In this episode, we discuss:
-How Zinni defines professional military education (PME) and the purpose behind it
-Why we tend to focus more on formal PME over informal PME
-The need for commanders to provide PME to their units
-Zinni’s experience facilitating PME as a unit commander
-Zinni’s use of decision games as teaching tools
-How decision games might feel threatening to some commanders
-Creating an open learning environment in your command
-Laying down ground rules for PME sessions
-The role of formal schools in a Marine’s PME
-Zinni’s approach to self-directed PME
-Having good role models in PME
-Books and subjects that influenced Zinni at different points in his Marine Corps career
-When should we start teaching leaders to think strategically?
-The profound learning experience Zinni had as an advisor to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps
-The virtues of the South Vietnamese Marines
-Some of Zinni’s views on the war in Vietnam
-The cognitive dissonance between what Zinni learned at The Basic School and what actually worked for him in Vietnam
-Zinni’s formal teaching experiences
-Zinni’s advice for senior officers on PME and the danger of “intellectual flatlining”
-Zinni’s drive for formal education outside of the military and the need to “cast one’s net widely” in their learning
-Zinni’s experiences with decision games while on active duty, and how they helped develop vicarious experience
-Zinni’s thoughts on the latest wave of interest in and support of wargaming in the Department of Defense
-How much emphasis the Marine Corps put on teaching decision-making during Zinni’s time in service
-Zinni on his Combat Concepts and the need for leaders to critically review received wisdom and theories and to commit to their own theory of combat
-The unsung contributions and brilliance of Marine General Graves B. Erskine
-Zinni’s recent PhD work on leadership
-Zinni’s relationship to the “maneuver warfare movement”
-How, if at all, has maneuver warfare made a difference for the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan?
-The effects of a lack of a clear strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan
-The gap between what the Marine Corps says about maneuver warfare and what it actually does
-The need to allow leaders to make forgivable mistakes
-How rampant the “zero defects mentality” is in today’s Department of Defense and determining what is forgivable and what is unforgivable
-On the obligation of senior leaders to speak out about wrongdoing
Links
Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win Or Lose Off The Battlefield by Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz: https://www.amazon.com/Before-First-Shots-Are-Fired/dp/125007505X/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1589206250&sr=8-1
Battle Ready by Tom Clancy, Tony Zinni, and Tony Koltz: https://www.amazon.com/Battle-Ready-Commander-Book-4-ebook/dp/B001QWFYFM/ref=sr_1_4?dchild=1&keywords=TONY+ZINNI&qid=1589206368&sr=8-4
“Why Lieutenants Should Study Strategy” by Colonel Michael D. Wyly: http://the-military-learning-library.24301.n8.nabble.com/file/n107/Why_Lieutenants_should_study_strategy.pdf