Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Barton v. Barr Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2019.Decided on Apr 23, 2020. Petitioner: Andre Martello Barton.Respondent: William P. Barr, Attorney General. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the petitioner) Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.” Question Can a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States be “render[ed] . . . inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)? Conclusion A lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime during the initial seven years of residence attains “inadmissible” status for the purposes of the stop-time rule, regardless of whether he is seeking admission, and thus is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a 5-4 majority of the Court. Looking at the text of the statute, the Court noted that cancellation of removal is precluded when the noncitizen, during the initial seven years of residence in the United States, “committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2)”, even if conviction occurred after those first seven years. Commission of such an offense renders the nonresident “inadmissible.” In this case, Barton’s offenses were serious offenses referred to in section 1182(a)(2) and occurred within the first seven years of his residence, therefore rendering him inadmissible. By being inadmissible, he was, therefore, ineligible for cancellation of removal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority “conflate[d]” the terms “inadmissible” and “deportable,” leading to the “paradox[ical]” conclusion that one can be already admitted to the country yet also “inadmissible.” Justice Sotomayor argued that for the stop-time rule to render Barton ineligible for relief from removal, the Government must show he committed an offense that made him deportable, not inadmissible.

Kansas v. Glover Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2019.Decided on Apr 6, 2020. Petitioner: State of Kansas.Respondent: Charles Glover. Advocates: Toby Crouse (for the petitioner) Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) Sarah E. Harrington (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) While on patrol, a Kansas police officer ran a registration check on a pickup truck with a Kansas license plate. Upon running the check, the officer learned that the truck was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that his license had been revoked. Acting on suspicion that the owner was unlawfully operating the vehicle (based on the assumption that the registered owner of the truck was also the driver), the officer stopped the truck. The officer confirmed that Glover was the driver and issued him a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws. Glover moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Glover, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The state argued that a law enforcement officer may infer that the owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle, absent information to the contrary, and the knowledge that the owner has a revoked license combined with that inference gives rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. The state trial court concluded that it is not reasonable for an officer to infer that the registered owner of a vehicle is also its driver and granted Glover’s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review. The supreme court reversed the lower court, holding that the inference impermissibly “stacked” assumptions and would relieve the state of its burden of showing reasonable suspicion for a stop. Question For purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, is it reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary? Conclusion When a police officer lacks information to the contrary, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the officer to assume that the driver of a vehicle is its owner, and if the owner’s license is revoked, to conduct an investigative stop of the vehicle. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may make a “brief investigative traffic stop” when he has “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing. Courts must permit officers to use common sense to make judgments and inferences about human behavior. In this case, the police officer’s common-sense inference was that the vehicle’s owner was most likely the driver, which provided sufficient suspicion to stop the vehicle. It does not matter that a vehicle’s driver is not always its registered owner; the officer’s judgment was based on common-sense judgment and experience. Thus he had reasonable suspicion, and the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, to point out that the license-revocation alert does not end the inquiry because, in a similar setting with slightly different facts, there might not be reasonable suspicion. Justice Kagan specifically described that most license suspensions (as opposed to revocations) do not relate to driving at all but are highly correlated with poverty. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court’s decision ignores “key foundations of our reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence and impermissibly and unnecessarily reduces the State’s burden of proof.” Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that seizing the vehicle was constitutional because drivers with revoked licenses in Kansas have demonstrated a disregard for the law, arguing that that conclusion “flips the burden of proof.”

