Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Opati v. Republic of Sudan Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2020. Petitioner: Monicah Okoba Opati, et al..Respondent: Republic of Sudan, et al.. Advocates: Matthew D. McGill (for the Petitioners) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioners) Christopher M. Curran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1998, truck bombs exploded outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring over a thousand. It was later discovered that al Qaeda was behind these bombings and that Sudan allegedly provided material support to al Qaeda in the form of safe harbor and training. Starting in 2001, victims of the bombings began to bring lawsuits against Sudan and Iran in U.S. courts under a provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that withdraws sovereign immunity and grants courts jurisdiction to hear suits against foreign states designated as sponsors of terrorism. When Sudan and Iran did not appear to defend these cases, the district court entered default judgments against them in several cases, including $4.3 billion in punitive damages. Sudan then appeared, filing appeals and motions to vacate the judgments. The district court denied Sudan’s motions to vacate, and Sudan again appealed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that FSIA does not permit the recovery of punitive damages arising from terrorist activities that occurred before Congress amended the law in 2008 to authorize punitive damages. The court pointed out that there is a strong presumption against retroactivity unless Congress made clear its intent. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that retroactive authorization of punitive damages “would raise a serious constitutional question.” Because the FSIA terrorism exception does not contain a clear statement of retroactive effect yet operates retroactively, the Tenth Circuit vacated the award of punitive damages under the federal cause of action. Question Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) apply retroactively to permit recovery of punitive damages against foreign states for terrorist activities that occurred prior to the passage of the current version of the statute?

United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2020.Decided on Jun 15, 2020. Petitioner: United States Forest Service, et al..Respondent: Cowpasture River Association, et al.. Advocates: Anthony A. Yang (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Michael K. Kellogg (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Appalachian Trail spans over 2,000 miles, from Maine to Georgia, with approximately 1,000 miles of the Trail crossing through lands within national forests. Under the National Trails System Act, the Secretary of the Interior has the responsibility to administer the trail and that responsibility may not be transferred to any other federal agencies. The Mineral Leasing Act grants the U.S. Forest Service the authority to grant certain rights-of-way through lands in the National Forest System, but no federal agency has the authority to grant equivalent rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System. In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) authorization to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas pipeline that would cross the Appalachian Trail at points located within the George Washington and Monogahela National Forests. After a review process, the Forest Service authorized Atlantic to proceed with construction of the pipeline, finding it had authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way for the pipeline and that the pipeline “would have no long lasting impacts” on the Trail. Cowpasture River Preservation Association and others filed a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of the Forest Service’s record of decision and special use permit. The court granted the petition, vacated the record of decision and special use permit, and remanded to the Forest Service. Notably, the court determined that the Forest Service lacked authority to grant the right-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act because the Appalachian Trail is a “unit” of the National Park System. The court determined that the Mineral Leasing Act “specifically excludes” the Trail “from the authority of the Secretary of the Interior ‘or appropriate agency head’ to grant pipeline rights of way.” The Court consolidated this case for oral argument with U.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, No. 18-1584. Question Does the U.S. Forest Service have the authority to grant rights-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail within national forests? Conclusion The Forest Service did have the authority to issue the special use permit because the Department of the Interior’s decision to assign responsibility for the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for the 7-2 majority of the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in full except as to the part of the majority’s discussion explaining why Cowpasture’s proposed interpretation would vastly expand the Park Service’s jurisdiction in a way inconsistent with the regulatory scheme. The Court first noted that it is undisputed that the Forest Service has jurisdiction over the federal lands within the George Washington National Forest. At issue was whether the presence of the Appalachian Trail removes that part of the lands from the Forest Service’s jurisdiction and places them under the jurisdiction of the Park Service. The Court observed that the Forest Service entered into a “right-of-way” agreement with the National Park Service, which resulted in the Appalachian Trail. A right-of-way is a type of easement, granting only nonpossessory rights of use of the land, so the grant of the right-of-way did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the land. Thus, the Court concluded, the Secretary retained authority to issue the special use permit for the pipeline running underneath the Trail. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority complicated what should be a simple question: “Is the Appalachian National Scenic Trail ‘land in the National Park System’?” Because federal law does not distinguish “land” from the Trail “any more than it distinguishes ‘land’ from the many monuments, historic buildings, parkways, and recreational areas that are also units of the Park System,” the dichotomy the Court draws contravenes the text of the statutes governing the Appalachian Trial.

Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2020.Decided on Jun 30, 2020. Petitioner: Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson and Jamie Schaefer.Respondent: Montana Department of Revenue, et al.. Advocates: Richard D. Komer (for the petitioners) Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Adam G. Unikowsky (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (“Rule 1”) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits “direct or indirect” public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs. Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court.  Question Does a state law that allows for funding for education generally while prohibiting funding for religious schools violate the Religion Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution? Conclusion The application of the Montana Constitution’s “no-aid” provision to a state program providing tuition assistance to parents who send their children to private schools discriminated against religious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion on behalf of the 5-4 majority. The Court first noted that the Free Exercise Clause “protects religious observers against unequal treatment” and against “laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” In this case, Montana’s no-aid provision excluded religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious status. As such, the law must be subject to strict scrutiny review; that is, the government must show that its action advances “‘interests of the highest order” and that the action is “narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” Montana’s interest in this case—which the Court described as creating greater separation of church and state than the federal Constitution requires—does not satisfy strict scrutiny given its infringement of free exercise. Because the Free Exercise Clause barred the application of Montana’s no-aid provision, the Montana Supreme Court lacked the authority to invalidate the program on the basis of that provision.  Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, opining that the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause (not at issue in this case) hampers free exercise rights.  Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Gorsuch each filed their own separate concurrences. Justice Alito argued, as he did in dissenting from the Court’s decision earlier this term in Ramos v. Louisiana, that original motivation should have no bearing on the present constitutionality of a provision of law, yet even without that consideration, the majority reached the correct conclusion in this case. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s characterization of the Montana Constitution as discriminating based on “religious status” and not “religious use,” is dubious at best. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Montana Supreme Court’s decision does not place a burden on petitioners’ religious exercise and thus does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court’s precedents establish that neutral government action is not unconstitutional solely because it fails to benefit religious exercise. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined in part. Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s approach and conclusion risk the kind of entanglement and conflict that the Religion Clauses are intended to prevent. Instead, Justice Breyer opined that the Court’s decision in Locke—upholding the application of a no-aid provision in Washington State based on the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause permitted Washington to forbid state-scholarship funds for students pursuing devotional theology degrees—controlled the outcome in this case, in which the no-aid provision was “materially similar.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a separate dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court in this case resolved a constitutional question not presented, thereby violating “Article III principles older than the Religion Clause” itself. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor continued, the Court answered incorrectly that question it should not have addressed in the first place.

GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2020.Decided on Jun 1, 2020. Petitioner: GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. a Foreign Corporation Formally Known As Converteam SAS.Respondent: Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al.. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner) Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) Jonathan D. Hacker (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three “cold rolling mills,” which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu’s plant was under construction, the company’s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (“Fives”) to provide three different-sized mills. Each of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany. The contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (“GE Energy”), formerly known as Converteam SAS. Fives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests of all three parties in the event of a dispute. Outokumpu filed a lawsuit against GE Energy in Alabama state court in 2016, and GE Energy removed to federal court and moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court granted GE Energy’s motion to compel and dismissed the action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded as to the motion to compel, holding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before Court or their privities, and only under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to an agreement) can parties compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Question Does the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards permit a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel? Conclusion The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not “alter background principles” of state law, including doctrines like equitable estoppel, which authorizes contract enforcement by a nonsignatory. Chapter 2 of the FAA provides that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that [Chapter 1] is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention.” The relevant provision of the Convention states that courts of a contracting state “shall...refer the parties to arbitration” when the parties to the action entered into a written agreement to arbitrate and one of the parties requests the referral. The Court then considered whether state-law equitable estoppel doctrine permitted under Chapter 1 conflicts with the Convention, concluding that it does not. Most importantly, the text of the Convention is silent as to whether nonsignatories may enforce arbitration agreements under domestic doctrines such as equitable estoppel; this silence is dispositive of the matter. This understanding is consistent with the history of the Convention as well as the post-ratification understanding of signatory nations. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to note that the application of domestic doctrine like equitable estoppel must be rooted in the principle of consent to arbitrate.

