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Absolute or unrestricted (muṭlaq) versus delimited (muqayyad) is a key area in the study of language and meaning (mabāḥith al-alfāẓ) in Islamic Legal Theory (uṣūl alfiqh). It deeply affects the understanding and interpretation of the apparent linguistic (ẓāhir) indication of Scripture and Tradition (Sunna), thereby deducing new, or justifying pre-existing, jurisprudential, ethical, and theological knowledge of Islam. This section in uṣūl al-fiqh includes three major chapters: preliminary discussions, the rulings of absolute expression (aḥkām al-iṭlāq), and the rulings when both absolute and delimited expressions coexist. The second chapter is divided into the utterances of absolute expression (alfāẓ al-iṭlāq) and the quality of indication of these utterances to absolute expression. This paper focuses on how the absolute (muṭlaq) indicates absolute expression (iṭlāq) and comprehensiveness (shumūl). Is this implication by designation (waḍʿ) or does it depend on context (qarīna)? Among Shi’ite Uṣūlis, the dominant approach since the 11th AH/17th AD century is the necessity of general context (qarīna ʿāmma) for absolute expression (iṭlāq). This general context depends on the realisation of a few necessary preliminaries, which are called “the necessary preliminaries of wisdom/ rationality” (muqadammāt al-ḥikma). There are at least three necessary preliminaries: first, the possibility of absolute and delimited expression; second, the speaker (mutakallim) must be in “the situation of a clear statement of complete intention” (maqām al-bayān li tamām al-murād) and not in “indetermination” (ihmāl) or ambiguity (ijmāl); third, the negation of what requires specification (ta’yīn). The focus has been on the second preliminary, analysing its boundaries and meaning. How can we determine if the speaker—here, the Lawmaker (Shāriʿ)—is in the “situation of a clear statement for complete intention”? What are its precise criteria? This paper examines holding absolute (al-tamassuk bi al-iṭlāq) in various fiqh cases and argues for a revision. If the Lawmaker’s situation is unclear, what does the foundational principle (al-aṣl al-awwali) require? Focusing on Imāmi uṣūl al-fiqh, this paper also provides a comparative analysis with Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh and linguistic philosophy. It comprises three sections: an overview of absolute and delimited (muṭlaq wa muqayyad), a literature review of “the necessary preliminaries of wisdom” (muqadammāt al-ḥikma), and the criteria for “the situation of a clear statement of complete intention” (maqām al-bayān li tamām al-murād).

The intricate relationships among the various sources of Islamic legal reasoning have long constituted some of the most vigorously discussed and contentious subjects. These include the relationships between: The Qurʾān and Sunna; text (naṣṣ) and reason (ʿaql); consensus (ijmaʿ) and the Qurʾān and Sunna; the internal dynamics within the religious texts themselves; the connections between analogical reasoning (qiyās) and textual evidence (al-adilla al-lafẓiyya), and others. Notably, the question of how conjectural Sunna (al-sunna al-ẓanniyya) like solitary narrations (pl. al-akhbār al-āḥād) relate to and potentially qualify (taqyīd) or specify (takhṣīṣ) the Qurʾān has been a pivotal topic extensively debated throughout the history of Islamic legal theory. Carrying profound implications on whether or not such solitary narrations possess the epistemic authority to specify and/or qualify the general indication of the Qurʾān or not. This paper aims to trace the historical evolution of the theory permitting ‘specifying of the Qurʾān through solitary reports’ (takhṣīṣ al-Qurʾān bil-khabr al-wāḥid) , analysing perspectives from both Sunnī and Shīʿī traditions. Among Sunnī scholars, the issue sparked numerous debates and stark scholarly divisions. In contrast, the Imāmī Shīʿī majority endorsed such qualification/specification, albeit with certain significant exceptions from early scholars. I will review the major critiques levelled against this specification theory and the responses from its proponents, as well as examine both the methodological and epistemological grounds underlying its construction within Sunnī and Shīʿī legal theories. Additionally, I will address the crucial issue of delineating the relationship between qualifying or specifying the Qurʾān through solitary reports, and the theory of abrogation (naskh) of the Qurʾān through such narrations, along with the consequent implications. Building upon this analysis, I will evaluate and critique the fundamental premises of the specification theory and uncover the extent to which the specification or qualification of the Qurʾān by solitary narrations is present in the practise of ijtihād. This will be done by examining whether the Qurʾān actually contains any general indications (ʿumūmāt), such that a jurist is able to qualify or specify the general indication of the Qurʾān by a solitary report. This entails analysing the legal (sharʿī) nature of the Qurʾānic texts regarding their amenability to generalisation. Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn regarding the extent to which rejecting the theory of specifying or qualifying the Qurʾān through solitary narrations impacts the overall corpus of Islamic legal theory and the juristic edicts (pl. fatāwa) in contemporary times.

