
Supreme Court Oral Arguments
A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court.
* Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov
* Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information.
* Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available as soon as oyez.org publishes the transcript).
Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument
Latest episodes

Dec 2, 2019 • 1h 2min
[18-280] New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 2, 2019.Decided on Apr 27, 2020.
Petitioner: New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc., et al..Respondent: City of New York, New York, et al..
Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Richard P. Dearing (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The State of New York law prohibits the possession of firearms without a license. To obtain a handgun license, an individual must apply with a local licensing officer—which, in New York City, is the police commissioner—and the application process involves an investigation into the applicant’s mental health history, criminal history, and moral character. There are two primary types of handgun licenses: “carry” licenses and “premises” licenses. This case involves the latter, which permits the licensee to “have and possess in his dwelling” a pistol or revolver. The premises license is specific to a particular address, and the handguns permitted by the license may not be removed from that address except in limited circumstances prescribed by law. One such circumstance is to “transport his/her handgun(s) directly to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, unloaded, and in a locked container, the ammunition to be carried separately.” All small arms ranges/shooting clubs authorized under the rule are located in New York City.
Three individuals with premises licenses sought to transport their handguns to shooting ranges and competitions outside New York City—which is prohibited by the rule. One of the individuals sought to transport his handgun between the premises in New York City for which it was licensed and his second home in Hancock, New York—which the rule also prohibits. The three individuals and petitioner New York State Rifle & Pistol Association filed a lawsuit in federal district court, asking the court to declare the city’s restrictions unconstitutional and to enjoin the city from enforcing them.
The district court found the rule “merely regulates rather than restricts the right to possess a firearm in the home and is a minimal, or at most, modest burden on the right” and thus did not violate plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. The district court also held that the rule did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, or the fundamental right to travel. Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does a New York City rule banning the transportation a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits violate the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the constitutional right to travel?
Conclusion
In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that the petitioners’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the City’s rule is moot because after the Court granted certiorari, the City amended the rule, permitting the petitioners to transport firearms to a second home or shooting range outside the city.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to express agreement with the determination that the claim in this case is moot but also to agree with the dissenting justices in their interpretation of the leading Second Amendment cases, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in full and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part. Justice Alito argued that the Court incorrectly dismissed the case as moot and that the Court should have decided the case on the merits to correct lower courts' misapplication of Heller and McDonald.

Dec 2, 2019 • 1h 1min
[18-1150] Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc.
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc.
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 2, 2019.Decided on Apr 27, 2020.
Petitioner: State of Georgia, et al..Respondent: Public.Resource.Org, Inc..
Advocates: Joshua S. Johnson (for the petitioners)
Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Eric F. Citron (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “shall be merged with annotations,” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia.
Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites.
The Commission sent PRO several cease-and-desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia’s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in the Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the “official” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created—finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations.
Question
Does the government edict doctrine extend to—and thus render uncopyrightable—the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated?
Conclusion
Under the government edicts doctrine, the annotations beneath the statutory provisions in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated are ineligible for copyright protection. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion.
Under the government edicts doctrine, judges cannot be authors of the works they produce in the course of their official duties, regardless of whether the material carries the force of law. The same reasoning applies to legislators and the works they produce. The “animating principle,” amply supported by precedent, is that “no one can own the law.”
First, the Court considered whether the annotations are created by legislators. Although the annotations were prepared by a private company, the work-for-hire agreement provides that Georgia’s Code Revision Commission is the sole “author” of the work. Because of the way it is created, receives funding and staffing, and operates, the Commission is an “arm” of the Georgia Legislature with “legislative authority” that includes “preparing and publishing the annotations.” This link is bolstered by the fact that the Commission brought this lawsuit “on behalf of and for the benefit of” the Georgia Legislature and the State of Georgia.
