Controversy & Clarity

In this episode, we discuss -The US Army’s individual replacement system in Vietnam -McDonough’s experience serving as the aide to the commanding general of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam -McDonough’s thoughts on how technology has extended senior leaders’ ability to overexert influence or command on small units -How McDonough’s Vietnam experiences shaped his approach to command -Some of the mistakes McDonough made as a platoon leader in Vietnam -The decision-forcing case The Farmer: its inspiration, development, and use with US Marines -What it was like to serve in the ‘Hollow Army’ after Vietnam -McDonough’s experience as a mechanized infantry company commander -McDonough’s time as an S-3 operations officer for an infantry battalion in South Korea -His experiences serving as the military assistant to General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe -McDonough’s observations of the maneuver warfare debates in the Marine Corps -The value and pitfalls of studying German military history, especially the German forces of World War II -The tight rope that military and military-civilian professionals must walk when studying the forces of the Nazi Germany a nthe Southern Confederacy -The events leading to McDonough’s appointment as director of the School of Advanced Military Studies -The process of revising FM 100-5 Operations -The origin of the term “operations other than war” -What inspired the writing of McDonough’s second book, The Defense of Hill 781, and what today’s soldiers and Marines can learn from it in light of renewed focus on large-scale conventional combat operations -What lessons from Hill 781 might not apply to today’s battlefields -McDonough’s third book, The Limits of Glory -His experience standing up the brigade that would eventually get reflagged as the 173rd Airborne Brigade -What it was like leading that brigade through the genocide, Cholera epidemic, and civil war in Rwanda Links Platoon Leader by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Platoon-Leader-Memoir-Command-Combat/dp/0891418008 The Defense of Hill 781 by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Defense-Hill-781-Allegory-Mechanized/dp/0891414754 The Limits of Glory by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Limits-Glory-Novel-Waterloo/dp/0891413847 "American Army Doctrine for the Post- Cold War" by John L. Romjue: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA317654.pdf 'Facing the "What Now?'" Moment' by Damien O'Connell: https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Facing-the-What-Now-Moment.pdf Errata -When discussing TBS's use of The Farmer DFC, I said they forced to students to either harm the farmer or risk certain death in the minefield. To be precise, TBS called for students "...to...[decide]...whether to threaten or do bodily harm to a local civilian in order to save the lives of their Marines (soldiers).”  -While discussing the bureaucratic differences between Colonel McDonough and Major General Wesley Clark at TRADOC, McDonough erroneously referred to himself as a 'one-star general,' though he meant to say, 'colonel.'

Note: This is part one of a two-part discussion. The conclusion will be released shortly. In this episode, we discuss -The Strategic Hamlet Program (SHP) in Vietnam and the role of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in that effort -How US platoon positions used in the SHP made enticing targets for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army -The layout of McDonough’s platoon position and the terrain surrounding it -McDonough’s assessment of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, as well as the South Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces -A particularly soul-shaking patrol that McDonough went on -The writing of Platoon Leader -The Viet Cong’s typical tactics, strengths, and weaknesses -McDonough’s biggest fight: October 6th 1970 -The story of McDonough’s wounding -The Viet Cong’s technique of employing M-79 ‘barrages’ -McDonough’s assessment of the small arms available to him and his men -A hair-raising interaction that McDonough had with one of his soldiers and an M-79 grenade launcher -McDonough’s relationship with Phil Nail, one of his radio operators -Killigan, arguably the best combat soldier McDonough ever saw -What it was like to lead a small unit with consistent attrition -McDonough’s advice for small unit leaders who may face high unit attrition in their units in combat -How well McDonough’s stateside tactical training lined up with his actual tactics in Vietnam -The value of “tactical cursing” Links Platoon Leader by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Platoon-Leader-Memoir-Command-Combat/dp/0891418008 The Defense of Hill 781 by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Defense-Hill-781-Allegory-Mechanized/dp/0891414754 The Limits of Glory by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Limits-Glory-Novel-Waterloo/dp/0891413847 This Kind of War T.R. Fehrenbach: https://www.amazon.com/This-Kind-War-Fiftieth-Anniversary/dp/1574883348

