Supreme Court Oral Arguments

United States v. Briggs Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 13, 2020.Decided on Dec 10, 2020. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Michael J.D. Briggs. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for the petitioner) Stephen I. Vladeck (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Michael Briggs guilty of rape in violation of Article 120(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2000), for conduct that occurred nine years earlier, in 2005. The UCMJ allows for a military offense that is punishable by death to be “tried and punished at any time without limitation.” In contrast, other military offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a death sentence for rape of an adult woman, Briggs argued on appeal that rape was not “punishable by death” and thus was subject to the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital crimes. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) rejected his challenge because Briggs had not raised the statute of limitations claim at trial. The court therefore affirmed the finding and sentence of the judge below. Briggs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Reviewing for plain error, the C.A.A.F. reversed the lower court, finding that the Rules for Courts-Martial R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B) requires the military judge to inform the accused of the right to assert the statute of limitations. As such, the court found that if the military judge had informed Briggs of a possible statute of limitations defense, he would have sought dismissal. Question Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces err in concluding—contrary to its own longstanding precedent—that the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows prosecution of a rape that occurred between 1986 and 2006 only if it was discovered and charged within five years? Conclusion The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces erred in concluding that the five-year statute of limitations applies to the prosecution of rape. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion on behalf of a unanimous (8-0) Court. The UCMJ exempts offenses “punishable by death” from the statute of limitations for prosecutions. Even though the offense of rape is no longer punishable by death, the context of that phrase implies that the offense itself is still not subject to the statute of limitations that applies to other offenses. First, the UCMJ is a “uniform” code, which means that it generally refers only to other provisions within the UCMJ itself, rather than external sources of law. The “most natural place” to determine whether rape was “punishable by death” and thus exempt from the statute of limitations is the UCMJ itself. Second, statutes of limitations are intended to provide clarity, and having to consider “all applicable law” to determine whether an offense is punishable by death obscures, rather than clarifies, the filing deadline. Finally, it is “unlikely” that lawmakers would want a statute of limitations to refer to judicial interpretations of such provisions, given that the purposes of statutes of limitations differ from the ends served courts’ Eighth Amendment analysis. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion to opine that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the CAAF but expressing agreement with the majority on the merits. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2020.Decided on Apr 5, 2021. Petitioner: Google LLC.Respondent: Oracle America, Inc.. Advocates: Thomas C. Goldstein (for the petitioner) E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the respondent) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) When Google implemented its Android Operating System (Android OS), it wrote its own programming language based on Java, which is owned by Oracle. To facilitate developers writing their own programs for Android OS, Google’s version used the same names, organization, and functionality as Java's Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement, but the federal district judge held that APIs are not subject to copyright because permitting a private entity to own the copyright to a programming language would stifle innovation and collaboration, contrary to the goals of copyright. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that the Java APIs are copyrightable but leaving open the possibility of a fair use defense. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Google’s petition for certiorari. Upon remand to the district court, a jury found that Google's use of the Java API was fair use. Oracle appealed, and the Federal Circuit again reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit held that Google's use was not fair as a matter of law. Question 1. Does copyright protection extend to a software interface? 2. If so, does the petitioner’s use of a software interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitute fair use? Conclusion Assuming a software interface may be subject to copyright protection, Google’s limited copying of the Java SE Application Programming Interface constituted a fair use of that material under copyright law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 6-2 majority opinion. Copyright law aims to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by simultaneously granting creators exclusive copyrights and limiting the scope of such rights through the fair use doctrine. To decide no more than necessary to resolve the case, the Court assumed that software code is subject to copyright protection. Courts consider four statutory factors in evaluating whether a secondary use is fair. First, Google’s use of the Java APIs is transformative. Google copied only what was necessary to allow programmers to work in a different computing environment but with a familiar programming language. Second, the copied lines are “inherently bound together with uncopyrightable ideas,” suggesting that the application of fair use to this context is unlikely to undermine the general copyright protection that Congress provided for computer programs. Third, Google copied only .4% of the entire API, weighing in favor of fair use. Finally, the record shows that Google’s new smartphone platform is not a market substitute for Java SE. Because all four factors support a finding of fair use, Google’s limited copying constituted fair use. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the Court should have addressed the question whether Oracle’s code is copyrightable. Justice Thomas would have concluded that it is, and then he would have found that Google’s use of that copyrighted code was not fair. By copying Oracle’s code, Google “erased 97.5% of the value of Oracle’s partnership with Amazon, made tens of billions of dollars, and established its position as the owner of the largest mobile operating system in the world.”  Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2020.Decided on Mar 25, 2021. Petitioner: Ford Motor Company.Respondent: Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al.. Advocates: Sean Marotta (for the petitioner) Deepak Gupta (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch. The personal representative of Gullett’s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design-defect, failure-to-warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant’s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s activities within the state. Ford Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana. The district court denied Ford’s motion to dismiss, finding a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there. This case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19-369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question. Question May a state court, consistent with the Due Process Clause, exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when none of the defendant’s contacts with that state caused the plaintiff’s claims? Conclusion The state courts in this case properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of the connection between plaintiffs’ product-liability claims arising from car accidents occurring in each plaintiff’s state of residence and Ford’s activities in those states. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a state court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Such exercise requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum state that the maintenance of a suit there is reasonable. Despite Ford’s argument to the contrary, this requirement establishes no “causation” requirement. That is, for jurisdiction to attach, it is not necessary that the defendant’s forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims. Rather, the Court’s precedents require only that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford’s substantial presence in the states (advertising, selling, and servicing those two car models, even if not the two specific vehicles involved in this case) establishes minimum contacts, and it does not matter that those contacts did not cause the plaintiffs’ injuries. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court need not focus on the words “relate to” as an independent basis for specific jurisdiction, and that doing so “risks needless complications.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch argued against the majority’s focus on the phrase “relate to” and elaborated on the “needless complications” referenced by Justice Alito in his concurrence.

Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2020. Petitioner: Leslie Rutlege, Arkansas Attorney General.Respondent: Pharmaceutical Care Management Association. Advocates: Nicholas J. Bronni (for the petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) Seth P. Waxman (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2015, the legislature of Arkansas passed a law regulating the conduct of pharmacy benefits managers ("PBMs")—the entities that serve as intermediaries between health plans and pharmacies—in an attempt to address the trend in that state of significantly fewer independent and rural-serving pharmacies. PBMs perform numerous functions in this rule, including creating a maximum allowable cost ("MAC") list which sets reimbursement rates to pharmacies dispensing generic drugs. As a result of contracts between PBMs and some pharmacies, some other pharmacies might actually lose money on a particular prescription transaction. The Act sought to address this and other situations where the conduct of PBMs could cause harm to pharmacies. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association (PCMA), a pharmacy trade association, filed a lawsuit on behalf of its members claiming, among other arguments, that Arkansas Act 900 is preempted by both ERISA and Medicare Part D. The district court found that ERISA did preempt some portions of the Act but that Medicare Part D did not preempt the Act. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Act 900 was preempted by both ERISA and Medicare Part D. The appellate court noted that ERISA broadly preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plans." Because Act 900 “both relates to and has a connection with employee benefit plans,” ERISA preempts it. Question Does ERISA preempt an Arkansas law regulating pharmacy benefit managers’ drug-reimbursement rates?

