Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2020.Decided on Jan 25, 2021. Petitioner: Henry Schein Inc..Respondent: Archer and White Sales Inc.. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner) Daniel L. Geyser (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2019, the Court unanimously held in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. that under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court may not decide whether an arbitration agreement applies to the particular dispute if the parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegated the question to an arbitrator, even if the court believes that the argument for arbitrability is “wholly groundless.” On remand the U.S. Court of Appeals again refused to compel arbitration, finding that the parties had delegated at least some questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Notably, the Fifth Circuit held that because the arbitration agreement included a provision exempting certain claims from arbitration, the agreement did not “clearly and unmistakably” delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. Question Does an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negate an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator? Conclusion The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.

Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2020.Decided on Apr 1, 2021. Petitioner: Facebook, Inc..Respondent: Noah Duguid. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner) Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) Bryan A. Garner (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Noah Duguid brought this lawsuit because Facebook sent him numerous automatic text messages without his consent. Duguid did not use Facebook, yet for approximately ten months, the social media company repeatedly alerted him by text message that someone was attempting to access his (nonexistent) Facebook account. Duguid sued Facebook for violating a provision of the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that forbids calls placed using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), or autodialer. Facebook moved to dismiss Duguid’s claims for two alternate reasons. Of relevance here, Facebook argued that the equipment it used to send text messages to Duguid is not an ATDS within the meaning of the statute. The district court dismissed the claim, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Facebook’s equipment plausibly falls within the definition of an ATDS. TCPA defines an ATDS as a device with the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Ninth Circuit precedent further clarifies that an ATDS “need not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store numbers,” only that it “have the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.” Question Does the definition of an "automatic telephone dialing system" in the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 encompass any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers, even if the device does not “use a random or sequential number generator”? Conclusion Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system,” a device must have the capacity either to store or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion of the Court. Section 227(a)(1) defines an autodialer as “equipment which has the capacity...to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and to dial such numbers.” Contrary to Duguid’s contention, the clause “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies both verbs to “store” and to “produce” telephone numbers. Because Facebook’s notification system neither stores nor produces numbers “using a random or sequential number generator,” it is not an autodialer. Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment to caution about the majority’s overreliance on a canon of statutory construction, that “when there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”

Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2020.Decided on Feb 3, 2021. Petitioner: Federal Republic of Germany, et al..Respondent: Alan Philipp, et al.. Advocates: Jonathan M. Freiman (for the petitioners) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Nicholas M. O'Donnell (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1929, just weeks before the October 1929 global stock market crash, several Jewish art dealers in Germany purchased a collection of medieval reliquaries. During the ensuing global depression, the dealers sold about half the pieces and stored the remainder in the Netherlands. Nazi leaders negotiated with the dealers to buy the remaining pieces; the parties dispute whether this negotiation was made under coercive circumstances. After World War II, the collection was transferred to Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (“SPK”), a German governmental institution that holds the cultural artifacts of former Prussia, and has been on display in a German museum nearly continuously since then. In 2014, heirs of the Jewish art dealers—respondents in this case—participated in a non-binding mediation process before the Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially Jewish Property (the “Advisory Commission”). In what the heirs describe as a “predetermined conclusion, and against the evidence,” the Advisory Commission recommended against restitution of the collection. The respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany and SPK moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the scope of the expropriation exception. Germany and SPK appealed, and the U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany’s and SPK’s argument based on principles of international comity.  Question 1. Does the “expropriation exception” of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provide jurisdiction over claims that a foreign sovereign has violated international human-rights law when taking property from its own national within its own borders? 2. Does the doctrine of international comity preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in this case? Conclusion The expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3), incorporates the domestic takings rule, which recognizes that a foreign sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property is not a violation of international law. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. FSIA immunizes foreign sovereigns from the jurisdiction of United States courts, subject to several specific exceptions, including the so-called expropriation exception, which abrogates immunity in any case “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3). The taking of property by a foreign sovereign from its own nationals, at issue in this case, does not violate international law because it does not interfere with relations among states. Known as the domestic takings rule, this principle has endured, notwithstanding developments in other areas of international human rights law. The text of FSIA’s expropriation exception supports this interpretation, as do other provisions of FSIA. Because Germany took property from its own citizens, that act did not violate international law and thus cannot be the basis for an exemption to sovereign immunity under the FSIA’s expropriation exemption.