In this episode, we discuss -What drew Sebastian to the Marine Corps and the infantry in particular -The persistent public view of the Marine Corps as an all-infantry force -The future of the ‘Every Marine a Rifleman’ ethos -The wearing away of front lines and rear areas in modern-day warfare -What Sebastian’s Marine Corps boot camp experience was like -Sebastian’s thoughts on changing bootcamp -His experiences at the School of Infantry-East -What it was like serving as a reserve enlisted infantryman -The stigma against reserve Marines -Some things Sebastian wishes active-duty Marines understood about reservists -Sebastian’s pre-deployment training and preparations for Iraq -His experience of breaking the news to his mother of his impending deployment to Iraq -Sebastian’s deployment to Ramadi, Iraq -Sebastian’s interactions with the Iraqis -What he took away from the deployment -How Sebastian’s operational experiences have influenced how he designs, develops, and facilitates wargames -How good decision games pose dilemmas to participants -Sebastian’s words of advice to young Marine reservists and those interested in the reserves -How Sebastian got into wargaming -How he learned how to design and facilitate wargames -How Sebastian defines “wargame” -The differences between analytical and educational wargames -Sebastian’s thoughts on the educational utility of commercial wargames -The design “autopsies” Sebastian runs in his wargame design courses -Sebastian’s two “translation points” for wargames -How the wargame design process enriches the designer -Why Sebastian prefers digital wargames for personal use and analog games for professional purposes -What matrix games and operational decision games are -The differences and similarities between different kinds of decision games -Where wargames fail most -The most common barriers to getting people interested in wargaming -How Sebastian wound up teaching wargame design at Georgetown University -Some of the standout student games from the wargame design course -Where the historical settings for those games came from -What inspired Sebastian to create the Georgetown University Wargaming Society (GUWS) -What GUWS has been up to lately -GUWS’ collaborations with the Army War College, Naval War College, and other organizations -The value proposition of playing wargames for Marines -Sebastian’s thoughts on the most effective way to introduce Marines to wargaming -His wargaming work with the Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College and US Naval Academy -Sebastian’s work with the Wargaming Division at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab -Sebastian’s thoughts on SOI-W’s incorporation of chess into the new Infantry Marine Course -Sebastian’s contribution to the Rand report, “Next Generation Wargaming for the Marine Corps” -The addendum Sebastian would write to the report to reflect the realities of COVID-19 -Where Sebastian thinks the Marine Corps gets wargaming right -Where the Marine Corps could improve with wargaming -What Sebastian would do with wargames if he were Commandant of the Marine Corps for the day Links -Sebastian’s RAND profile page: https://www.rand.org/about/people/b/bae_sebastian_joon.html -Georgetown University Wargaming Society: https://www.guwargaming.org/ -(RAND) Next-Generation Wargaming for the U.S. Marine Corps: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2227.html

