The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

Hannibal was clearly one of the best Generals in history.  How could he win 3 major battles against Rome, but he wasn't able to win the second Punic war. We discuss the definition Center of Gravity, where it came from and why it is so confusing and why Hannibal and his staff may have struggled with the concept of Centre of Gravity. Has the meaning of the Center of Gravity been lost in translation?  How has the usage of Schwerpunkt transformed over time? The Bundeswehr now uses the term Centre of Gravity, rather than the term in it's native German.  We look at the evolution of the definition for CoG from when it was first used in US Army doctrine.  LWD 1 gives us the following definition - The centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. At the tactical level, the centre of gravity will often change as the mission progresses and will frequently be determined by the interaction of enemy and friendly intentions.  The approaches to defeating the enemy’s centre of gravity are described as dislocation, disruption and destruction. How does this relate to what Clausewitz was originally talking about?  Is the characteristic in the definition part of the problem? What about multiple Centers of Gravity?  How does that work? How are Centres and Gravities nested?  Have a look at the example given in Levels of War and Iraqi CoGs from the 1991 Gulf War.   The relationship between Genters of Gravity at different levels of war by Strange and Iron. What about the Center of Gravity in a Coalition?  We look at the Scud Hunt was a major part of shielding the CoG of the Coalition. Flexibility for commanders increases with the level of their command because  there are more resources and greater scope to shape your enemy. We look at the surfaces and gaps that need to be thought about and how you can shield your CoG and critical capabilities.  Would Hannibal had been better off using Joint Doctrine rather than the Army Doctrine for a definition of Centre of Gravity that he and his staff could use?  We look at the Carthaginian navy, the development of the corvus and how the Romans took a land strength onto the open seas.  Finally - why did Hannibal cross the Alps? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.      

Explore the tactical brilliance of Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae, where he executed a stunning encirclement against a larger Roman army. Uncover the concept of 'center of gravity' and how it reveals critical vulnerabilities in military strategy. Delve into Fabius' adaptive tactics amidst political pressures, revealing the complex interplay between military actions and governance. The discussion also touches on the lasting impact of Cannae on future military engagements and how internal command dynamics shaped Rome's response.

We look at the remaining principles of Manoeuvre Warfare in the conduct of the Malaya Campaign. Percival attempted to be strong everywhere and was never able to generate enough combat power to slow the Japanese. We look at the loss of Force Z and how it decreased the Allied ability to influence the war at sea and the sea lines of communication.  The loss of Force Z created an exponentially deteriorating situation which denied the Allies the time required to Deception was not really used well.  The Allies were quite good at signalling their intentions and movements to the Japanese. Recon Pull was well used by the Japanese with their recon in force.  Success was reinforced and any slow down lead to a flanking manoeuvre, either by land or by sea. Combined Arms Teams - why weren't the Allies able to use their combined arms teams to defeat the light Japanese infantry and light tanks?  We look at what was lacking.  The story of LT Russell 'Bill' McCure highlights the lack of training in the use of artillery for the Battalion COs.  Employing the guns worked very effectively when the Allies were able to do it, but sadly, this happened to infrequently. We look at some of issues that lead to the erosion of trust within the Allied battalions. Operational Tempo - the Japanese were able to rotate troops through the front line and bring them out to rest.  Some of the Allied COs were sent to hospital with sleep deprivation.  This highlights the difference between the Allies and the Japanese. Application of joint fires and effects - The Japanese did a better job than the Allies, however the Japanese didn't fully exploit their advantage that they had with regard to air superiority. What could have made a difference in the Malaya Campaign? Yamashita had culminated just prior to the Allied surrender of Singapore.  What would have made a difference in the conduct of the defence? The allocation of resources?  More fighters (with trained pilots) and tanks.  Tanks! Ensuring that Allied supplies did not fall into the hands of the Japanese.  Too many trucks, POL installations, rations, and ammunition fell into the hands of the Japanese. We look at the moral implications in the campaign. Lastly, we discuss the training and leadership of the Allies. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.  

