Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Nasrallah v. Barr Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2020.Decided on Jun 1, 2020. Petitioner: Nidal Khalid Nasrallah.Respondent: William P. Barr, Attorney General. Advocates: Paul W. Hughes (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Nidal Khalid Nasrallah, a native and citizen of Lebanon, was 17 years old when he entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2006. He became a lawful permanent resident the following year. In 2011, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Nasrallah pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property in interstate commerce. An immigration judge determined that one of those convictions made Nasrallah subject to removal as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). However, the judge also found Nasrallah had established a clear probability that he would be tortured and persecuted in Lebanon by groups such as Hezbollah and ISIS because of his Druze religion and western ties, so the judge granted him a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Both the government and Nasrallah appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On appeal, the BIA held that the immigration judge erred in granting Nasrallah a deferral, and it ordered his removal. Nasrallah appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Reviewing the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, the Eleventh Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Nasrallah’s petition for review. Specifically, Nasrallah had asked the court to reweigh the factors involved in the removal order, but under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), the courts lack jurisdiction to review the factual findings underlying the denial of removal relief. The court therefore dismissed Nasrallah’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. Question Do the federal courts have jurisdiction to review an administrative agency’s factual findings underlying denials of withholding (and deferral) of removal relief? Conclusion Federal courts have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s factual challenges to an administrative order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion on behalf of the 7-2 majority. To understand the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and D, the Court looked to three related statutes. First, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 authorizes noncitizens to obtain direct “review of a final order of removal” in a court of appeals and requires that all challenges arising from the removal proceedings be consolidated. Second, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) implements the relevant provision of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and provides for judicial review of CAT claims “as part of a final order of removal.” Third, the REAL ID Act of 2005 states that final orders of removal and CAT claims may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals. Because a factual challenge to a CAT claim, as Nasrallah brought in this case, is not a challenge to a final order of removal, FARRA provides that the denial of the CAT claim is reviewable “as part of a final order of removal.” The challenger must meet the burden of “substantial evidence”—that is, that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to arrive at a different conclusion from that at which the agency arrived. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that a so-called “zipper clause” of Section 1252(b)(9) determines the meaning of Section 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), and that clause precludes judicial review of CAT orders.

Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2020.Decided on Jun 25, 2020. Petitioner: Department of Homeland Security, et al..Respondent: Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam. Advocates: Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioner) Lee Gelernt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam is a native and citizen of Sri Lanka and a Tamil, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka. Thuraissigiam entered the United States via its southern border, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers arrested him and placed him in expedited removal proceedings. Thuraissigiam indicated a fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, but an asylum officer determined he had not established a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal. A supervisor affirmed the officer’s finding, and an immigration judge affirmed it as well in a check-box decision. Thuraissigiam filed a habeas petition in federal district court, arguing that his expedited removal order violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) did not authorize jurisdiction over Thuraissigiam’s claims and rejecting his argument that the removal process to which he was subjected effectively suspended the writ of habeas corpus, in violation of the Suspension Clause. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. Because the administrative scheme governing credible fear determinations in this context is “meager,” and § 1252(a)(2) disallows judicial review of whether DHS complied with the procedures, the process does not meet minimum constitutional requirements. Question Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) as applied to the respondent Thuraissigiam violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution? Conclusion As applied to this case, 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(2)—which limits the habeas review obtainable by an alien detained for expedited removal—does not violate the Suspension or Due Process Clauses. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 7-2 majority opinion. To determine the scope of the Suspension Clause, the Court first considered its meaning at the time the Constitution was adopted. The Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Habeas has traditionally provided a means to seek release from unlawful detention. However, the respondent in this case does not seek release from custody, but an additional opportunity to obtain asylum. Because this meaning was not contemplated at the time the Constitution was adopted, his claims fall outside the scope of the writ. Turning to the question of due process, the Court noted that a noncitizen who is unlawfully in the United States has only those rights that Congress has provided him by statute. The protections of the Due Process Clause do not apply to an individual simply because he might physically be within the United States. Given that the Court’s precedents establish that “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law” for noncitizens, the respondent received all the process that was required. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to expand on the discussion of the original meaning of the Suspension Clause. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, noting that the Court’s holding should be applied only to this particular case (since that was the narrow question presented) and should not address more broadly the question whether the Suspension Clause protects people challenging removal decisions. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the majority makes asylum determinations by the Executive Branch unreviewable, “no matter whether the denial is arbitrary or irrational or contrary to governing law.” Such unchecked power, Justice Sotomayor warned, “handcuffs the Judiciary’s ability to perform its constitutional duty to safeguard individual liberty and dismantles a critical component of the separation of powers.”

Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2020.Decided on Jun 8, 2020. Petitioner: Arthur James Lomax.Respondent: Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al.. Advocates: Brian T. Burgess (for the Petitioner) Eric R. Olson (for the Respondents) Jeffrey A. Rosen (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying the usual court fees) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars inmates from filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a legal claim for relief.  Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show cause before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show cause order, Lomax argued (among other things) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they do not count as strikes. The district court denied Lomax’s motion as barred by the three-strikes provision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim count as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act? Conclusion Dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion on behalf of the majority that was unanimous except as to footnote 4 (dicta as to the provision’s applicability when a court gives a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint), which Justice Clarence Thomas did not join. The three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis (IFP) if he has had three or more prior suits “dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The very language of that provision covers all dismissals for failure to state a claim, whether issued with or without prejudice. To read it differently would require reading the word “dismissed” in Section 1915(g) as “dismissed with prejudice,” which not only runs contrary to the plain language but would create conflicts with other parts of the Act.

United States v. Sineneng-Smith Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2020.Decided on May 7, 2020. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Evelyn Sineneng-Smith. Advocates: Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner) Mark C. Fleming (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Her clients were mostly natives of the Philippines, who were unlawfully employed in the United States and were seeking to obtain legal permanent residence (green cards). Sineneng-Smith purported to help her clients obtain permanent residence through the Labor Certification process, but that program expired on April 30, 2001. Sineneng-Smith knew that the program had expired but nonetheless continued to tell clients that they could obtain green cards via Labor Certifications. Federal law prohibits encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the country, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of the law. Sineneng-Smith was indicted, charged, and convicted by a jury of violating this law. She appealed her conviction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals solicited supplemental briefing on several constitutional questions presented in the appeal. The court held that the statute was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, criminalizing a “substantial amount of protected expression in relation to the statute’s narrow legitimate sweep.” Question Is a federal law criminalizing the act of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain unconstitutional on its face? Conclusion In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit panel abused its discretion when it “drastic[ally]” departed from the principle of party presentation in ruling on the issue of constitutional overbreadth. The Court found that the Ninth Circuit did not address the party-presented controversy, but instead addressed a different question that the parties did not raise, constituting a “radical transformation” of the case.  Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision violates “far more than the party presentation rule.” He noted that while he has joined the Court in applying overbreadth doctrine in the past, he has “since developed doubts about its origins and application.” Finding no basis in the Constitution’s text, he would urge the Court to revisit that doctrine.

Opati v. Republic of Sudan Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2020. Petitioner: Monicah Okoba Opati, et al..Respondent: Republic of Sudan, et al.. Advocates: Matthew D. McGill (for the Petitioners) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioners) Christopher M. Curran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1998, truck bombs exploded outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring over a thousand. It was later discovered that al Qaeda was behind these bombings and that Sudan allegedly provided material support to al Qaeda in the form of safe harbor and training. Starting in 2001, victims of the bombings began to bring lawsuits against Sudan and Iran in U.S. courts under a provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that withdraws sovereign immunity and grants courts jurisdiction to hear suits against foreign states designated as sponsors of terrorism. When Sudan and Iran did not appear to defend these cases, the district court entered default judgments against them in several cases, including $4.3 billion in punitive damages. Sudan then appeared, filing appeals and motions to vacate the judgments. The district court denied Sudan’s motions to vacate, and Sudan again appealed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that FSIA does not permit the recovery of punitive damages arising from terrorist activities that occurred before Congress amended the law in 2008 to authorize punitive damages. The court pointed out that there is a strong presumption against retroactivity unless Congress made clear its intent. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that retroactive authorization of punitive damages “would raise a serious constitutional question.” Because the FSIA terrorism exception does not contain a clear statement of retroactive effect yet operates retroactively, the Tenth Circuit vacated the award of punitive damages under the federal cause of action. Question Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) apply retroactively to permit recovery of punitive damages against foreign states for terrorist activities that occurred prior to the passage of the current version of the statute?

