Controversy & Clarity

In this episode, we discuss: --Alford’s experiences as a platoon commander in Operation Just Cause --His experiences in Desert Storm, including seeing the effects of Allied airpower and artillery on Iraqi forces --The organization of Task Force Tarawa in Operation Iraqi Freedom I --The virtues of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force --Alford’s experiences with commanding a light armored infantry platoon --How Alford and a cobra detachment commander worked together to create an air-ground cavalry team while on a MEU --Alford’s experiences afloat --The strategic value of port calls --How to keep Marines engaged during sea deployments --Alford’s role in Operation Assured Response in Libera --The experience of watching a horrific civil war unfold in the Liberian capital of Monrovia --The traits that Alford looked for and sought to develop in his squad leaders and platoon commanders --The benefits of having Marines live in squad bays --The Gunfighter Gym and the need to invest substantial funds into the individual infantry Marine --The rigors of Marine Corps recruiting duty --Alford’s experiences as a battalion executive officer during the March Up to Baghdad --Fighting the Fedayeen --Alford’s deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq as a rifle battalion commander and the differences between them --The origins of how the Marines ended up concentrated in Helmand Province, Afghanistan --Alford’s time as General David McKiernan’s counterinsurgency advisor --Some of the US Army officers that Alford has worked for and his high praise for them --Alford’s thoughts on Marine Corps Recruit Training and its transformative effects --The cult of the Marine Corps --What Alford learned from spending time with different NATO forces in Afghanistan --The counterinsurgency books and thinkers that most influenced Alford --The role that Alford’s counterinsurgency reading had on his decisions as a battalion commander --How Alford expects the Chinese to fight the US --The focus on Western warfare in US PME institutions and why we should study more Chinese military history and warfare --Alford’s stance that the Marine Corps needs to be ready to do “anything, anytime, anywhere, today” --The deployment that influenced Alford most --The sacrifices of command and the toll they take on one’s family life --What it was like serving during the ‘maneuver warfare years’ --Alford’s interactions with Bill Lind --How faithfully the Marine Corps adheres to its capstone doctrinal publication, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication Warfighting 1 --What maneuver warfare in garrison looks like and Alford’s surprising response "Underground PME: The Warfighting" Society by Damien O'Connell: https://innovatedefense.net/kcic/customObject/viewCustomObject/8f0088d3356d  Some of the books mentioned by MajGen Alford The Village by Bing West: https://www.amazon.com/Village-Bing-West/dp/0743457579 Invisible Armies by Max Boot: https://www.amazon.com/Invisible-Armies-History-Guerrilla-Warfare/dp/0871406888 The Bear Went Over the Mountain edited by Lester Grau: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a316729.pdf Everything Under the Sun by Howard F. French: https://www.amazon.com/Everything-Under-Heavens-Chinas-Global/dp/0385353324

In this episode, we discuss: *Adam’s experiences with Marine expeditionary units (MEUs), including his thoughts on how to keep Marines engaged and developing as warfighters throughout a MEU deployment *What it was like joining a unit of combat veterans as a new Marine *Adam’s first combat deployment: Ramadi, Iraq *What it was like being attached to the Army during the deployment *The disconnect in intensity between Adam’s own combat experiences and the combat stories he had heard from more senior Marines in his unit *The highs and lows of a combat deployment *The necessity for trust, up and down the ranks, in Adam's battalion throughout the deployment *What Adam’s typical encounters with the enemy looked like and how the enemy chose to fight *Adam’s experience at the (now-defunct) Infantry Squad Leader Course in 2007 *Adam’s redeployment from the 11th MEU to Afghanistan as part of a security force mission in 2010 *What it was like working with Georgians and Afghans—and dealing with the tensions between the two groups *Adam’s experience setting up, training, and leading a mobile assault section for Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, for its 2011 deployment to Afghanistan *The deployment itself and how the enemy in Afghanistan differed from those Adam faced in Iraq *Adam’s first firefight in Afghanistan *Adam’s involvement as a senior sergeant in helping plan company and battalion-sized operations and the profound learning experiences he had observing “commanders’ huddles” *Adam executing his first B-Billet at the School of Infantry-West (SOI-W)—after eight-and-a-half years in the same infantry battalion—and the many things he learned about the Marine Corps, its policies, and training at Infantry Training Battalion (ITB) *How Adam ended up as an instructor at the Infantry Small Unit Leaders Course (ISULC) *The evolution of ISULC at SOI-W *Adam’s introduction to Staff Sergeant Neil McCoy *The wide latitude the ISULC staff had in creating the course *The ISULC staff’s introduction to me (Damien O’Connell) and DFCs *The truth about Damien's so-called “skinny jeans” *Adam’s take on why DFCs are effective teaching tools *How DFCs encourage facilitators to be vulnerable and grow as learners themselves *Adam’s favorite DFC *Adam’s approach to facilitating DFCs *Adam’s advice to young leaders who would like to develop their own DFCs *The benefits and pitfalls of reaching out to people who lived through the events of a DFC *What enlisted education was like when Adam was a young Marine and his thoughts on enlisted education in general *The two things Adam would change about enlisted education and training *The one thing Adam would change about the Marine Corps infantry community *What excites Adam most about the future of the Marine Corps *What worries Adam most about the future of the Marine Corps *The benefits of reflecting on one’s experiences and thoughts Links Fangs of the Lone Wolf by Dodge Billingsley: https://www.amazon.com/Fangs-Lone-Wolf-Russian-Chechen-1994-2009/dp/1909384771 Hill 488 by Ray Hildreth: https://www.amazon.com/Hill-488-Ray-Hildreth/dp/0743466438#ace-g9766277718 "Maneuver Warfare: The way forward" by GySgts Neil D. McCoy, Adam D. DuVall, & Joshua L. Larson, & SSgt Luke T. Hudson: https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Maneuver-Warfare.pdf 