In the time that we have been producing the Malaya Campaign series in The Principles of War, the Australian Army has produced a new version of the LWD 3-0, so Army Doctrine is moving faster than this podcast! We look at the new doctrine and the application of Manoeuvre Warfare. We look at the  application of tenets of manoeuvre theory. Focusing friendly action on the adversary centre of gravity. Achieving surprise. Identify and prioritising a main effort. Utilising deception. Reconnaissance pull. Operation Tempo Combined arms teams. Applications of joint fires and effects. We discuss how the logistics tail for the Japanese could have been the critical vulnerability that the Allies could have targeted.  We discuss the question what would it have been if the 9th Division had been in Malaya rather than the 8th Division? Got a favourite Australian military quote?  Let us know, we are crowdsourcing a list of best quotes about and by Australians. We discuss how the Japanese were able to target the Allied moral centre of gravity and how the Asia for the Asian memes undermine the effectiveness of the British Army in Malaya.  With surprise, we look at the strategic surprise that the Allies experienced with Malaya.  The fact that the Singapore strategy was well understood, especially by people like MAJ GEN Lavarack, who was arguing for a better ability to defend the country. We look at Group Captain John Lerew and his famous signal "Morituri vos salutamus".  What would cause him to signal his higher headquarters "Those who about to die, salute you." What effect did a racial bias play in the intelligence appreciation of the Japanese capabilities, especially given the kind of operations that the Japanese were conducting in places like Shanghai.   

LT COL Charles Anderson was placed in a very difficult moral dilemma at Parit Sulong. We look at his actions in WW1 in Africa and his Reserve service in the interwar period and how he comes to be the CO of the 2nd/19th Battalion. We also briefly look at BRIG Maxwell, the previous CO of the 2nd/19th. Check out the resources for this podcast, specifically the books by Farrell and Pratten.  We look at the events around the engagement that the 2nd/29th fought and pick up the story with the 2nd/19th moving out to hold the ground at Bakri. BRIG Duncan attempts to consolidate his position whilst under attack from the Japanese.  Anderson's counterattack sees the Japanese literally 'running around in circles'.  However the Japanese are also moving to cut of the lines of retreat. The Japanese 3rd Air Brigade starts attacking the retreating troops, striking the Brigade HQ and killing many of the staff, and wounding BRIG Duncan, making Anderson the commander of the BDE Column. We look at Anderson's retreat of 24km to Parit Sulong from Bakri.  The column moves out at walking pace and meets the first Japanese roadblock just 1.5 km down the road.  Anderson displays physical courage leading an assault on the road block.  BRIG Duncan leads a counterattack with the Jats, and is killed.  Anderson discovers that the bridge at Parit Sulong is held by the Japanese.  This leaves Anderson needing to clear the bridge to be able to cross the river and move closer to friendly lines. The column is unable to clear the bridge, ammunition is low and casualties are mounting.  He is left with the dilemma of what to do - surrender, attack again or leave the wounded and escape in small groups.  Overnight the Japanese attack with tanks and a deadly battle between the tanks, the artillery and tank hunting parties goes on through the night. There were only 3 survivors of the massacre at Parit Sulong.  What actions did Bennett take to rescue the column? What is the role of the Battalion Commander?  When should they personally lead attacks? We look at the role of LT GEN Takuma Nishimura in the Parit Sulong massacre.  He confided in the Medical Officer that he had never been so scared as during the retreat from Bakri, but it never showed to the men that he lead as he worked to save the column.  This is the fine example of courage and leadership that he set and why he was awarded the VC for his actions. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.      

A lot of this story has come from an audio interview of LT Russell 'Bill' McCure.  It is an amazing record of the preparation, conduct and aftermath of his participation in the Malaya Campaign. LT McCure started out in the 53rd Ack Ack Search Light Bty and he wanted to join the 2nd AIF.  The only way was for him to obtain a commission.  He undertook that and was assigned to the 58th Infantry Battalion.  The CMF was parading 2 nights a week. LT McCure showed multiple examples of Moral Courage.  This made it difficult for him to do his job, but he understand what was required of him, in spite of the direct orders from his CO. We look at the Battle of Bakri, especially the initial contacts with the Gotanda Tank Detachment.  The Japanese attacked without infantry support and because of the actions of LT McCure they pay the price.  Too often in the Malaya campaign, the Japanese weren't held to account for paying off some of the Principles of War.  The lack of cooperation of the infantry created the losses at Bakri for the Japanese tanks.  How did the 2nd/29th's CO, LT COL Robertson's training let him down when it came to combined arms training? The withdrawal from Bakri was hellish.  The Japanese had manoeuvred around the 2nd/29th and cut them off.  LT COL Anderson in command of the 2nd/19th pushes forward to bring out the 2nd/29th, but Bill is stuck behind enemy lines. He stays in Malaya for the rest of the war.  He spends time attacking Japanese troop, supplies and trains.  He ends up with a group of Malay Communists until the end of the war. Bill's story is a great example of Moral Courage and and story that too few people have heard, especially considering that he was active in Malaya for the rest of the war.      

