Epictetus on the usefulness of logic

“Most people are unaware that the handling of arguments which involve equivocal and hypothetical premisses, and, further, of those which derive syllogisms by the process of interrogation, and, in general, the handling of all such arguments, has a bearing upon the duties of life. For our aim in every matter of inquiry is to learn how the good and excellent person may find the appropriate course through it and the appropriate way of conducting themselves in it. …

For what is the professed object of reasoning? To state the true, to eliminate the false, to suspend judgement in doubtful cases. …

[Therefore] one must learn in what way a thing follows as a consequence upon certain other things. …

There has consequently arisen among us, and shown itself to be necessary, a science which deals with inferential arguments and with logical figures and trains people therein. …

Why are we still indolent and easy-going and sluggish, seeking excuses whereby we may avoid toiling or even late hours, as we try to perfect our own reason? — If, then, I err in these matters, I have not murdered my own father, have I? — Slave, pray where was there in this case a father for you to murder? What, then, have you done, you ask? You have committed what was the only possible error in the matter. Indeed this is the very remark I made to Rufus when he censured me for not discovering the one omission in a certain syllogism. ‘Well,’ said I, ‘it isn’t as bad as if I had burned down the Capitol.’ But he answered, ‘Slave, the omission here is the Capitol.’”

(Discourses, 1.7)

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