United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2020.Decided on Jun 15, 2020. Petitioner: United States Forest Service, et al..Respondent: Cowpasture River Association, et al.. Advocates: Anthony A. Yang (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Michael K. Kellogg (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Appalachian Trail spans over 2,000 miles, from Maine to Georgia, with approximately 1,000 miles of the Trail crossing through lands within national forests. Under the National Trails System Act, the Secretary of the Interior has the responsibility to administer the trail and that responsibility may not be transferred to any other federal agencies. The Mineral Leasing Act grants the U.S. Forest Service the authority to grant certain rights-of-way through lands in the National Forest System, but no federal agency has the authority to grant equivalent rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System. In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) authorization to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas pipeline that would cross the Appalachian Trail at points located within the George Washington and Monogahela National Forests. After a review process, the Forest Service authorized Atlantic to proceed with construction of the pipeline, finding it had authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way for the pipeline and that the pipeline “would have no long lasting impacts” on the Trail. Cowpasture River Preservation Association and others filed a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of the Forest Service’s record of decision and special use permit. The court granted the petition, vacated the record of decision and special use permit, and remanded to the Forest Service. Notably, the court determined that the Forest Service lacked authority to grant the right-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act because the Appalachian Trail is a “unit” of the National Park System. The court determined that the Mineral Leasing Act “specifically excludes” the Trail “from the authority of the Secretary of the Interior ‘or appropriate agency head’ to grant pipeline rights of way.” The Court consolidated this case for oral argument with U.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, No. 18-1584. Question Does the U.S. Forest Service have the authority to grant rights-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail within national forests? Conclusion The Forest Service did have the authority to issue the special use permit because the Department of the Interior’s decision to assign responsibility for the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for the 7-2 majority of the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in full except as to the part of the majority’s discussion explaining why Cowpasture’s proposed interpretation would vastly expand the Park Service’s jurisdiction in a way inconsistent with the regulatory scheme. The Court first noted that it is undisputed that the Forest Service has jurisdiction over the federal lands within the George Washington National Forest. At issue was whether the presence of the Appalachian Trail removes that part of the lands from the Forest Service’s jurisdiction and places them under the jurisdiction of the Park Service. The Court observed that the Forest Service entered into a “right-of-way” agreement with the National Park Service, which resulted in the Appalachian Trail. A right-of-way is a type of easement, granting only nonpossessory rights of use of the land, so the grant of the right-of-way did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the land. Thus, the Court concluded, the Secretary retained authority to issue the special use permit for the pipeline running underneath the Trail. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority complicated what should be a simple question: “Is the Appalachian National Scenic Trail ‘land in the National Park System’?” Because federal law does not distinguish “land” from the Trail “any more than it distinguishes ‘land’ from the many monuments, historic buildings, parkways, and recreational areas that are also units of the Park System,” the dichotomy the Court draws contravenes the text of the statutes governing the Appalachian Trial.

Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2020.Decided on Jun 30, 2020. Petitioner: Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson and Jamie Schaefer.Respondent: Montana Department of Revenue, et al.. Advocates: Richard D. Komer (for the petitioners) Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Adam G. Unikowsky (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (“Rule 1”) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits “direct or indirect” public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs. Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court.  Question Does a state law that allows for funding for education generally while prohibiting funding for religious schools violate the Religion Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution? Conclusion The application of the Montana Constitution’s “no-aid” provision to a state program providing tuition assistance to parents who send their children to private schools discriminated against religious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion on behalf of the 5-4 majority. The Court first noted that the Free Exercise Clause “protects religious observers against unequal treatment” and against “laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” In this case, Montana’s no-aid provision excluded religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious status. As such, the law must be subject to strict scrutiny review; that is, the government must show that its action advances “‘interests of the highest order” and that the action is “narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” Montana’s interest in this case—which the Court described as creating greater separation of church and state than the federal Constitution requires—does not satisfy strict scrutiny given its infringement of free exercise. Because the Free Exercise Clause barred the application of Montana’s no-aid provision, the Montana Supreme Court lacked the authority to invalidate the program on the basis of that provision.  Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, opining that the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause (not at issue in this case) hampers free exercise rights.  Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Gorsuch each filed their own separate concurrences. Justice Alito argued, as he did in dissenting from the Court’s decision earlier this term in Ramos v. Louisiana, that original motivation should have no bearing on the present constitutionality of a provision of law, yet even without that consideration, the majority reached the correct conclusion in this case. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s characterization of the Montana Constitution as discriminating based on “religious status” and not “religious use,” is dubious at best. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Montana Supreme Court’s decision does not place a burden on petitioners’ religious exercise and thus does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court’s precedents establish that neutral government action is not unconstitutional solely because it fails to benefit religious exercise. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined in part. Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s approach and conclusion risk the kind of entanglement and conflict that the Religion Clauses are intended to prevent. Instead, Justice Breyer opined that the Court’s decision in Locke—upholding the application of a no-aid provision in Washington State based on the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause permitted Washington to forbid state-scholarship funds for students pursuing devotional theology degrees—controlled the outcome in this case, in which the no-aid provision was “materially similar.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a separate dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court in this case resolved a constitutional question not presented, thereby violating “Article III principles older than the Religion Clause” itself. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor continued, the Court answered incorrectly that question it should not have addressed in the first place.