In this episode, we discuss: -How Neil views training and education -How the Marine Corps seems to focus more on training enlisted Marines over educating them -What professional military education (PME) was like when Neil joined the Marine Corps -The lack of PME he experienced as a young Marine in the fleet -Where Neil’s interest in PME began -The influence that the Infantry Small Unit Leaders Course had on Neil -Neil’s initial reaction to working with me (a non-Marine civilian) -Why Neil thinks decision-forcing cases (DFCs) are effective teaching tools -How creating and facilitating DFCs helped Neil trust his Marines more -Neil’s favorite DFC -Neil’s process of researching and developing DFCs -If Neil were the Commandant of the Marine Corps, what’s the one thing he would change about enlisted professional education? -Neil’s ideas on how to get Marines of all military occupational specialties interested in the profession of arms -If Neil could change one thing about Marine training, what would it be? -What about changing one thing about the infantry community? -Neil’s thoughts on Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 7 Learning -Neil’s journey to writing, the trials of publishing, and his advice to Marines who are interested in writing -The need for honest critiques of one’s writing -Some of Neil’s ‘a-ha’ moments with maneuver warfare -The dichotomy between maneuver and attrition warfare -What does the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy look like in garrison? -As a former platoon sergeant, Neil’s expectations of his Marines, squad leaders, and platoon commanders -What excites Neil most about the future of the Marine Corps -What worries Neil most about the future of the Marine Corps Links to books mentioned The Bear Went Over the Mountain edited by Lester Grau: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a316729.pdf The Other Side of the Mountain by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a376862.pdf Fangs of the Lone Wolf by Dodge Billingsley: https://www.amazon.com/Fangs-Lone-Wolf-Russian-Chechen-1994-2009/dp/1909384771 Errata Lester Grau did not write Fangs of the Lone Wolf. Dodge Billingsley did, though Grau wrote the foreword.

In this episode, we discuss: -How Vanya found her way to reading, writing, and teaching military history -The importance of reading any text in the context of its writing and publication -The fascinating story of how Vanya came to write about Marie and Karl von Clausewitz -The process of researching and writing her book on Marie -The backgrounds of Marie and Karl and their relationship -How Karl was “so out of Marie’s league” -How much of Marie’s hand we see in On War and his other works -How Karl wrote On War -Vanya’s thoughts on how On War might be different if Karl had lived to see it published -How Karl might respond if he could see how widely his work is used (and abused) today -Vanya’s thoughts on which parts of Clausewitz are most misunderstood -Studying Karl’s other works, including his campaign histories -Karl’s interest in and use of decision games -The profound influence that Gerhard von Scharnhorst had on Karl -Scharnhorst’s background and Vanya’s recent research on him -The influence of Scharnhorst’s Military Society on the Prussian Army -The influence of literary salons on Scharnhorst -What happened at Military Society meetings -How much Western militaries owe to Scharnhorst -The role Scharnhorst had in reforming the Prussian Army after its crushing defeat at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806 -Where listeners should go to start learning more about Scharnhorst and Clausewitz -Vanya’s advice on civilians wanting to get into the world of military matters -Why we all should embrace honesty and humility in our professional work -Why we should debate Clausewitz Links Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War by Vanya Bellinger: https://www.amazon.com/Marie-von-Clausewitz-Behind-Making-ebook/dp/B0146Y9T2K/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=Marie+von+Clausewitz%3A+The+Woman+Behind+the+Making+of+On+War&qid=1589213020&sr=8-1 “Five Things That You Did Not Know About Carl von Clausewitz” by Vanya Bellinger: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/1/5/five-things-you-did-not-know-about-carl-von-clausewitz “Five Things That Helped Carl von Clausewitz Become A Great Strategic Thinker” by Vanya Bellinger: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/4/19/five-things-that-helped-carl-von-clausewitz-become-a-great-strategic-thinker ‘Introducing #Scharnhorst: The Vision of an Enlightened Soldier “On Experience and Theory”’ by Vanya Bellinger: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/4/1/introducing-scharnhorst-the-vision-of-an-enlightened-soldier-on-experience-and-theory The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805 by Charles E. White: https://www.amazon.com/Enlightened-Soldier-Scharnhorst-Militarische-Gesellschaft/dp/0275929361