Then, the Court considered whether the annotations are created in the course of legislative duties. Although the annotations are not enacted into law through bicameralism and presentment, the Court cited a decision by the Georgia Supreme Court holding that the preparation of the annotations under Georgia law constitute an act of “legislative authority.”
The Court found unpersuasive Georgia’s arguments to the contrary. First, Section 101 of the Copyright Act, which lists “annotations” among the kinds of works eligible for copyright protection, refers only to annotations that represent an original work of authorship, which the annotations cannot be when legislators are the authors. Second, the fact that the Copyright Act excludes from copyright protection works by federal officials but does not mention state officials does not lead to the negative inference that state officials must be eligible to be authors. Neither the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, a non-binding administrative manual, nor the overall purpose of the Copyright Act, supports Georgia’s position.
The Court pointed out that if it adopted Georgia’s position and allowed “everything short of statutes and opinions” to be copyrightable, then “States would be free to offer a whole range of premium legal works for those who can afford the extra benefit.” That outcome would force many people “to think twice before using official legal works that illuminate the law we are all presumed to know and understand.”
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined and Justice Stephen Breyer joined in part. Justice Thomas argued that the Court should leave to Congress the decision whether to exclude state legislators from copyright authorship and that the majority misunderstands the word “author.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined, arguing that the annotations are not created in a legislative capacity because of key differences between judges and legislators.

Nov 13, 2019 • 1h 2min
[18-938] Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC
Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 13, 2019.Decided on Jan 14, 2020.
Petitioner: Ritzen Group, Inc..Respondent: Jackson Masonry, LLC.
Advocates: James K. Lehman (for the petitioner)
Griffin S. Dunham (for the respondent)
Vivek Suri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline.
Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract.
After this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the automatic stay (which Ritzen did not appeal at the time). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits.
Ritzen appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines: the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal.
Question
Is an order denying a motion for relief from the automatic stay in bankruptcy proceeding a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)?
Conclusion
A bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly denying relief from the automatic stay constitutes a final, immediately appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.
The Court first looked to its own precedent in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015), in which it held that a bankruptcy court’s order rejecting a proposed plan was not final because it did not conclusively resolve the relevant “proceeding.” Bankruptcy court orders are final only when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the bankruptcy case. Applying that reasoning to the facts of this case, the Court found that a bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly granting or denying relief from a bankruptcy’s automatic stay conclusively resolves a discrete dispute and thus qualifies as an independent “proceeding” within the meaning of §158(a).

Nov 13, 2019 • 59min
[18-1171] Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media
Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 13, 2019.Decided on Mar 23, 2020.
Petitioner: Comcast Corporation.Respondent: National Association of African American-Owned Media and Entertainment Studio Networks, Inc..
Advocates: Miguel A. Estrada (for the petitioner)
Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
Erwin Chemerinsky (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by African American actor and comedian Byron Allen, and the National Association of African American-Owned Media, an entity created by Allen, sued Comcast over the latter’s decision not to carry ESN’s channels. ESN alleged that Comcast’s decision not to carry ESN’s networks was based, at least in part, on racial animus against ESN, which is the only 100% African American-owned multi-channel media company in the United States. At the time of Comcast’s decision, several other large distributors— including Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and AT&T—had also declined to enter into carriage agreements with ESN.
The district court dismissed ESN’s original complaint and several subsequent amended complaints against Comcast and other defendants for failure to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held in a related case involving Charter Communications that “mixed-motive claims are cognizable under § 1981,” meaning that “even if racial animus was not the but-for cause of a defendant’s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that decision.” Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ESN had stated a valid Section 1981 claim based on its assertions that the carriers had entered into contracts with “white-owned, lesser-known networks during the same period.”
The Ninth Circuit declined petitions for rehearing en banc.
Question
Does a claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 require that the plaintiff show but-for causation, or only that race is a motivating factor?
