Practical Wisdom

“But should we grant them even this, that people are by death deprived of good things; would it follow that the dead are therefore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that account? …Can those who do not exist be in need of anything? To be in need of has a melancholy sound, because it in effect amounts to this — they had, but they have not; they regret, they look back upon, they want.Such are, I suppose, the distresses of one who is in need of. Are they deprived of eyes? to be blind is misery. Are they destitute of children? not to have them is misery.These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no existence. …‘To want,’ then, is an expression which you cannot apply to the dead. …When such an expression is used respecting the dead, it is absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want.” (Tusculan Disputations, I.36)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Helvidius Priscus saw this, too, and acted on the insight.When Vespasian told him not to attend a meeting of the Senate, he replied, ‘You have the power to disqualify me as a senator, but as long as I am one, I’m obliged to attend meetings.’‘All right, then, attend the meeting,’ says Vespasian, ‘but don’t say anything.’ ‘Don’t ask me for my opinion and I’ll keep quiet.’‘But I’m bound to ask you.’ ‘And I’m bound to say what seems right.’‘But if you speak, I’ll have you killed.’ ‘Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You do your job and I’ll do mine. Yours is to put me to death and mine to die fearlessly. Yours is to send me into exile and mine to leave without grieving.’” (Discourses, 1.2.19)Figs in Winter: New Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“The case of our friend Pompey was something better: once, when he had been very ill at Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as did those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to congratulate him—it is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still, it is a sign of good fortune.But the question is, had he died, would he have been taken from good, or from evil?Certainly from evil. He would not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law; he would not have taken up arms before he was prepared; he would not have left his own house, nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to death by them; his children would not have been destroyed; nor would his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors.Did not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would have died in all his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life?” (Tusculan Disputations, 1.35)Figs in Winter: New Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to discuss their sons, because they’re anxious for the boys’ characters to develop in the best way possible. So, what we must do, if we claim we can, is to point out to them teachers who are known firstly to have been upstanding men in their own right and to have cared for many young men’s characters, and secondly to have taught us also. …I’ll be the first to explain my position, then, Lysimachus and Melesias, and I may say I’ve not had any instruction on the subject, although it’s true that it has been a passionate interest of mine ever since I was a boy. But I’ve never been able to pay fees to the sophists – the only ones who professed to be able to make a good and honest man of me – and I can’t discover the art for myself even now. …I have in consequence a request to make of you in return, Lysimachus. …I urge you not to let Laches or Nicias slip away, but to ask them some questions. Say to them, ‘Socrates says he doesn’t understand this subject in the slightest and isn’t competent to decide which of you is right: he hasn’t been taught, or discovered for himself, anything about that kind of thing at all. And now you, Laches and Nicias, are each to tell us if you’ve met anyone who was highly skilled in bringing up the young, and whether you learnt what you know from someone else or discovered it for yourselves. If you learnt it, could you tell us who taught each of you, and who is in the same profession?” (Laches, 186a-186e)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“[Lysimachus] ‘I am asking you, Socrates, because it seems as if our council needs someone to act as umpire.’[Socrates] ‘What, Lysimachus? Do you intend to follow whatever course the majority of us recommends?’[Lysimachus] ‘Yes, what alternative is there, Socrates?’[Socrates] ‘Imagine there was some discussion about the kind of athletic training your son should practice: would you be influenced by the majority of us, or by the man who happened to have trained and exercised under a good coach. … I think that if a decision is to be made properly, then it must be made on the basis of knowledge and not numbers.’‘So, what we should do now, first of all, is consider whether we have among us an expert in the subject we’re discussing or not. If we have, we should take his advice and ignore other people; and if we haven’t, we should look for somebody else.’” (Laches, 184c-185a)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“There are many who labor on the other side of the question, and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally convicted; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality of the soul appears to them to be incredible, except that they are not able to conceive what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form, and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so fine a texture that it would escape their sight.Let those consider this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate idea of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character while it is in the body—a place which, as it were, does not belong to it—than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at the free aether, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own habitation.” (Tusculan Disputations, I.22)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Saying that ‘happiness is best’ is something manifestly agreed on, whereas what it is still needs to be said more distinctly. Now, perhaps this would come to pass if the work of the human being should be grasped. … So whatever, then, would this work be? For living appears to be something common even to plants, but what is peculiar [to human beings] is being sought. One must set aside, then, the life characterized by nutrition as well as growth.A certain life characterized by sense perception would be next, but it too appears to be common to a horse and cow and in fact to every animal. So there remains a certain active life of that which possesses reason. …We assert that the work of a given person is the same in kind as that of a serious person, just as it would be in the case of a cithara player. … For it belongs to a cithara player to play the cithara, but to a serious one to do so well. …If we posit the work of a human being as a certain life, and this is an activity of soul and actions accompanied by reason, the work of a serious man is to do these things well and nobly. …But, in addition, in a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day. And in this way, one day or a short time does not make someone blessed and happy either.” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1.7)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Which is preferable, death or life? Life, of course. Pain or pleasure? Pleasure, of course.‘But if I refuse to take part in the Emperor’s show, I’ll lose my head.’ ‘Go ahead, then. Take part. But I won’t.’‘Why me and not you?’ ‘Because you’re thinking of yourself as just one thread in the toga.’ ‘Meaning what?’‘You’re bound to care about how to be similar to other people, just as a thread too wants to be no different from all the other threads. But I’d like to be purple, the little bit of brightness that makes all the rest seem fair and lovely. So why are you telling me to conform to the majority? How, in that case, would I be purple?’” (Discourses, I.2.15-18)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“In order to determine what is and isn’t reasonable, we not only take account of the values of external things, but each of us also takes his role into consideration. For one person it’s reasonable to fetch someone else’s chamber pot, because he’s focused on the fact that, if he doesn’t do it, he’ll be flogged and denied food, while, if he does, nothing unpleasant or painful will happen to him.But another person not only considers it unbearable to do that but can’t stand even the idea of someone else’s doing it.So if you ask me, ‘Should I or shouldn’t I fetch the chamber pot?’ I’ll reply that being fed is preferable to being denied food, and that being thrashed is less preferable than not being thrashed, and that therefore, if these are the criteria by which you measure what’s in your interest, you should go and fetch it.‘But that’s not the kind of person I am.’ That’s something for you, not me, to take into account in your deliberations. After all, you’re the one who knows himself, which is to say you know how much you’re worth to yourself and at what price you sell yourself. For different people sell themselves at different prices.” (Discourses, I.2.7-11)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“Cato left this world in such a manner as if he were delighted that he had found an opportunity of dying; for that God who presides in us forbids our departure hence without his leave. But when God himself has given us a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates, and lately to Cato, and often to many others — in such a case, certainly every man of sense would gladly exchange this darkness for that light.For the whole life of a philosopher is, as the same philosopher says, a meditation on death.” (Tusculan Disputations, 1.30)The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe