Practical Wisdom

Dive into the philosophy of integrity with Epictetus as he challenges listeners to hold onto their identity amid external pressures. He emphasizes the value of personal growth and discipline, promoting the idea that striving for virtue matters more than achieving greatness. Through witty analogies about natural gifts, he encourages us not to surrender our efforts out of despair. The conversation inspires reflection on the true price of freedom and the importance of discipline in our lives.

Delving into Epicurus's key teachings on living a good life, the podcast discusses the divine's calm nature, the irrelevance of death, pleasure as absence of pain, brief bodily discomfort, and the importance of virtuous living for a pleasant life.

“Away, then, with those follies, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she recalls it at her pleasure? For you received it on these terms. …Because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion of time they were given us for.Aristotle said there is a kind of insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, especially when the days are at the longest.Compare our longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals.” (Tusculan Disputations, I.39)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Those fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin one’s blessedness, for they both inflict pains and impede many activities.Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many great misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is wellborn and great souled. …For we suppose that someone who is truly good and sensible bears up under all fortunes in a becoming way and always does what is noblest given the circumstances, just as a good general makes use, with the greatest military skill, of the army he has. …And if this is so, the happy person would never become wretched. … He would not be unstable and subject to reversals either, for he will not be easily moved from happiness, and then not by any random misfortunes but only by great and numerous ones.” (Nicomachean Ethics, I.10)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“It is to be expected, then, that we do not say that either a cow or a horse or any other animal is at all happy, for none of them are able to share in such an activity.It is because of this too that a child is not happy either: he is not yet apt to do such things, on account of his age. …As we said, both complete virtue and a complete life are required: many reversals and all manner of fortune arise in the course of life, and it is possible for someone who is particularly thriving to encounter great disasters in old age, just as the myth is told about Priam in the Trojan tales.Nobody deems happy someone who deals with fortunes of that sort and comes to a wretched end.” (Nicomachean Ethics, I.9)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“The good Epicurean believes that certain events occur deterministically, that others are chance events, and that still others are in our own hands.He sees also that necessity cannot be held morally responsible and that chance is an unpredictable thing, but that what is in our own hands, since it has no master, is naturally associated with blameworthiness and the opposite.Actually it would be better to subscribe to the popular mythology than to become a slave by accepting the determinism of the natural philosophers, because popular religion underwrites the hope of supplicating the gods by offerings, but determinism contains an element of necessity, which is inexorable.” (Letter to Menoeceus, II)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“[Socrates] First of all, then, let’s try to say what bravery is, Laches; and after that we’ll investigate any ways of adding it to young men, in so far as it may be possible to do so by means of various activities and disciplines. So, as I say, try to put into words what bravery is.[Laches] My word, Socrates, that’s not difficult! If a man is prepared to stand in the ranks, face up to the enemy and not run away, you can be sure that he’s brave. …[Socrates] But what about another man, a man who still fights the enemy, but runs away and doesn’t make a stand?[Laches] How do you mean, ‘runs away’?[Socrates] Well, I suppose just like the Scythians are said to fight every bit as much in retreat as in pursuit. …[Laches] Your point about the Scythians applies to cavalry – that’s the way cavalry go into action, but infantry operate as I described.[Socrates] With the possible exception, Laches, of the Spartan infantry. At the battle of Plataea, so the story goes, the Spartans came up against the troops with wicker shields, but weren’t willing to stand and fight, and fell back. The Persians broke ranks in pursuit; but then the Spartans wheeled round fighting like cavalry and so won that part of the battle.[Laches] That’s true.