In this episode, we discuss: -Woods’ definition of professional military education (PME) -The need for all leaders in a unit to emphasize PME -The purpose of PME -How PME in the Marine Corps changed from the early 1970s to the early 1980s -What good PME programs look like -The lack of emphasis of PME in the Marine Corps in the immediate years following Vietnam -Woods’ exposure to maneuver warfare and interactions with then-Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Mike Wyly at Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) -How LtCol Wyly stood out from the other staff at AWS -Woods’ experience with decision games at AWS -How Woods got into hobby wargaming as a lieutenant -How wargaming predisposed Woods to embracing Wyly’s teaching and maneuver warfare -How well the Marine Corps taught decision-making during Woods’ time as a company-grade officer -A deep dive on the free-play force on force exercises that the 2ndMarine Division held while then-Major General Al Gray was its commanding general -How free play exercises terrified some senior unit leaders -Woods’ role in planning the Ft Pickett exercises -The role of umpires and observers in these exercises -How the 2ndMarine Division led free play exercise critiques -How observers helped with the “I shot you.” “No, I shot you.” problem of free play exercises -How to avoid public shaming in a free play after-action review -How Al Gray created an atmosphere where free play could thrive in the 2ndMarine Division -How Gray attempted to build a consensus on maneuver warfare in the division The genesis of the 2ndMarine Division Maneuver Warfare Board and the famous “ambush” of Al Gray at the Camp Lejeune officers club -Woods’ views on Bill Lind -Woods’ experiences with Colonel John Boyd -How Woods’ involvement with the maneuver warfare movement affected his career -Woods’ experience serving as the aide-de-camp to Al Gray -Why Al Gray’s attention shifted away from promoting maneuver warfare toward creating MEU (SOCs) -The insights that Woods gained about general officers as an aide -What made Al Gray a standout among senior leaders -Woods’ thoughts on the prospects of another intellectual renaissance in the Marine Corps -The likelihood of a future US-China war -What future warfare may look like -Woods’ thoughts on the maneuver vs attrition dichotomy

