The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

Malaya and Economy of Effort We look at the definition and how the Japanese and Allies applied this principle.  For the Allies there was too much economy and not enough effort.  There wasn't enough resources available to prepare the defences so Allied troops spent a lot of time digging in rather than training.  The Royal Navy, Air Force and Army all allocated insufficient resources to be able to achieve the mission. There was a lot of economy of effort in the hope that the US would be able to assist in the defence of Singapore. By the time the perilous situation was realised, it was too late to reinforce before Singapore fell. Synchronisation and Orchestration are implicit in cooperation, so where did the wheels fall off the wagon? It is every commanders job to work towards cooperation, building harmonious relationships between agencies. The base building program for the RAF was kept from the Army.  The British provided no strategic guidance provide by higher in London.  Brooke Popham was the first Air Force commander of a Joint Command.  How did he do? The defence often gives the defender the ability to choice the ground that they will fight on.  Percival lost that right because the locations was dictated by the location We look at Brig Ivan Simpson, the CRE for Malaya Command.  He was energetic, thoughtful and planned extensive defensive works to slow the Japanese advance.  His work was largely ignored for a range of reasons. A lack of training and understanding of the work that engineers do was replicated with other Corps.  There was little understanding of the employment of Artillery, Signals was understood poorly.  There was very little combined arms training.  Artillery was employed by Bn COs, often in the wrong place, meaning that the troops did not receive the support that they needed.    

Malaya was a secondary effort of secondary effort for both the British and the Japanese - so how does Concentration of Force work for secondary efforts? Force Z was HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. A force too small to effect the outcome, but too large to lose. 1 Squadron RAAF conduct the first air strike against the Japanese in WW2. How did Admiral Tom Phillips plan to interdict the Japanese landing forces?  What is the role of the naval LO? Why did CAPT Tennant disobey orders about radio silence? RAAF support for Force Z was too little, too late.  Churchill described this as the most direct shock that he had ever received after Force Z was sunk. Force Z was the first capital ships sunk by air power alone, this is a great example of technological surprise. The Japanese create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation - how did this impact the British decision making. Don't penny packet your Battleships. The IJA stacked the deck in aircraft.  More aircraft and aircraft that were better with better pilots - this helps swing the balance for the Japanese. The force ratios for the Japanese were very low.  They never achieved overwhelmingly combat power, but they achieved overwhelming success. They had 11 Divisions for their land operations across the Pacific AO.  How did Yamashita entirely pay of Concentration of Force and still succeed? Leadership, training, doctrine, planning, morale, combined arms and audacity.  Do this and pay of concentration of force at your leisure. "Read this alone and the war can be won" was the book that built the moral case for the offensive and covered the tactics as well that would lead to victory.      

How did Security and Surprise impact operations in Malaya and Singapore? There was little security in the Malaya campaign for the Allies.  The Japanese had a strong expat community.  We look at the work of Patrick Heenan, a Kiwi born British and Indian Army Officer who became a spy for the Japanese, betraying the Air Force base at Alor Star. Not sure why he did, but he took a 6 month secondment to Japan prior to the war. We also look at how the Japanese learnt that the British had no capability to reinforce Singapore and Malaya when a highly sensitive document from the British War Cabinet for Brooke Popham was captured on the SS Automedon. Security for the Allies created a reluctance to use wireless, which inhibited tactical flexibility.  Japanese security was tight enough to limit the time available for Brooke Popham to be able to make a decision. Percival conducted an appreciation in 1937 that was very accurate in regards to how the Japanese would attack Singapore and yet there was little work done in the 4 years before the Japanese landing. The Allies are surprised because they fundamentally under rated the technical and operational capabilities of the Japanese.  The British were reading Japanese diplomatic messages one month before the invasion, but it still did not start ringing alarm bells. The British did not think that the Japanese would attack during the wet season - why were the Japanese in the wet, with the much more difficult conditions for troops and movement.  How about in the Australian Army?  Were we surprised? Where do you find the Officers and SNCO's when you raise 3 new divisions? What impact did the death of Australia's ablest soldier on 13 August 1940 have on the Australian Army? Gordon Bennett gets the Div Comd job that he so desperately wanted.  Sixth time lucky after being rejected 5 times prior! How did the battalions prepare for the Malaya campaign?  We look at a PAR report from 6 months before the Japanese invasion.  Surprise sees Australia commit 2 BDEs to Malaya, poorly equipped and poorly trained - we look at the reasons. How can a country improve the Whole of Government approach when moving over onto a war footing? Lastly we look at what happens when the Japanese pay off security entirely and repeatedly.

We look at the dithering that occurred in the British Malaya Command. We look at Operation Matador and how centralised control lead to delays and an inability to execute on an offensive defence that was planned. How do you think a Combat Team assault would go against a prepared Divisional defensive position?  We find out as we look at the Battle of Jitra. The application of manouevre requires: Combat Arms Teams Orchestration Focus all actions on the Centre of Gravity. How does all of this relate to the Japanese conduct of their offensive. We look at the Japanese driving charge and how it harnessed offensive action.  At the tactical level, this looks like the filleting attack whereby tanks fight through the defensive positions on the road and push through into the rear of the defense. The driving charge along with poor British training and decision making enabled Yamashita to attack with a 1:3 numerical inferiority and win.  The strategic and tactical operational tempo created an OODA loop that was much tighter than that of the British. The defence of Jitra was unprepared for the Japanese assault.  How long did they have to prepare their defences?  We look at the Saeki Detachment, their training, their tactics and their success at Jitra.  The Japanese win the Battle of Jitra and win 3 months of ammunition and 300 trucks.  75% of the Indian casualties are taken as prisoners of war.  Jitra saw 500 troops against 14,000 troops. The British are able to defend successfully at the Battle of Kampar, only withdrawing after being forced to withdraw when the Japanese are able to threaten their Main Supply Route. We look at Slim River, where the Allies had 500 KIA and 3,200 POW, and Japanese suffered 17 KIA and  60 wounded.  It was described as reckless and gallant determiniation. LT COL Stewart admitted the position of BDE HQ was not very good and he should have used the artillery in an anti-tank roll, but he had never taken part in an exercise with an anti tank component.  He was surprised at the use of tanks on a road and at night.      

We look at how the British and Japanese came about to select their aims and how they got to them. What was the British mission and what did Churchill understand of the mission to be?  How did Brooke Popham understand his mission and how did that impact the troops on the ground (and pilots in the air).  We have a slight diversion to look at the Whole of Government approach to defence and how the Australian Government undermined the Air Force and it's capabilities.  Why would they do that?  How effective was the Beaufort Bomber?  Was a defence procurement decision influenced by political needs? What role did the 'China incident' play with Japanese decision making processes?  How did COL Tsuji influence the decision to go south and east as opposed to north and west. The Imperial Japanese Navy was using 400 tonnes of oil an hour - how would they secure the resources they needed? What were the similarities and differences between the Japanese and British thinking? We look at Unity of Command in both the Japanese and British forces. How did issues with command structure effect each of the forces? What was the relationship between Bennett and Percival?  Did Bennett's micromanagement of the Brigades limit their effectiveness.  How would command issues effect 22nd and 27th Brigade. What issues did LT GEN Yamashita have?  What is Gekokujo and why was Charlie Chaplin nearly assassinated? What was the May 15th incident and why did 350,000 people sign a petition in blood?  

Allied Doctrine had seen little development between the war with significant budget cuts.  The Army was relegated to an Imperial policing role.  It is very Command and Control way of We look at Sir John Dill and his visit to Tannenburg and his interpretation of 'Mission Command'.  Malaya was a very laissez-faire, with some units preferring not to train in the jungle. LT COL Ian Stewart from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.  He trained one of the best battalions in Malaya.  How was his training methodologies viewed at Malaya Command? British Staff College focused on strategy, not on Brigade and Division Command, which meant that British officers struggled when commanding one up. How did the 8th Division transition from the training for desert fighting once they landed in Malaya? What was the thinking about Combined Arms and how was it trained for? How did MAG GEN Gordon Bennett train the Division for the withdrawal and what where his thoughts on digging in? How did the personalities of the individual Battalion Commanders impact each of their battalions. The Japanese developed a Jungle Warfare in Taiwan to develop doctrine.  They also conducted 10 major exercises for amphibious operations. The reliance on the bicycle enabled rapid movements of troops with very little logistics impact. The difference between the Japanese and British highlighted the amount of recent modern warfare experience that each Army had been subjected to. How did the road impact the thinking for each of the commanders?  How would it shape their actions and dispositions. What is fighting for the road off the road and how did the British and Indian troops respond to this tactic? How did the Japanese task organise for their upcoming offensive? 8th Division started from the ground up to develop their doctrine, which meant that there was still significant work to be done after first contact with the enemy.

The British planned to use Artillery and Air Power to defend Malaya. Malaya is hot and humid and it has the 29th longest coastline (lots of areas for conducting amphibious operations).  There is a steep mountain range splitting the country between the East and West, and there are very few laterals over the ranges. The road infrastructure improved over time to support the rubber and tin industries in Malaya and this enabled easy road movement.  They are often 2 lane highways and in a large number of places the roads are cut into the hills forming defiles, perfect for the defence. The Air Force constructs a number of airfields. Little consideration was given to the provision of local defence for these airfields.  This dictates the ground that the Army is required to defend. The human terrain consists of British expats, Chinese, Malays, and Indians.  The Chinese are very co-operative with the British, but the Malays, who are exploited as cheap labour, are more co-operative with the Japanese.  Cheap wages for labourers create discontent among the Malays and Indians.  The Indians, being exploited for labour, this increased feelings of Indian Nationalism.  Racism exacerbated the tensions between the Indians and the British.  Britain relied on a massive expansion of the Indian Army.  The IIIrd Indian Corps had a lot of junior, poorly trained troops. In Australia, there was a pool of 80,000 in the Commonwealth Military Force.  This pool created 6th Division, 7th Division and 8th Division.  Eighth Div would provide the troops from Australia who would serve in Singapore and Malaya. The Japanese had been our allies in WW1.  We discuss the Marco Polo incident and the experience that the Japanese troops had prior to the invasion.  The Japanese had been on a war footing for a long time and their Army was much better trained and equipped. We ran out of time for Doctrine.  Next episode we will try to make the doctrine interesting, if not fascinating!    

The Centre of Gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight.  For the British, the CoG was the Singapore Naval Base.  It was the fundamental part of the defence of the whole of South East Asia.  In times of need the Royal Navy would sail out to Singapore and defeat all comers and ensure that the Empire was secure.  The port at Singapore was central to the defence of Australia.  The base wasn't big enough for the fleet required to keep the seas free.  The fleet was unlikely to sally forth if decisively engaged in Europe, so the fleet base was too small for a fleet that was unlikely ever sail there.  It turned out to be the second largest graving dock in the world at the time. We look at how the Singapore Strategy became increasingly untenable, but no one was prepared to In 1940 it became apparent that the Navy would not be able to sail to Singapore 'for the foreseeable future." LT GEN Percival conducted an analysis of the defence of Singapore before the war.  This dictated that the defence of Singapore would need to be conducted in Malaya and northern Malaya at that. As the war progressed, Churchill hoped that the US would provide the Navy required to support the British in the Far East, if provoked. With no Navy to defend the base, the defence of Malaya fell to the Air Force.  With not enough planes and the planes they had being too old, the last line of defence would be the Army. The defence of the base dictated the way that the Battle of Malaya was fought. For the Japanese, the CoG analysis is a lot easier.  It was the tank. The tanks the Japanese had were not great and the tactics they used were not modern, but they had tanks, used them very aggressively and the British had no tanks in Malaya.  The Japanese used the tanks for filleting attacks which were devastating, especially against forces that were not well versed in combined arms, or even anti tank weapons. A Critical Vulnerability of tanks, of course, is the logistics tail required.  How will Yamashita overcome this?  

Our first campaign that we will look at is from Malaya. We detail some of the key people in the Malaya Campaign: LT Gen Percival AVM Pulford LT Gen Heath MAJ Gen Gordon Heath LT Gen Yamashita We look at the numbers for both sides.  Yamashita was fighting significantly outnumbered, so how did he make up the numbers? Armoured warfare - who had the advantage with tanks? In late 1941 the war is going quite badly for the Allies, the Germans are at the gates of Moscow. The Royal Navy sends Prince of Wales and Repulse to defend Singapore and Malaya.  After Japanese landings, Force Z moves out to defeat the Japanese only to be sunk.  Churchill describes it as the greatest naval disaster ever in the history of the Royal Navy. The Japanese fight at Jitra and win.  Within the first 100 hours, they have achieved control of the air, control of the sea and started to dominate on the land. Yamashita pushes aggressively south down Malaya.  A series of major withdrawals continue.  He leapfrogs down the Western coast of Malaya outflanking the Allies out of prepared defences. Wavell takes command of the ABDA command and he orders a 150 mile retreat.  We look at COL Tsuji, the God of Operations and how he prepared the strategy for the Japanese attack.  Wavell meets MAJ GEN Bennett and likes the aggressive spirit that he displays.  An inexperienced divisional staff takes over command of 3 divisions. The Battle of Muar is fought and lost and significant casualties are suffered by the Allies. The situation is so bad in the air that unarmed flying club planes are used for recon. The Japanese advanced 740 km in one month and 1 month and 23 days with a force ratio of 1:2, not the expected 3:1.  How did they manage such a marked victory?

We look at how the Principles of War podcast is going to work, what we want to do and how we are going to do it. We discuss how terrain plays a part in the outcomes of battles and we will be looking at leadership. What role does leadership play in battle? What about Post H-Hour Execution and leadership?  We look at some examples from General Grant's experiences that lead him to be the Commander of the Army of the Potomac. We discuss each of the principles and give a brief example of why each is important. Selection and the Maintenance of the Aim.  Probably the most important of the principles. Concentration of Force - My strategy is 1 against 10 - my tactics 10 against 1. The Economy of effort - if you aren't the main effort, you will be short of everything except the enemy. Co-operation - why is this so difficult to achieve.  We briefly looked at the problems with co-operation for the D-Day landings. Security - Truth is so precious it should be attended by a bodyguard of lies. Surprise - To surprise the enemy is to defeat them.  The Germans driving through the Ardennes forest in 1940.  We talk briefly about technical surprise. Flexibility - Auftragtaktik and Mission Command. We look at Yom Kippur.  Offensive Action - Britzkrieg.  Sustainment - Supplies set the left and right of arc of what is possible.  Sherman's march to the sea and the Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands. Morale - The Army of the Potomac after the Battle of the Wilderness. Sun Tzu said -The art of war is of vital importance to the State.  It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.  Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. This is why we need to understand the principles of war.