Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Monasky v. Taglieri Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 11, 2019.Decided on Feb 25, 2020. Petitioner: Michelle Monasky.Respondent: Domenico Taglieri. Advocates: Amir C. Tayrani (for the petitioner) Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party) Andrew J. Pincus (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights. The Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court’s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en banc) affirmed. Question When an infant is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, is a subjective agreement between the infant‘s parents is necessary to establish her habitual residence under the Hague Convention? What is the proper standard of review of a district court’s determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention—de novo, a deferential version of de novo, or for clear error? Conclusion Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a child’s “habitual residence” depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parties. Such a determination is subject to review for clear error. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the Court that was unanimous in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined in part and concurred in the judgment. The text of the Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but the accompanying explanatory report states that a child habitually resides where she is at home. No single fact is dispositive of all cases; instead, courts must make a fact-driven inquiry “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.” The Court found unpersuasive Monasky’s argument that an actual agreement between the parents on where to raise their child was required to determine the child’s habitual residence. None of the treaty partners interpret the treaty that way, and to do so would run counter to the principle that the inquiry is an intensely fact-driven one. Turning to the question of the standard of review, the Court found that because the question of habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact that is heavily fact-laden, a determination by a trial court should be entitled to deferential clear-error review. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas would have decided this case principally on the plain meaning of the treaty’s text—which leads to the same outcome.

McKinney v. Arizona Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 11, 2019.Decided on Feb 25, 2020. Petitioner: James Erin McKinney.Respondent: State of Arizona. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner) Oramel H. Skinner (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) By way of relevant background, James McKinney’s childhood was “horrific” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse—all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention. In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney’s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund’s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder. At McKinney’s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney’s childhood trauma and produce “diminished capacity.” The trial judge credited the psychologist’s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney’s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider McKinney’s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney’s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘final’ before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring. Question After the Ninth Circuit identifies an Eddings error, may the state appellate court reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, or must a jury resentence the defendant? Conclusion After a finding of a capital sentencing (Eddings) error during habeas corpus review, the state appellate court, rather than the jury, may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to resentence the defendant. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion for the Court. In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), the Supreme Court a state appellate court may conduct the reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances after a capital sentencing error was found on collateral review. Although that case involved improperly considering an aggravating circumstance, and this case involved improperly ignoring a mitigating circumstance, the Court found no meaningful difference in the context. Thus, the Court found, Clemons determined the outcome in this case. The Court found unpersuasive McKinney’s argument that because the Arizona trial court, not a jury, made the initial aggravating circumstances finding that made him eligible for the death penalty, a jury must weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the Court’s decision in Ring. Agreeing with the court below, the Court found that McKinney’s case was “final” before Ring was decided, and that case does not apply retroactively to this situation. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s precedent require the application of new rules of constitutional law to cases currently on direct review (with two exceptions, neither of which applies, by the Court’s own holding). Thus, Justice Ginsburg, argued, the “pivotal question” in this case is whether McKinney’s case is currently on direct review, in which case Ring applies (retroactively), or on collateral review, in which case Ring does not apply. McKinney’s first appeal of a criminal conviction is “the archetype” of direct review, and his renewal of that first appeal “cannot sensibly be characterized as anything other than direct review.” As such, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Arizona Supreme Court’s proceeding presently before the Court is a direct review and thus that Ring applies, making McKinney’s death sentences unconstitutional. 

Holguin-Hernandez v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2019.Decided on Feb 26, 2020. Petitioner: Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Kendall Turner (for the petitioner) Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent in support of vacatur) K. Winn Allen (for the court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges. At the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court issued a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence. Question Must a criminal defendant make a formal objection after the pronouncement of his sentence to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of the sentence? Conclusion A criminal defendant need not make a formal objection to his issued sentence in order to preserve his right on appeal to have that sentence reviewed for “reasonableness” rather than for “plain error,” the standard that would control absent sufficient objection at the time of sentencing. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer noted a split of authority among the various federal courts of appeal and explained, “We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that defendants are required to refer to the “reasonableness’ of a sentence” to preserve their right to have that sentence reviewed for reasonableness rather than plain error. In other words, “A defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” The Court continued, “He need not also refer to the standard of review” in his argument or objection to preserve the more favorable reasonableness standard of review on appeal.  The Court also noted a pair of issues raised by the government and various amicus curiae about preserving a claim of improper sentencing procedures and also when a party has preserved particular arguments regarding an appeal over the length of a sentence. The Court refused to reach those larger issues, holding only that the appellant had preserved his right to appeal the length of his sentence as unreasonable in the particular circumstances of this case. Justice Alito authored a concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, to further elaborate on the limited nature of the ruling.