In this episode, we discuss: -How Stuart got into studying Russia -Stuart’s childhood interest in military history and the books that have influenced him most -What led Stuart to translating books on the Eastern Front -The prolific work of Colonel David Glantz, US Army (ret), and how he helped get Stuart his “big break” -What are the key roles and responsibilities of a translator and editor of Russian military history -The excellent Great Patriotic War website “I Remember” -Stuart’s role models and inspirations when it comes to translating and editing -Working with Russian military historians and researchers -Russians’ propensity to write large books and the special role of authors in Russian society -Stuart’s favorite Russian military historians and the challenges that historians in Russia face in writing “objective” history -Which books Stuart has enjoyed translating the most -What Stuart has learned about the Eastern Front since becoming a translator -Three stereotypes that Westerners still hold about the Soviet Army of WW II: commissars, blocking detachments, and penal companies and battalions -The Red Army’s ability to learn quickly from their failures and how Stalin became more open to listening to his generals as the war went on -On General Konstantin Rokossovsky—Stalin’s Polish-born “Gentlemen Commander” -Stuart’s interest in the forgotten (and horrific) Battle of Rzhev -Forgotten offensives and battles of the Eastern Front -How well Americans understand the influence of the Great Patriotic War on the Russian memory and psyche -How well Russians understand the American contribution to WWII -How much WWII still influences Russia’s behaviors on the world stage -The Russian Army’s long-held emphasis on maskirovka -What every American should know about Russia’s experience in the Second World War -Stuart’s advice on which books Marines and soldiers should read to begin their study of the Great Patriotic War -Sources for potential tactical decision games, decision-forcing cases, and wargames from the Eastern Front -How Stuart got into wargaming -How wargaming plays a role in his translation work -Stuart’s thoughts on using wargames as training and educational tools -Decision games as a form of therapy -The lifesaving wargaming efforts of the Western Approaches Tactical Unit in WWII -Some perils of wargaming Links Stuart Britton’s translations on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=stuart+britton&ref=nb_sb_noss David Glantz’s books on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=david+glantz&ref=nb_sb_noss_2 The “I Remember” website: https://iremember.ru/en/ Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the Eastby David Stahel: https://www.amazon.com/Operation-Barbarossa-Germanys-Cambridge-Histories-ebook/dp/B00B23DEBQ/ref=sr_1_2?dchild=1&keywords=david+stahel&qid=1589214281&sr=8-2 Errata At the 00:50:25 mark, Stuart references the movie “Stalingrad.” He meant to say instead the movie “Enemy at the Gates.”

In this episode, we discuss: -How Zinni defines professional military education (PME) and the purpose behind it -Why we tend to focus more on formal PME over informal PME -The need for commanders to provide PME to their units -Zinni’s experience facilitating PME as a unit commander -Zinni’s use of decision games as teaching tools -How decision games might feel threatening to some commanders -Creating an open learning environment in your command -Laying down ground rules for PME sessions -The role of formal schools in a Marine’s PME -Zinni’s approach to self-directed PME -Having good role models in PME -Books and subjects that influenced Zinni at different points in his Marine Corps career -When should we start teaching leaders to think strategically? -The profound learning experience Zinni had as an advisor to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps -The virtues of the South Vietnamese Marines -Some of Zinni’s views on the war in Vietnam -The cognitive dissonance between what Zinni learned at The Basic School and what actually worked for him in Vietnam -Zinni’s formal teaching experiences -Zinni’s advice for senior officers on PME and the danger of “intellectual flatlining” -Zinni’s drive for formal education outside of the military and the need to “cast one’s net widely” in their learning -Zinni’s experiences with decision games while on active duty, and how they helped develop vicarious experience -Zinni’s thoughts on the latest wave of interest in and support of wargaming in the Department of Defense -How much emphasis the Marine Corps put on teaching decision-making during Zinni’s time in service -Zinni on his Combat Concepts and the need for leaders to critically review received wisdom and theories and to commit to their own theory of combat -The unsung contributions and brilliance of Marine General Graves B. Erskine -Zinni’s recent PhD work on leadership -Zinni’s relationship to the “maneuver warfare movement” -How, if at all, has maneuver warfare made a difference for the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan? -The effects of a lack of a clear strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan -The gap between what the Marine Corps says about maneuver warfare and what it actually does -The need to allow leaders to make forgivable mistakes -How rampant the “zero defects mentality” is in today’s Department of Defense and determining what is forgivable and what is unforgivable -On the obligation of senior leaders to speak out about wrongdoing Links Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win Or Lose Off The Battlefield by Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz: https://www.amazon.com/Before-First-Shots-Are-Fired/dp/125007505X/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1589206250&sr=8-1 Battle Ready by Tom Clancy, Tony Zinni, and Tony Koltz: https://www.amazon.com/Battle-Ready-Commander-Book-4-ebook/dp/B001QWFYFM/ref=sr_1_4?dchild=1&keywords=TONY+ZINNI&qid=1589206368&sr=8-4 “Why Lieutenants Should Study Strategy” by Colonel Michael D. Wyly: http://the-military-learning-library.24301.n8.nabble.com/file/n107/Why_Lieutenants_should_study_strategy.pdf

