Practical Wisdom

“We would have no need for natural science unless we were worried by apprehensiveness regarding the heavenly bodies, by anxiety about the meaning of death, and also by our failure to understand the limitations of pain and desire.It is impossible to get rid of our anxieties about essentials if we do not understand the nature of the universe. … Hence it is impossible to enjoy our pleasures unadulterated without natural science. …There is no advantage in gaining security with regard to other people if phenomena occurring above and beneath the earth – in a word, everything in the infinite universe – are objects of anxiety.”(Leading Doctrines, 11, 12, and 13) Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

Discover the philosophical depths of hardened reasoning as Epictetus warns against the dangers of resisting evident truths. Explore how such rigid mindsets hinder rational thinking and create barriers to engaging with reality. The discussion draws intriguing parallels between ancient wisdom and contemporary challenges, highlighting the struggles many face in recognizing contradictions and improving their understanding. Tune in for a thought-provoking insight into the impact of denial on our reasoning faculties.

Explore Cicero's views on the vital role of philosophy in society. He emphasizes its importance for personal growth and cultural flourishing in Rome. Delve into his reflections on pain and suffering, tying these themes to personal loss and political exile. The discussion highlights the need for open-mindedness in philosophical pursuits, encouraging dialogue and the exchange of ideas. Cicero advocates for a renaissance of philosophical thought, urging others to embrace a comprehensive study of all its branches.

“Virtue, then, is twofold, intellectual and moral. Both the coming-into-being and increase of intellectual virtue result mostly from teaching—hence it requires experience and time—whereas moral virtue is the result of habit, and so it is that moral virtue got its name [ēthikē] by a slight alteration of the term habit [ethos]. It is also clear, as a result, that none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature. …For as regards those things we must learn how to do, we learn by doing them—for example, by building houses, people become house builders, and by playing the cithara, they become cithara players. So too, then, by doing just things we become just; moderate things, moderate; and courageous things, courageous. …As a result of building houses well, people will be good house builders; but as a result of doing so badly, they will be bad ones. If this were not the case, there would be no need of a teacher, but everyone would come into being already good or bad. So too in the case of the virtues: by doing things in our interactions with human beings, some of us become just, others unjust; and by doing things in terrifying circumstances and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, some of us become courageous, others cowards. …It makes no small difference, then, whether one is habituated in this or that way straight from childhood but a very great difference—or rather the whole difference.”(Nicomachean Ethics, II.1)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“SOCRATES: Now, Nicias, could you explain it to us again from the beginning? You know we started our discussion by considering bravery as a part of goodness?NICIAS: Yes, I do.SOCRATES: So you did agree with our answer that it’s a part, and hence that there are other parts, which are known collectively as goodness, didn’t you?NICIAS: Yes, of course.SOCRATES: Now, you mean the same by these parts as I do, don’t you? For me, besides bravery, the list includes self-control, fairness and other similar qualities. Isn’t it the same for you?NICIAS: Certainly. …SOCRATES: [But] bravery can’t only be knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, because like other kinds of knowledge it understands not only the future stages of good and evil, but also the present and the past.NICIAS: Apparently so.SOCRATES: So the answer you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of bravery, whereas we asked what bravery is as a whole. And so now, it seems, on your own admission, bravery is knowledge not only of what is fearful and what is encouraging, but according to the way you describe it now, of pretty well the whole subject of good and evil, regardless of time. Does that reflect your change of mind, or would you put it differently, Nicias?NICIAS: No, That’s how it seems to me, Socrates. …SOCRATES: So, What you’re now describing, Nicias, won’t be a part of goodness, but goodness in its entirety.NICIAS: So it seems.SOCRATES: But we did say that bravery is only one of the parts of goodness.NICIAS: Yes, we did.SOCRATES: But what you’re now describing appears not to be so.NICIAS: No, it seems not.SOCRATES: So we’ve not discovered what bravery is, Nicias.NICIAS: No, apparently not.”(Laches, 198a-199e) Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“What is the work of virtue? Serenity. Who, then, is making progress? The man who has read many treatises of Chrysippus? What, is virtue no more than this — to have gained a knowledge of Chrysippus? For if it is this, progress is confessedly nothing else than a knowledge of many of the works of Chrysippus. …And where is your work? In desire and aversion, that you may not miss what you desire and encounter what you would avoid; in choice and in refusal, that you may commit no fault therein; in giving and withholding assent of judgement, that you may not be deceived. …Suppose, for example, that in talking to an athlete I said, ‘Show me your shoulders,’ and then he answered, ‘Look at my jumping-weights.’ Go hang, you and your jumping-weights! What I want to see is the effect of the jumping-weights. …And so never look for your work in one place and your progress in another.”(Discourses, I.4) Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Any means by which it is possible to procure freedom from fearing other people is a natural good.Some people have desired to gain reputation and to be well regarded, thinking in this way to gain protection from others. If the lives of such people are secure, they have acquired a natural blessing; but if they are not, they do not possess what they originally reached for by natural instinct.No pleasure is bad in itself. But the things that make for pleasure in certain cases entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.”(Leading Doctrines, 6, 7, and 8)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

Exploring death's philosophical implications, the discussion highlights Socrates’ views on burial and the immortality of the soul. Crito's dilemma captures the tension between belief and practice. Diogenes offers a stark contrast, advocating for a carefree disposal of the body, emphasizing the lack of sensation after death. This conversation questions societal norms about how we treat the deceased, leading to profound insights about our connection to the physical form in the face of mortality.

Delve into Aristotle's intriguing tripartite model of the soul, where he categorizes it into vegetative, sensitive, and rational aspects. Discover how his insights contrast with Plato's philosophy. The discussion also highlights connections between Aristotle's ideas and contemporary psychology and biology, revealing their lasting relevance. The complexities of human nature are examined, particularly the duality of the non-rational components of the soul that both challenge and align with reason. It's a fascinating exploration of ancient wisdom in the modern world.

SOCRATES: Now, Nicias, tell me – or rather, tell us, since Laches and I are sharing the discussion between us – your argument is that bravery is knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, isn’t it?NICIAS: Yes.SOCRATES: And this isn’t something everyone is aware of … unless they supplement their own knowledge with this particular kind. Isn’t that what you said?NICIAS: Yes, it was.SOCRATES: So, it’s actually not something any pig would know, as the saying goes, and a pig couldn’t be brave.NICIAS: No, I think not. …SOCRATES: I think that if one puts forward this theory, one is forced to deny that any animal whatsoever is brave. …NICIAS: ‘Brave’ is not a word I use to describe animals, or anything else that’s not afraid of danger because of its own lack of understanding; I prefer ‘fearless’ and ‘foolish.’ Or do you suppose I call every little child brave because it doesn’t understand, and so is not afraid of anything? No, I think to be unafraid and to be brave are two quite different things. Bravery and foresight are, in my opinion, things a very small number of people possess; whereas being reckless, daring, fearless and blind to consequences is the norm for the vast majority of men, women, children and animals. So you see, what you and most people call brave, I call reckless: brave actions are those coupled with wisdom, as I said.(Laches, 196d-197e)The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe