[18-1109] McKinney v. Arizona

McKinney v. Arizona

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 11, 2019.
Decided on Feb 25, 2020.

Petitioner: James Erin McKinney.
Respondent: State of Arizona.

Advocates:

• Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner)
• Oramel H. Skinner (for the respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

By way of relevant background, James McKinney’s childhood was “horrific” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse—all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention.

In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney’s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund’s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder.

At McKinney’s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney’s childhood trauma and produce “diminished capacity.” The trial judge credited the psychologist’s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney’s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death.

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider McKinney’s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney’s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘final’ before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring.

Question

After the Ninth Circuit identifies an Eddings error, may the state appellate court reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, or must a jury resentence the defendant?

Conclusion

After a finding of a capital sentencing (Eddings) error during habeas corpus review, the state appellate court, rather than the jury, may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to resentence the defendant. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion for the Court.

In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), the Supreme Court a state appellate court may conduct the reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances after a capital sentencing error was found on collateral review. Although that case involved improperly considering an aggravating circumstance, and this case involved improperly ignoring a mitigating circumstance, the Court found no meaningful difference in the context. Thus, the Court found, Clemons determined the outcome in this case. The Court found unpersuasive McKinney’s argument that because the Arizona trial court, not a jury, made the initial aggravating circumstances finding that made him eligible for the death penalty, a jury must weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the Court’s decision in Ring. Agreeing with the court below, the Court found that McKinney’s case was “final” before Ring was decided, and that case does not apply retroactively to this situation.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s precedent require the application of new rules of constitutional law to cases currently on direct review (with two exceptions, neither of which applies, by the Court’s own holding). Thus, Justice Ginsburg, argued, the “pivotal question” in this case is whether McKinney’s case is currently on direct review, in which case Ring applies (retroactively), or on collateral review, in which case Ring does not apply. McKinney’s first appeal of a criminal conviction is “the archetype” of direct review, and his renewal of that first appeal “cannot sensibly be characterized as anything other than direct review.” As such, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Arizona Supreme Court’s proceeding presently before the Court is a direct review and thus that Ring applies, making McKinney’s death sentences unconstitutional.