In this episode, we discuss: -Wargames and the different ways to define them -The trouble with the term “games” -How Eric got into wargaming -How wargaming led Eric to study all kinds of military history -Eric’s thoughts on wargames as teaching tools for grade schoolers -The many benefits of wargaming -How wargames and reading helped Eric understand “the why” of doctrine, enemy tactics and organizations, and maneuver warfare -How we should be wary of using games as a means of evaluating Marines as combat leaders -Eric’s reaction to the explosion of interest in and acceptance of wargames in the Department of Defense -Some recent wargame developments in the Army and Marine Corps -Eric’s thoughts on General Berger’s focus on wargaming -Eric’s experiences running wargames in the fleet as a company-grade officer -How well the Marine Corps taught decision-making during Eric’s time as a young officer -On the power of being supported by your superiors -Eric’s thoughts on professional military education (PME) and what “professional” means to him -What good PME looks like -The need for one-on-one coaching in PME with accomplished masters -The dangers of self-directed PME -The need for study in the absence of experience -The role formal schools should play in PME -Eric’s thoughts on “lifelong learning” -The coaches Eric has had over his career and life -The value of belonging to a community of practice -American Military University’s influence on Eric -How decision games help build trust -Eric’s approach to building PME programs while on active duty and the results of those programs -What is critical thinking? -Some critical thinking models and resources that Eric uses -The relationship between decision games and critical thinking -Eric’s admonition to Marines to remain relevant and take a long view of future threats Links https://www.criticalthinking.org(for resources on critical thinking) “Interview with COL(R) Eric Walters, USMC” by Grogheads: https://grogheads.com/interviews/3066 “Maneuver Warfare in Commercial Board Wargames” by Eric Walters: https://mca-marines.org/gazette/maneuver-warfare-in-commercial-board-wargames/ “Is Mission Control the Weakness of Maneuver Warfare?” by Eric Walters: https://mca-marines.org/gazette/is-mission-control-the-weakness-of-maneuver-warfare/

In this episode, we discuss: -Wyly’s thought on professional military education (PME) -What a profession is -The obligation for professionals to study their profession -Can a private be a professional? -The value of the Socratic method -How Wyly got into PME, maneuver warfare, and military reform -The benefits of reading -The value of PME as a means to get into the mind of past commanders -The role of formal schools in PME -History as a basis for decision-making exercises -The role of humility in PME and leadership -Wyly’s thoughts on self-study -The unsung role and contributions of Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor with respect to PME and maneuver warfare -The similarities between Trainor and General Al Gray -How Wyly was introduced to Al Gray -How Wyly discovered decision games -How he facilitated decision games -Wyly on taking his AWS students to the field for tactical exercises without troops -The reaction of students who were experiencing decision games for the first time -School solutions -The lack of emphasis on decision-making during Wyly’s time as a young officer -Wyly’s company commander tour in Vietnam -The trouble with the term “maneuver warfare” -The misconception that maneuver warfare avoids fighting -Wyly’s role in the maneuver warfare movement -Wyly’s relationship with Colonel John Boyd -What maneuver warfare looks like in garrison -The need for risk-takers Links “MARINES HAVE THE LAST WORD ON ONE WHO DID IT HIS WAY” by David Evans: https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1991-04-12-9102020610-story.html “Doctrinal Change: The Move To Maneuver Theory” by Colonel Mike Wyly: https://mca-marines.org/gazette/doctrinal-change-the-move-to-maneuver-theory/ “At the Forefront of Tactical Thought” by Colonel Mike Wyly: https://mca-marines.org/gazette/at-the-forefront-of-tactical-thought/

The topics we discussed in this episode include: -Smith’s thoughts on professional military education (PME) and training -What good PME and training look like -The best PME experience Smith ever had -Major General O.K. Steele’s approach to training and PME -The effect that bootcamp had on Smith’s development as a person -How to get young Marines interested in learning -The value of getting to know your Marines -Why squad leaders are the most important people in a unit -The key role of trust in maneuver warfare -Smith’s thoughts on leaders being teacher-scholars -What gets in the way of building trust in a unit -Responding to when Marines make honest mistakes (“sins of commission”) -The zero-defect mentality and the value of second chances -The responsibility of a commander to protect their Marines -The “colonel syndrome” and becoming self-interested -Why it’s tough to be a major in the Marine Corps -What it was like serving with Tony Zinni -Smith’s battlefield “sixth sense” -How the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) fought -Comparing how Marine and NVA units fought -The role that Vietnam played on Ray Smith’s journey to maneuver warfare -Smith’s destruction of an NVA battalion in Aug 1968 -Working with a company of tanks as a rifle company commander -Smith’s experience in Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada -The need to know your enemy in maneuver warfare -What surprised Smith the most about Grenada -Smith on the fog of war -The biggest maneuver warfare lesson Smith took away from Grenada Links “Commemoration of Grenada with MajGen Ray Smith, USMC (Ret) at Marines' Memorial 10-23-2019”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzSi_5ZvJ7Q