Nullius in Verba

Nathaniel C. Smith, a pioneering psychologist, discusses the critical yet overlooked role of replication studies in psychological research. He reveals how neglecting these studies has led to significant biases and challenges in validating findings. Smith highlights the influence of participant backgrounds and experimental conditions on research outcomes. By advocating for tailored methodologies, he emphasizes the need for reliable and generalizable data to enhance the credibility of psychological theories.

In this episode, we discuss a fun mix of eponymous laws, which are laws named after individuals who postulate them.    Shownotes Campbell, D. T. (1979). Assessing the impact of planned social change. Evaluation and Program Planning, 2(1), 67–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/0149-7189(79)90048-X Merton, R. K. (1995). The Thomas Theorem and the Matthews Effect. Social Forces, 74(2), 379–422. Stigler, S. M. (1980). Stigler’s Law of Eponymy*. Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, 39(1 Series II), 147–157. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2164-0947.1980.tb02775.x Clarke, A. C. (Arthur C. (1962). Profiles of the future: An inquiry into the limits of the possible. New York : Bantam Books. http://archive.org/details/profilesoffuture00clar Brandolini’s Law: Based on a tweet, after reading Kahneman Thinking fast and slow: https://twitter.com/ziobrando/status/289635060758507521 Preston, I. L. (1980). Researchers at the Federal Trade Commission—Peril and Promise. Current Issues and Research in Advertising, 3(1), 1–15. Twyman’s Law: “The more unusual or interesting the data, the more likely they are to have been the result of an error of one kind or another.” Earliest scholarly reference is in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Vol 138, No 4, 1975. The Teaching of Statistics by A. S. C. Ehrenberg. Bloch, A. (1990). Murphy's law complete: All the reasons why everything goes wrong. Arrow Books Limited.   

In this final episode of the three-part series on the Philosophical Psychology lectures by Paul Meehl, we discuss lectures 6-8, which cover the ten obfuscating factors in "soft areas" of psychology and a host of advice Meehl provides for researchers, reviewers, editors, and educators on how to improve practice.    Shownotes Krefeld-Schwalb, A., Sugerman, E. R., & Johnson, E. J. (2024). Exposing omitted moderators: Explaining why effect sizes differ in the social sciences. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(12), e2306281121. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2306281121 Lakens, D., & Etz, A. J. (2017). Too True to be Bad: When Sets of Studies With Significant and Nonsignificant Findings Are Probably True. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8(8), 875–881. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617693058  

In this episode, we continue the discussion of Meehl's Philosophy of Psychology course, focusing on lectures 3, 4, and 5.    Shownotes The quote "Don't make a mockery of honest ad-hockery" is probably from Clark Glymour: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clark_Glymour Good, I. J. (1965). The Estimation of Probabilities: An Essay on Modern Bayesian Methods. M.I.T. Press. Shepard, R. N. (1987). Toward a universal law of generalization for psychological science. Science, 237(4820), 1317–1323.  

D. Faust and P. E. Meehl discuss using scientific methods in the history and philosophy of science. They cover topics like the evolution of the scientific method, role of case studies, sampling techniques, theory selection, psychosocial properties, evaluation of theories, and truth likeness in science.

Video lectures: https://meehl.umn.edu/video  Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1992). Using scientific methods to resolve questions in the history and philosophy of science: Some illustrations. Behavior Therapy, 23(2), 195–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7894(05)80381-8 Serlin, R. C., & Lapsley, D. K. (1985). Rationality in psychological research: The good-enough principle. American Psychologist, 40(1), 73–83. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.40.1.73 Meehl, P. E. (1990). Appraising and amending theories: The strategy of Lakatosian defense and two principles that warrant it. Psychological Inquiry, 1(2), 108–141. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0102_1 Meehl, P. E. (1992). Cliometric metatheory: The actuarial approach to empirical, history-based philosophy of science. Psychological Reports, 71, 339–467.