Mathena v. Malvo Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2019. Petitioner: Randall Mathena.Respondent: Lee Boyd Malvo. Advocates: Toby J. Heytens (On behalf of the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Danielle Spinelli (On behalf of the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2002, Lee Malvo and John Allen Muhammad killed 10 people in sniper attacks in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. Muhammad was sentenced to death and executed in 2009. Malvo, only 17 years old at the time of the attacks, was sentenced to life in prison by judges in Virginia and Maryland. He challenged his Virginia sentences based on two recent US Supreme Court decisions. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016), the Court held that its decision in Miller was a “substantive rule of constitutional law” and therefore must be given “retroactive effect” in cases where direct review was complete when Miller was decided. Malvo argued that his sentence must be vacated because Montgomery modified a “substantive rule of constitutional law” and was thus retroactively applied to his own sentencing. Under this reading, sentences that were legal when imposed, as Malvo’s was, must be vacated if they were imposed in violation of the Court’s new rules. The district court found Malvo’s arguments persuasive and vacated his four sentences of life imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana modify a “substantive rule of constitutional law” such that it must be given retroactive effect, requiring the respondent’s sentences of life without the possibility of parole to be vacated?

Kansas v. Garcia Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2019.Decided on Mar 4, 2020. Petitioner: Kansas.Respondent: Ramiro Garcia, et al.. Advocates: Derek Schmidt (Attorney General, Kansas) Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Paul W. Hughes (On behalf of the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The controversy before the Court arises from three cases presenting the same issue. In State v. Garcia, Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding in Overland Park, Kansas. When asked why he was speeding, he told officers that he was on his way to work. A records check revealed that he was already the subject of an investigation, and police contacted his employer to obtain employment documents. Among the documents was his federal Form I-9, which listed a social security number belonging to another person. Further investigation revealed that Garcia had used the same number on other federal and state forms. On the basis of this information, Garcia was charged with identity theft under state law. In State v. Morales, a special agent with the Social Security Administration determined that Donaldo Morales was using a social security number issued to another person. The agent reviewed Morales’s employment file, which included a federal Form I-9 as well as various federal and state tax forms. Morales was charged with identity theft and two other state-law offenses. In State v. Ochoa-Lara, federal and state officers determined that Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara was using a social security number issued to another individual to lease an apartment. On further investigation, officers reviewed the Form W-4 that Ochoa-Lara had completed for employment and found he was using the same social security number that belonged to another individual. On this basis, Ochoa-Lara was charged with two counts of identity theft under state law. All three defendants were convicted of at least one related charge, and all three appealed their convictions. Question Does the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) expressly or impliedly preempt states from using information provided on a federal Form I-9 in a prosecution of any person when the same information also appears in non-IRCA documents? Conclusion The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) neither expressly nor impliedly preempts Kansas’s application of its state identity-theft and fraud statutes to the noncitizens in this case. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. The express preemption provision of IRCA applies only to employers and those who recruit or refer prospective employees and thus does not apply to state laws, such as the one at issue in this case, that impose criminal or civil sanctions on employees or applicants for employment. The Kansas Supreme Court erroneously relied on a different provision, § 1324a(b)(5), which prohibits any use of an I-9 or any information “contained in” that form; that interpretation is “contrary to standard English usage.” Thus, IRCA does not expressly preempt state law. Further, IRCA does not impliedly preempt state law for two key reasons. First, Kansas’s prosecutions of the noncitizens in this case were based on the information provided not in the I-9, but in tax-withholding forms, which are outside of immigration-enforcement functions. Thus, the relevant provisions of the IRCA “did not create a comprehensive and unified system regarding information a State may require employees to provide.” Second, the Court found no intent by Congress to eliminate overlap between state identity-theft prosecutions and federal prosecution fraud crimes arising from the employment-verification process or tax-withholding forms. Thus, the federal laws do not conflict with the state laws, nor do they pose “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of IRCA.” Because IRCA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts Kansas’s laws, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision, validating the convictions below. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined to express his view that the Court should explicitly abandon its “purposes and objectives” preemption jurisprudence. Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part (with respect to express preemption and dissenting in part (with respect to implied preemption), in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that  IRCA’s text, structure, context, and purpose, make it “‘clear and manifest’” that Congress has “occupied at least the narrow field of policing fraud committed to demonstrate federal work authorization.” In Justice Breyer’s view, it should not matter that Kansas relied on the information in the tax-withholding forms rather than the I-9; the noncitizens were still submitting information as part of the process of verifying their employment eligibility.  