Republic of Hungary v. Simon Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2020.Decided on Feb 3, 2021. Petitioner: Republic of Hungary, et al..Respondent: Rosalie Simon, et al.. Advocates: Gregory Silbert (for the petitioners) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Sarah E. Harrington (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Rosalie Simon and other respondents in this case are Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Hungary. They sued the Republic of Hungary and other defendants in federal court in the United States seeking class certification and class-wide damages for property taken from them during World War II. Importantly, they did not first file a lawsuit in Hungary. Rather, they invoked the expropriation exemption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in claiming the federal court had jurisdiction, though their substantive claims arose from federal and D.C. common law. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that FSIA's treaty exception grants the Hungarian defendants immunity, that the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Hungary set forth an exclusive mechanism for Hungarian Holocaust victims to obtain recovery for their property losses, and that permitting the plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed under FSIA would conflict with the peace treaty's terms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the non-property claims and reversed as to the property-based claims. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether, as a matter of international comity, it should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over those claims until the plaintiffs exhaust domestic remedies in Hungary. On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, holding that international comity required that the plaintiffs first exhaust their claims in Hungary. Again, the D.C. Circuit reversed, noting that its intervening decision in Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany (2018) “squarely rejected” the comity-based ground for declining to exercise jurisdiction. Question Was it proper for the district court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons of international comity, because the plaintiffs made no attempt to exhaust local Hungarian remedies? Conclusion The Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings consistent with Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. ___ (2021).

Edwards v. Vannoy Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2020.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: Thedrick Edwards.Respondent: Darrel Vannoy, Warden. Advocates: Andre Belanger (for the petitioner) Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent) Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards’s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10-2 vote, so Edwards’s conviction became final in 2010. On April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana. Question Does the Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts, apply retroactively to cases on federal collateral review? Conclusion The jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. A decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral (habeas) review. Applying constitutional rules retroactively undermines the principle of finality, which is “critical to the operation of our criminal justice system.” However, two questions are relevant to the consideration whether a rule may be applied retroactively: (1) whether it is a new rule or applies a settled rule, and (2) whether it is a “watershed” procedural rule. New rules, as opposed to application of settled rules, ordinarily do not apply retroactively unless they are “watershed.” The “watershed” exception is “extremely narrow” and applies only when the new rule “alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” In fact, the only time the Court has recognized a new rule as being watershed was in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which established the right to counsel. First, the Ramos rule is new because it was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Second, Ramos presents none of the considerations for a watershed rule. The situation in Ramos does not support a different outcome from (1) other jury-unanimity cases that the Court did not apply retroactively, (2) other cases decided based on original meaning that the Court did not apply retroactively, and (3) other cases involving race discrimination that the Court did not apply retroactively. As a new rule of criminal procedure, the jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.  Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas noted that the Court could alternatively have resolved the case by applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which, in his view, leaves no room for a court to grant relief under the present facts. Justice Gorsuch also filed his own separate concurring opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that the Court’s decision correctly eliminated the “watershed” exception that was never really an exception at all. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for not only misapplying the “watershed” exception in this case but also for going further and eliminating the exception altogether, preventing any procedural rule from ever benefiting a defendant on habeas review.

CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2020.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: CIC Services, LLC.Respondent: Internal Revenue Service, et al.. Advocates: Cameron T. Norris (for the petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2004, Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to gather information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any "reportable transactions." IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors. On November 21, 2016, the IRS published Notice 2016-66, which identified certain “micro-captive transactions” as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties. On March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Question Does the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes also bar challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates that are not taxes? Conclusion A lawsuit seeking to enjoin IRS Notice 2016–66 as an unlawful regulatory mandate does not trigger the Anti-Injunction Act, even though a violation of the Notice may result in a tax penalty. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the filing of lawsuits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” CIC’s lawsuit challenged Notice 2016–66’s reporting obligations, which, alone, would place it clearly beyond the scope of the Act. However, a consequence for failing to report as required under the Notice is a tax penalty, which makes the result in this case less clear. However, when considering a “suit[’s] purpose,” a court looks not at the taxpayer’s subjective motive, but at the relief the suit requests. If the relief sought is an injunction against the collection or assessment of a tax, the Act prohibits it. Because CIC’s suit contests the legality of Notice 2016–66, not the statutory tax penalty, it is not prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. This conclusion is supported by public policy; allowing the lawsuit to proceed will not open the floodgates to pre-enforcement tax litigation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Court’s conclusion might be different if CIC Services were a taxpayer instead of a tax advisor because of the slightly different role tax penalties play with respect to individual taxpayers. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion observing that, in his view, the Court’s ruling in this case established a rule that pre-enforcement suits challenging regulatory taxes or traditional revenue-raising taxes are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, but pre-enforcement suits challenging regulations backed by tax penalties are not barred, even if those suits might preclude the collection or assessment of a tax. 

