In Moscow's Shadows

Released on 6 September to Patrons, public release later. A snapshot of the three key figures within Belarus's security structures: the new head of the KGB, the Interior Minister and the (newish) Defence MinisterSupport the show

Trying (it turns out in vain) to avoid the present inevitable concentration on Navalny and Belarus, I discuss two forms of power. What the creation and current role, status and business activities of the National Guard tell us about Russian politics (and economics). And, in response to questions from Patron Callum Christie, quite why the Kremlin is so determined to believe the EU has no real power, no real relevance, maybe even no real existence...You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

What makes Alexei Navalny so dangerous for Putin's regime? This short 'cellcast' was provided to patrons of the podcast (https://www.patreon.com/join/InMoscowsShadows) on 22 August 2020, and general access a week later.Support the show

Rumours abound amidst the Belarusian revolution. Why do I think that's a particular problem now? Because, as it looks like the revolution is moving from its protest to politics phase, the scope for information operations on every side gets all the greater - and their potential impact all the more dangerous.The Raam op Rusland article I mention is here.This is one of the short 'cellcasts' offered as an early bonus for Patrons of the podcast (www.patreon.com/inmoscowsshadows) and usually released publicly a week later. However, given the situation I'm issuing it early...Support the show

Belarus is in turmoil. Why did Lukashenka award himself such an implausible 80% of the vote> How does Moscow see the current crisis, and what might it do about it? This is one of the short 'cellcasts' offered as an early bonus for Patrons of the podcast (www.patreon.com/inmoscowsshadows) and usually released publicly a week later. However, given the situation, and at the suggestion of several public-spirited Patrons, I'm issuing it early...Support the show

The release of a long-awaited report on Russian influence in the UK provides a chance to look at why Moscow tries - and often fails - to exert influence, and why the Kremlin seems to default to aggressive, bullying words and deeds. Be warned, I spend more time on my soap box in this episode than I should.For my other writings on this report:'The weakness of the Russia report' - a quick response in The Spectator'The ISC’s Russia Report Offers More Critiques of the Intelligence Community than Solutions' a commentary for RUSI'The UK must urgently adapt to Russia's 'dark power' tactics' a Telegraph piece focusing on the obvious'Lebedev’s Peerage Highlights London’s Need to Address Russian Influence' for the Moscow Times 'TEN SUGGESTIONS FOR A ‘RUSSIA STRATEGY’ FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM', a lengthier and presumptious set of prescriptions, in War On The RocksThe Arutunyan article in Foreign Affairs I mentioned is here, the Levada poll is summarised here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

There is more to Putin's regime than his capacity to threaten and unleash violence - but this is a crucial element, and as his legitimacy wanes, this may come to the fore. Thrones of bayonets are uncomfortable, though, and so today I consider the mood of the police and other security forces, and what scope the opposition may have in wooing, or at least neutralising them.In a short second part, I explain why I think the claims of hacking British and others' coronavirus research sounds wholly plausible.My article on the Khabarovsk protests in Raam op Rusland is here, and the Riddle article on military voting is here. Gallyamov's Ekho Moskvy commentary is here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

The big story is the constitutional vote, but I honestly have nothing new to say about that, so instead I take three controversial court cases - Kirill Serebrennikov the director, Colonel Miniakhmetov the investigator, and the alleged (and unlikely) "terrorists" of the Set' (Network) group - and explore what they say about power and performative repression in Russia. Indeed, the 'Three Russias.'If anyone is interested, my take on the constitutional vote is in the Spectator here and on the Afghan bounty case in the Moscow Times here, while the Naked Pravda podcast I reference is here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

Having talked about Security Council secretary Patrushev in the last podcast, he and most of the other heads of the security agency chiefs suddenly seem uncharacteristically newsworthy - and they are playing one of two roles, either the trusty technocrat or the cultural warrior. Why so?If anyone is interested, the Patrushev article I cite is here and Putin's is here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

Who could be the most dangerous man in Russia? A president? An ideologue? A kleptocrat? A gangster? None of those, in my opinion...If anyone is interested in the Argumenty i Fakty article I mention, it's here. In addition, a short paper I wrote on the Security Council is here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show