In advance of the next three episodes discussing the Philosophical Psychology lectures by Paul E. Meehl, we present a brief reading from his autobiography in A history of psychology in autobiography. Meehl, P. E. (1989). Paul E. Meehl. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), A history of psychology in autobiography (Vol. 8, pp. 337–389). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

In this episode, we discuss objectivity and disinterestedness in science. We talk about norms, values, interests, and objectivity in research practice, peer review, and hiring decisions. Is it possible to be completely objective? Is objectivity a feature of epistemic products or epistemic processes? And most importantly, how would you objectively rate this podcast?   Shownotes Armstrong, J. S. (1979). Advocacy and objectivity in science. Management Science, 25(5), 423–428. Declaration of Interest by Stephen Senn: http://senns.uk/Declaration_Interest.htm Djørup, S., & Kappel, K. (2013). The norm of disinterestedness in science; a restorative analysis. SATS, 14(2). https://doi.org/10.1515/sats-2013-0009 Elliott, K. C. (2017). A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190260804.001.0001 Feyerabend, Paul. "How to defend society against science." Philosophy: Basic Readings (1975): 261-271. Jamieson, K. H., McNutt, M., Kiermer, V., & Sever, R. (2019). Signaling the trustworthiness of science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(39), 19231–19236. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1913039116 Janack, M. (2002). Dilemmas of objectivity. Social Epistemology, 16(3), 267-281. John, S. (2021). Objectivity in science. Cambridge University Press. Merton, R. K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. University of Chicago Press. Mitroff, I. I. (1974). Norms and Counter-Norms in a Select Group of the Apollo Moon Scientists: A Case Study of the Ambivalence of Scientists. American Sociological Review, 39(4), 579–595. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094423 Mitroff, I. I. (1974). The subjective side of science: A philosophical inquiry into the psychology of the Apollo moon scientists (First Edition). Elsevier. A Russian polar researcher has been charged trying to stab a colleague to death at a remote Antarctic base https://www.businessinsider.com/sergey-savitsky-alleged-attempted-murder-at-antarctic-bellingshausen-2018-10  Stamenkovic, P. (2023). Facts and objectivity in science. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/03080188.2022.2150807  

In this episode, we discuss the role of criticism in science. When is criticism constructive as opposed to obsessive? What are the features of fair and useful scientific criticism? And should we explicitly teach junior researchers to both give and accept criticism?   Shownotes: Babbage, C. (1830). Reflections on the Decline of Science in England: And on Some of Its Causes. Prasad, Vinay, and John PA Ioannidis. "Constructive and obsessive criticism in science." European journal of clinical investigation 52.11 (2022): e13839. Lakatos, I. (1968, January). Criticism and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian society (Vol. 69, pp. 149-186). Aristotelian Society, Wiley. LOWI: https://lowi.nl/en/home/ As an independent advisory body it plays a role in the complaints procedure about alleged violations of principles of research integrity. Holcombe, A. O. (2022). Ad hominem rhetoric in scientific psychology. British Journal of Psychology, 113(2), 434–454. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12541 Daniel C. Dennett: I've Been Thinking https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393868050  Phillip Stark textbook chapter on logical fallacies: https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/SticiGui/Text/reasoning.htm  Gelman, A., & Tuerlinckx, F. (2000). Type S error rates for classical and Bayesian single and multiple comparison procedures. Computational Statistics, 15(3), 373–390. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001800000040 Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge. PubPeer: https://pubpeer.com  

In this episode, we continue discussing Dubin’s 8-step method for theory building. We discuss the measurement of theoretical constructs, using logical propositions to make falsifiable predictions from theories, and the importance of specifying boundary conditions.    Shownotes Jaccard, J., & Jacoby, J. (2010). Theory Construction and Model-building Skills: A Practical Guide for Social Scientists. Guilford Press. McGuire, W. J. (1973). The yin and yang of progress in social psychology: Seven koan. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26(3), 446–456. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034345 Simons, D. J., Shoda, Y., & Lindsay, D. S. (2017). Constraints on Generality (COG): A Proposed Addition to All Empirical Papers. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(6), 1123–1128. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617708630 Norm Macdonald: The Professor of Logic Raven Paradox: https://platonicrealms.com/encyclopedia/Hempels-Ravens-Paradox  Pavlov, I. (1936). Bequest of Pavlov to the Academic Youth of His Country. Science, 83(2155), 369–370. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.83.2155.369