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2020.Decided on Jun 17, 2021. Petitioner: Nestlé USA, Inc..Respondent: John Doe I, et al.. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (on behalf of the petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Paul L. Hoffman (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case). Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,” resulting in a “system built on child slavery to depress labor costs.” The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor. The children filed a proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are “universal and absolute” can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation, and the prohibition of slavery is “universal.” It did not address the defendants’ argument that the complaint sought an extraterritorial application of the ATS, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recently proscribed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). On remand, the district court dismissed the claims alleging aiding and abetting slave labor under the ATS, finding that the complaint sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the ATS. In the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __ (2018), holding that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Again the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the holding in Jesner does not disturb its prior holding as to the domestic defendants, Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., and that the specific domestic conduct alleged by the plaintiffs falls within the focus of the ATS and does not require extraterritorial application of that statute. Question 1. May an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States and where the plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that activity? 2. Does the judiciary have the authority under the Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations? Conclusion To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity; the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding is reversed, and the case is remanded. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion in which a majority of the Court concluded that the respondents here improperly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS. The Court’s precedents establish “a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.” First, a court must presume that a statute applies only domestically and ask “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication” that rebuts this presumption. Second, where the statute does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.” The ATS does not rebut the presumption, so the question is whether the relevant conduct occurred in the United States. Nearly all the conduct that the respondents describe as aiding and abetting forced labor—providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms—occurred in Ivory Coast. As the Court made clear in Kiobel, “mere corporate presence” and activity are not sufficient to support domestic application of the ATS. As such, the respondents did not plead sufficient facts to support domestic application of the ATS. Joined only by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Thomas wrote that the respondents’ suit fails for a separate reason: the Court cannot create a cause of action—only Congress may do that. Justice Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, which Justices Alito and Justice Kavanaugh joined in (different) parts. Justice Gorsuch, joined only by Justice Alito, argued that nothing in the ATS supports the notion that corporations are immune from suit. Then, joined only by Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch argued that courts lack discretion to create new causes of action under the ATS and should stop doing so. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that Justice Thomas’s interpretation of ATS as limited to the three international law torts that were recognized in 1789 contravenes the Court’s express holding in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), as well as the text and history of the ATS.  Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that if a particular claim may be brought under the ATS against a natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar claim may be brought against a domestic corporation. 

Van Buren v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2020. Petitioner: Nathan Van Buren.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Nathan Van Buren was a sergeant with the Cumming, Georgia, Police Department. In that capacity, he came to know a man named Andrew Albo, who allegedly paid young prostitutes to spend time with him and then accused the women of stealing the money he gave them. Van Buren asked Albo for a loan, falsely claiming that he needed over $15,000 to settle his son’s medical bills. Unbeknownst to Van Buren, Albo recorded the conversation in which Van Buren requested the loan. Albo presented the recording to a detective in the Forsyth County Sheriff’s Office, alleging that Van Buren was “shaking him down for his money.” As a result, the FBI conducted a sting operation to test how far Van Buren was willing to go for money. As part of the sting operation, Albo asked Van Buren to look into a woman Albo named, to see whether she was an undercover officer before he would provide Van Buren with the full amount of money Van Buren requested. Van Buren searched the woman’s information in a government database maintained by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) and the FBI. The next day, FBI and GBI agents confronted Van Buren, and Van Buren admitted to the fake story about his son to get the loan from Albo, his use of the government database to search for the woman Albo mentioned might be an undercover officer, and that he understood the purpose of searching the database was to discover and reveal to Albo whether the woman was an undercover officer. A federal grand jury charged Van Buren with one count of honest-services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, and one count of felony computer fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. A jury convicted Van Buren on both counts, and Van Buren appealed his convictions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the jury instructions as to the honest-services count were fatally flawed and remanded that charge for a new trial. It found no deficiencies in the conviction for computer fraud and affirmed that conviction, citing Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a person with authority to access a computer can be guilty of computer fraud if that person subsequently misuses the computer.  Question Does a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violate Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses that information for an improper purpose?