Tanzin v. Tanvir Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2020.Decided on Dec 10, 2020. Petitioner: FNU Tanzin, et al..Respondent: Muhammad Tanvir, et al.. Advocates: Edwin S. Kneedler (for the petitioners) Ramzi Kassem (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the U.S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed their names on the national “No Fly List,” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in U.S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”  The U.S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges. Question Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, permit lawsuits seeking money damages against individual federal employees? Conclusion The express remedies of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permit litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous (8-0) Court. RFRA states that persons may sue and “obtain appropriate relief against a government,” including officials of the United States. In using this language, RFRA adopts a meaning of the word “government” different from its ordinary meaning—one that encompasses individual officials. The phrase “appropriate relief” is “open-ended,” and monetary damages have long been awarded as an appropriate form of relief. Thus, the best understanding of RFRA is that it permits lawsuits seeking money damages against individual federal officials. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Texas v. New Mexico Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 5, 2020.Decided on Dec 14, 2020. Petitioner: Texas.Respondent: New Mexico. Advocates: Kyle D. Hawkins (for the State of Texas) Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for the State of New Mexico) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting New Mexico) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies with its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 30 days of its final determination. In 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico. When the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based on the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30-day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to credit New Mexico for the evaporative loss. Question 1. Did the River Master err in retroactively amending the River Master Manual? 2. Did the River Master err in charging Texas for evaporative losses? Conclusion Texas’s motion to review the Pecos River Master’s determination is denied. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. New Mexico’s motion for credit for the evaporated water was not untimely. As Texas and New Mexico agreed to postpone the River Master’s resolution of the evaporated water issue, neither party may now object to the negotiation procedure the River Master outlined for resolving the dispute. Additionally, Texas’s request that Net Mexico store water at a facility in New Mexico was based on Texas’s understanding that the water belonged to Texas. Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the Court’s rejection of Texas’s argument that New Mexico forfeited any objection to the River Master’s 2014 report because it did not file an objection by the deadline imposed by the amended decree. However, he would vacate and remand the case for the River Master to redo his analysis in accordance with the relevant terms of the amended decree and the manual. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Carney v. Adams Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 5, 2020.Decided on Dec 10, 2020. Petitioner: John C. Carney, Governor of Delaware.Respondent: James R. Adams. Advocates: Michael W. McConnell (for the petitioner) David L. Finger (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) James R. Adams is a resident of Delaware and member of that state’s bar. Adams considered applying for a judicial position but ultimately decided not to because the state required the candidate to be a Republican, and Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat. Adams filed a lawsuit against the governor, challenging the provision of the Delaware Constitution that limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican Parties. First, the district court held Adams had Article III (“constitutional”) standing as to some, but not all of the provisions, but that because he had prudential standing to the other provisions, it would consider his challenge as to all of them. Turning to the merits, the district court noted that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel, a government employer may not make employment decisions based on political allegiance except with respect to policymakers. The court found that a judge’s job is to apply, rather than create, the law, and thus that judges do not fall within the policymaking exception of Elrod and Burns. As such, the court found the provision unconstitutional in its entirety. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed only as to the provisions for which Adams lacked Article III standing. Question 1. Does the plaintiff in this case have Article III standing to challenge Delaware’s judicial service requirements? 2. Does a state law that effectively limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican parties violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Because Adams had not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to demonstrate Article III standing to challenge the Delaware Constitution’s political balance requirement for appointments to the State’s major courts. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous (8-0) opinion of the Court. Article III standing requires that an “injury in fact” be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” In this context, Adams needed to show that he was likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future, which required a showing that he was “able and ready” to apply. He did not adequately make this showing, supporting his claim only with two statements he made that he wanted to be a judge without other supporting evidence of his intent to do so. As such, his grievance is generalized and does not meet the requirement for an “injury in fact.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion expressing her agreement that Adams did not demonstrate Article III standing. In anticipation that the constitutional questions raised in the case were likely to be raised again, she highlighted two considerations that “may inform their answers”: the possibility of material difference between the “major party” requirement and the “bare majority” requirement, and a question of the severability of those two requirements. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 

Colorado Department of State v. Baca Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on May 13, 2020.Decided on Jul 6, 2020. Petitioner: Colorado Department of State.Respondent: Micheal Baca, et al.. Advocates: Philip J. Weiser (for the petitioner) Jason Harrow (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich were appointed as three of Colorado’s nine presidential electors for the 2016 general election. Colorado law requires presidential electors to cast their votes for the winner of the popular vote in the state for President and Vice President. When Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in that state, instead of casting his vote for her, Mr. Baca cast his vote for John Kasich. The Colorado Secretary of State discarded his vote and removed him as an elector. As a result, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich voted for Hillary Clinton, despite their desire to vote for John Kasich. The three presidential electors sued the Colorado Department of State, alleging that the law requiring presidential electors to vote for the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in that state violates their constitutional rights under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed the action, finding the electors lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, and in the alternative, because the electors failed to state a legal claim because the Constitution does not prohibit states from requiring electors to vote for the winner of the state’s popular vote. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court as to Mr. Baca’s standing, but reversed as to the standing of the other two electors who did not cast their votes in violation of the law. On the merits, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding the state’s removal of Mr. Baca and nullification of his vote were unconstitutional. Question 1. Do the petitioners in this case, the presidential electors, have judicial standing to sue the state of Colorado over a law requiring them to vote in the Electoral College for the winner of the popular vote in that state? 2. Is that Colorado law unconstitutional? Conclusion In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court reversed the judgment of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit below, for the reasons stated in Chiafalo v. Washington. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in that case, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor took no part in the decision of this case.