Conclusion
A plaintiff who sues for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must show—in all parts of the lawsuit—that race was the actual cause of her injury. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court noted from the outset that normally, a plaintiff suing for an injury must prove actual causation (also called “but-for” causation), and that burden of proof remains constant throughout the life of the lawsuit. The Court rejected Entertainment Studios Network (ESN)’s argument that § 1981 creates an exception to these default principles, finding that the statute’s text and history, as well as the Court’s precedent, support reading it as following the normal rules. Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for a “motivating factor” causation test, the history of that statute is unique and does not apply to § 1981. Because § 1981 follows the usual rules, a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, the plaintiff would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which she noted her disagreement with a strict but-for causation standard in discrimination cases such as this one but acknowledged the Court’s own precedent otherwise. Justice Ginsburg further clarified that she rejected (and the Court did not resolve) Comcast’s narrow view of the scope of § 1981, that it applies only to the final decision whether to enter a contract and not to earlier stages of the contract-formation process.

Nov 12, 2019 • 1h 23min
[18-587] Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 12, 2019.Decided on Jun 18, 2020.
Petitioner: Department of Homeland Security, et al..Respondent: Regents of the University of California, et al..
Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)
Theodore B. Olson (for the private respondents)
Michael J. Mongan (for the state respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a program—known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)—to postpone the deportation of undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children and to assign them work permits allowing them to obtain social security numbers, pay taxes, and become part of “mainstream” society in the United States.
In 2017, after the national election, when the Trump administration replaced the Obama administration, DHS began a phase-out of DACA. The parties do not dispute the authority of a new administration to replace old policies with new policies, but the plaintiffs in this and related challenges allege that the new administration terminated DACA based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law. Specifically, the Trump administration terminated DACA based on a conclusion that the Obama administration had created DACA “without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date” and thus that it was an “unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.”
The plaintiffs in this case and the related cases challenged this conclusion of law, alleging that the recission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was arbitrary and capricious, and because it was a substantive rule that did not comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. The challengers also alleged that the recission deprived DACA recipients of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests without due process of law and violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was motivated by discriminatory animus.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the DACA recission was not “committed to agency discretion by law” and that there was “law to apply.” Further, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction restoring DACA, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits of their arguments, they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in the plaintiffs’ favor, and the injunction is in the public interest.
Question
Is the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy judicially reviewable?
Is DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy lawful?
Conclusion
The Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down DACA is reviewable, and its decision was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion.
As a threshold matter, the Court noted that the APA contains a rebuttable presumption that agency action is subject to judicial review. Because DACA was not merely a non-enforcement policy but affirmatively created a program for conferring immigration relief, it constitutes agency action subject to judicial review. Further, because the parties do not challenge any removal proceedings, the jurisdictional provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act do not apply.
Under the APA, an agency must supply “reasoned analysis” for its actions. The rescission memorandum failed to consider the possibility of eliminating benefits eligibility while continuing forbearance, relying solely on the Attorney General’s conclusion regarding the illegality of benefits. Moreover, the rescission memorandum failed to address whether there was “legitimate reliance” on the DACA Memorandum. While an agency does not need to consider all policy alternatives, it is required to assess “important aspects” of the problem before it. Given that deferred action was not only “within the ambit” of DACA, but its “centerpiece,” the failure to consider these options rendered the decision arbitrary and capricious.
Joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, The Chief Justice also opined that the respondents in this case failed to establish a plausible inference that the rescission was motivated by animus, in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part. Though she joined the Chief Justice’s opinion as to the reviewability of the rescission and the conclusion that it was arbitrary and capricious, Justice Sotomayor argued that it was premature to dismiss the respondents’ equal protection claims and would thus remand the case to allow the respondents to develop those claims.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas argued that because the Obama administration’s implementation of DACA was unlawful, DHS’s decision to rescind the program is “clearly reasonable” and that the Court’s decision allows administrations to “unlawfully bind their successors by unlawfully adopting significant legal changes through Executive Branch agency memoranda” that “cannot be undone” without “sufficient policy justifications to the satisfaction of this Court.” Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment only as to the rejection of the equal protection claim.
