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The linguistic principle of absoluteness leads to the absolutisation of a regulation in terms of the unrestricted scope of the applicability of its referent. Thus, the statement “respect the scholar” due to lack of qualifiers will yield the meaning of obligation as opposed to encouragement from the form of the imperative “respect” and this respect will be applicable to every type of scholar by virtue of the unqualified clause the “scholar”. The outcome is the obligation of respect to every scholar regardless of the scholar’s denomination, field of expertise and piety. The principle of absoluteness is utilised as a legal hermeneutical tool for the interpretation of evidences across the chapters of jurisprudence. A fundamental assumption in the principle of absoluteness is that the lawgiver is in a position to explicate his intention fully including all possible qualifications pertinent to the regulation and scope of its application in relation to the subject. Thus, by not restricting qualifiable terms the implication is that there are no qualifications to the regulation and to its scope of application. Having stated this the unqualified clause can be qualified at any point within the timeframe of the lawgiver which is a period of over two centuries. Thus, an absolutised verse of the Quran due to lack of qualifications within the Quran may be qualified and restricted by the statements of the Prophet or anyone of the subsequent twelve Imams. Analysing the phenomena of post-absolutised restrictions demonstrates rationally that the absolutised regulation was not absolute in essence from the outset but yet was treated as an absolute prior to its qualification since the qualifications can be delayed for up to a couple of centuries. This phenomenon reflects on the fallibilism of the absolutised regulations. Additionally, it shows that the issuance of unqualified regulations was resorted to at a pragmatic level and on utilitarian basis. The regulations are designed to secure their values in an overall manner and for the majority of individuals. Existentially it is difficult to conceive of absolute regulations; all regulations are bound by their existential contexts. In light of the above it is argued that: 1. existentially the lawgiver cannot be in a position to explicate all the qualifications beyond the lawgiver’s immediate context with a view to catering for the majority. 2. since the regulations are value-bearing the qualifications can be conceived through refined human learning and experience in every field of life. 3. existence being dynamic can effect change in relations of things to human beings. Such changes can qualify originally absolutised regulations and similarly restricted regulations may become absolutised by the same token.

Among contemporary scholars dedicated to examining the intersection of language and Islamic legal theory, Bernard G. Weiss’ contributions to the study of Islamic law frequently emphasise the paramount importance of linguistic inquiries and language analysis (al-mabādiʾ al-lughawiyya or mabāḥith al-alfāẓ) within the uṣūl alfiqh literature. By taking into account a few late-19th/early-20th century digests and manuals used in the madrasa curriculum, his doctoral dissertation Language and Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of “Waḍʿ al-Lughah” and its Development and his subsequent articles on ʿilm al-waḍʿ (1966, 1976, and 1987) provided an initial general overview of a new science called ʿilm al-waḍʿ to a Western audience, underscoring its significance within the framework of legal methodology. Nevertheless, the extensive 14th - 20th century exegetical literature of ʿilm al-waḍʿ, originating from the foundational al-Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), as well as the contexts in which this short text emerged, remain largely unexplored and understudied. The linguistic investigations of basic elements of language (nouns, verbs, and prepositions) undertaken by early commentators and glossators on al-Ījī’s Risāla are mainly devoted to analysing the roots of signification but also to developing a semantic theory that filled critical gaps in various disciplines, like balāgha, uṣūl al-fiqh, and logic. In general, ʿilm al-waḍʿ (lit. the science of linguistic positing), which can be loosely rendered as “semantics of the parts of speech,” examines how terms come to convey their concepts and, particularly, how terms convey particular and individual, or universal and general concepts. The original scope of ʿilm al-waḍʿ aimed to elucidate how terms, such as prepositions and pronouns, are posited in a universal way yet ultimately convey particular and individual concepts. The innovative solutions provided by ʿilm al-waḍʿ for explaining the semantic properties of this group of terms were so influential that premodern scholars, mainly commentators and glossators on al-Ījī’s Risāla, expanded the scope of this science, developing a comprehensive semantic theory that encompassed all parts of speech and simple sentence structures, while also engaging with the ḥaqīqa-majāz dichotomy. This presentation will first offer a heretofore unprecedented survey of the emergence and subsequent formation of ʿilm al-waḍʿ as an independent, and yet interdisciplinary, science between uṣūl al-fiqh and ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān. It will then present some aspects of the linguistic investigations undertaken by legal theorists prior to the emergence and establishment of ʿilm al-waḍʿ, in order to highlight the innovative and original contributions that this new discipline introduced into the broader discourse of the linguistic inquiries. Finally, it will offer some preliminary reflections on how ʿilm al-waḍʿ has impacted legal theorists’ analysis of language and uṣūl al-fiqh literature.

