Walden Pod

Today, we explore the privacy of consciousness, a feature of the mind rejected by qualia antirealists.  (summary of the arguments begins at 43:45)  A few of the papers and books referenced: Is Mental Privacy Defensible? Jaffer Ahmed Explaining Mental Privacy - Colin McGinn Other minds are neither seen nor inferred - Mason Westfall  Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer Illusionism As A Theory of Consciousness  Galileo's Error - Philip Goff Linktree

Today we discuss three skeptical arguments from Wang Chong, a first-century Chinese philosopher who railed against the belief in ghosts. Although the skeptics who initially presented these arguments to me seemed to think they were decisive, I was unimpressed and wanted to explain why I think they miss the center of the spectral target.  As summarized on Wang’s IEP entry:  (1) Argument from physical shape:  The death of a person is the result of the body losing the animating qi (vital essence), and once the qi is separated from the body, the body decays.  All will admit to this.  If this is so, however, and the person’s qi is still existent, how can this qi itself manifest in the form of a physical shape?  It is not a body, it is qi.  But when one sees a ghost, one sees a body.  But if the person has died, they no longer have a body, so where could they get another one?  They cannot take over another living body, which will already possess its own qi.  Thus, the view that people when they die become ghosts is nonsensical.  (2) Argument from population:  If people become ghosts when they die, there should be more ghost sightings than living people, as the number of people who have lived in the past and died is far greater than the number of people now living.  This is not true — ghost “sightings” are rare.  Thus it cannot be that people when they die become ghosts. (3) Argument from ghostly efficacy:  If a living person is harmed, this person will immediately go to a magistrate and bring a case against the party who harmed them.  If it were the case that people become ghosts when they die and can interact with living humans, every ghostly murder victim would be seen going to a magistrate, telling him the name of the killer and the means of murder, leading him to the body, and so forth.  This is never witnessed (ever).  Wang Chong - IEP  Philosophy on the Fringes - Ghosts and Hauntings  Dale Allison Interview - Encountering Mystery  Greenbrier Ghost - Jimmy Akin’s Mysterious World  Twitter thread where I first encountered Wang Chong Music for this episode was performed by yours truly (except the drums). Linktree 

Explore the fascinating tale of Mary, the color scientist, and her intriguing encounters with her cousin Fred and a colorblind neuroscientist. Delve into the limits of physical knowledge and its inability to fully capture conscious experiences. Philip Goff challenges the ability hypothesis and presents 'phenomenal curiosity' as a threat to moderate forms of physicalism. This thought-provoking discussion critiques various responses to the knowledge argument while shedding light on the nature of consciousness.

We discuss Philip Goff’s conversion, the online reaction to it, and what his “heretical Christianity” involves. Is he a real Christian? What does he think about the resurrection, the ascension, the miracles of Christ, the virgin birth, the trinity, inerrantism, the atonement, and God’s nature?  Amos Wollen - Conversion Review: Christianity gains a new smart person  Randal Rauser on Goff’s Conversion  Nathan Ormond (DigitalGnosis)- Philosopher CONVERTS to Christianity  Linktree

I give three reasons why panpsychism typically strikes us as counterintuitive, and why we shouldn't credit our innate bias against it.  David Papineau: Physicalists who find panpsychism counterintuitive haven’t truly freed themselves from dualist thinking  Jonathan Birch on overconfidence about sentience This episode was available early to supporters at patreon.com/waldenpod Linktree

Today we continue our exploration of the conceivability argument, covering the best response in the physicalist arsenal, and why it doesn't help physicalists escape the hoard of zombies in the end. Linktree

Today we discuss David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism: the zombie argument. Linktree

The core theory, weak and strong emergence, micro-reductionism, and Sean Carroll’s skeptical argument against everything. Is Dr. Carroll correct in holding that physics has ruled out the afterlife, the soul, fundamental consciousness, parapsychology, and other immaterialist claims?  Linktree  Sean Carroll speaking to the Freedom From Religion Foundation https://youtu.be/40eiycH077A?si=xgg4KC0JPYWnH0fU Philip Goff: Is physics different in the brain? https://www.youtube.com/live/wlyKdirhOa4?si=RRYXSUbW8As7sRLw Papers:  Carroll: Consciousness and the Laws of Physics (2021) https://philarchive.org/archive/CARCAT-33 Goff’s response to critics: https://philpapers.org/archive/GOFPCF.pdf The Quantum Field Theory on Which the Everyday World Supervenes (2021) https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.07884 Relevant blog posts from Carroll:  https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/01/04/the-world-of-everyday-experience-in-one-equation/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/09/23/the-laws-underlying-the-physics-of-everyday-life-are-completely-understood/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/09/29/seriously-the-laws-underlying-the-physics-of-everyday-life-really-are-completely-understood/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/10/01/one-last-stab/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/07/18/the-effective-field-theory-of-everyday-life-revisited/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/05/23/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2008/02/18/telekinesis-and-quantum-field-theory/