Justice Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, to reiterate his agreement with Justice Thomas’s dissent and with Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s separate dissent.
Justice Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the Court should have focused not on the memorandum by DHS Secretary Duke, but the one by the subsequent DHS Secretary Nielsen, which the Court “jettison[ed]” as a post hoc justification. In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, the Nielsen Memorandum reasonably explained the decision to rescind DACA and thus would pass muster as an explanation for the rescission.

Nov 12, 2019 • 1h 2min
[17-1678] Hernandez v. Mesa
Hernandez v. Mesa
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 12, 2019.Decided on Feb 25, 2020.
Petitioner: Jesus C. Hernández, et al..Respondent: Jesus Mesa, Jr..
Advocates: Stephen I. Vladeck (for the petitioners)
Randolph J. Ortega (for the respondent)
Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández’s friends on U.S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From U.S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him.
Hernández’s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the parents’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “clearly established” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on U.S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hernández’s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could assert claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __ (2017), in which the Court held that for a new type of claim to be cognizable under Bivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim.
Question
Should federal courts recognize a damages claim under Bivens if plaintiffs plausibly allege that a rogue federal law enforcement officer violated clearly established Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for which there is no alternative legal remedy?
Conclusion
The Court’s decision in Bivens does not extend to claims based on a cross-border shooting by a federal law enforcement officer. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion for a 5-4 majority.
Bivens recognized an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the Court has extended that holding to cover claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments as well. When considering whether to extend Bivens, a court must ask (1) whether the claim arises in a “new context” or involves a “new category of defendants,” and if so, then (2) whether there are “special factors” that weigh against extending Bivens to that type of claim.
In this case, the Court found the claims arise from a new and “significantly” different context—a cross-border shooting. As to the second part of the test, the Court also found “multiple” separation-of-powers factors counseling hesitation before extending Bivens: (1) to extend Bivens to this context implicates foreign relations, which is beyond the reach of the Court, (2) the risk of undermining border security and the system of military discipline created by statute and regulation, and (3) Congress has “repeatedly” declined to recognize a damages award against federal officials who cause injury outside U.S. borders. For these reasons, the Court declined to recognize a Bivens cause of action for the injury in this case.
Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to suggest that the Court discard Bivens and its progeny of cases.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that conduct by a “rogue” federal officer is not a new context, but the very context contemplated in Bivens. Even if it were a new setting, Justice Ginsburg argued neither foreign policy nor national security would be endangered by recognizing a Bivens claim in this case, so no “special factors” counsel against recognizing the claim.

Nov 6, 2019 • 1h 3min
[18-260] County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund
County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 6, 2019.Decided on Apr 23, 2020.
Petitioner: County of Maui, Hawaii.Respondent: Hawaii Wildlife Fund.
Advocates: Elbert Lin (for the petitioner)
Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)
David L. Henkin (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources, which the CWA defines as “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances.” In contrast, all other sources of pollution are characterized as nonpoint sources and are controlled through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other non-CWA programs. The CWA also distinguishes between groundwater and navigable waters, the latter being “waters of the United States” and exclusive of the former.
Constructed with funding by the EPA in the 1970s, the County of Maui’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility treats wastewater generated by homes and business in the western part of Maui by injecting treated wastewater (called “effluent”) into underground injection control (UIC) wells—a common method used by municipalities to dispose of effluent. Before injection, effluent is treated to meet R-1 water standards, Hawaii’s highest standards for recycled water. Some of the treated effluent is used for resort and golf course irrigation. Upon injection, effluent immediately mixes with groundwater and disperses vertically and horizontally, eventually migrating to the ocean. Over 90% of the effluent/groundwater mixture enters the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable entry point. Reports from 1973, 1991, and 1994 indicate that both the EPA and the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) understood that the wastewater entered the ocean, and neither agency suggested that this result required NPDES permitting.
