Communication Commission's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act? Conclusion The extent to which a 2006 order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is binding on a district court turns on two preliminary questions: (1) whether the order is the equivalent of a “legislative rule” with the “force and effect of law”; and (2) whether the subject of the rule (in this case, PDR Network) had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the order. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court that was unanimous in its judgment. Whether an agency’s order is binding on courts depends on two preliminary considerations. First, the order must be equivalent to a “legislative rule” with the “force and effect of law,” as opposed to an “interpretive rule,” which merely “advises the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” Second, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency action be subject to judicial review except “to the extent that a prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law.” The Hobbs Act requires certain challenges to FCC final orders to be brought in a court of appeals, so a court should determine whether this provision afforded PDR Network a prior and adequate opportunity for judicial review. The Court declined to resolve these questions, instead vacating the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanding for consideration of these preliminary questions. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas’s concurrence highlights, in his view, the Court’s mistaken understanding of the relationship between federal statutes and the agency orders interpreting them. Justice Thomas argues that federal courts cannot disregard the text of the governing statute when considering whether or not to treat agency orders as controlling law. Justice Brett Kavanaugh concurred in the judgment, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Kavanaugh criticizes the majority for answering a question other than the one presented in this case. Rather than resolving a different question, Justice Kavanaugh would conclude that the Hobbs Act does not bar a defendant in an enforcement action from arguing that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is wrong. He suggests that the Fourth Circuit on remand (and other courts, when the issue arises) can employ the analysis set forth in his separate concurrence.

The Dutra Group v. Batterton Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2019.Decided on Jun 24, 2019. Petitioner: The Dutra Group.Respondent: Christopher Batterton. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner) David C. Frederick (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Respondent Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a vessel owned and operated by the the petitioner, Dutra Group. While Batterton was working on the vessel, a hatch cover blew open and crushed his hand. The hatch cover blew open because the vessel lacked a particular exhaust mechanism, the lack of which made the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law. The district court denied Dutra Group’s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  In Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that “punitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness,” as distinguished from Jones Act claims, where punitive damages are unavailable. Dutra Group argues that Evich is implicitly overruled by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), which holds that loss of society damages are unavailable in a general maritime action for wrongful death and lost future earnings are unavailable in a general maritime survival action. The Ninth Circuit found unpersuasive Dutra Group’s argument, finding that the Court in Miles considered only damages for loss of society and of future earnings, not punitive damages. While Miles does limit recovery for “pecuniary loss,” punitive damages are not “pecuniary loss,” which means simply loss of money. Thus, Miles left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Evich. Question Are punitive damages available to a seaman in a personal injury lawsuit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel? Conclusion A plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a maritime claim of unseaworthiness. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court first needed to reconcile two seemingly conflicting precedents. In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the Court held that non-economic damages were unavailable in a general maritime-law wrongful death action because such relief was unavailable under the Jones Act. But in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), the Court held under maritime law that a plaintiff may seek punitive damages for an employer’s willful and wanton disregard of its obligation to pay maintenance and cure. The Court distinguished Atlantic Sounding based on the finding in that case that there was significant “historical evidence” that punitive damages had been available in maintenance-and-cure cases. In contrast, punitive damages were unavailable under the Jones Act, and there was “overwhelming historical evidence” that punitive damages were unavailable in general maritime-law unseaworthiness actions for personal injuries. The Court found “practically dispositive” the absence of recovery of punitive damages in maritime cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Ginsburg argued that by default, punitive damages are available in maritime cases, and Miles exemplified the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, the Jones Act had expanded the remedies available to seamen and did not bar punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions.

Flowers v. Mississippi Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2019.Decided on Jun 21, 2019. Petitioner: Curtis Giovanni Flowers.Respondent: State of Mississippi. Advocates: Sheri Lynn Johnson (for the petitioner) Jason Davis (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers’s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the guilt phase. In the sixth trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders. Flowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers’s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), where it held that the defendant in a capital case had shown intentional discrimination in the selection of jurors. On remand to the state supreme court, the court again upheld the ruling for the state. Flowers again sought review by the US Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari as to the question whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986). Question Did the Mississippi Supreme Court err in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky in this case? Conclusion The trial court at Flowers’s sixth murder trial committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of a particular black prospective juror was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion. Under Batson v. Kentucky, once the defendant has made a prima facie case of discrimination, the State must provide race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. The trial court judge must then determine whether the provided reasons actually motivated the peremptory strikes or instead were simply pretext for unlawful race discrimination. The Court found four categories of evidence present in Flowers’s sixth trial that the State’s peremptory strike of one juror in particular—Carolyn Wright—was based on racial discrimination. First, the Court found that the State’s history of peremptory strikes in Flowers’s first four trials strongly supported the conclusion that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in his sixth trial was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. The State appeared “relentless” in trying to strike all black jurors to have an all-white jury try Flowers. Second, the Court noted that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in the sixth trial followed the same pattern as in the first four trials. Third, the Court observed that the State spent far more time questioning the black prospective jurors than the accepted white jurors—an indicator (though not dispositive) of discriminatory intent. Fourth and finally, the Court found significant differences between the jurors who were struck and not struck. The State asked extensive questions of Carolyn Wright, a black juror who was struck, about her knowledge of the facts, witnesses, and Flowers’s family, but did not ask three white prospective jurors about their comparable connections to witnesses. The Court found these four factors, plus the overall context to support the determination that the trial court had committed clear error in concluding the State’s peremptory strike was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full but filed a concurring opinion to note how extraordinary the circumstances in this case are and that although he agrees with the Court’s judgment here, he would be disinclined to do so in the majority of cases that are “less unusual” in their facts. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissent in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, criticizing the majority for ignoring the race-neutral reasons the State gave for striking Carolyn Wright. Both Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court should not have even granted the case, but having done so, it decided wrongly on the merits. Justice Thomas (alone) criticized Batson, arguing that it “requires that a duly convicted criminal go free because a juror was arguably deprived of his right to serve on the jury.”