This week we examine the final chapters of Division Two of Being and Time. These last sections of Being and Time represent Heidegger’s effort to strengthen the concept of ecstatic temporality. From sections 72-83 Heidegger talks about the difference between history and historicality, an explanation of how ordinary time is dependent on existential-ontological time and the work concludes with a brief engagement with Hegel’s theory of time. In this lecture I want to focus on one element of these last sections, and that is the importance of history for Dasein.These lectures are brought to you by Staffordshire University's Philosophy team. Come study on our MA in Continental Philosophy via this link: . Or, join our MA in Philosophy of Nature, Information and Technology via this link:. Find out more about me here. January and September intakes available either F/T or P/T. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

After last week’s exploration of death and demise, we get a shift in gears so to speak in sections 60-70. Here Heidegger confronts the question of temporality, the meaning of care and just what exactly is ‘anticipatory resoluteness.’ All of the concepts we have studied up to this point, present-to-hand and ready-to-hand, authenticity and inauthenticity, fear and anxiety, death and demise, truth, states-of-mind, care, are all reworked here as iterations of Dasein’s fundamental temporality. In overview, we can say these sections are important for two obvious reasons. Firstly, they round out the idea of authenticity implicit from the earliest pages of the work, and they do so through the idea of ‘anticipatory resoluteness,’ which is important for our understanding of Dasein. Secondly, they provide a full account of the temporal structure of Dasein, which is also very important. Some readings of Being and Time, especially those that focus on ‘world’ and present a pragmatic reading of the book, tend to pay little attention to Division Two and underplay the temporal analyses. This is a great shame, as in a sense they are the core of the whole book, or the point about which it turns, and in addition are highly original. These lectures are brought to you by Staffordshire University's Philosophy team. Come study on our MA in Continental Philosophy via this link: . Or, join our MA in Philosophy of Nature, Information and Technology via this link:. Find out more about me here. January and September intakes available either F/T or P/T. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In division two of Being and Time Heidegger changes register somewhat. While Division One was focussed on average everydayness, and revolved around understanding Dasein as a practical, pragmatic being, in Division Two we see Heidegger offer an even more fundamental account of what constitutes the being of Dasein. In the opening sections of Division Two Heidegger engages two existential themes death and guilt, which will in turn reveal the importance of time. This engagement is necessary because it makes explicit the temporal horizons of Dasein and how meaningful possibilities may be projected. There is a sense that in Division 1 Heidegger concerned himself with more conventional questions of philosophy such as theory and practice, language, meaning, and the nature of subjectivity, in Division 2 we start to get a sense of how Heidegger is doing something startlingly original. So much so that that we will need to retroactively reconsider what occurred in Division One.[1] We begin where we left off in Division One, with Heidegger attending to the difference between an everyday and existential-ontological conception. The subject this time though is death.These lectures are brought to you by Staffordshire University's Philosophy team. Come study on our MA in Continental Philosophy via this link: . Or, join our MA in Philosophy of Nature, Information and Technology via this link:. Find out more about me here. January and September intakes available either F/T or P/T. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In the last lecture we discussed the different ways Dasein is ‘there’ and ‘with,’ and the ways states-of-minds (moods) disclose to Dasein it’s available possibility. We need to understand, however, how inauthentic modes, the they-self, idle talk, help make apparent how we are ontologically. Remember, authentic and inauthentic are ways of being of Dasein, not facts about Dasein. Dasein is inseparable from the facts of its life, but not reducible to them. As such, Dasein continually project into the world it inhabits. However, certain modes become apparent which disclose the ontological structure of Dasein. This week then, I want to look at some of these modes, so I will talk about what Heidegger has to say about idle talk, fear, anxiety and care.These lectures are brought to you by Staffordshire University's Philosophy team. Come study on our MA in Continental Philosophy via this link: . Or, join our MA in Philosophy of Nature, Information and Technology via this link:. Find out more about me here. January and September intakes available either F/T or P/T. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