Rotkiske v. Klemm Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2019.Decided on Dec 10, 2019. Petitioner: Kevin C. Rotkiske.Respondent: Paul Klemm, et al.. Advocates: Scott E. Gant (On behalf of the Petitioner) Shay Dvoretzky (On behalf of the Respondents) Jonathan C. Bond (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014. Rotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule,” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “delays the beginning of a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the district court. Question Does the statute of limitations under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act begin when the violation is discovered or when the violation occurred? Conclusion The statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act begins to run when the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not when it is discovered. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority affirming the judgment below. The Court first looked at the statutory language of the FDCPA, finding that the plain meaning of the statute of limitations unambiguously refers to the date of the alleged violation. The Court rejected Rotkiske’s argument that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule” that would delay the beginning of the limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury, finding the “atextual judicial supplementation...particularly inappropriate.” The Court declined to consider Rotkiske’s fraud-based equitable defense because he failed to preserve that argument when he appealed to the Third Circuit. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to point out that the Court has “long recognized” the equitable “discovery rule” in cases of fraud or concealment, notwithstanding the majority’s disparagement of that rule in its opinion in this case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion in which she agrees with the majority’s determination that the “discovery rule” does not apply to the one-year statute of limitations in the FDCPA, but she disagrees with the majority that Rotkiske failed to preserve a fraud-based discovery argument in the court below. Justice Ginsburg would hold that if the conduct giving rise to the claim is fraudulent, or if fraud infects the manner in which the claim is presented, then the fraud-based discovery rule governs. Because, in her view, Rotkiske did preserve this argument on appeal, she would allow adjudication of his claim on the merits.

Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2019.Decided on Jun 1, 2020. Petitioner: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.Respondent: Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al.. Advocates: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (On behalf of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico) Jeffrey B. Wall (On behalf of the United States) Theodore B. Olson (On behalf of Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al.) Jessica E. Mendez-Colberg (On behalf of UTIER) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Since it was ceded to the United States in 1898, Puerto Rico has accumulated substantial debt, in large part due to its ambiguous legal status as a protectorate of the United States and the economically detrimental policies the United States has enacted over the decades. Exacerbated by a series of governmental financial deficits and a recession, Puerto Rico’s debt crisis came to a head in 2015, when its governor announced that the Commonwealth was in a “death spiral” and was unable to pay its debt. In June 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), which gave him authority to appoint a seven-member Financial Oversight and Management Board that would have control over Puerto Rico’s budget and would negotiate the restructuring of its $125 billion indebtedness. President Obama appointed the seven-member board in August 2016 based on lists supplied by Republic and Democratic lawmakers. A number of creditors and elected officials of Puerto Rico have been dissatisfied with the board and its decisions and brought a lawsuit challenging President Obama’s authority to appoint the board members. The challengers alleged that the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that the Senate confirm high-level federal officers and that the board members were within the scope of this Clause. The federal district court in Puerto Rico ruled against the creditors, finding the board is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth government established pursuant to Congress’s plenary powers under the Territorial Clause and that the board members are not “Officers of the United States.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the Territorial Clause does not supersede the application of the Appointments Clause in an unincorporated territory and that the board members are “Officers of the United States” because: (1) they occupy “continuing positions,” (2) exercise “significant authority” that is the same or more than that exercised by other officers the U.S. Supreme Court has found to be “Officers of the United States,” and (3) exercise their authority “pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Moreover, these officers are “principal” officers subject to the Appointments Clause because they are answerable to and removable only by the President and are not directed or supervised by others who were appointed by the President with Senate confirmation. Question Does the Appointments Clause govern the appointment of members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico? Does the de facto officer doctrine allow courts to deny meaningful relief to successful separation-of-powers challengers who are suffering ongoing injury at the hands of unconstitutionally appointed principal officers? Conclusion The Appointments Clause constrains the appointments power as to all officers of the United States, including those who exercise power in or in relation to Puerto Rico, but the Clause does not restrict the appointment or selection of the members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board. Based on this conclusion, the Court had no reason to address the second question presented. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment. The Appointments Clause of the federal Constitution is intended to allocate between the President and the Senate responsibility for selecting officers to hold high federal positions. Because of this purpose, the Appointments Clause should apply to all officers of the United States, even those with powers and duties related to Puerto Rico. However, the Appointments Clause does not restrict the appointment of local officers that Congress vests with primarily local duties. When an officer has primarily local duties, he is not an officer of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. The Board members have primarily local powers and duties, exemplified by the fact that the power of the Board is backed by Puerto Rico law rather than federal law. Indeed, the Board’s duty is to oversee the fiscal and budgetary development of Puerto Rico and to initiate bankruptcy proceedings in the interests of Puerto Rico. Consequently, the Appointments Clause does not constrain the appointments power as to the Board members. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but based on interpretation of the “original public meaning” of the phrase “Officers of the United States” within the Appointments Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment to explore issues the Court did not (and did not need) to address regarding the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. Specifically, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the history of that relationship calls into question whether the Board members may be territorial officers of Puerto Rico when “they are not elected or approved, directly or indirectly, by the people of Puerto Rico.”