(This is the conclusion to our interview with Colonel Barrick.) In this episode, we discuss -The work Barrick is doing with wargaming and force design at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab -The differences between wargaming for education, wargaming for analysis, and wargaming for training -Assassin’s Mace, an operational wargame designed, developed, and used by the Warfighting Lab -How Assassin’s Mace is currently being used beyond the Warfighting Lab -Barrick’s favorite wargames -The differences between educational wargames, decision-forcing cases, and tactical decision games -The Marine Corps’ upcoming Wargaming Center and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s possible relationship to it -The role the Wargaming Center might play in educating Marines -Potential ways the center could provide wargaming to the Fleet Marine Forces -The role that matrix and analog games may play at the Wargaming Center -Barrick’s concerns for the future of wargaming in the Marine Corps -The case for gamification for learning -How games can help learning -Barrick’s thoughts on the future of tanks in the Marine Corps -Why the Commandant of the Marine Corps cased the colors on his tank battalions -How tanks contribute to the Marine Corps’ combined arms capabilities -The challenges of creating a tank corps from scratch -The future of combined arms -The Marine Corps’ spotty record of institutionalizing experience -Common misperceptions that Marines have about tanks -Some of the creative ways Barrick has seen tanks employed -The decision to send Marine tanks to Afghanistan in 2010 -The special capabilities added to Marine tanks deploying to Afghanistan -Barrick’s favorite tanks from World War II and the modern day -Barrick’s thoughts on the Russian T-14 Armata tank -Barrick’s thoughts on some historical tank commanders -The development of Soviet combat experience and skill in World War II -Barrick’s favorite armored warfare books Links Red Army by Ralph Peters: https://www.amazon.com/Red-Army-Ralph-Peters/dp/1451636695 Defense of Hill 781 by James McDonough: https://www.amazon.com/Defense-Hill-781-Allegory-Mechanized/dp/0891414754 Panzer Commander by Hans von Luck: https://www.amazon.com/Panzer-Commander-Memoirs-Colonel-Library/dp/0440208025 Brazen Chariots by Robert Crisp: https://www.amazon.com/Brazen-Chariots-Robert-Crisp/dp/0393327124 Panzer Battles F.W. von Mellenthin: https://www.amazon.com/Panzer-Battles-Major-General-von-Mellenthin/dp/1862274592 The Heights of Courage by Avigdor Kahalani https://www.amazon.com/Heights-Courage-Tank-Leaders-Golan/dp/0275942694 Errata *I misspoke when I called the SU 122 the "cat killer." The correct tank destroyer was the SU 152. It was known as the “beast killer” for its ability to knock out German Panther, Tiger, and King Tiger Tanks as well as the Jagdpanther, Jagdtiger and Elefant Tank Destroyers. For more see: https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/soviet/soviet_ISU-152.php 

Note: This is part one of a two-part interview with Col Barrick. The conclusion will be released shortly. In this episode, we discuss -Barrick’s early military training and educational experiences at the US Naval Academy, The Basic School, and the Army’s Armor Officer Basic Course -Barrick’s thoughts on the reaction course at Officer Candidate School -The sandtable tests that Barrick underwent at the Armor Officer Basic Course -Barrick’s experiences with FMFM 1 Warfighting and the Marine Corps Warfighting Skills Program as a company-grade officer -The degree to which Marines actually practice maneuver warfare -The role of trust and adaptation in maneuver warfare -Barrick’s experiences as a staff officer with Combined Joint Task Force 76 in Afghanistan in 2004 -One instance of how Barrick’s formal PME schooling failed him during his interactions and collaboration with NATO planners in Kabul -Another hard learned lesson, this one involving NATO planners and an Afghan military parade -Barrick’s experiences attending the Advisor Training Group in 29 Palms and the limits of training -Barrick’s time as a senior advisor to an Afghan National Civil Order Police Brigade in 2011-12 -Barrick’s hair-raising experience planning a Afghan National Army-led operation to counter Afghan warlords in Herat in 2004—all in 24 hours -What lifelong lessons Barrick took away from hi advisor deployment -How Barrick got into wargaming -Barrick’s experiences wargaming at the Naval Academy -The lack of wargaming opportunities throughout Barrick’s Marine Corps career -The benefits and disadvantages of analog and digital wargames -How tools like Zoom have facilitated virtual wargaming -The many benefits of wargames for warfighters -Creating a culture of wargaming in the Marine Corps -Thoughts on creating wargame facilitators for the Marine Corps -Leveraging the gaming habits of Marines to generate interest in wargaming -Commercial wargames that could be used to generate such interest -How Barrick used wargames at the Marine Corps Tactics Operations Group -The limitations of wargames -The value of wargaming for planning -The Warfighting Lab’s use of games like Command: Professional Edition Links -The Marine Corps' Warfighting Skills Program: https://www.themaneuverist.org/resources-main-page/thedustybookshelf/ (See the column of links second from the left,) -Wargame: Red Dragon: https://www.epicgames.com/store/en-US/p/wargame-red-dragon -Flashpoint Campaigns: https://store.steampowered.com/app/330720/Flashpoint_Campaigns_Red_Storm_Players_Edition/  -Command: Professional Edition: https://www.warfaresims.com/?page_id=3822 -Combat Mission: Shock Force 2: https://store.steampowered.com/app/1369370/Combat_Mission_Shock_Force_2/ -Battle Academy 2: Eastern Front: https://store.steampowered.com/app/306640/Battle_Academy_2_Eastern_Front/ -The Operational Art of War IV: https://store.steampowered.com/app/792660/The_Operational_Art_of_War_IV/

 In this episode, we discuss: -What first attracted Chuck to military history -How he came to study Scharnhorst and the Prussian military reforms -Some of Chuck’s work at the United States Army Infantry School and the 21st Theater Army Area Command in Germany -What led Chuck to joining the Army -Chuck’s interactions with Major Richard “Dick” Winters of Band of Brothers fame -What Chuck’s experiences as a student at West Point were like -Chuck’s criticisms of West Point today -The inspiration for Chuck’s work on Scharnhorst’s Military Society -How Scharnhorst’s work and thinking are relevant to today’s warfighters -The influence that Count Wilhelm Friedrich Ernst von Schaumburg-Lippe and Colonel Emmerich d’Estorff had on Scharnhorst -The genesis of the Prussian military reforms and the role of the Military Society -Scharnhorst’s role as head of the Military Reorganization Committee -The resistance that Scharnhorst encountered from special interest groups -Scharnhorst’s relationship with Carl von Clausewitz -Scharnhorst’s relationship with his wife -The genesis of Scharnhorst’s general staff -What Scharnhorst might think about the size of today’s US military staffs -Chuck’s speculation on what Scharnhorst would have turned his attention to if he had survived the Napoleonic Wars -What fascinates Chuck most about Scharnhorst -Chuck’s forthcoming book on Scharnhorst, Scharnhorst: The Formative Years, 1755-1801, and what he learned while writing it -What Scharnhorst might think of current US military efforts to improve education for enlisted servicemembers -Which aspects of Scharnhorst’s work still need attention in English -What Chuck thinks every US servicemember should know about Scharnhorst and his contributions to the profession of arms -Chuck’s reaction to the especially positive reception his work received from the US Marine Corps -What Chuck’s other forthcoming work on Scharnhorst has in store for us -Chuck’s critique of Martin van Creveld and John Keegan’s work Links The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805, by Charles Edward White: https://www.amazon.com/Enlightened-Soldier-Scharnhorst-Militarische-Gesellschaft/dp/0275929361 Scharnhorst: The Formative Years, 1755-1081, by Charles Edward White: https://www.amazon.com/Scharnhorst-Formative-1755-1801-Reason-Revolution/dp/1913118991 “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession”, Dr Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen J Gerra, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, February 2015: https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/lying-to-ourselves-dishonesty-in-the-army-profession/ Link to Barry Lyndon movie on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/Barry-Lyndon-Ryan-ONeal/dp/B000MQPKVG Errata *I misspoke when saying the name of Count Wilhelm’s name. I should have said “Count Wilhelm Friedrich,” not “Count Friedrich Wilhelm.” *When discussing “Lying to Ourselves”, I neglected to mention Dr. Stephen J. Gerra as a co-author. I also failed to state that the study goes beyond just mandatory training but covers the full range of requirements placed on today’s Army leaders.