One of the things that Heidegger thinks characterises Dasein is its ‘withness.’ Prior to being a subject, or a self, Dasein is always with. You will very well ask with what? Well, as we saw in a general sense last week, Dasein is always with world. As Being and Time progresses Heidegger starts to ask what else is Dasein with. One of the other things that Dasein is with, is things in the world and also others, or as he calls it mitsein (being-with). Dasein as mitsein is always with others in certain ways. This week then I want to explain how Dasein is ‘in the world’ already ‘with others,’ and also how being-with-others can take the form of two types of impersonal being (the ‘they’), inauthenticity and authenticity. I say both are impersonal, because they characterise Dasein, not specific subjects. Although, more on this as I progress.These lectures are brought to you by Staffordshire University's Philosophy team. Come study on our MA in Continental Philosophy via this link: . Or, join our MA in Philosophy of Nature, Information and Technology via this link:. Find out more about me here. January and September intakes available either F/T or P/T. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

I want to proceed with Heidegger’s preliminary sketch of how to interpret Dasein as a being-in-the-world. Firstly, I want to explain just what Heidegger means by being-in-the-world, secondly, I want to explain what he means by world. Finally, I will turn to Heidegger’s tool-analysis as one of the first core concepts of how  Heidegger explains Dasein in Being and Time. If we are to understand what it is to be human, then we need to understand that there is something essential about our tool use as we navigate the world.These lectures are brought to you by Staffordshire University's Philosophy team. Come study on our MA in Continental Philosophy via this link: . Or, join our MA in Philosophy of Nature, Information and Technology via this link:. Find out more about me here. January and September intakes available either F/T or P/T. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last week we looked at some of the core elements of Husserl’s phenomenological method: natural attitude, bracketing (epoché), reduction and intentionality. The last concept, intentionality, was the one I said was of the most significance for Martin Heidegger. Intentionality, Husserl’s idea that all consciousness is consciousness of something, became for Heidegger an insight of the first importance. This was because Heidegger saw the ‘worldliness’ of thought, consciousness, as of the utmost significance. What philosophy really needs to do, is not to focus on subjects and objects, but to make sense of the human being’s place in the world, or our being-in-the-world. There is a reversal at stake here. In many ways, Heidegger’s masterwork Being and Time is a 20th Century reflection on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Heidegger is interested in understanding philosophy in a practical sense rather than a purely theoretically (theoria and phronesis). Although this distinction is never clear cut, for reasons we will go into, Heidegger wants to understand what the human being is, and to do this we need to tackle that question from the perspective of human’s practical everydayness. And this means we need to ask ourselves what he means by the term ‘Being.’These lectures are brought to you by Staffordshire University's Philosophy team. Come study on our MA in Continental Philosophy via this link. Or, join our MA in Philosophy of Nature, Information and Technology via this link. Find out more about me here. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

To understand Husserl’s phenomenological method we need to do a couple of things. Firstly we need to engage in the steps of the method themselves. Husserl saw phenomenology as something that was available to anybody; it was something anybody could do. Certainly, Husserl’s technical exposition is challenging, but at its core he implores us to think for ourselves. And to think for ourselves we need to look at what is under our noses, the way things appear to consciousness. And to do this we need to think through how things appear to us, as well as what the nature of those appearances disclose. So, in this lecture I want to explain some of the core steps of Husserl’s method so as to help us get a sense of what phenomenology is all about it. To this end, I explain what Husserl has to say about natural attitude, bracketing, reduction, givenness, the phenomenological attitude and what it reveals about the nature of consciousness. In addition, I explain Husserl’s discovery of intentionality, one of the most important elements of phenomenology.These lectures are brought to you by Staffordshire University's Philosophy team. Come study on our MA in Continental Philosophy via this link: . Or, join our MA in Philosophy of Nature, Information and Technology via this link:. Find out more about me here. January and September intakes available either F/T or P/T. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This podcast delves into Merleau-Ponty's perspective on time and freedom, challenging traditional understandings. It explores the inseparability of time and freedom, the temporality of subjectivity, and the influence of social roles and norms on identity and choice. The podcast emphasizes the importance of embodied subjectivity and the paradoxical nature of human freedom, highlighting the role of structures in making freedom possible.

This lecture explores Merleau-Ponty's understanding of space in relation to the body, using the case of Schneider as a study. It delves into the breakdown of perception and the embodiment of erotic perception. The chapter also discusses perspectives on sexuality and emphasizes the importance of motor intentionality in understanding corporeality.