The district court at summary judgment held that the County violated the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater and into the ocean without the NPDES permit required by the CWA, and that the County had fair notice of its violations. The court based its ruling on findings that the County “indirectly discharged[d] a pollutant into the ocean through a groundwater conduit,” (2) the groundwater is a “point source” as defined by the CWA, and (3) the groundwater is a “navigable water” under the CWA. The County appealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court.
Question
Does the Clean Water Act require a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater?
Conclusion
The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires a permit when there is a direct discharge, or a functional equivalent of a direct discharge, of pollutants from a point source into navigable waters. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority.
The scope of the statutory language “from any point source” turns on the word “from.” The environmental groups advocated for the broad interpretation adopted by the Ninth Circuit, below—that a pollutant must be “fairly traceable” to the point source. In contrast, the County of Maui and the Solicitor General, as an amicus curiae, argued that the statute required a permit only if the point source is the “last conveyance” that conducted the pollutant to the navigable waters. Based on the statutory context, including inferred congressional intent and legislative history, and “longstanding regulatory practice,” the Court interpreted the phrase to mean something between the two positions advocated by the parties. Specifically, the Court found that the CWA requires a permit if there is a functional equivalent of a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters. The Court described a non-exhaustive list of seven factors to consider when deciding whether a discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge, the most important of which are the time and distance. The Court did not decide whether the facts in the case satisfied its functional equivalent test, but rather vacated the Ninth Circuits judgment and remanded the case for application of the new test.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority in full and authored a concurring opinion to note three points. First, he noted the Court’s interpretation of the CWA is consistent with the interpretation set forth in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Second, Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the statute—not the Court—is vague as to when a pollutant may be considered to have come “from” a point source. Third, with respect to Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent in this case, Justice Kavanaugh disagreed that “the Court does not commit to which factors are the most important in determining whether pollutants that enter navigable waters come ‘from’ a point source.”
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that based on the statutory text and structure, a permit is required only when a point source discharges pollutants directly into navigable waters.
Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority “makes up a rule that provides no clear guidance and invites arbitrary and inconsistent application.”

Nov 6, 2019 • 1h 1min
[18-1165] Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander
Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander
Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 6, 2019.Decided on Jan 14, 2020.
Petitioner: Retirement Plans Committee of IBM, et al..Respondent: Larry W. Jander, et al..
Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)
Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
Samuel Bonderoff (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. __ (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), fiduciaries to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) are not entitled to a presumption of prudence regarding their decisions to buy or hold employer stock. Rather, for a plaintiff to state a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence based on inside information, the plaintiff need only “plausibly allege that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s position could not have concluded that [an alternative action] would do more harm than good to the fund.” Thus the Court established a “context-specific” pleading standard rather than a generalized presumption standard.
IBM offers as a benefit to its employees an ERISA-qualified ESOP, invested predominantly in IBM common stock, with Retirement Plans Committee of IBM as the fiduciary. In 2015, two substantially similar lawsuits were filed against IBM and its officers, one under securities laws and the other under ERISA. Both lawsuits alleged that IBM fraudulently concealed problems with the company’s microelectronics unit, thereby artificially inflating IBM’s reported value. By continuing to invest in IBM stock despite allegedly knowing that the market price was artificially inflated due to the fraudulent scheme, the plaintiffs in the ERISA lawsuit argued that the ESOP’s fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence under Section 404 of ERISA.
The district court dismissed the ERISA lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading standard established in Fifth Third, as they had not alleged facts showing that the fiduciaries “could not have concluded” that publicly disclosing the alleged “fraud” or halting further investments in IBM stock would be more likely to harm the fund than to help it.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add generic allegations that disclosure of the alleged fraud was “inevitable” and that the magnitude of the stock price correction resulting from a delayed disclosure would increase over time. The plaintiffs also added a claim that the fiduciaries could have avoided doing more harm than good by instead purchasing a “low-cost” hedging product.