In this episode, we discuss: *Furness’ experience at The Basic School (TBS) as a student in 1987 *The degree to which the philosophy of maneuver warfare was present at TBS by that point *What the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) was like as a student *Furness’ experience as a TBS instructor, including learning how to teach maneuver warfare *Why teaching at TBS and IOC saw the greatest professional development of his 34-year career *What the atmosphere of TBS was like upon Furness’ return to the school as an instructor *How TBS forced Furness to ‘up his game’ as an instructor and officer *How teaching at IOC prepared him for company command *The TBS staff’s acceptance and understanding of maneuver warfare *How TBS attempted to teach maneuver warfare *The “Zen Patrol” *How IOC facilitated TDGs, including the “McNamara Method” *How Furness applied the teaching methods he encountered at IOC to PME with the 2nd Marine Division staff *The story behind Furness’ contest-winning Marine Corps Gazette article, “The NCO and Maneuver Warfare” *How the issues addressed in the article persist in today’s Marine Corps *How Furness has attempted to create a culture conducive to maneuver warfare in his units *Integrating tactical decision games into ranges *How maneuver warfare is akin to “institutionalized military excellence” *Why the Marine Corps has been unable to execute maneuver warfare as a service *Why the Marine Corps needs a reformed manpower system in order to fulfill General Berger’s vision for the Marine Corps *Furness’s thoughts on General Neller’s efforts to “rejuvenate” maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps *How the Marine Corps shapes the success of its staffs but not of its squads *Why Furness thinks the Marine Corps requires more rigorous PME *The PME program that Furness developed for his division staff *The 2nd Marine Division’s experience at the MAGTF Warfighting Exercise (MWX) *What Furness learned from the MWX *How Furness models his approach to PME *The effect that Anthony Zinni’s “Combat Concepts” had on Furness’ approach to modeling effective PME and self-development *How Furness encouraged his subordinate leaders to develop their own PME programs *What surprised Furness the most during the MWX *Potential downsides (and possible solutions) to free play force-on-force exercises *The steep learning curve of learning to command large units and formations *The challenges facing the Marine Corps from Furness’ current position at Headquarters Marine Corps *Furness’ thoughts on the future of Marine Corps PME and training *His efforts to man all the rifle squads in 2nd Marine Division with qualified sergeants Links “The NCO and Maneuver Warfare” by Capts William H. Weber IV & David J. Furness https://mca-marines.org/blog/gazette/the-nco-and-maneuver-warfare/ “TDGs Return” (on the McNamara Method) by Col Thomas X. Hammes, USMC (Ret) https://mca-marines.org/blog/gazette/tdgs-return/ “Winning Tomorrow’s Battles Today: Reinvigorating Maneuver Warfare in the 2d Marine Division” by MajGen David Furness https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Winning-Tomorrow’s-Battles-Today.pdf

(This is the second half of a longer podcast. Also, we experienced sound quality problems while recording this episode, so we apologize in advance!) In this episode, we discuss: *How Nick found his way to DFCs *Nick’s experience of watching a DFC taught about his own combat experiences *Green-eyed Ghosts, the first DFC that Nick designed, developed, and facilitated *Nick’s first time teaching Green-eyed Ghosts and the reception it received *The need for case facilitators to honor the facts of the case and describe its events as accurately as possible *Why case facilitators should be impartial in their facilitation *Nick’s experience delivering a Battle of Belleau Wood case at a World War One conference *His thoughts on what makes a great DFC and his work on enlisted-focused cases *How teaching DFCs on ethics and leadership is akin to hitting the “easy button” *How Nick finds a “home” for a DFC *The experiences of Nick’s wife teaching DFCs at her job at Marine Corps Community Services *Common DFC facilitation pitfalls *One of Damien’s nightmare case teaching experiences and the profound learning he took from it *The need for including fine details in tactical DFCs *Why context is key to DFCs *How some case participants get “stuck” on the actual decisions made by the case protagonist *Nick’s favorite DFC, Missile Command, and the time he taught it The Basic School *The stories behind two other DFCs that Nick created and taught, Rage Against the Machine and 1st and 10 *Nick’s experience teaching DFCs in the fleet and at the 29 Palms Staff Non-Commissioned Officer Academy *Nick’s approach to teaching people how to develop and facilitate DFCs *His thoughts on why we don’t see more enlisted Marines facilitating DFCs and what he’d do to change that *What drew Nick to teaching and his advice to young Marines interested in becoming instructors *The connection between teaching and leading *Nick’s experience as a sergeant major Notes If you’d like to get in touch with Nick, please send us an email at thewarfightingsociety@gmail.com.