Chiafalo v. Washington Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on May 13, 2020.Decided on Jul 6, 2020. Petitioner: Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John.Respondent: State of Washington. Advocates: Lawrence Lessig (for the petitioners) Noah Purcell (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $1,000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a “winner-take-all” electoral system, which means that all of a state’s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state. In the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton/Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a different individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $1,000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law. The electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed. This case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19-518, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020. Question Does a state law requiring presidential electors to vote the way state law directs or else be subject to a fine violate the electors’ First Amendment rights? Conclusion A state may constitutionally enforce a presidential elector’s pledge to support his party’s nominee—and the state voters’ choice—for President. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion that was unanimous in the judgment. Article II, §1 gives the States the authority to appoint electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” which the Court has interpreted as conveying to the states “the broadest power of determination” over who becomes an elector. The Twelfth Amendment, which also addresses the Electoral College, only sets out the electors’ voting procedures. Thus, the appointment power of the states is extensive, and nothing in the Constitution prohibits states from taking away the discretion of presidential electors’ discretion, as Washington does. The history of voting in this country supports the conclusion that electors do not have the discretion to vote however they like; indeed “long settled and established practice” of voting in this nation requires finding that electors are required to vote for the candidate whom the state’s voters have chosen. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, but for a different reason. Justice Thomas disagreed with the Court that Article II determines the outcome in this case; he would resolve this case by simply recognizing the principle enshrined in the Tenth Amendment that “[a]ll powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the States are controlled by the people of each State.” Justice Neil Gorsuch joined as to the discussion of the Tenth Amendment.

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on May 12, 2020.Decided on Jul 9, 2020. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, et al..Respondent: Mazars USA, LLP, et al.. Advocates: Patrick Strawbridge (for the petitioners) Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Douglas N. Letter (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to Mazars USA, the accounting firm for Donald Trump (in his capacity as a private citizen) and several of his businesses, demanding private financial records belonging to Trump. According to the Committee, the requested documents would inform its investigation into whether Congress should amend or supplement its ethics-in-government laws. Trump argued that the information serves no legitimate legislative purpose and sued to prevent Mazars from complying with the subpoena. The district court granted summary judgment for the Committee, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding the Committee possesses the authority under both the House Rules and the Constitution. In the consolidated case, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 19-760, two committees of the U.S. House of Representatives—the Committee on Financial Services and the Intelligence Committee—issued a subpoena to the creditors of President Trump and several of his businesses. The district court denied Trump’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent compliance with the subpoenas, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in substantial part and remanded in part. Question Does the Constitution prohibit subpoenas issued to Donald Trump’s accounting firm requiring it to provide non-privileged financial records relating to Trump (as a private citizen) and some of his businesses? Conclusion The courts below did not take adequate account of the significant separation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. The Court first acknowledged that this dispute between Congress and the Executive is the first of its kind to reach the Court and that the Court does not take lightly its responsibility to resolve the issue in a manner that ensures “it does not needlessly disturb ‘the compromises and working arrangements’ reached by those branches. Each house of Congress has “indispensable” power “to secure needed information” in order to legislate, including the power to issue a congressional subpoena, provided that the subpoena is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.” However, the issuance of a congressional subpoena upon the sitting President raises important separation-of-powers concerns. The standard advocated by the President—a “demonstrated, specific need”—is too stringent. At the same time, the standard advocated by the House—a “valid legislative purpose”—does not adequately safeguard the President from an overzealous and perhaps politically motivated Congress. Rather than adopt either party’s approach, the Court proposed a balancing test that considers four factors. First, courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose requires involving the President and his papers, or whether the information is available elsewhere. Second, courts should consider whether the subpoena is no broader than reasonably necessary in scope so as to still serve Congress’s legislative purpose. Third, courts should evaluate the evidence Congress has offered to “establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose”—the more “detailed and substantial,” the better. Finally, courts should assess what burdens a subpoena imposes on the President. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that Congress can never issue a legislative subpoena for private, unofficial documents. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that even accepting the balancing test adopted by the majority, the House subpoenas should fail without a greater showing from the House as to each of the four considerations outlined by the majority.