The district court again dismissed the lawsuit for failing to meet the Fifth Third pleading standard and because a prudent fiduciary could reasonably find their proposed alternative likely to cause more harm than good. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that “when a ‘drop in the value of the stock already held by the fund’ is inevitable, it is far more plausible that a prudent fiduciary would prefer to limit the effects of the stock’s artificial inflation on the ESOP’s beneficiaries through prompt disclosure.”
Question
Do generalized allegations that the harm of an inevitable disclosure of an alleged fraud generally increases over time satisfy the “more harm than good” pleading standard for ERISA claims the Court established in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer?
Conclusion
In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to determine whether to entertain the parties’ arguments on ERISA’s duty of prudence.

Nov 5, 2019 • 1h 1min
[18-877] Allen v. Cooper
Allen v. Cooper
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 5, 2019.Decided on Mar 23, 2020.
Petitioner: Frederick L. Allen, et al..Respondent: Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al..
Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the petitioners)
Ryan Park (for the respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the U.S. Copyright Office.
At some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen’s works. The state then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which purportedly converted Allen’s works into “public record” materials that the state could use freely.
Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA)—which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity”—abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen’s arguments regarding the CRCA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA.
Question
Did Congress validly abrogate state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, which allows authors of original expression to sue states who infringe their federal copyrights?
Conclusion
Congress lacked the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for the Court unanimous in the judgment. First, the Court considered whether, in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Congress had enacted “unequivocal statutory language” abrogating the states’ immunity from lawsuits. The Court concluded that it had. Next, the Court considered whether Congress had authority to do so. Allen argued that the Intellectual Property Clause (art. I § 8, cl. 8) of the U.S. Constitution authorized the exercise of that power, but the Court rejected that theory in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Board, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and stare decisis requires following that precedent unless there is a “special justification” to overturn it. Neither does Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment give Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. For Congress’s action to fall within its Section 5 authority, “there must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented and the means adopted to that end.” In the absence of any evidence of this nature, the CRCA fails this test. Thus, Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in that Act.
Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part and authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s conclusion but noted two disagreements. First, he argue that the Court need not “special justification” to overrule precedent; rather, the Court must correct its error if the prior decision is “demonstrably erroneous.” But the present case does not even meet that lower standard. Second, he declined to join the majority’s discussion regarding future copyright legislation.
Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Breyer pointed out the inherent unfairness to creators and artists that arises from the Court’s decision but concurred in the judgment because the Court’s precedent in Florida Prepaid “controls this case.”

Nov 5, 2019 • 56min
[18-565] CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co.
CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co.
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Nov 5, 2019.Decided on Mar 30, 2020.
Petitioner: CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al..Respondent: Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al..
Advocates: Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners)
Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent)
Thomas C. Goldstein (for the private respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1,900-mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers.
As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $143 million.
Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil.
At the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of CITGO’s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati (thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO’s liability by 50%. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims.
Question
Under federal maritime law, is a safe-berth clause in a voyage charter contract a guarantee of a ship’s safety or a duty of due diligence?
Conclusion
A safe-berth clause in a voyage charter agreement—which requires the party to designate a safe berth for a vessel to load and discharge cargo—establishes a warranty of safety. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for a 7-2 majority of the Court. The Court first looked at the text of the safe-berth clause in the charter agreement, finding that it imposes, unqualified, on the charterer a duty to select a safe berth. Although the clause does not expressly use the word “warranty,” it need not do so to be subject to such an obligation. Basic principles of contract law hold a party strictly liable for a breach of contract, regardless of fault or diligence, and those principles determine the outcome here, as well.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Thomas argued that the majority’s conclusion “is the wrong rule and finds no basis in the contract’s plain text.” Because the plain language of the safe-berth clause “contains no warranty of safety,” Justice Thomas would remand the case for factfinding on whether industry custom and usage establish such a warranty.