Can a perfectly good and wise God impose “impossible obligations” (takīf bi mā lāyotāq), that is, obligations surpassing human ability? This question holds profound significance within Islamic theology and carries weighty implications in the realm of Islamic law and morality, particularly concerning the comprehension of divine commands. For example, if one concedes that a perfectly good and wise God cannot (or does not) mandate impossible obligations, then an individual may reasonably question the religious validity of any prescription of Sharia if it is demonstrated to exceed human capacity. As I have argued in this paper, one’s position on this matter is tightly connected to the principle of Ultra posse nemo obligatur or “ought implies can” (from now on “the ability principle”). Historically, Muʿtazili, Shīʿī, and Māturīdi scholars have advocated for the ability principle and thus the notion that a perfectly good and wise God cannot issue impossible commands. Many of these scholars argued that the truth of the ability principle is necessary and evident to reason, while they also offered some textual and rational justifications for their position. In recent times, some modernist Shīʿī scholars have leveraged the ability principle and the concept of the immorality of impossible obligations not only as a guiding principle to reform traditional Islamic jurisprudence but also as a cornerstone for the revival of a morally sensitive understanding of religion in general, which they term "humane religion" or Dīn-e Insānī or Dīn-e Rahmānī. Conversely, Ashʿarī scholars have contested this principle and thus asserted that it falls within God’s power and authority to impose obligations beyond human ability. This paper sets out to first analyse different types of “ought” and “can” to identify the most appropriate understandings of these concepts in the context of moral and legal obligations. Second, it explores the traditional Ashʿarī arguments, championed by Abu Hamid Muhammad Ghazali, challenging the ability principle and advocating for the moral permissibility of God's imposition of impossible obligations. Additionally, it delves into traditional Muʿtazili and Shīʿī responses to this notion, as articulated by Qazi Abdul Jabbar and Shaykh Tusi. However, it finally argues that the ability principle (and consequently, its theological and legal implications) faces some new philosophical challenges that warrant careful consideration. There are at least three scenarios that can be counted against the ability principle and its theological and legal implications: First, the phenomenon of psychological compulsion, such as kleptomania. Second, scenarios originally offered by Harry Frankfurt (known as “Frankfurt cases”), and finally, cases in which the moral status of one person’s action depends on some other person’s having a certain moral obligation. This paper briefly examines these new challenges and argues that there are ways to meet them.