This research paper consists of two steps. Firstly, it introduces a new perspective on the problem of the relationship between expression and meaning, thereby contributing to linguistic discussions in uṣūl al-fiqh. Secondly, it discusses some drawbacks of the principle of authoritativeness of apparent meaning. The process of assigning (al-waḍʿ) vocal expressions (alfāẓ) to meanings and the topic of denotation (dalāla) has been one of the oldest subjects discussed by scholars in the field of uṣūl al-fiqh since its inception. In this context, assigning and imposing refer to a particular correlation between an expression and its corresponding meaning. It involves the speaker and the audience inherently associating the intended meaning upon encountering the expression. Therefore, assignation is the sole factor through which a text or utterance signifies a specific meaning. Also, according to Islamic logicians, denotation is a state wherein recognising something elicits recognising something else. Scholars in uṣūl al-fiqh agree on assignation as a distinct link between expression and meaning, offering varied explanations of its workings. Al-Ṣaymarī sees assignation as natural, while Mohaghegh Isfahani deems the relation arbitrary. Mohaghegh Nāīnī refutes both, asserting God posits the connection, revealing languages to humankind. Al-Khoei, influenced by Nahavandi, highlights dependency on the positer’s intention. This study introduces a new perspective on the relationship between expression and meaning. The relationship between meaning and expression in a given source text can have three modalities: textually explicit, implicit synoptic, and apparent. The principle asserting the primacy of apparent meaning as authoritative evidence underpins most principles in uṣūl al-fiqh. However, this principle necessitates scrutiny, as it has specific limitations. This essay addresses these issues by examining the following questions: Firstly, it analyses whether the audience of the source text confines to the immediate addressees from the first generation when the text was initially uttered or it extends to contemporary individuals in subsequent generations. Secondly, it contemplates whether, if the addressees of source texts encompass contemporary people, the criterion for the authoritative apparent meaning should be what could be comprehended at the time of utterance or what could be understood in the context of contemporary circumstances. Finally, despite Islamic theologians maintaining that the Quran’s text is God’s speech, this essay raises the following questions: does the same hold true for the texts of hadiths? Do hadith texts correspond to the speeches of the Imams? Or can they be considered paraphrased quotes? If so, applying the linguistic principles from uṣūl al-fiqh, especially the principle of apparent meaning, to hadiths could be methodologically controversial.

