Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 21, 2024. Petitioner: Ohio, et al.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al. Advocates: Mathura J. Sridharan (for the State Applicants) Catherine E. Stetson (for the Industry Applicants) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Federal Respondents) Judith N. Vale (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question None

Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 20, 2024. Petitioner: Neal Bissonnette, et al.Respondent: LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, et al. Advocates: Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Petitioners) Traci L. Lovitt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Flowers Foods, Inc. is a holding company that owns subsidiaries responsible for producing and distributing baked goods like breads, buns, rolls, and snack cakes. Two of the independent distributors for Flowers in Connecticut are Neal Bissonnette and Tyler Wojnarowski. Both entered into Distributor Agreements with Flowers in 2017 and 2018, respectively. According to these agreements, they pick up baked goods from local warehouses and distribute them to stores and restaurants, earning the difference between the acquisition and selling prices. They are also responsible for sales promotion, stock management, and other operational tasks. While they can sell non-competitive products, they primarily work full-time for Flowers. The Distributor Agreement includes an appended Arbitration Agreement, which states that any disputes must be submitted to binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, except for certain specified issues. Pursuant to that arbitration agreement, the district court compelled arbitration. Bissonnette and Wojnarowski claimed that they are not subject to the FAA because they are “transportation workers” within the meaning of Section 1 of the FAA, which excludes contracts with “seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision ordering arbitration and dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendant for unpaid or withheld wages, unpaid overtime wages, and unjust enrichment, concluding that Bissonnette and Wojnarowski did not qualify as transportation workers because they were not employed by a company in the transportation industry. Question To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?

Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 20, 2024. Petitioner: Corner Post, Inc.Respondent: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Advocates: Bryan K. Weir (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The case concerns the interchange fees associated with debit card transactions, which generate billions of dollars in revenue for issuing banks. The regulatory agency, the Board of the Federal Reserve System, promulgated a rule (“Regulation II”) to govern these fees. Regulation II caps the fees that banks can charge for each debit card transaction. Petitioners in the case include Corner Post, a convenience store, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA), and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA), all of whom accept debit card payments and are thus affected by interchange fees. On April 29, 2021, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA) challenged Regulation II as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the Board moved to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations, NDRA and NDPMA amended their complaint to add Corner Post, Inc. as an additional plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the 2015 clarification to Regulation II did not reset the statute of limitations, that Corner Post's statute of limitations began in 2011 with the original publication of Regulation II, and that none of the plaintiffs’ claims warranted equitable tolling. The Merchants appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a plaintiff’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act “first accrue” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule, or when the rule first causes harm to the plaintiff?

Trump v. Anderson Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 8, 2024. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.Respondent: Norma Anderson, et al. Advocates: Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Petitioner) Jason C. Murray (for Respondents Anderson, et al.) Shannon W. Stevenson (for Respondent Griswold) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President, serving for four years. In the 2020 election, Joe Biden was elected as the 46th President, despite Trump's refusal to accept the results. The Electoral College confirmed Biden's victory with 306 votes to Trump's 232. Trump continued to challenge the outcome in court and media. On January 6, 2021, during a Congressional session to certify the election, Trump held a rally, claiming victory and urging supporters to protest at the Capitol. The next day, Vice President Pence certified Biden's win. Trump is currently seeking the Colorado Republican Party’s nomination for the 2024 presidential election. A group of Colorado electors, consisting of both registered Republicans and unaffiliated voters, filed a petition in the Denver District Court to prevent Trump from appearing on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. Citing Colorado’s Uniform Election Code, they requested the court to direct Secretary of State Jena Griswold to exclude Trump’s name. Their argument centered on Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming Trump was disqualified due to his involvement in the January 6, 2021, insurrection, violating his presidential oath to support the U.S. Constitution. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Trump engaged in insurrection as those terms are used in Section Three but that Section Three does not apply to the president. Thus, the court denied the petition. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that Section Three disqualifies Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus that it would be unlawful under Colorado law to list him on the ballot. Question Does Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualify Donald Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus from appearing on Colorado’s 2024 presidential primary ballot?

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2024. Petitioner: Loper Bright Enterprises, et al.Respondent: Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A group of commercial fishermen who regularly participate in the Atlantic herring fishery sued the National Marine Fisheries Service after the Service promulgated a rule that required industry to fund at-sea monitoring programs at an estimated cost of $710 per day. The fisherman argued that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 did not authorize the Service to create industry-funded monitoring requirements and that the Service failed to follow proper rulemaking procedure. The district court granted summary judgment for the government based on its reasonable interpretation of its authority and its adoption of the rule through the required notice-and-comment procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Question 1. Does the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorize the National Marine Fisheries Service to promulgate a rule that would require industry to pay for at-sea monitoring programs? 2. Should the Court overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council or at least clarify whether statutory silence on controversial powers creates an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?

Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2024. Petitioner: Relentless, Inc., et al.Respondent: Department of Commerce, et al. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Atlantic herring fishery is regulated by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), aimed at preventing overfishing and promoting conservation. The MSA sets up regional councils, including the New England Fishery Management Council, which oversees the Atlantic herring fishery. These councils create fishery management plans (FMPs) to set conservation measures, which must align with ten National Standards and other laws. The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), reviews and publishes these plans for public comment. In 2000, the New England Council established an FMP for Atlantic herring, updated with an industry-funded monitoring program in 2020. The program partially shifts the cost of at-sea monitoring to vessel owners but aims for a 50% target of monitored herring trips, which will cause reduced profits for the fishing industry and communities. Owners of two fishing vessels, Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC, challenged the Rule, arguing that the monitoring requirement disproportionately burdens them because of their longer trips and inability to qualify for exemptions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Agency, ruling that the MSA’s ambiguity on industry-paid monitors allows for agency interpretation under Chevron deference, that the Rule complies with the MSA’s National Standards and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and does not violate the Commerce Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question 1. Should Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council be overruled? 2. Does statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?

Devillier v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 16, 2024. Petitioner: Richard Devillier.Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Robert J. McNamara (for the Petitioners) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Devillier and others own property in Texas along Interstate Highway 10 (IH-10). The State of Texas, through the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), elevated IH-10 and installed a solid concrete median barrier, which acted as a “weir” to obstruct natural water flow and led to the flooding of the petitioners’ properties. Despite being aware of the potential for flooding, the State proceeded with the construction and even extended the barrier, causing extensive damage to the petitioners’ properties. The petitioners sued the state, directly invoking the Taking Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which they argued applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied Texas’s motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated, finding the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against the state. Question May a party sue a state directly under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 16, 2024. Petitioner: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp., et al.Respondent: Moab Partners, L.P., et al. Advocates: Linda T. Coberly (for the Petitioners) David C. Frederick (for the Respondent) Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) For years, Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. had been lauded as a “total return opportunity” thanks to its strong dividend history, diversified business operations, and favorable growth rates. One of its most significant assets, International-Matex Tank Terminals (“IMTT”), was a substantial driver of its profit, with a major focus on storing No. 6 fuel oil. However, Macquarie and its leadership allegedly hid crucial information from investors, specifically about IMTT’s heavy reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, a commodity facing stringent upcoming regulations and declining demand. Even after international regulations on sulfur levels in fuel were confirmed to drastically affect the market for No. 6 fuel oil, the company continued to misrepresent its exposure, allegedly misleading investors about IMTT's flexibility and downplaying the impending effects on revenue. On February 21, 2018, Macquarie first announced a sharp decline in IMTT utilization, earnings falling short of analysts’ expectations, and a 31% cut to the company’s dividend. The company admitted for the first time that it would need to spend hundreds of millions to repurpose IMTT's storage tanks due to the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil. As a result, the stock price plummeted, and Macquarie’s management faced a credibility crisis. Questions arose about the company’s transparency and honesty, harming investor trust and the company’s overall reputation. On behalf of a class of plaintiffs, Moab Partners, L.P., sued Macquarie, alleging that it made material omissions and false and misleading statements about IMTT in violation of various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that while many of the alleged misstatements are not actionable, the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded material omissions and facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. Question May a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K support a private claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even in the absence of an otherwise misleading statement?

Smith v. Arizona Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2024. Petitioner: Jason Smith.Respondent: State of Arizona. Advocates: Hari Santhanam (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Alexander W. Samuels (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In December 2019, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Jason Smith's father's property, which had multiple structures. They detected a strong odor of marijuana from a shed, where they found Smith and later discovered various drugs and paraphernalia. Smith was charged with multiple felonies related to drug possession. During the trial, a forensic scientist testified that the seized substances were indeed illegal drugs. Smith's defense argued he was merely at the property to care for his ill father and was not involved in any illegal activities. Smith was found guilty on several counts, including possession of marijuana for sale, and was sentenced to four years in prison. Smith appealed the decision, claiming, among other things, that the admission of drug-analysis testimony violated his confrontation rights because the testifying expert relied on data generated by a non-testifying expert. The appellate court affirmed. Question Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permit the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst?

Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2024. Petitioner: Office of the United States Trustee.Respondent: John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, et al. Advocates: Masha G. Hansford (for the Petitioner) Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the U.S., bankruptcy proceedings are administered through two systems: the Trustee Program managed by the Department of Justice for 88 judicial districts, and the Bankruptcy Administrator Program for six districts in Alabama and North Carolina, overseen directly by the courts. This dual system originated in 1978, with Alabama and North Carolina eventually gaining a permanent exemption from the Trustee Program in 2000. Both programs have different funding models, with the Trustee Program financed primarily through debtor fees and the Administrator Program funded through the general judicial budget. Over the years, Congress has enacted various amendments to balance the fee structures between the two systems, but disparities have remained, most notably with the 2017 Amendment which significantly raised fees in Trustee districts. Seventy-six Chapter 11 debtors associated with John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts (Debtors) filed for bankruptcy in the District of Kansas, a Trustee district, in June 2016. Their cases were still pending when a 2017 Amendment took effect in January 2018, which significantly increased their quarterly Chapter 11 disbursement fees. By the end of December 2019, they had paid over $2.5 million more in fees than they would have if they had filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district, such as those in North Carolina and Alabama. The Debtors challenged the fee increase in bankruptcy court, arguing it was unequally applied and retroactive without clear congressional intent. The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. Question Must the U.S. Trustee issue refunds for the extra fees paid by debtors in certain districts to address the lack of uniformity identified in Siegel v. Fitzgerald?