Epictetus on the consequences of human nature

“If what is said by the philosophers regarding the kinship of Nature and people be true, what other course remains for us but that which Socrates took when asked to what country he belonged, never to say ‘I am an Athenian,’ or ‘I am a Corinthian,’ but ‘I am a citizen of the universe’? For why do you say that you are an Athenian, instead of mentioning merely that corner into which your paltry body was cast at birth? …

As soon as you have had your fill to-day, you sit lamenting about the morrow, by which means you shall be fed. Man, if you get it, you will have it; if you do not get it, you will depart; the door stands open. Why grieve? Where is there yet room for tears? What occasion for flattery? Why shall one person envy another? Why shall we admire those who have great possessions, or those who are stationed in places of power, especially if they be prone to anger? For what will they do to us? …

How did Socrates feel with regard to these matters? … ‘If you tell me now,’ says he, ‘We will acquit you on these conditions, namely, that you will no longer engage in these discussions which you have conducted hitherto, nor trouble either the young or the old among us,’ I will answer, ‘You make yourselves ridiculous.’ …

We, however, think of ourselves as though we were mere bellies, entrails, and genitals, just because we have fear, because we have appetite, and we flatter those who have power to help us in these matters, and these same people we fear.”

(Discourses, 1.9)

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