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2019.Decided on Jun 15, 2020. Petitioner: R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc..Respondent: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.. Advocates: David D. Cole (for respondent Aimee Stephens) John J. Bursch (for the petitioner) Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent EEOC, supporting reversal) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home’s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated. Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes. The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home’s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Question Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination against transgender employees based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)? Conclusion An employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.  Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).

Bostock v. Clayton County Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2019.Decided on Jun 15, 2020. Petitioner: Gerald Lynn Bostock.Respondent: Clayton County, Georgia. Advocates: Pamela S. Karlan (for the petitioner in 17-1618 and the respondent in 17-1623) Jeffrey M. Harris (for the respondent in 17-1618 and the petitioner in 17-1623) Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance in 17-1618 and reversal in 17-1623) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting  procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision. This case is consolidated for oral argument with Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1623. Question Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompass discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation? Conclusion An employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.  Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).

Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2019.Decided on Dec 12, 2019. Petitioner: Laura Peter, Deputy Director, Patent and Trademark Office.Respondent: NantKwest, Inc.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner) Morgan Chu (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2001, Dr. Hans Klingemann filed a patent application with the US Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) describing a method for treating cancer using natural killer cells. Dr. Klingemann assigned his application to NantKwest Inc., and in 2010, the examiner rejected the application as obvious. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirmed the rejection. When the Board affirms an examiner’s rejection of a patent application, the applicant may either appeal directly to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or challenge the Board’s decision in district court (under 35 U.S.C. § 145). Pursuant to § 145, NantKwest challenged the Board’s decision by filing a complaint in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The court granted the PTO’s motion for summary judgment, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. After its victory on the merits, PTO filed a motion for reimbursement of “the expenses of the proceedings” under § 145, including almost $80,000 in attorney’s fees and over $33,000 in expert witness fees. Applicants who invoke § 145 are required by statute to pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the PTO in defending the Board’s decision, regardless of the outcome. Historically, the PTO has used this requirement to recover payment for expenses such as travel, printing, and expert witnesses. The district court denied PTO’s motion with respect to attorney’s fees, citing the American Rule—a “bedrock principle” in this country that “each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose” unless there is an “express grant from Congress.” A panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, and then the circuit voted to hear the appeal en banc. After requesting briefing on the single question whether § 145 authorizes award of attorney’s fees, the en banc Federal Circuit concluded that it does not, affirming the district court. Question Does the phrase “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” in 35 U.S.C. § 145 include attorneys’ fees? Conclusion The Patent and Trademark Office cannot recover the salaries of its legal personnel as “expenses” in civil actions brought by patent applicants pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Under the “American Rule,” there is a presumption that each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. That presumption is particularly important in the context of proceedings challenging the rejection of a patent application because allowing the agency to recover fees from a prevailing party would be a “radical departure” from the norm. The plain text—use of the word “expenses”—does not provide adequate basis from departing from the strong presumption that the American Rule applies. Nor does the history of the Patent Act support such an expansive reading of the term.

