Practical Wisdom

Explore the profound insights of Epictetus on family affection and responsibility. Delve into a father’s struggles with his daughter’s illness, revealing the emotional turmoil of parenting. Discover the Stoic perspective on balancing personal feelings and familial duties. Can love and duty coexist? Unpack the age-old question of what it means to act ‘naturally’ as a parent while striving for happiness in family life.

Explore the age-old dilemma of ambition versus inner peace, as Epictetus reflects on the seductive pull of material possessions. Listen to a captivating story about an older man's resolution to seek tranquility, only to be lured back into the chaos of ambition by a call from Caesar. The discussion ties ancient philosophy to today’s societal pressures, urging listeners to prioritize self-improvement and personal growth over the relentless chase for external validation.

Explore the profound thoughts of Epictetus on our universal kinship and purpose. Discover why identifying as a 'citizen of the universe' enriches our lives. The discussion challenges the values we place on material possessions and power, stressing the futility of envy and fear. It highlights Socratic wisdom, encouraging us to rise above basic desires and seek deeper understanding. The episode invites listeners to reflect on their true nature and connections within the human experience.

Dive into the wisdom of Epictetus, who challenges the blend of relevant and accidental qualities in philosophy. Uncover why superficial traits like beauty or strength have little to do with true philosophical thinking. The discussion emphasizes the importance of moral purpose and reasoning as the foundations of a virtuous life. Learn how to focus on what truly matters, rather than getting distracted by external appearances.

Dive into the fascinating world of Epictetus as he argues for the importance of logic in leading a good life. Discover how reasoning shapes our ethical decisions and personal growth. The conversation highlights the necessity of context when evaluating mistakes, emphasizing the value of understanding errors as a part of our development. You'll be challenged to reflect on how cultivating logical skills can transform everyday choices and enhance our pursuit of excellence.

“‘Shall we assume, then, that … the bad is akin to the bad; the good to the good; and what is neither good nor bad to what is neither good nor bad?’They said they thought it was so: each was akin to its counterpart.‘In that case, boys,’ I said, ‘haven’t we fallen back into those first statements of ours about friendship, which we rejected, since one unjust man will be a friend to another unjust man, a bad man to another bad man, no less than one good man to another good man?’‘It would appear so,’ they said. …‘Then I don’t know what more to say.’With that I was intending to provoke another of the older men into speaking. Just then, like evil spirits, Lysis’s and Menexenus’s tutors came over with the boys’ brothers, called to them, and told them to come home; it was already late. …However, I did say, just as they were leaving, ‘Lysis and Menexenus, we’ve now made utter fools of ourselves, an old man like me and you, since these people will go away and say that we think that we’re friends of one another – for I consider myself one of your number – though we were not as yet able to find out precisely what a friend is.’”(Lysis, 222c-223b) Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“‘All right then,’ I said. ‘Now that we’ve got as far as this, boys, let’s be careful not to be deceived.’ …‘Let’s consider the following case: medicine, we say, is a friend for the sake of health.’‘Yes.’‘Is health a friend too, then?’‘Of course.’‘If it is a friend, it is so for the sake of something.’‘Yes.’‘And that something is a friend, if it is to be consistent with what we admitted earlier.’‘Of course.’‘And that too, in its turn, will be a friend for the sake of a friend?’‘Yes.’‘Well then, aren’t we bound to get tired going on like that and give up, or else arrive at some point of origin which will not refer us to yet another friend, but which will constitute the first thing that is a friend, for the sake of which we say that all the others too are friends?’‘We are.’ …“Admittedly, we do often say that we value gold and silver highly, but that hardly comes any nearer the truth. What we value most highly is that thing (whatever it may reveal itself as being) for the sake of which both gold and everything else that is procured are procured. Shall we settle for that?’‘Of course.’”(Lysis, 219c-220a)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“‘That’s why we’d say that those who are already wise, whether they are gods or men, no longer love wisdom, and that those who are so ignorant that they are bad do not love wisdom either, because no bad or stupid man loves wisdom.So, we’re left with those who possess that bad thing, ignorance, but have not yet been rendered foolish or stupid by it, in that they still believe they don’t know what they don’t know.Consequently those who are still neither good nor bad do, in fact, love wisdom; whereas all those who are bad, as well as all those who are good, do not, because, as we decided earlier in our discussion, neither is opposite the friend of opposite, nor like of like. Don’t your remember?’‘Of course,’ they said.‘So now, Lysis and Menexenus,’ I said, ‘we’ve done it! We’ve discovered what a friend is and what it is not. We say that in the soul, in the body and anywhere else, it is what is neither bad nor good that is the friend of the good because of the presence of bad.’The two of them agreed wholeheartedly, admitting that it was so.”(Lysis, 218a-218c)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“‘Have you come across the writings of our wisest men, which say that like must always be friend to like? These are, of course, the men who discuss and write about nature and the universe.’‘That’s true,’ he said.‘Well,’ I said, ‘are they right?’‘Possibly,’ he replied. …[But] ‘We think that the closer one wicked man gets to another wicked man and the more he associates with him, the more he becomes hated by him, because he wrongs him; and it is, of course, impossible for wronger and wronged to be friends, isn’t it?’‘Yes,’ he replied. …‘Well then, in my opinion, Lysis, this is what people mean when they say, in their cryptic way, that like is friend to like: friendship exists only between good men, whereas the bad man never achieves true friendship with either a good or a bad man. Do you agree?’He nodded assent.”(Lysis, 214b-214d)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe

“The justice that seeks nature’s goal is a utilitarian pledge of men not to harm each other or be harmed.Nothing is either just or unjust in the eyes of those animals that have been unable to make agreements not to harm each other or be harmed. …Justice was never an entity in itself. It is a kind of agreement not to harm or be harmed.It is impossible for a person who underhandedly breaks the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel sure that he will escape punishment, even though he manages to do so time after time; for up to the very end of his life he cannot be sure that he will actually escape.In its general meaning, justice is the same for all because of its utility in the relations of men to each other, but in its specific application to countries and various other circumstances it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.If somebody lays down a law and it does not prove to be of advantage in human relations, then such a law no longer has the true character of justice.”(Leading Doctrines, 31-38)The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Figs in Winter: a Community of Reason at figsinwintertime.substack.com/subscribe