I recently asked for your questions, and I posted my responses on YouTube here. We touch on compatibilism, NDEs, aliens, euthanasia, abortion, death anxiety as an atheist, idealism, incest, Islam, Mormonism, subjectivism, psychophysical harmony, and more. (For those listening via podcast, I left the introduction in to preserve the timestamps for those who want to skip around to different sections.) 00:00 Intro 00:46 Atheistic platonism? 01:22 Why are you gay? 01:30 Are you still a naturalist? 05:47 What kind of compatibilist are you? 09:41 If I settle your debt with PragerU, will you become a libertarian? 10:12 What’s your biggest gripe with physicalism? 12:42 On the abortion debate, when do you think personhood / full moral status begins? 17:22 Do twinks make better philosophers? 17:56 Are you agnostic about anything in philosophy? 19:37 Why are you such a sucker for spooky stuff? 30:49 Who makes those guitar transitions? 32:34 Favorite music? 34:30 Who are some of your favorite Eastern philosophers? 35:03 Which religion would you choose to be true? 40:54 Who are your favorite theist and atheist philosophers? 42:18 Arguing for dualism from mereological nihilism? 45:48 Euthanasia? 48:43 What are your thoughts on each general era of philosophy? 55:00 Thoughts on Jordan Peterson? 58:55 Have you looked into Islam? 1:03:57 Does your mother know you spend so much time talking to strangers on the internet? 1:04:04 What is your opinion on the resurrection? 1:08:23 The best argument against veganism? 1:21:18 What is the primary goal of adopting panpsychism? 1:23:20 Best defenses of objective morality? 1:24:34 How would aliens affect theism and atheism? 1:30:53 Are you a dualist or a physicalist? 1:31:31 Isn’t solipsism simpler than panpsychism? 1:33:37 Thoughts on idealism? 1:35:41 Which political system do you think is right? 1:39:34 Thoughts on metaethical naturalism? 1:41:52 Is incest wrong? 1:45:27 When will you have some Mormons back on your show? 1:46:34 Why atheist and not agnostic? Where can I find good philrel content? 1:49:54 Would necessitarianism defeat fine-tuning and psychophysical harmony? 1:57:38 Do you accept physical causal closure? 2:00:00 How do you explain psychophysical harmony? 2:02:34 Kant’s transcendental idealism and free will? 2:07:56 Are we obligated to refute false beliefs even if they’re meaningful? 2:13:01 Is there any profound nugget of wisdom that Christianity has first or exclusive ownership of? 2:15:17 Analytic/Continental divide? 2:18:05 “Emmerson” 2:19:03 Does the phenomenal powers view weaken psychophysical harmony? 2:22:04 Is time necessary for consciousness? 2:28:49 If you did reconvert, would you be a Christian or a generic theist? 2:32:20 Finite theism? 2:36:22 Top three philosophers who are wrong about everything? 2:37:57 Moral subjectivism with normally functioning humans as the (collective) observer(s) morality is stance-dependent upon? 2:48:52 Are you afraid of death? How do you cope with death anxiety as an atheist? Linktree

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states have no effect on anything. The feeling of pain, counterintuitively, does not cause your aversion, mentally or physically. Beliefs don’t cause behavior. None of our actions occur in virtue of our thoughts, feelings, or sensations. Inspired by Matthew Adelstein’s post defending epiphenomenalism, I want to explain my opposition to the view. A few times, he referenced a podcast episode / blog post of mine from 2020, which I hadn’t read since it was first posted. I found a few things to disagree with in my own episode, so I thought I’d respond to Matthew and try to offer an updated critique of epiphenomenalism in the process. While epiphenomenalism is probably less wrong than physicalism, the causal efficacy of our mental states is as evident as anything, so the view should still be rejected in favor of panpsychism or interactionist dualism. As Paul Draper once put it, “wild ideas are needed” to explain consciousness, but I don’t think epiphenomenalism is the right wild idea. After responding to a few key points from Matthew, I offer a few reasons to reject epiphenomenalism: Epiphenomenalism is self-defeating. The evidence that supports the causal influence of mental states is the exact same kind of evidence for causal influence in other cases. This not only supports mental causation, but also raises the threat of undermining the epiphenomenalist’s claim that the physical has causal powers. The phenomenal powers view as defended by Mørch (2017, 2020) is plausible and entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. In short, there are plausible examples of causal necessity in the mind. Among metaphysical theories of consciousness, epiphenomenalism is the most vulnerable to the problem of psychophysical harmony. Transcript YouTube Linktree