77 - The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism - A New Angle
Nov 10, 2024
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Explore the fascinating tale of Mary, the color scientist, and her intriguing encounters with her cousin Fred and a colorblind neuroscientist. Delve into the limits of physical knowledge and its inability to fully capture conscious experiences. Philip Goff challenges the ability hypothesis and presents 'phenomenal curiosity' as a threat to moderate forms of physicalism. This thought-provoking discussion critiques various responses to the knowledge argument while shedding light on the nature of consciousness.
The case of Mary the color scientist illustrates the limitations of physicalism by showing that experiential knowledge cannot be fully captured through physical explanations.
Philip Goff argues that phenomenal curiosity highlights the inadequacies of the ability hypothesis and phenomenal concept strategy in addressing consciousness.
Deep dives
Knut Nordby's Colorblindness and Scientific Curiosity
Knut Nordby, a Norwegian neuroscientist, exemplifies the complex relationship between scientific understanding and personal experience in color vision. Despite being colorblind, he expressed a deep curiosity about color perception, which parallels the philosophical thought experiment of Mary. Mary, a color scientist trapped in a black-and-white room, gains firsthand knowledge upon experiencing color, highlighting a potential gap in physicalist explanations of consciousness. This scenario illustrates that experiencing color provides insights that purely physical knowledge cannot, challenging the completeness of physicalism.
The Knowledge Argument and Its Implications
The knowledge argument posits that Mary has all physical knowledge of color before her release but learns something new upon experiencing it. This illustrates a conceptual separation between physical knowledge and phenomenal experience, suggesting that not all knowledge is physical. The argument argues that if Mary gains new knowledge, physicalism may not provide a full account of consciousness, thus revealing limitations in scientific understanding of experiences. Consequently, this raises questions about the nature of consciousness and the extent to which physical science can fully explain subjective experiences.
Responses from Physicalism: Ability Hypothesis and Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Physicalists have proposed responses to the knowledge argument through concepts like the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy. The ability hypothesis suggests that Mary gains new abilities, not new knowledge, when she sees red, while the phenomenal concept strategy argues that Mary acquires a new way of conceptualizing previously known phenomena. However, both approaches struggle to reconcile with the concept of phenomenal curiosity, which indicates that true understanding requires direct experience. Ultimately, these responses face critiques, leading to a reevaluation of the conventional physicalist stance in light of non-physicalist perspectives.
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The Limits of Physical Knowledge and the Nature of Consciousness
Today we discuss Mary the color scientist, her cousin Fred, and a colorblind Norwegian neuroscientist. Specifically, we talk about why Philip Goff thinks "phenomenal curiosity" threatens the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, ruling out moderate forms of physicalism.