(Note: This is the first half of a longer podcast. Also, we experienced sound quality troubles recording this episode, so we apologize in advance!) In this episode, we discuss: *What’s changed and what’s stayed the same in the Marine Corps since Nick enlisted in 1999 *The enduring phenomenon of “Old Corps” vs “New Corps” *The role that social media plays in perpetuating this dichotomy *Social media’s general effects on the Marine Corps *Nick’s experience at recruit training and the School of Infantry-West *His views on the oft-repeated fleet phrase “Forget everything you learned at [insert school or course name].” *Nick’s thoughts on the gap between what’s taught in formal schools and what’s practiced in the fleet *What drew Nick to the infantry *Nick’s time as a rifleman in Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, before 9/11 *His experiences training under severe resource constraints *Corporals Jose Pagan and Sergio Alvarado, the fireteam leaders Nick took to war in Operation Iraqi Freedom-I *The story of how Nick became a rifle squad leader *Nick’s thoughts on going to war with a two-fire team squad *His experiences on the first day of the war *Nick’s first firefight and the events behind the decision-forcing case (DFC) Sandstorm *Nick’s harrowing decision of having to leave behind a fireteam to guard an immobilized amphibious assault vehicle *The events of the battle and decision-forcing case Devil’s Ditch *Nick’s proudest moment as a Marine leader *The events for which Lance Corporal Joseph Perez would receive the Navy Cross *Nick’s squad in the Iraqi town of Diwaniyah and the disheartening events that colloquially became known as “Operation Donkey Freedom” *Nick’s training in and experiences with crowd control in Iraq *The qualities that make a great squad leader *The differences between Nick’s first and second tours in Iraq *Nick’s transition from squad leader to platoon sergeant *His expectations of his platoon commander and squad leaders *The serious discipline problems that Nick witnessed in his platoon, both stateside and in Ramadi, Iraq, and how he addressed them *How these experiences shaped Galvan as a leader Links and Notes If you’d like to get in touch with Nick, please send us an email at thewarfightingsociety@gmail.com. Lance Corporal Joseph Perez’s Navy Cross citation https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/3633 “Crowd Control”, Nick’s essay (Chapter 8) in Marines at War: Stories from Afghanistan and Iraq https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796398 Update: At the request of the author, we have removed “The Platoon Sergeant” essay.

In this episode, we discuss: *What the Marine Corps was like when Dathan enlisted in 1998 *Dathan’s journey to decision-making, critical thinking, and emotional intelligence *A sense of what the Marine Corps infantry experience was like before 9/11 *The focus on uniformity, structure, and discipline that Dathan observed during his early years as a Marine *The dangers of compartmentalizing training and education *The experience of serving on MEUs in the late 1990s/early 2000s *Why the Marine Corps is attempting to “reembrace” maneuver warfare and concepts like commander’s intent *The confusion among some non-commissioned and staff non-commissioned officers between maneuver warfare and warfighting functions *How Dathan helps his students understand maneuver warfare as a philosophy of action *Applying the warfighting philosophy outside of combat *The general lack of understanding among staff non-commissioned officers about what maneuver warfare is and isn't *Dathan’s time serving with 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and the revelations he had there about his own competence and abilities *Dathan’s experiences being involuntarily recalled to duty in February 2005 and being sent to Iraq as a combat replacement with several units, including Third Battalion, Second Marines (3/2); a Marine wing unit, Regimental Combat Team 7; and Regimental Combat Team 2 *The division between the active duty Marines of 3/2 and the combat replacements *The lifechanging experience that Dathan had in Iraq with a lance corporal, and the role it played in his mission to educate Marines *Dathan on the topic of race while serving in 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion *Dathan’s observations on race and the Marine Corps in general *Dathan’s experiences serving at the Advisor Training Branch under the Special Operations Training Group *Dathan's experience of going through the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Course and working with the Emiratis *His journey to earning three college degrees (BA, Ed. M., and Ed. D.) *How writing a dissertation was harder than going to combat *The need for Marines to be valid and credible *Dathan’s advice on Marines wanting to go college *Dathan’s groundbreaking work with wargaming at the College of Enlisted Military Education (CEME) *Dathan’s use of matrix-style wargames *His stance on the superiority of wargames over tactical decision games *The lack of understanding for wargames that Dathan encountered among his colleagues *Dathan’s thoughts on the state of educational wargaming in the Marine Corps *How enlisted Marine wargaming efforts lag behind officer wargaming *How the complexity of some wargames make them less than ideal for use at CEME *How wargames can help develop intuitive thinking, critical thinking, communication, and an understanding of warfighting *The need to maintain momentum with wargaming efforts in enlisted education *The connection between education, validity, credibility, and reliability Links Dathan’s “Introduction to a Wargame Seminar (Nov. 2019)” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vXCeGEK2WUs&t=703s Dathan’s “Wargame Demonstartion (Dec 2019)” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ge0SU9Cm6GE Dathan’s dissertion: “Improving the Success of Light Armored Vehicle Drivers: A Qualitative Descriptive Narrative Study” https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED575388 Marine Corps Order 1500.55: MILITARY THINKING AND DECISION MAKING EXERCISES https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCO%201500.55.pdf