Ramos v. Louisiana Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2019.Decided on Apr 20, 2020. Petitioner: Evangelisto Ramos.Respondent: State of Louisiana. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner) Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Evangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Ramos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review. Question Does the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict against the states? Conclusion The Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states, requires that a jury find a criminal defendant guilty by a unanimous verdict. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the primary opinion. In Part I, Justice Neil Gorsuch (writing for a majority: himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Brett Kavanaugh) noted that the original public meaning of the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury, as well as its history, support an interpretation that it requires guilt be determined by a unanimous jury. Because this right is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” it is incorporated against the states (that is, it applies to state governments as well) by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in state court. In Part II-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the same majority, explained how the Court’s jurisprudence came to allow Oregon and Louisiana to permit non-unanimous jury verdicts, describing the fractured plurality opinions in those cases (Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana) with a fifth vote from Justice Lewis Powell that was “neither here nor there” but effectively permitted those states to proceed with non-unanimous jury verdicts. In Part II-B, Justice Gorsuch wrote for a plurality of the Court (himself, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor), describing the confusion surrounding the Apodaca decision and the apparent conflict in the Court’s precedent as to whether the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts. In Part III, Justice Gorsuch, again writing for the majority, rejected Louisana’s arguments for non-unanimous jury verdicts, finding that the drafting history of the Sixth Amendment is ambiguous at best, the Apodaca plurality’s reasoning was “skimpy,” and most importantly, that the Apodaca plurality “subjected the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” In Part IV-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for a plurality (himself and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer), addressed the dissent’s argument that the principle of stare decisis required the Court to stand by its decision in Apodaca and uphold Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury law. Justice Gorsuch argued that under no view can the plurality opinion in Apodaca be controlling on today’s Court. Writing again for a majority in Part IV-B-1, Justice Gorsuch noted that even if the Court accepted the premise that Apodaca established a precedent, no one on the Court today would say it was rightly decided, and “stare decisis isn’t supposed to be the art of methodically ignoring what everyone knows to be true.” For the four-justice plurality (Justice Kavanaugh did not join this part), Justice Gorsuch in Part IV-B-2 addressed the reliance interest Louisiana and Oregon have in the security of their final criminal judgments. Justice Gorsuch minimized the significance of the state’s reliance interests and pointed instead to the reliance interests of the American people in having a just criminal jury that uniformly requires a unanimous verdict for a finding of guilt. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part IV-A, writing separately to raise three points: “First, overruling precedent here is not only warranted, but compelled. Second, the interests at stake point far more clearly to that outcome than those in other recent cases. And finally, the racially biased origins of the Louisiana and Oregon laws uniquely matter here.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote an opinion concurring in part to explain his view of how stare decisis applies in this case, laying out seven factors, which he argued, support overruling Apodaca in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas noted from the outset that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury includes protection against non-unanimous jury verdicts and would thus resolve the question there. He would further find that the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, but would find that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates it against the states. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, and which Justice Elena Kagan joined as to all but Part III-D. Justice Alito argued that stare decisis requires following Apodaca and that in overruling that case, the majority “cast[] aside an important and long-established decision with little regard for the enormous reliance the decision has engendered.” In the part of the dissent that Justice Kagan did not join, Justice Alito argued that the reliance in this case “far outstrips” the reliance interests in other recent cases where the dissenters in those cases claimed reliance interests.