Muslim jurists infer, or justify, knowledge of Sharia regulations by primarily taking recourse to the apparent linguistic indication (ẓāhir) of the scriptural sources of the Quran and hadith corpora. These scriptural injunctions of Sharia are regarded as being based on values, with adherence to them considered beneficial to humanity and capable of mitigating harm. While Sharia's scriptural injunctions originated in the context of physical reality, contemporary society is increasingly becoming familiar with virtual environments, including virtual reality, augmented reality, video games and virtual worlds, broadly referred to as the Metaverse. As virtual reality unfolds as a multifaceted digital environment with interactive capabilities akin to the physical world, and with new user interfaces and more realistic graphics, it inevitably introduces new dimensions of ethical and religious inquiry, intersecting with technology, ethics, and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). For instance, Sharia has plentiful injunctions relating to actual reality including injunctions concerning sexuality, violence, deception, economics/trade, unlawful social interaction etc; however, the question that arises is whether these injunctions are also applicable and extendable to human actions in virtual reality? In navigating this uncharted terrain, Muslim jurists and theologians must grapple with a spectrum of normative dilemmas pertaining to both deontological Sharia regulations (al-aḥkām al-taklīfiyya) and situational Sharia regulations (al-aḥkām al-waḍʿiyya). As such, they must meticulously scrutinise semantic and interpretative methodologies to decern the applicability of Sharia injunctions to the complexities of virtual reality. The paper will explore the applicability and extension of scriptural injunctions to the following areas: 1. Individuals’ interaction with virtual objects and the virtual economy. 2. Individuals’ interaction with virtual characters, known as NPCs (non-playable characters), or AI avatars. 3. Individuals’ interaction with another real person’s avatar This paper embarks on a thought-provoking inquiry: to what extent can scriptural injunctions of Sharia be extended from their original context to the domain of virtual reality? If such extension is deemed plausible, what implications arise regarding the applicability of these injunctions in assessing an individual’s actions, interactions, and behaviours within virtual environments? Specifically, our analysis will focus on the relevance of technical Uṣūlī hermeneutical concepts, notably exploring linguistic principles such as the primacy of unrestricted meaning (aṣālat al-iṭlāq) and the primacy of generality (aṣālat al-ʿumūm) of scripture. We seek to determine whether these linguistic principles, traditionally applied in physical reality, retain their validity within virtual reality contexts. This examination encompasses existing virtual environments as well as potential future technologies, such as brain-computer interfaces or haptic suits, which augment users' sensory experiences within the virtual realm.

Absolute or unrestricted (muṭlaq) versus delimited (muqayyad) is a key area in the study of language and meaning (mabāḥith al-alfāẓ) in Islamic Legal Theory (uṣūl alfiqh). It deeply affects the understanding and interpretation of the apparent linguistic (ẓāhir) indication of Scripture and Tradition (Sunna), thereby deducing new, or justifying pre-existing, jurisprudential, ethical, and theological knowledge of Islam. This section in uṣūl al-fiqh includes three major chapters: preliminary discussions, the rulings of absolute expression (aḥkām al-iṭlāq), and the rulings when both absolute and delimited expressions coexist. The second chapter is divided into the utterances of absolute expression (alfāẓ al-iṭlāq) and the quality of indication of these utterances to absolute expression. This paper focuses on how the absolute (muṭlaq) indicates absolute expression (iṭlāq) and comprehensiveness (shumūl). Is this implication by designation (waḍʿ) or does it depend on context (qarīna)? Among Shi’ite Uṣūlis, the dominant approach since the 11th AH/17th AD century is the necessity of general context (qarīna ʿāmma) for absolute expression (iṭlāq). This general context depends on the realisation of a few necessary preliminaries, which are called “the necessary preliminaries of wisdom/ rationality” (muqadammāt al-ḥikma). There are at least three necessary preliminaries: first, the possibility of absolute and delimited expression; second, the speaker (mutakallim) must be in “the situation of a clear statement of complete intention” (maqām al-bayān li tamām al-murād) and not in “indetermination” (ihmāl) or ambiguity (ijmāl); third, the negation of what requires specification (ta’yīn). The focus has been on the second preliminary, analysing its boundaries and meaning. How can we determine if the speaker—here, the Lawmaker (Shāriʿ)—is in the “situation of a clear statement for complete intention”? What are its precise criteria? This paper examines holding absolute (al-tamassuk bi al-iṭlāq) in various fiqh cases and argues for a revision. If the Lawmaker’s situation is unclear, what does the foundational principle (al-aṣl al-awwali) require? Focusing on Imāmi uṣūl al-fiqh, this paper also provides a comparative analysis with Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh and linguistic philosophy. It comprises three sections: an overview of absolute and delimited (muṭlaq wa muqayyad), a literature review of “the necessary preliminaries of wisdom” (muqadammāt al-ḥikma), and the criteria for “the situation of a clear statement of complete intention” (maqām al-bayān li tamām al-murād).

