We take a short break from our epistemology series to talk about the hypothesis of indifference, a limited God, natural teleology, pan-agentialism, and how value-orientation in the universe is not binary but rather comes on a continuum. For reference, Paul Draper (1989) characterizes the hypothesis of indifference as follows: “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons.”  If the audio sounds different than usual, that's because I recorded this as a video and edited it slightly differently as a result. You can watch the video on YouTube here  Check out the series on atheism and epistemology over on Counter Apologetics here Linktree 

This is part one of a series about epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge and justification. When does something count as knowledge? How can we be justified in accepting mathematical truths, moral truths, and truths about the external world? Can I trust my perceptual faculties, my memory, my ability to reason? Can I know anything at all?  Today, we're discussing internalism vs. externalism about knowledge and justification. We also touch on the person-based nature of justification, giving others the benefit of the doubt, and empathy on the epistemic landscape. Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer  Linktree 

Perspective Philosophy and I speak about metaethics, intervening in wild animal suffering, veganism, the toll of working in a slaughterhouse, ethical intuition, moral disagreement, and a few metaphysical questions about contingency and necessity.  Full interview here Linktree

“On panpsychism, how can there ever be unconsciousness, like in the case of dreamless sleep?” As far as objections go, this is a pretty weak one, but I decided to take the opportunity to talk about death, sleep, states of unconsciousness, and how panpsychists see the mind and its place in nature.  YouTube Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Transcript Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism linktr.ee/emersongreen

Philip Goff and Dustin Crummett debate psychophysical harmony, God, axiarchism, pan-agentialism, natural teleology, and explore some neglected terrain between theism and the hypothesis of indifference. What are our options in explaining the fine-tuning of consciousness?  Subscribe on YouTube Twitter @waldenpod @Philip_Goff @dustin_crummett Dustin's Channel Mind Chat Music by ichika Nito & Whalers. Used with permission. linktr.ee/emersongreen 

When did consciousness first evolve? If physicalism is true, we’d expect it to have evolved gradually, just as other complex biological phenomena evolved gradually. But the transition from feeling nothing to feeling something couldn’t have been gradual. No matter how minimal a conscious experience is, if it’s “like something” to exist – anything at all – it’s not like nothing at all. On reflection it seems hard to imagine anything other than a sharp border between non-experiential reality and experiential reality. On the other hand, complex physical states are not sharp: they admit borderline cases. If we remove one atom at a time from a given brain state, it will eventually be vague or indeterminate whether or not the organism is still in that physical brain state. So if consciousness is just a kind of physical state, we’d expect consciousness to follow suit. Since it seems impossible that there could be a borderline case of consciousness – it’s either like something for a creature or like nothing – we have reason to think that physicalism is false.  Michael Tye - Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness David Papineau’s review of Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness in NDPR Nino Kadic - Phenomenology of Fundamental Reality YouTube Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Support at patreon.com/counter or patreon.com/waldenpod  Music by ichika Nito and used with permission. Transcript  Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism linktr.ee/emersongreen / timestamps / 00:00 The vagueness argument 04:18 Which creatures are conscious? 06:18 The sharpness of consciousness 10:09 The vagueness of biological phenomena 12:41 The sharpness of consciousness (cont.) 20:14 Weak emergence 21:42 The advantage of vagueness arguments

In many ways, I'm the ideal audience for apologists of capital punishment. I believe in free will, I think human beings are responsible for their actions, I’m not opposed to retribution in all cases, I believe there are virtuous qualities to revenge, and I think some people deserve to die. However, none of that is enough to justify the death penalty system.  First, arguing that some people deserve to die is not sufficient to show that any particular institution (e.g. the state) should have the power and legitimacy to carry out executions. Second, capital punishment is not reconcilable with the principle of remedy: when mistakes are inevitably made, the punishment for the wrongly convicted cannot be brought to an end and they cannot be given damages. Third, the application of the death penalty will inevitably be morally arbitrary in some cases – either due to the morally arbitrary nature of the laws themselves, the enforcement of the law, or the imperfect determination of guilt. Since this is unavoidable, we cannot have the death penalty without murdering innocents. And since saving innocent life is far more important than ending the lives of the guilty, this should dissuade us from maintaining a death-penalty system. Finally, the virtuous qualities of revenge are absent in the death penalty system. linktr.ee/emersongreen Support at patreon.com/waldenpod & patreon.com/counter YouTube Transcript Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Music by ichika Nito and used with permission. Twitter @waldenpod

linktr.ee/emersongreen Subscribe on YouTube Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Music by ichika Nito and used with permission. Full interview on the Sentientism podcast Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen Subscribe on YouTube Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Music by ichika Nito and used with permission. Full interview on the Sentientism podcast Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

Dr. Michael Huemer joins me to discuss moral realism vs. antirealism, ethical intuitionism, phenomenal conservatism, moral disagreement, and much else in moral philosophy.  Ethical Intuitionism  Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy  William Lane Craig vs. Erik Wielenberg  Linktree / The Five Metaethical Positions /  Noncognitivism/expressivism: Moral statements are neither true nor false. Evaluative predicates do not even purportedly refer to any sort of property, nor do evaluative statements assert propositions. Error theory/nihilism: Moral statements (that imply that something has an evaluative property) are all false. Subjectivism: Some moral statements are true, but not objectively. For a thing to be good is for some individual or group to (be disposed to) take some attitude towards it. Moral Naturalism: There are objective moral properties, but they are reducible. Evaluative truths are reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, moral statements can be justified empirically. Moral Non-Naturalism/Intuitionism: There are objective moral properties, and they are irreducible. Evaluative truths are not reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, at least some moral truths are known intuitively. / Timestamps / 00:00 Introduction 01:05 Objective vs. Subjective 06:45 Five Metaethical Views 36:45 Fictionalism 50:40 Phenomenal Conservatism, Scientism, Skepticism 1:15:00 Moral Disagreement 1:25:00 Theism and Moral Realism 1:41:00 Companions in Innocence 1:46:30 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 2:00:00 Huemer’s soul is not in Colorado nor is it in Michigan