Maine Community Health Options v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2019.Decided on Apr 27, 2020. Petitioner: Maine Community Health Options.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners) Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress, in order to persuade the nation’s health insurance industry to provide insurance to previously uninsured or uninsurable persons, the legislation creating the Affordable Care Act provided that insurance losses over a designated percentage would be reimbursed, and comparable profits would be turned over to the government. In reliance on the government’s commitment to reimburse them, the nation’s insurance industry provided the designated health insurance. However, when some carriers experienced significant losses, the government refused to appropriate the funds to pay the statutory shortfall and prohibited existing funds from being used for this purpose. As a result, the insurers did not receive reimbursement. Several of these insurance carriers filed suit against the government seeking reimbursement. The courts denied them the relief they sought, in part relying on the “cardinal rule” disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with “especial force” to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is “irreconcilable” with the former. Question Do the insurance carriers in this case have a right to payment under the “Risk Corridors” program of the Affordable Care Act? Conclusion The insurance carriers in this case have a right to payment under the “Risk Corridors” program of the Affordable Care Act, Congress did not repeal the obligation of the federal government to pay the carriers, and the carriers can sue for payment under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for an 8-1 majority. First, the Court considered whether the Risk Corridors program, Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act, obligated the federal government to pay participating insurers the full amount calculated by the statute. Congress may create an obligation directly through statutory language, which it did through the Risk Corridors program, in plain language. Thus, the legal duty of the government became a legal liability when the insurance carriers participated in the health care exchanges. Second, the Court considered whether Congress impliedly repealed the obligation by passing appropriations riders. The Court first noted its “aversion to implied repeals,” especially in the context of appropriations. For an implied repeal, the government must show more than merely the failure to appropriate sufficient funds, which it did not do here. Finally, the Court considered whether the insurance carriers properly brought suit under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. Although the federal government is immune from suit unless it unequivocally consents, it waived immunity for certain damages suits in the Court of Federal Claims through the Tucker Act. A claim falls within the Tucker Act’s immunity waiver if: (1) the claim “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained,” (2) the obligation-creating statute does not provide its own detailed remedies, and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act does not provide an avenue for relief. In this case, the Court found that the insurance carriers’ claim satisfied this test and was thus properly brought under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined the majority opinion except as to the part discussing the legislative history of the appropriations riders. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority’s decision “infers a private right of action” where Congress did not expressly create one. Specifically, Justice Alito questioned the test the Court has used (and used in this case) to determine whether a claim may be brought against the United States under the Tucker Act.

Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2019.Decided on Apr 20, 2020. Petitioner: Thryv, Inc..Respondent: Click-to-Call Technologies, LP and Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Advocates: Adam H. Charnes (for the petitioner) Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent, supporting reversal) Daniel L. Geyser (for the private respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case arises out of a complex procedural history involving a patent dispute between several parties and concerns not the merits of the proceedings but a procedural aspect of it. The America Invents Act created “inter partes review” as a way of challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One provision, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), precludes the institution of inter partes review more than one year after the petitioner “is served with a complaint” alleging infringement of the patent. The parties disagree over whether this one-year time bar applies when the underlying patent infringement suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it does apply. The court rejected the argument that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice restores the parties to their positions as though no legal proceedings had ever begun, concluding instead that a defendant served with a complaint remains “served” even if the civil action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and thus does such a dismissal does not toll the statute of limitations. Further, 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) provides that “the determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” Notwithstanding this provision, the en banc Federal Circuit held that a decision to institute an inter partes review after finding that the § 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable. Question Does 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permit an appeal of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute an inter partes review upon finding that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply? Conclusion Section 314(d) precludes judicial review of a Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review upon finding that §315(b)’s time bar did not apply. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the 7-2 majority opinion for the Court. The text of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), as well as the Court’s decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. __ (2016), preclude a party from arguing on appeal that the agency should have refused “to institute an inter partes review.” A challenge under § 315(d) constitutes an appeal of the agency’s decision “to institute an inter partes review” and thus falls within the general prohibition of § 314(d). The majority (though without Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito) found further support for this understanding in the statute’s purpose and design, which is “to weed out bad patent claims efficiently.” The Court found Click-to-Call’s claims to the contrary unpersuasive. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined in large part, arguing that the majority’s decision allows a “politically guided agency” to take the rightful property of an inventor and immunizes the agency’s action from judicial review.