Shular v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2020.Decided on Feb 26, 2020. Petitioner: Eddie Lee Shular.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Richard M. Summa (for the petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “categorical” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “serious drug offense” as well. Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses—five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.” Question Does the determination of a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act require the same categorical approach used in the determination of a “violent felony” under the act? Conclusion The statute does not require “a generic-offense matching exercise” between the elements of the offenses listed in the federal statute and the elements of the state offense under which the defendant was convicted. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg adopted the argument of the United States, which instead would have the trial court asked “whether the state offense’s elements necessarily entail one of the types of conduct” identified in the federal statute. The Court found that two features of the statute in question lead to this interpretation. The first is that the offenses listed in the statute are “unlikely names for generic offenses” and therefore refer to underlying conduct and not offenses themselves. Secondly, the use of the word “involving” in the statute suggests an intention to describe criminal conduct and not particular criminal offenses. The Court noted that both parties’ interpretations of the statutory language “achieve a measure of inconsistency. Justice Ginsburg explained, “Resolving this case requires us to determine which form of consistency Congress intended: application of [the statute] to all offenders who engaged in certain conduct or to all who committed certain generic offenses (in either reading, judging only by the elements of their prior convictions).“ She continued, “For the reasons explained, we are persuaded that Congress chose the former.” In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh stated he joined the Court’s opinion in full but wrote separately to explain that the rule of lenity advocated by Shular was not appropriately invoked where the Court found the statutory language unambiguous. 

Babb v. Wilkie Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 15, 2020.Decided on Apr 6, 2020. Petitioner: Noris Babb.Respondent: Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the petitioner) Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists—all females over 50—and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40. Two of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well. Babb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb’s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 without an advanced scope was selected for the promotion. Babb brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) alleging that she was the victim of gender-plus-age discrimination and that the VA retaliated against her for participating in protected EEO in violation of those laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Babb argued that the district court erred in part by not allowing her to prove that illegal discrimination or retaliation was a “motivating factor” behind the VA’s refusal to promote her. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding itself bound by precedent that federal sector employees’ claims under ADEA and Title VII require that the plaintiff show discrimination or retaliation is a “but for” factor in the adverse personnel action. Question Does the provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) that protects federal employees aged 40 years from age discrimination require a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of the challenged personnel action? Conclusion The federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), requires that age not be taken into consideration at all in making personnel actions, but if age is a but-for cause of the personnel action, that fact may be important in determining the remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. The relevant provision provides “All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” The Court found the plain meaning of the statute supports the reading that age does not need to be a but-for cause of an employment decision for there to be a violation. To reach this conclusion, the Court focused on several phrases as well as the syntax of the sentence. This interpretation is also consistent with the Court’s precedent interpreting the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the ADEA’s private-sector provision, and Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision because the language in those provisions is “markedly” different. The Court noted, however, that but-for causation is important in determining the appropriate remedy. For example, the plaintiffs cannot obtain compensatory damages without showing that age discrimination was a but-for cause of the employment decision. Remedies must be tailored to the injury, and the injury is measured in part by the causal relationship. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, pointing out that the Court’s decision does not foreclose claims arising from discriminatory processes (as distinct from decisions) and that the same provision may also permit damages remedies even when the federal government engages in “nondispositive” age discrimination. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s reading of the statute is too broad and “disrupts the settled expectations of federal employers and employees.”  

Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2020.Decided on Apr 23, 2020. Petitioner: Romag Fasteners, Inc..Respondent: Fossil, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioner) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc., sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in wallets, handbags, and other leather goods. Respondent Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including handbags and small leather goods. In 2002, Fossil and Romag entered into an agreement to use Romag fasteners in Fossil’s products, and Fossil’s manufacturers purchased tens of thousands of Romag fasteners between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, the president of Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags sold in the United States contained counterfeit snaps bearing the Romag mark. Romag sued Fossil in 2010 for patent and trademark infringement. Romag alleged that Fossil knowingly adopted and used the Romag mark without Romag’s consent. A jury found that Fossil had infringed Romag’s trademark and patents but that none of the violations were willful. The jury awarded Romag trademark damages under two theories: over $90,000 in profits “to prevent unjust enrichment” and over $6.7 million in profits “to deter future trademark infringement.” For the latter award, the jury found that Fossil had acted with “callous disregard” for Romag’s trademark rights. However, the district court struck the jury’s award, finding that “a finding of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendants’ profits in this Circuit.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that within the Second Circuit, a showing of willfulness was required for an award of profits. Romag petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In light of its decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. __ (2017), that affected the patent infringement claims in this case, the Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case. On remand, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the district court’s judgment declining to award Fossil’s profits. Question Does Section 35 of the Lanham Act require a showing of willful infringement for a plaintiff to be awarded an infringer’s profits for a violation of Section 43(a)? Conclusion Section 35 of the Lanham Act does not require a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit to show that a defendant willfully infringed the plaintiff’s trademark as a precondition to an award of profits. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion of the Court on behalf of the 8-1 majority. The plain language of Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) does not require a plaintiff alleging a claim under § 1125(a) to show willfulness. Rather, the statute mentions “willfulness” only in connection to § 1125(c). The Court declined to read into the statute words that are not there, particularly since Congress included the term “willfulness” elsewhere in the very same statutory provision. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan to note that while willfulness is a “highly important” consideration in awarding profits under Section 35 of the Lanham Act, it is not an “absolute precondition.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, to highlight a distinction, supported by the weight of authority, between “willful” infringement and “innocent” infringement—a distinction she criticizes the majority of being “agnostic” about.

Kelly v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2020.Decided on May 7, 2020. Petitioner: Bridget Anne Kelly.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jacob M. Roth (for the petitioner) Michael Levy (for respondent William Baroni, supporting the petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case arises from the scandal that became known as “Bridgegate.” Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly conspired to create major traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor Chris Christie. The defendants and others limited motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge, the world’s busiest bridge, for four days during the first week of Fort Lee’s school year, resulting in extensive traffic delays. In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and Kelly for their roles in the scheme. Each was charged with seven counts, including conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense underlying that conspiracy, 18 U.S.C § 666(a)(1)(A). A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as to four of the seven, including the two at issue here. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendants had defrauded the Port Authority of its property by citing a “traffic study” as the purpose for the lane closures rather than their “real reason” of political payback. Question Did the public officials in this case “defraud” the government of its property by advancing a “public policy reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the decision? Conclusion Baroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws because the scheme did not aim to obtain money or property. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. First, the Court looked to the language of the federal wire fraud statute and the federal-program fraud statute, finding those statutes “limited in scope to the protection of property rights.” Thus, the government needed to prove not only that Baroni and Kelly engaged in deception, but that the object of that deception was money or property. Taking control of the lanes of the bridge does not constitute taking of government property because under Court precedent, a scheme to alter a regulatory choice does not amount to taking of property. Similarly, causing increased costs of compensating traffic engineers and back-up toll collectors is an incidental product and not the “object of the fraud,” as required by the statute.

Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2020.Decided on Jun 1, 2020. Petitioner: James J. Thole, et al..Respondent: U.S. Bank, N.A., et al.. Advocates: Peter K. Stris (for the petitioners) Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Joseph R. Palmore (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against U.S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Must a plaintiff demonstrate individual financial loss or the imminent risk of financial loss in an ERISA plan in order to seek injunctive relief or restoration of plan losses caused by fiduciary breach? Conclusion The plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue in federal court because, win or lose this case, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits they are already entitled to receive. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority. As participants in a defined-benefit plan (as opposed to a defined-contribution plan, such as a 401(k)), the plaintiff retirees receive a fixed payment each month, notwithstanding any changes to the value of the plan or the investment decisions of the plan’s fiduciaries. As such, the poor decisions by the fiduciaries did not cause any actual injury to the plaintiffs in this case. Without concrete injury, the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the fiduciaries’ actions. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to opine that the Court’s precedents on standing unnecessarily complicate the issue by requiring the Court to engage with petitioners’ analogies to trust law. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court’s decision precludes pensioners from bringing a federal lawsuit to stop or cure retirement-plan mismanagement until their pensions are on the verge of default. She cautioned that this outcome conflicts both with common sense and long-standing precedent.  

Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2020.Decided on May 14, 2020. Petitioner: Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc., et al..Respondent: Marcel Fashions Group, Inc.. Advocates: Dale M. Cendali (for the petitioners) Michael B. Kimberly (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Marcel and Lucky Brand are competitors in the apparel industry, and this dispute arises over Marcel’s allegation that Lucky Brand is infringing on its “Get Lucky” trademark through its use of “Lucky” on its merchandise in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the two parties. In 2003, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a trademark dispute in which Lucky Brand agreed not to use “Get Lucky” and Marcel agreed to release certain claims it might have in the future arising out of its trademarks. The two parties contest the scope of Marcel’s release of claims, with Marcel contending that it only released claims as to infringement that occurred prior to the 2003 execution of the agreement and Lucky Brand arguing that it released any future claim Marcel may have in relation to any trademark registered prior to the execution of the agreement. Further litigation ensued. In litigation between the two parties over substantially the same trademark disputes, Lucky Brand argued for its interpretation of the 2003 settlement agreement. It moved to dismiss on the basis that because the marks at issue were registered prior to the settlement agreement, Marcel released any claim alleging infringement of those marks. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was premature to determine which claims were subject to release in the 2001 agreement. However, the district court noted that Lucky Brand was “free to raise the issue . . . again after the record is more fully developed.” Lucky Brand raised the defense again in its answer and as an affirmative defense, but not again during the litigation. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Marcel, declaring that Lucky Brand infringed on Marcel’s “Get Lucky” trademark and enjoining Lucky Brand from using the “Get Lucky” mark. Lucky Brand did not appeal. In 2011, Marcel filed another lawsuit against Lucky Brand alleging that the latter continued to use “Lucky Brand” mark after the injunction. Lucky Brand moved for summary judgment on the basis that Marcel’s claims were precluded by res judicata in light of the final disposition of the previous action. The district court agreed, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding the allegedly barred claims “could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” On remand, Marcel filed a second amended complaint, which Lucky Brand moved to dismiss on the sole basis that the 2001 agreement barred Marcel’s claims. The district court granted the motion and rejected Marcel’s argument that Lucky Brand was precluded from raising those claims. The Second Circuit vacated, concluding that the doctrine of claim preclusion (or more precisely, defense preclusion) applied in situations as this one and that it barred Lucky Brand from invoking its release defense again in this action. Question When a plaintiff asserts new claims, can federal preclusion principles bar a defendant from raising defenses that were not actually litigated and resolved in any prior case between the parties? Conclusion Because the trademark action at issue challenged different conduct—and raised different claims—from an earlier action between the parties, Marcel cannot preclude Lucky Brand from raising new defenses, including a defense that Lucky Brand failed to press fully in the earlier suit. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for the unanimous Court. “Res judicata” is a term that comprises two doctrines of preclusion. First, issue preclusion (also known as “collateral estoppel”) precludes a party from litigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment. Second, claim preclusion (also known as “res judicata”) prevents parties from raising claims that could have been raised and decided in a prior action, even if they were not actually litigated. Courts define the “same claim” as meaning the claims arise from the same transaction, or involve a “common nucleus of operative facts.” In this case, the Court found the two suits “were grounded on different conduct, involving different marks, occurring at different times.” The 2005 claims arose from Lucky Brand’s alleged use of “Get Lucky,” while the 2011 claims arose from other alleged uses of the word “Lucky,” not the phrase “Get Lucky.” As such, they did not share a “common nucleus of operative facts,” and claim preclusion therefore cannot apply.