Legal and normative discourse has been integral to the fabric of Shīʿism since its inception. Revered across nearly all schools of Islam, the sixth Shīʿī Imām, Imām Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq (d. 765), stands as a paragon of juridical scholarship. The legal doctrines elucidated by Imām Jaʿfar and his immediate successors have purportedly been meticulously preserved by eminent figures such as al-Kulaynī (d. 941), Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d. 974), al-Ṣudūq (d. 991), and al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067) within their respective ḥadīth collections. These compendia collectively form a coherent corpus of legalistic discourse, distinctively associated with the Jaʿfarī school of thought. Within this corpus, a specific legal persona of the Imām is presupposed, wherein the linguistic formulation of legal pronouncements is contingent upon the recipient, while the underlying legal principles remain immutable and accessible solely to the Imām. Numerous traditions assert that God has conferred upon the Imām the authority of legal guardianship (al-wilāyah al-tashrīʿiya), enabling them to legislate per divine knowledge, thus allowing flexibility in expressing their legal rulings through various linguistic forms. The embodiment of this principle becomes evident when the Imām issues divergent rulings on the same matter due to specific circumstances, illustrating the dynamic nature of legal language. By recognizing the parallels between legal guardianship and other prevalent Jaʿfarī themes such as dissimulation (taqiyya) and intellectual accommodation (kalām ʿalā qadr ʿuqūl al-nās), one can argue that the aforementioned Shīʿī corpus posits a perspective on legal principles and legal language that is characterized by realism yet subject-dependency. Within this framework, the Imām not only receives legal principles but also interprets and applies them, emphasising the nuanced interplay between linguistic expression and the application of legal principles. Due to this, the Imām embodies a ‘proto-Uṣūlī’ role, applying consistent principles but issuing varied judgments based on circumstances, akin to a 'legal demiurge' endowed with divine authority. This meta-ethical stance, akin to ‘Platonic Moral Realism’, underscores the constancy of principles amidst changing moral judgments. Such a view significantly impacts the legal language used by the Imām, with specific rulings tailored for ‘common’ followers and general principles revealed to legally ‘qualified’ ones. The rejection of analogical reasoning (qiyās), attributed to the Imām, is also rooted in the belief that only he holds the necessary knowledge for accurate interpretation, ensuring clarity in legal meaning. Viewing the Imām as a ‘Divine Jurist’ reveals disparities in Jaʿfarī legal thought before and after the Occultation, shedding light on evolving synthetic legal trends amongst later Twelver communities. This perspective highlights Imāms’ distinct stance on the relationship between legal language and meaning, affirming the adaptability of the former and the permanence of the latter.

For centuries, under the rubrics of dalīl al-khiṭāb, mafhūm al-mukhālafa, and al-istidlāl bi-l-ḥaṣr, Muslim legal theorists debated the validity of affirming for what is unspoken the contradictory of the ruling for what is spoken. Put differently, if revelation links a ruling to a specified attribute of a thing, does this entail (linguistically, logically, or in some other way) the opposite ruling for what lacks that attribute? Referring to a common example: Does the Prophet’s assertion that zakāt is due on free-grazing sheep (fī sāʾimat al-ghanam zakāt) entail that zakāt is not due on fodder-fed sheep? Navigating the confluence of linguistic and logical implication, uṣūlist discourse on this issue reached a considerable degree of refinement, and has inspired a number of informative studies in past decades. So far, however, some important linguistic-logical parallels seem to have escaped notice. First is the fact that propositions which link a ruling to a specified attribute may be formally rendered as conditionals, and the inference “If p then q, not-p, therefore not-q” (with a conditional major premise) constitutes the formal fallacy of denying the antecedent (aka the inverse fallacy); whereas the inference “If and only if p then q, not-p, therefore not-q” (with a biconditional major premise) is valid. Second is the fact that in some cases contextual factors dictate that propositions formulated as mere conditionals (if p then q) should be understood as biconditionals (if and only if p then q), thus allowing valid inferences of the inverse (if not-p then not-q). Third, and on top of these older, logical observations, modern pragmaticians have developed a lively discourse around “conditional perfection”: our tendency to hear conditionals as biconditionals (subconsciously “perfecting the conditional”) and thus to accept inferences of the inverse. As is too often the case with modern theorists, however, they have proceeded in evident ignorance of very rich and relevant premodern discourses. This talk therefore aims first to present select definitions, typologies, and controversies of the uṣūlist discourse on dalīl al-khiṭāb, mafhūm al-mukhālafa, and al-istidlāl bi-lḥaṣr, second to understand these with reference to their logical parallels, and third to juxtapose all this with a summary of the modern discourse on conditional perfection, suggesting (as in previous studies) how centuries of refined, premodern Islamic theorising and debate can complement and contribute to the (sometimes re-inventive) efforts of modern theorists.