Shular v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2020.Decided on Feb 26, 2020. Petitioner: Eddie Lee Shular.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Richard M. Summa (for the petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “categorical” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “serious drug offense” as well. Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses—five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.” Question Does the determination of a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act require the same categorical approach used in the determination of a “violent felony” under the act? Conclusion The statute does not require “a generic-offense matching exercise” between the elements of the offenses listed in the federal statute and the elements of the state offense under which the defendant was convicted. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg adopted the argument of the United States, which instead would have the trial court asked “whether the state offense’s elements necessarily entail one of the types of conduct” identified in the federal statute. The Court found that two features of the statute in question lead to this interpretation. The first is that the offenses listed in the statute are “unlikely names for generic offenses” and therefore refer to underlying conduct and not offenses themselves. Secondly, the use of the word “involving” in the statute suggests an intention to describe criminal conduct and not particular criminal offenses. The Court noted that both parties’ interpretations of the statutory language “achieve a measure of inconsistency. Justice Ginsburg explained, “Resolving this case requires us to determine which form of consistency Congress intended: application of [the statute] to all offenders who engaged in certain conduct or to all who committed certain generic offenses (in either reading, judging only by the elements of their prior convictions).“ She continued, “For the reasons explained, we are persuaded that Congress chose the former.” In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh stated he joined the Court’s opinion in full but wrote separately to explain that the rule of lenity advocated by Shular was not appropriately invoked where the Court found the statutory language unambiguous. 

GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2020.Decided on Jun 1, 2020. Petitioner: GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. a Foreign Corporation Formally Known As Converteam SAS.Respondent: Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al.. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner) Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) Jonathan D. Hacker (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three “cold rolling mills,” which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu’s plant was under construction, the company’s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (“Fives”) to provide three different-sized mills. Each of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany. The contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (“GE Energy”), formerly known as Converteam SAS. Fives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests of all three parties in the event of a dispute. Outokumpu filed a lawsuit against GE Energy in Alabama state court in 2016, and GE Energy removed to federal court and moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court granted GE Energy’s motion to compel and dismissed the action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded as to the motion to compel, holding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before Court or their privities, and only under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to an agreement) can parties compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Question Does the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards permit a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel? Conclusion The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not “alter background principles” of state law, including doctrines like equitable estoppel, which authorizes contract enforcement by a nonsignatory. Chapter 2 of the FAA provides that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that [Chapter 1] is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention.” The relevant provision of the Convention states that courts of a contracting state “shall...refer the parties to arbitration” when the parties to the action entered into a written agreement to arbitrate and one of the parties requests the referral. The Court then considered whether state-law equitable estoppel doctrine permitted under Chapter 1 conflicts with the Convention, concluding that it does not. Most importantly, the text of the Convention is silent as to whether nonsignatories may enforce arbitration agreements under domestic doctrines such as equitable estoppel; this silence is dispositive of the matter. This understanding is consistent with the history of the Convention as well as the post-ratification understanding of signatory nations. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to note that the application of domestic doctrine like equitable estoppel must be rooted in the principle of consent to arbitrate.

Babb v. Wilkie Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 15, 2020.Decided on Apr 6, 2020. Petitioner: Noris Babb.Respondent: Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the petitioner) Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists—all females over 50—and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40. Two of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well. Babb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb’s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 without an advanced scope was selected for the promotion. Babb brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) alleging that she was the victim of gender-plus-age discrimination and that the VA retaliated against her for participating in protected EEO in violation of those laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Babb argued that the district court erred in part by not allowing her to prove that illegal discrimination or retaliation was a “motivating factor” behind the VA’s refusal to promote her. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding itself bound by precedent that federal sector employees’ claims under ADEA and Title VII require that the plaintiff show discrimination or retaliation is a “but for” factor in the adverse personnel action. Question Does the provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) that protects federal employees aged 40 years from age discrimination require a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of the challenged personnel action? Conclusion The federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), requires that age not be taken into consideration at all in making personnel actions, but if age is a but-for cause of the personnel action, that fact may be important in determining the remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. The relevant provision provides “All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” The Court found the plain meaning of the statute supports the reading that age does not need to be a but-for cause of an employment decision for there to be a violation. To reach this conclusion, the Court focused on several phrases as well as the syntax of the sentence. This interpretation is also consistent with the Court’s precedent interpreting the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the ADEA’s private-sector provision, and Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision because the language in those provisions is “markedly” different. The Court noted, however, that but-for causation is important in determining the appropriate remedy. For example, the plaintiffs cannot obtain compensatory damages without showing that age discrimination was a but-for cause of the employment decision. Remedies must be tailored to the injury, and the injury is measured in part by the causal relationship. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, pointing out that the Court’s decision does not foreclose claims arising from discriminatory processes (as distinct from decisions) and that the same provision may also permit damages remedies even when the federal government engages in “nondispositive” age discrimination. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s reading of the statute is too broad and “disrupts the settled expectations of federal employers and employees.”