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2019.Decided on Mar 23, 2020. Petitioner: Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla.Respondent: William P. Barr. Advocates: Paul W. Hughes (for the petitioners) Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero’s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, under Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2018) the question whether a litigant acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual question, not a question of law, and thus is not reviewable. Question Does the phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and Nationality Act include the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts? Conclusion The phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s Limited Review Provision, 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(D), includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petitioners’ “factual” due diligence claims for equitable tolling purposes. The Court first looked to the statute’s language, finding that nothing there precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. Courts repeatedly refer to mixed questions of law and fact as “questions of law.” The Court then considered the principle of statutory construction favoring judicial review of administrative action, finding that principle supported interpreting the court of appeals as having appellate jurisdiction in cases such as this one. Next the Court looked at the language immediately surrounding the phrase at issue, finding a “zipper clause,” which consolidates judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.” The Court then turned to the statutory history and relevant precedent, finding that they too supported an interpretation of “questions of law” as including the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined all but one subpart. Justice Thomas argued that despite being presented with a narrow question, the Court’s decision answers a much broader question and “effectively nullifies a jurisdiction-stripping statute” by disregarding the text and structure of the statute.

Banister v. Davis Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2019.Decided on Jun 1, 2020. Petitioner: Gregory Dean Banister.Respondent: Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division. Advocates: Brian T. Burgess (for the petitioner) Kyle D. Hawkins (for the respondent) Benjamin W. Snyder (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gregory Dean Banister was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. He filed a habeas petition asserting numerous constitutional violations, which the district court denied on the merits on May 15, 2017. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which the district court also denied in the same order. On June 12, 2017, Banister filed a motion to “amend or alter” the judgment of the district court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court denied on the merits on June 20, 2017. On July 20, 2017, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA, which the district court “considered” despite its previous order denying the COA, but again denied on July 28, 2017. Banister then sought and received from the Fifth Circuit an extension of time to file a COA application. He filed a petition for a COA with the Fifth Circuit on October 11, 2017, and the court denied his petition, citing lack of jurisdiction, on May 8, 2018. The Fifth Circuit held that Banister’s purported 59(e) motion was, in fact, a successive habeas petition, which would not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Fifth Circuit noted that “alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.” Question Under what circumstances should a timely Rule 59(e) motion be recharacterized as a successive habeas petition? Conclusion A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court’s judgment is not a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), so Banister’s appeal was timely. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for the 7-2 majority. To determine what “second or successive application” means, the Court first turned to historical habeas doctrine and practice and the purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which governs federal habeas proceedings. In Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257 (YYYY), decided before AEDPA, the Court held that Rule 59(e) applied in habeas proceedings. Although the language of the rule has since changed, those changes did not narrow the scope of that rule. In the fifty years since the adoption of the Federal Rules, only once has a court dismissed a Rule 59(e) motion as impermissibly successive, resolving all other cases on the merits. When Congress passed AEDPA, it gave no indication it intended to change this understood meaning of a successive application, nor do its purposes suggest such a change in meaning. The Court pointed out that its decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), applied to Rule 60(b) and that Rule 60(b) is substantially different from Rule 59(e) in critical ways. While Rule 60(b) is a means of attacking a habeas court’s judgment, a Rule 59(e) motion is a one-time effort to point out alleged errors in a just-issued decision before taking a single appeal. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, arguing that because a Rule 59(e) motion asserts a habeas claim, it must be viewed as a “second or successive habeas petition” and be treated as such.

Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2019.Decided on Feb 26, 2020. Petitioner: Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al..Respondent: Christopher M. Sulyma. Advocates: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the petitioners) Matthew W.H. Wessler (for the respondent) Matthew Guarnieri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company’s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment (and thus investment) period of 2010 to 2012. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred under 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “actual knowledge” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Question Does the three-year statute of limitations period in ERISA, which runs “from the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation”—bar a suit where the defendants disclosed all relevant information but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information? Conclusion The three-year statute of limitation does not run from the date where a plaintiff had access to but did not read, or could not recall reading, the information giving rise to an ERISA claim. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Alito explained that, “Although ERISA does not define the phrase ‘actual knowledge’” in setting the statute of limitations, “its meaning is plain.” After quoting a number of general and legal dictionaries (though stating the exercise was “hardly necessary to confirm the point”), the Court concluded that an individual must in fact be aware of a piece of information in order to have “actual knowledge” of it.  The Court pointed to other sections of the ERISA statute that make the distinction more clearly than that governing the statute of limitations for an ERISA claim. Because Congress repeatedly drew a distinction between “what an ERISA plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know,” the Court would not impute to knowledge to an ERISA plaintiff absent evidence of what that plaintiff was in fact aware of that gave rise to the ERISA claim. The Court concluded by noting the limitations of its holding. It noted that its ruling did not limit any of the ways a defendant might demonstrate actual knowledge by an ERISA plaintiff sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, nor does it allow a plaintiff to disclaim actual knowledge where the evidence points to actual knowledge. Finally, the Court also clarified that its holding does not stop defendants from arguing that “willful blindness” to a potential ERISA claim should allow a defendant to avoid the actual knowledge necessary to trigger ERISA’s statute of limitations.

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, et al. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2019.Decided on Apr 20, 2020. Petitioner: Atlantic Ritchfield Company.Respondent: Gregory A. Christian, et al.. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) Joseph R. Palmore (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case arises from Montana’s Anaconda Smelter site—the location of a large copper concentrating and smelting operation that started in 1884 and expanded to other nearby areas in 1902. In 1977, Atlantic Richfield purchased Anaconda Smelter, and it shut down smelter activities in 1980. The smelter operations over the almost-century of operations caused high concentrations of arsenic, lead, copper, cadmium, and zinc to contaminate soil, groundwater, and surface water. In 1983, the EPA prioritized the Anaconda Smelter site as a Superfund site, working with Atlantic Richfield to address the contamination. Since then, Atlantic Richfield has worked with the EPA for 35 years to remediate the site, at a cost of approximately $470 million. In 2008, landowners within the Anaconda Superfund site sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court, alleging that the smelter operations between 1884 and 1980 had caused damage to their properties. Atlantic Richfield raised no objections to the plaintiffs’ claims of loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminution of value, incidental and consequential damages, and annoyance and discomfort. However, it did object to the common-law claim for “restoration” damages. To establish a claim for restoration damages in Montana, plaintiffs must prove that they will actually use the award to clean up the site. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that restoration of their property requires “work in excess of what the EPA required of Atlantic Richfield in its selected remedy.” Atlantic Richfield moved for summary judgment, arguing that the restoration claim constituted a “challenge” to the EPA’s remedy and thus was jurisdictionally barred by CERCLA § 113, which deprives courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA-selected remedies. Atlantic Richfield also argued that the landowners are “potentially responsible parties” and thus must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action. Finally, Atlantic Richfield argued that CERCLA preempted state common-law claims for restoration. The trial court held that CERCLA permitted plaintiffs’ claim for restoration damages, and Atlantic Richfield sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court, which the court granted. Over a dissent, the Supreme Court of Montana rejected all three of Atlantic Richfield’s arguments, affirming the trial court’s decision permitting the plaintiffs to proceed to a jury trial on their restoration claim. Question Is a common-law claim for restoration seeking cleanup remedies that conflict with remedies the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ordered a jurisdictionally barred “challenge” to the EPA’s cleanup under 42 U.S.C. § 9613 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)? Is a landowner at a Superfund site a “potentially responsible party” that must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action? Does CERCLA preempt state common-law claims for restoration that seek cleanup remedies that conflict with EPA-ordered remedies? Conclusion The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim for restoration, and the Montana Supreme Court erred in holding that the landowners in this case were not potentially responsible parties under CERCLA and thus did not need the Environmental Protection Agency’s approval to take remedial action. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion. In Part II-A, the Court unanimously held that it had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Montana Supreme Court. The Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments, and a state court judgment is a “final judgment if it is “an effective determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein.” Because under Montana law, a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-contained case, not an interlocutory appeal, it was a final judgment subject to review. In Part II-B, the Chief Justice, writing for the 8-1 majority, found that the Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this lawsuit. While § 113(b) of CERCLA provides that “the United States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this chapter,” thereby depriving state courts of jurisdiction over such actions, the landowners’ common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability claims arise under Montana law, not under the Act. Justice Samuel Alito dissented from this part of the opinion, writing in his separate opinion that the issue of whether state courts have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to EPA-approved CERCLA plans was “neither necessary nor prudent” to decide in this case. In Part III, the Chief Justice, writing for the 7-2 majority, held that the Montana Supreme Court erred by holding that the landowners were not potentially responsible parties under the Act and therefore did not need EPA approval to take remedial action. To determine who is a potentially responsible party, the Court found that the Act includes as “covered persons” any “owner” of “a facility,” and that a “facility” includes “any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.” Under this definition, the landowners are “potentially responsible parties,” and this reading is consistent with the Act’s objective “to develop a ‘Comprehensive Environmental Response’ to hazardous waste pollution.” Justice Neil Gorsuch (joined by Justice Clarence Thomas) dissented from this part of the opinion, arguing that the majority’s holding departs from CERCLA’s terms in a way that transforms the Act “from a law that supplements state environmental restoration efforts into one that prohibits them.” Justice Gorsuch expressed concern that the Court’s reading “strips away ancient common law rights from innocent landowners and forces them to suffer toxic waste in their backyards, playgrounds, and farms.”

Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2019.Decided on Feb 25, 2020. Petitioner: Simon E. Rodriguez.Respondent: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Advocates: Mitchell P. Reich (for the petitioner) Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI) was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings when it received a tax refund check from the Internal Revenue Service that was the result of net operating losses incurred by one of UWBI’s subsidiaries (United Western Bank). UWBI and its subsidiaries had entered into a tax allocation agreement in 2008 that was the source of the present ownership dispute. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) alleged that, as receiver for the Bank, it was entitled to the federal tax refund that was due because the refund stemmed exclusively from the Bank’s business loss carrybacks. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated a bankruptcy adversary proceeding against the FDIC, alleging that UWBI owned the tax refund and thus that it was part of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court agreed with Rodriguez and entered summary judgment. The FDIC appealed to federal district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. Under federal common law, “a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund.” Applying this rule and noting that the agreement’s intended treatment of tax refunds mandates the same result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax refund at issue belonged to the Bank and thus that the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, was entitled to summary judgment. Question Does federal common law or the law of the relevant state determine the ownership of a tax refund paid to an affiliated group? Conclusion In an opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, a unanimous Court held that state law is “well equipped to handle disputes involving corporate property rights.” Federal common law should only exist to “protect uniquely federal interests” the Court explained. “Nothing like that exists here” it continued. While the federal government potentially has a sufficiently unique interest in rules governing the receipt of taxes from corporate entities, the court elaborated, it questioned the strength of any interest in how a tax refund, once received, is distributed among the members of that entity. The Court found that neither federal courts that have applied federal common law to this question nor the FDIC as the advocate for federal common law in this case had ever articulated a sufficient unique federal interest to justify the existence of federal common law on this point. The Court did not decide whether the outcome of the particular dispute before it would have been different if decided under the applicable state law rather than erroneously under the federal common law it deemed improper. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal for that determination.