While the task of jurisprudence (fiqh) is to determine what people are supposed to do in their daily affairs by inference from premises that involve the divine rulings of Sharia, the science of the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl) is intended to facilitate such transitions by providing the relevant methodological principles and rules of validity for such inferences. In that sense, the science of usūl can be regarded as the logic of jurisprudence. One of the principles that a jurist needs to rely on to derive religious (Sharia) rulings concerns the evidence at their disposal. This evidence either directly comes from the Qurʾān and the Sunna or is grounded in reason. The former comes into two varieties: linguistic evidence which involves statements of the Qurʾān and the non-linguistic variety which includes, among other things, the actions of the māʿṣūm (infallible). For linguistic evidence to fulfil its role, however, three things must be determined: (i) the prima facia meaning of the evidence and what it denotes, (ii) its reliability (ḥujjiyya), and (iii) whether evidence did, in fact, issue from the legislator. The questions that arise from the role of linguistic evidence in the process of deriving particular Sharia rulings have, however, spawned an important chapter in the science of uṣūl about the foundations of meaning. These investigations include discussions about the characterisation of meaning, its apparent arbitrary character as well as its different varieties. More fundamental questions concern the origin of meaning i.e., what renders words or expressions meaningful. Here, discussions of such concepts as convention, usage, and intention feature prominently. Although important insights are fleshed out in these uṣūlī investigations, the overall results are often fragmentary and disconnected. It is here that the contemporary analytic philosophy of language can fruitfully interact with the science of uṣūl. In this paper, focusing on the works of Mohammad Bagher Sadr, I shall try to bring some of the discussions of meaning in the philosophy of language to bear on the issues of linguistic meaning discussed in the science of uṣūl. Hopefully, investigations along these lines may result in the mutual enrichment of both disciplines.

Medieval Muslim legal theorists devised increasingly complex categorisations of linguistic clarity and ambiguity. This paper traces the emergence of key terms including muḥkam, mutashābih, mujmal, and ẓāhir, which eventually crystalised in a four-fold Shāfiʿī classification and an eight-fold Ḥanafī one. Both these systems treated clarity and ambiguity not as features of the words and sentences of scripture, but as interpretive claims about the hermeneutical relationship between a text and a proposed interpretation of it. Both the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī systems served the same purpose, which was not to pin down meanings but to give the jurists as much interpretive power and flexibility as they reasonably could within the bounds of ordinary linguistic usage. Those legal theorists who resisted this combination of power and flexibility, including Ẓāhirīs and Akhbārīs, could not prevail against the flexible mainstream paradigm that took hold among Sunnīs and Imāmīs alike, and that still tacitly undergirds most legal discourse today. Today modern reformers and traditionalists alike exploit the vocabulary of clarity and ambiguity to support their interpretations. One highly original reformulation of these concepts comes from the Egyptian thinker Hassan Hanafi, who compounds the flexibility of the classical hermeneutic by retaining the flexible mainstream legal theorists’ analysis of ambiguity, albeit transposed into the language of twentieth-century European phenomenology, and then adding two more layers of ambiguity or subjectivity through his theory of how language relates to phenomenal reality and human action. This aspect of Hanafi’s hermeneutic has been much appreciated in some quarters, but all by itself interpretive flexibility is not the panacea some reformers take it to be, for flexibility cuts both ways: it can be used to justify reform or to uphold the status quo, and if anything is more readily amenable to the latter. As Hanafi himself illustrates, those who seek to justify the most radical reinterpretations cannot pin their hermeneutical hopes on the ambiguity of language, but are compelled to reconsider the whole theory of language and meaning on which classical legal theory rested.