Trump v. New York Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2020.Decided on Dec 18, 2020. Appellant: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al..Appellee: New York, et al.. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (on behalf of the Appellants) Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of the State Appellees) Dale E. Ho (on behalf of the private Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of "aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status." The President left it to the Secretary to determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear how the Secretary would obtain that number. Immediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs—a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (the "Governmental Plaintiffs"); and a coalition of non-governmental organizations—challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws. The federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United States to use the latter to apportion the House, the memorandum violated the statutory scheme. In addition, the court concluded that the memorandum violated the statute governing apportionment because, so long as they reside in the United States, illegal aliens qualify as “persons in” a “State” as Congress used those words. Question 1. Does a group of states and local governments have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge a July 21, 2020, memorandum by President Donald Trump instructing the secretary of commerce to include in his report on the 2020 census information enabling the president to exclude noncitizens from the base population number for purposes of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives?  2. Is the memorandum is a permissible exercise of the President’s discretion under the provisions of law governing congressional apportionment? Conclusion In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that the plaintiffs in this case had not shown standing and that their claims were not ripe for adjudication. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. For a federal court to have jurisdiction to hear a case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they have standing, which requires “an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Further, the case must be “ripe”—that is, it must not depend on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Although the President clearly expressed his desire to exclude unlawfully present noncitizens from the apportionment base “to the extent practicable,” it remains mere conjecture whether and how the Executive Branch might eventually implement this general statement of policy. Moreover, the plaintiffs had suffered no concrete harm from the policy itself, because the policy “does not require them ‘to do anything or to refrain from doing anything.’” As such, the courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated Article III standing or that the case is ripe for review. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plaintiffs did have standing based on its own precedents in census cases, which have recognized standing based on a substantial risk of anticipated apportionment harm. Justice Breyer also argued that the question is ripe for resolution, and as such, that the plaintiffs should prevail on the merits because “the plain meaning of the governing statutes, decades of historical practice, and uniform interpretations from all three branches of Government demonstrate that aliens without lawful status cannot be excluded from the decennial census solely on account of that status.”

California v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2020.Decided on Jun 17, 2021. Petitioner: The State of California, et al..Respondent: The State of Texas, et al.. Advocates: Michael J. Mongan (for California, et al.) Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the U.S. House of Representatives) Kyle D. Hawkins (for Texas, et al.) Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate. The federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review. Question Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to challenge the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which now has a penalty of zero for not buying health insurance? If the plaintiffs have standing, is the individual mandate unconstitutional? If the individual mandate is unconstitutional, is it severable from the remainder of the ACA? Conclusion The plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s minimum essential coverage provision. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. To have standing to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” No plaintiff in this case has shown such an injury. With respect to the individual plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged—past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires—not “fairly traceable” to the allegedly unlawful conduct. There is no penalty for noncompliance, only the statute’s unenforceable language, which alone is insufficient to establish standing. With respect to the state plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged not traceable to the government’s allegedly unlawful conduct. The state plaintiffs alleged direct and indirect injuries. The states alleged indirect injuries in the form of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs, but they failed to show how an unenforceable mandate would cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. The states alleged direct injuries in the form of increased administrative and related expenses, but those expenses are the result of other provisions of the Act, not §5000A(a) and are thus not fairly traceable to the conduct alleged. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, praising Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in this case (describing the “epic Affordable Care Act trilogy”) but stopping short of agreeing with his opinion in its entirety because Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs lack standing in this case. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that Texas and the other state plaintiffs have standing and that because the “tax” imposed by the individual mandate is now $0, the mandate cannot be sustained under the taxing power.