The intricate relationships among the various sources of Islamic legal reasoning have long constituted some of the most vigorously discussed and contentious subjects. These include the relationships between: The Qurʾān and Sunna; text (naṣṣ) and reason (ʿaql); consensus (ijmaʿ) and the Qurʾān and Sunna; the internal dynamics within the religious texts themselves; the connections between analogical reasoning (qiyās) and textual evidence (al-adilla al-lafẓiyya), and others. Notably, the question of how conjectural Sunna (al-sunna al-ẓanniyya) like solitary narrations (pl. al-akhbār al-āḥād) relate to and potentially qualify (taqyīd) or specify (takhṣīṣ) the Qurʾān has been a pivotal topic extensively debated throughout the history of Islamic legal theory. Carrying profound implications on whether or not such solitary narrations possess the epistemic authority to specify and/or qualify the general indication of the Qurʾān or not. This paper aims to trace the historical evolution of the theory permitting ‘specifying of the Qurʾān through solitary reports’ (takhṣīṣ al-Qurʾān bil-khabr al-wāḥid) , analysing perspectives from both Sunnī and Shīʿī traditions. Among Sunnī scholars, the issue sparked numerous debates and stark scholarly divisions. In contrast, the Imāmī Shīʿī majority endorsed such qualification/specification, albeit with certain significant exceptions from early scholars. I will review the major critiques levelled against this specification theory and the responses from its proponents, as well as examine both the methodological and epistemological grounds underlying its construction within Sunnī and Shīʿī legal theories. Additionally, I will address the crucial issue of delineating the relationship between qualifying or specifying the Qurʾān through solitary reports, and the theory of abrogation (naskh) of the Qurʾān through such narrations, along with the consequent implications. Building upon this analysis, I will evaluate and critique the fundamental premises of the specification theory and uncover the extent to which the specification or qualification of the Qurʾān by solitary narrations is present in the practise of ijtihād. This will be done by examining whether the Qurʾān actually contains any general indications (ʿumūmāt), such that a jurist is able to qualify or specify the general indication of the Qurʾān by a solitary report. This entails analysing the legal (sharʿī) nature of the Qurʾānic texts regarding their amenability to generalisation. Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn regarding the extent to which rejecting the theory of specifying or qualifying the Qurʾān through solitary narrations impacts the overall corpus of Islamic legal theory and the juristic edicts (pl. fatāwa) in contemporary times.