This podcast explores the leadership dynamics of the 8th Division in World War II, including the controversial commander Black Jack Galleghan and the mutiny that took place. It also delves into the ambush at Gemas, discussing the Japanese's role and the actions taken by Galleghan to minimize its impact. The podcast highlights the importance of leadership, training, and communication in military operations.

Good leadership, thorough training and success on operations will all contribute to high morale.  We contrast LT COL Stewart and with other units.  The Indian and Australian armies had a lot of new troops, with varying degrees of training.  This contrasts with battle hardened IJA troops, some who had many years of experience. Kampar was the high point for the Allied morale. The conduct of the withdrawl is difficult to do and it is difficult to maintain morale during the withdrawl.  This continually eroded Allied morale with many of the Brigades. Lack of training in tank fighting was evident in most Brigades.  This led to poor performance against the Japanese tanks which eroded morale. Too many senior officers weren't team players.  Morale in BDE and DIV HQs was often poor because of the friction generated within the HQs.  This impacted decision making and lead to further defeats. The way the Japanese fought neglected many of the principles of war.  Trust and co-ordination with units staying in place would have enabled fierce and effective counter attacks. We look at the importance of fighting the battle in the enemy commanders mind and how that impacts the battle. We look at Moral Dislocation, a concept that both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart had discussed.  The moral dislocation of the Indian troops.  The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere wanted to deliver Asia for the Asians.  The Japanese were coming as liberators of the Indian people.  The Indian workers were underpaid. The evacuation of Penang helped dislocate the locals from the British morally. Lastly the operationally tempo increased inversely with morale. The moral dislocation by the Japanese was crowned with the creation of the Indian National Army, consisting of Indian troops wanting to fight the British. The Japanese Army had troops, bought up on a modified Bushido code in school, that were successful, highly motivated and fighting for a cause that they all believed in. What role does / should the education system play in a national defence strategy? Lastly, despite Yamashita's high tempo, he was still able to rotate troops out of the front line for a few days rest.  Fresh troops were able to continually harass defeated, depleted and over tired Allied troops with predictable results. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Colourised image courtesy of Colours of Yesterday.  It is a great picture showing the moral of the Australian troops.    

We look at how the Japanese were able to use operational manoeuvre from the sea as a part of their approach to flexibility.  We look at their history of amphib operations and how they developed their capability. We look at the Shanghai Incident and how the IJN demonstrated their already impressive amphib capability.  The Japanese are able to launch 3 independent landings to start the offensive in Malaya. We look at the Battle of Kampar and how the Japanese assault bogged down and how they were able to respond to a change in the tactical situation.  BRIG Paris wanted a more offensive defence.  How did Kampar mask the limitations of the Allied forces? We look at the performance of the British Battalion at Kampar, which differs markedly from that exhibited from a lot of the Allied forces. How was LT COL Stewart was able to train a Battalion that was able to operate effectively in the jungle.  How did he do it?  Did he use Mission Command to manage for the difficulties created by jungle fighting. What are the requirements for mission command and were they displayed within 8th Division. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Sustainment - often the least considered of the principles.  How did logistics impact the conduct of the Malaya We look at the interplay of logistics between the forces.  There The Japanese were operating from an amphibious operation which severely constrained their operations.  The British were fighting a defensive battle, with a lot of trucks on well made roads. What was the relationship between the two? What were the Churchill supplies and why were they so important? How did the conduct of the British withdrawal impact the Japanese supplies? With constrained sea lines, what action did Yamashita take to ensure that he could supply his 4 divisions. What was Yamashita's mobility solution that helped solve his logistics problem and enabled him to outmanoeurve the British by moving a lot quicker than the defenders could. What are the similarities between Sherman's march to the sea with Yamashita's march to Singapore.