Muslim scriptural text seems to pose contemporary challenges as to how its reader may mitigate tension between what text says and what it means. This tension defines the hermeneutical problem represented in the potential opposition between language and meaning, such opposition which Muslim jurists, and Arabic philologists for that matter, sought to resolve by referring to the idea of ‘context’. Particularly in juristic literature, Muslim scholars tend to use the word ‘context’ in two meanings: 1) ‘context’ in the sense of the linguistic context of the scriptural text; that is to read a text semantically and thematically according to its language-use and in connection with the surrounding texts which come before and after (aka sawābiq and lawāḥiq), where syntactical structure and speech arrangement are detrimental in the meaning-making process, and 2) ‘context’ as referring to the specifics of a given situation, where a text is read in connection with its speaker’s (authorial) intent and its surrounding historical and cultural circumstances. Based on these two meanings, ‘context’ can be classified into two types: context of language and context of situation, to borrow Malinowski’s term for the latter type. This paper seeks to demonstrate that the Muslim jurists relegated ‘context of situatio’ to an ancillary but instrumental role in determining meaning, as they do not seem to envisage the possibility of meaning beyond text or outside the context of language-use. It is possible however, I argue, to redeem a space within classical Islamic tradition, where ‘context of situation’ can be said to play an equally active role in the meaning-making process, hence balancing/reconciling the notion of language with the notion of meaning. Toward that end, the current paper seeks to expand the idea of ‘context’ to include another type of ‘context’, i.e., the context of interpreting religious text in connection with concrete reality. That is, a text – to be intelligible – is to be understood in connection with the way the text applies to a concrete situation. With this, the paper shall refer to three types of ‘context’: context of language, context of situation, and context of application. The paper shall draw on perspectives not only from classical Islamic knowledge but also from the philosophy of language and philosophical hermeneutics that may inform discussions on the attempt to develop such hermeneutics of application from within Islamic tradition. As it proceeds to situate its argument within Islamic tradition and modern knowledge, this paper will make references to 1) classical Islamic scholars such as al-Shāṭibī, Ibn al-Qayyim, and other philologists and jurists from Islamic tradition and 2) modern scholars of language and hermeneutics such as Firth, Wittgenstein, Malinowski, and Gadamer from modern times.

One of the pivotal issues in contemporary philosophy of language is the nature of linguistic meaning: what is it in virtue of which a word or a phrase has a specific linguistic meaning it actually does? A foundational theory of meaning aims to provide a systematic answer to this question. Although this question has not been explicitly raised in Shiite uṣūl al-fiqh, the uṣūlīs have long been concerned with a related problem, namely, the nature of convention (waḍʿ), and have proposed several theories in this regard. It seems that by “waḍʿ,” the uṣūlīs mean (at least implicitly) the process or condition that bestows words and phrases with their meanings. Thus, from the uṣūlīs’ theories of convention, we can infer their foundational theories of meaning, even if these theories are not explicitly formulated in uṣūl texts. One prominent uṣūlī theory of convention is the commitment (taʿahhud) theory, proposed by Nahāvandī (d. 1322), Ḥā’irī (d. 1355), Isfihānī (d. 1362), and most notably Khūʾī (d. 1413), among others. Given the close connection between the notions of convention and linguistic meaning in uṣūl al-fiqh, we can construct a foundational theory of meaning from the commitment theory of convention. At first approximation, such a theory of meaning runs as follows: Commitment Theory of Meaning: S means M in a group G if and only if the members of G are committed that whenever they intend to induce M (or induce a particular attitude relevant to M) in their audience, they utter S. This formulation is a schematic statement; depending on whether S is a word, a declarative sentence, or a non-declarative sentence, the parenthetic phrase (namely, “induce a particular attitude relevant to M”) will take a more specific form. The commitment theory of meaning is particularly interesting as it closely aligns with the basic idea of use theories of meaning, especially the intention-based theory of meaning developed by Paul Grice. In this paper, I will provide a detailed comparison between the commitment theory of meaning and the Gricean theory of meaning. I will then argue that although the commitment theory of meaning represents a significant step towards a sophisticated theory of meaning in uṣūl al-fiqh, it suffers from important problems in its accounts of both word meaning and sentence meaning. As we shall see, the Gricean theory of meaning fares better regarding at least some of these criticisms. Finally, I will tentatively propose that the notion of commitment might be employed in the context of William Alston’s theory of meaning (another form of the use theory of meaning) to shed light on the nature of illocutionary rules.

The Simulation Hypothesis, by best-selling author, renowned MIT computer scientist and Silicon Valley video game designer Rizwan Virk, explains one of the most daring and consequential theories of our time.Drawing from research and concepts from computer science, artificial intelligence, video games, quantum physics, and referencing both speculative fiction and ancient eastern spiritual texts, Virk shows how all of these traditions come together to point to the idea that we may be inside a simulated reality like the Matrix.The Simulation Hypothesis is the idea that our physical reality, far from being a solid physical universe, is part of an increasingly sophisticated video game-like simulation, where we all have multiple lives, consisting of pixels with its own internal clock run by some giant Artificial Intelligence. Simulation Theory explains some of the biggest mysteries of quantum and relativistic physics, such as quantum indeterminacy, parallel universes, and the integral nature of the speed of light.