This research paper consists of two steps. Firstly, it introduces a new perspective on the problem of the relationship between expression and meaning, thereby contributing to linguistic discussions in uṣūl al-fiqh. Secondly, it discusses some drawbacks of the principle of authoritativeness of apparent meaning. The process of assigning (al-waḍʿ) vocal expressions (alfāẓ) to meanings and the topic of denotation (dalāla) has been one of the oldest subjects discussed by scholars in the field of uṣūl al-fiqh since its inception. In this context, assigning and imposing refer to a particular correlation between an expression and its corresponding meaning. It involves the speaker and the audience inherently associating the intended meaning upon encountering the expression. Therefore, assignation is the sole factor through which a text or utterance signifies a specific meaning. Also, according to Islamic logicians, denotation is a state wherein recognising something elicits recognising something else. Scholars in uṣūl al-fiqh agree on assignation as a distinct link between expression and meaning, offering varied explanations of its workings. Al-Ṣaymarī sees assignation as natural, while Mohaghegh Isfahani deems the relation arbitrary. Mohaghegh Nāīnī refutes both, asserting God posits the connection, revealing languages to humankind. Al-Khoei, influenced by Nahavandi, highlights dependency on the positer’s intention. This study introduces a new perspective on the relationship between expression and meaning. The relationship between meaning and expression in a given source text can have three modalities: textually explicit, implicit synoptic, and apparent. The principle asserting the primacy of apparent meaning as authoritative evidence underpins most principles in uṣūl al-fiqh. However, this principle necessitates scrutiny, as it has specific limitations. This essay addresses these issues by examining the following questions: Firstly, it analyses whether the audience of the source text confines to the immediate addressees from the first generation when the text was initially uttered or it extends to contemporary individuals in subsequent generations. Secondly, it contemplates whether, if the addressees of source texts encompass contemporary people, the criterion for the authoritative apparent meaning should be what could be comprehended at the time of utterance or what could be understood in the context of contemporary circumstances. Finally, despite Islamic theologians maintaining that the Quran’s text is God’s speech, this essay raises the following questions: does the same hold true for the texts of hadiths? Do hadith texts correspond to the speeches of the Imams? Or can they be considered paraphrased quotes? If so, applying the linguistic principles from uṣūl al-fiqh, especially the principle of apparent meaning, to hadiths could be methodologically controversial.

Legal and normative discourse has been integral to the fabric of Shīʿism since its inception. Revered across nearly all schools of Islam, the sixth Shīʿī Imām, Imām Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq (d. 765), stands as a paragon of juridical scholarship. The legal doctrines elucidated by Imām Jaʿfar and his immediate successors have purportedly been meticulously preserved by eminent figures such as al-Kulaynī (d. 941), Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d. 974), al-Ṣudūq (d. 991), and al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067) within their respective ḥadīth collections. These compendia collectively form a coherent corpus of legalistic discourse, distinctively associated with the Jaʿfarī school of thought. Within this corpus, a specific legal persona of the Imām is presupposed, wherein the linguistic formulation of legal pronouncements is contingent upon the recipient, while the underlying legal principles remain immutable and accessible solely to the Imām. Numerous traditions assert that God has conferred upon the Imām the authority of legal guardianship (al-wilāyah al-tashrīʿiya), enabling them to legislate per divine knowledge, thus allowing flexibility in expressing their legal rulings through various linguistic forms. The embodiment of this principle becomes evident when the Imām issues divergent rulings on the same matter due to specific circumstances, illustrating the dynamic nature of legal language. By recognizing the parallels between legal guardianship and other prevalent Jaʿfarī themes such as dissimulation (taqiyya) and intellectual accommodation (kalām ʿalā qadr ʿuqūl al-nās), one can argue that the aforementioned Shīʿī corpus posits a perspective on legal principles and legal language that is characterized by realism yet subject-dependency. Within this framework, the Imām not only receives legal principles but also interprets and applies them, emphasising the nuanced interplay between linguistic expression and the application of legal principles. Due to this, the Imām embodies a ‘proto-Uṣūlī’ role, applying consistent principles but issuing varied judgments based on circumstances, akin to a 'legal demiurge' endowed with divine authority. This meta-ethical stance, akin to ‘Platonic Moral Realism’, underscores the constancy of principles amidst changing moral judgments. Such a view significantly impacts the legal language used by the Imām, with specific rulings tailored for ‘common’ followers and general principles revealed to legally ‘qualified’ ones. The rejection of analogical reasoning (qiyās), attributed to the Imām, is also rooted in the belief that only he holds the necessary knowledge for accurate interpretation, ensuring clarity in legal meaning. Viewing the Imām as a ‘Divine Jurist’ reveals disparities in Jaʿfarī legal thought before and after the Occultation, shedding light on evolving synthetic legal trends amongst later Twelver communities. This perspective highlights Imāms’ distinct stance on the relationship between legal language and meaning, affirming the adaptability of the former and the permanence of the latter.

For centuries, under the rubrics of dalīl al-khiṭāb, mafhūm al-mukhālafa, and al-istidlāl bi-l-ḥaṣr, Muslim legal theorists debated the validity of affirming for what is unspoken the contradictory of the ruling for what is spoken. Put differently, if revelation links a ruling to a specified attribute of a thing, does this entail (linguistically, logically, or in some other way) the opposite ruling for what lacks that attribute? Referring to a common example: Does the Prophet’s assertion that zakāt is due on free-grazing sheep (fī sāʾimat al-ghanam zakāt) entail that zakāt is not due on fodder-fed sheep? Navigating the confluence of linguistic and logical implication, uṣūlist discourse on this issue reached a considerable degree of refinement, and has inspired a number of informative studies in past decades. So far, however, some important linguistic-logical parallels seem to have escaped notice. First is the fact that propositions which link a ruling to a specified attribute may be formally rendered as conditionals, and the inference “If p then q, not-p, therefore not-q” (with a conditional major premise) constitutes the formal fallacy of denying the antecedent (aka the inverse fallacy); whereas the inference “If and only if p then q, not-p, therefore not-q” (with a biconditional major premise) is valid. Second is the fact that in some cases contextual factors dictate that propositions formulated as mere conditionals (if p then q) should be understood as biconditionals (if and only if p then q), thus allowing valid inferences of the inverse (if not-p then not-q). Third, and on top of these older, logical observations, modern pragmaticians have developed a lively discourse around “conditional perfection”: our tendency to hear conditionals as biconditionals (subconsciously “perfecting the conditional”) and thus to accept inferences of the inverse. As is too often the case with modern theorists, however, they have proceeded in evident ignorance of very rich and relevant premodern discourses. This talk therefore aims first to present select definitions, typologies, and controversies of the uṣūlist discourse on dalīl al-khiṭāb, mafhūm al-mukhālafa, and al-istidlāl bi-lḥaṣr, second to understand these with reference to their logical parallels, and third to juxtapose all this with a summary of the modern discourse on conditional perfection, suggesting (as in previous studies) how centuries of refined, premodern Islamic theorising and debate can complement and contribute to the (sometimes re-inventive) efforts of modern theorists.

While the task of jurisprudence (fiqh) is to determine what people are supposed to do in their daily affairs by inference from premises that involve the divine rulings of Sharia, the science of the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl) is intended to facilitate such transitions by providing the relevant methodological principles and rules of validity for such inferences. In that sense, the science of usūl can be regarded as the logic of jurisprudence. One of the principles that a jurist needs to rely on to derive religious (Sharia) rulings concerns the evidence at their disposal. This evidence either directly comes from the Qurʾān and the Sunna or is grounded in reason. The former comes into two varieties: linguistic evidence which involves statements of the Qurʾān and the non-linguistic variety which includes, among other things, the actions of the māʿṣūm (infallible). For linguistic evidence to fulfil its role, however, three things must be determined: (i) the prima facia meaning of the evidence and what it denotes, (ii) its reliability (ḥujjiyya), and (iii) whether evidence did, in fact, issue from the legislator. The questions that arise from the role of linguistic evidence in the process of deriving particular Sharia rulings have, however, spawned an important chapter in the science of uṣūl about the foundations of meaning. These investigations include discussions about the characterisation of meaning, its apparent arbitrary character as well as its different varieties. More fundamental questions concern the origin of meaning i.e., what renders words or expressions meaningful. Here, discussions of such concepts as convention, usage, and intention feature prominently. Although important insights are fleshed out in these uṣūlī investigations, the overall results are often fragmentary and disconnected. It is here that the contemporary analytic philosophy of language can fruitfully interact with the science of uṣūl. In this paper, focusing on the works of Mohammad Bagher Sadr, I shall try to bring some of the discussions of meaning in the philosophy of language to bear on the issues of linguistic meaning discussed in the science of uṣūl. Hopefully, investigations along these lines may result in the mutual enrichment of both disciplines.