[Socrates] Well, this is what I meant just now when I said it was my fault you didn’t give a proper answer, because I didn’t phrase the question properly; you see, I wanted to find out not just what it is to be brave as an infantryman, but also as a cavalryman, and as any kind of member of the forces; and not just what it is to be brave during a war, but to be brave in the face of danger at sea; and I wanted to find out what it is to be brave in the face of an illness, in the face of poverty, and in public life; and what’s more not just what it is to be brave in resisting pain or fear, but also in putting up stern opposition to temptation and indulgence – because I’m assuming, Laches, that there are people who are brave in all these situations.[Laches] Very much so, Socrates.[Socrates] … So try again, and tell me with respect to bravery first of all what the constant factor in all these situations is – or do you still not understand what I mean?” (Laches, 190d-191d)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Happiness manifestly requires external goods in addition, just as we said. For it is impossible or not easy for someone without equipment to do what is noble: many things are done through instruments, as it were—through friends, wealth, and political power.Those who are bereft of some of these (for example, good birth, good children, or beauty) disfigure their blessedness, for a person who is altogether ugly in appearance, or of poor birth, or solitary and childless cannot really be characterized as happy; and he is perhaps still less happy, if he should have altogether bad children or friends or, though he did have good ones, they are dead.Just as we said, then, happiness seems to require some such external prosperity in addition.” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1.8)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“LACHES: I take courage to be a certain endurance present in one’s character, if I have to mention the element essentially present in all cases.SOCRATES: Now, this is how it appears to me: by no means every kind of endurance, I think, can appear to you to be bravery. So endurance accompanied by wisdom would be both fine and good, wouldn’t it?LACHES: Certainly.SOCRATES: But what of it when accompanied by foolishness? Surely it’s quite the opposite, damaging and detrimental?LACHES: Yes.SOCRATES: So, according to your account, wise endurance will be bravery.LACHES: So it seems.SOCRATES: Let’s see now: wise, but wise in what respect? Perhaps in every respect, great or small? Suppose, for instance, someone showed endurance in spending his money wisely, because he realized that if he spent it, he’d make a profit: would you call him brave?LACHES: Good heavens, I certainly wouldn’t!SOCRATES: Well then, suppose during a war a man showed endurance by being prepared to fight: he has calculated his chances wisely and realized that others will support him, and that he’ll be fighting an enemy outnumbered and outclassed by his own side, and that he has the stronger position – now, which would you say is the braver, the man showing endurance with the benefit of this kind of wisdom and these resources, or a man from the opposing camp willing to show endurance in standing against him?LACHES: I’d say the man in the opposing camp, Socrates.SOCRATES: But surely his endurance is more foolish than that of the other?LACHES: Yes, you’re right.SOCRATES: Now, we’ve previously shown that without knowledge endurance and daring are disgraceful and damaging, haven’t we?LACHES: Certainly.SOCRATES: But now we’re claiming, on the contrary, that this disgraceful thing, endurance without knowledge, is bravery.LACHES: Apparently so.SOCRATES: Then do you think we’ve given a good account?LACHES: Good heavens, Socrates, I certainly don’t. I’m not prepared to give up too soon, Socrates. I’m really annoyed because I can’t find the words to say what I’m thinking – I’m sure I can see what Bravery is, but somehow or other she has escaped me for the moment, so I can’t find the words to catch her and actually say what she is!SOCRATES: Then do you mind if we invite Nicias here to join the hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.LACHES: Of course I don’t mind.SOCRATES: Come on then, Nicias, your friends are floundering in a sea of words! We’ve got ourselves hopelessly confused, so you’d better give us some help, if there’s anything you can do. The hopelessness of our predicament is obvious; but if you tell us what you think bravery is, you’ll get us out of this hopeless state, and you’ll also confirm your own thoughts by putting them into words.” (Laches, 192c-194c)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“When I say that pleasure is the goal of living I do not mean the pleasures of libertines or the pleasures inherent in positive enjoyment, as is supposed by certain persons who are ignorant of our doctrine or who are not in agreement with it or who interpret it perversely.I mean, on the contrary, the pleasure that consists in freedom from bodily pain and mental agitation. The pleasant life is not the product of one drinking party after another or of sexual intercourse with women and boys or of the seafood and other delicacies afforded by a luxurious table.On the contrary, it is the result of sober thinking – namely, investigation of the reasons for every act of choice and aversion and elimination of those false ideas about the gods and death which are the chief source of mental disturbances.” (Letter to Menoeceus, II)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe