The Proto-Uṣūlī: Legal Language and Meaning in Formative Shīʿism by Abdullah Ansar

Legal and normative discourse has been integral to the fabric of Shīʿism since its inception. Revered across nearly all schools of Islam, the sixth Shīʿī Imām, Imām Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq (d. 765), stands as a paragon of juridical scholarship. The legal doctrines elucidated by Imām Jaʿfar and his immediate successors have purportedly been meticulously preserved by eminent figures such as al-Kulaynī (d. 941), Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d. 974), al-Ṣudūq (d. 991), and al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067) within their respective ḥadīth collections. These compendia collectively form a coherent corpus of legalistic discourse, distinctively associated with the Jaʿfarī school of thought. Within this corpus, a specific legal persona of the Imām is presupposed, wherein the linguistic formulation of legal pronouncements is contingent upon the recipient, while the underlying legal principles remain immutable and accessible solely to the Imām. Numerous traditions assert that God has conferred upon the Imām the authority of legal guardianship (al-wilāyah al-tashrīʿiya), enabling them to legislate per divine knowledge, thus allowing flexibility in expressing their legal rulings through various linguistic forms. The embodiment of this principle becomes evident when the Imām issues divergent rulings on the same matter due to specific circumstances, illustrating the dynamic nature of legal language. By recognizing the parallels between legal guardianship and other prevalent Jaʿfarī themes such as dissimulation (taqiyya) and intellectual accommodation (kalām ʿalā qadr ʿuqūl al-nās), one can argue that the aforementioned Shīʿī corpus posits a perspective on legal principles and legal language that is characterized by realism yet subject-dependency. Within this framework, the Imām not only receives legal principles but also interprets and applies them, emphasising the nuanced interplay between linguistic expression and the application of legal principles. Due to this, the Imām embodies a ‘proto-Uṣūlī’ role, applying consistent principles but issuing varied judgments based on circumstances, akin to a 'legal demiurge' endowed with divine authority. This meta-ethical stance, akin to ‘Platonic Moral Realism’, underscores the constancy of principles amidst changing moral judgments. Such a view significantly impacts the legal language used by the Imām, with specific rulings tailored for ‘common’ followers and general principles revealed to legally ‘qualified’ ones. The rejection of analogical reasoning (qiyās), attributed to the Imām, is also rooted in the belief that only he holds the necessary knowledge for accurate interpretation, ensuring clarity in legal meaning. Viewing the Imām as a ‘Divine Jurist’ reveals disparities in Jaʿfarī legal thought before and after the Occultation, shedding light on evolving synthetic legal trends amongst later Twelver communities. This perspective highlights Imāms’ distinct stance on the relationship between legal language and meaning, affirming the adaptability of the former and the permanence of the latter.