Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Smith v. Spizzirri Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2024. Petitioner: Wendy Smith, et al.Respondent: Keith Spizzirri, et al. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioners) E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Plaintiffs Smith and others were current and former delivery drivers for Intelliserve. They sued Intelliserve in Arizona state court alleging that “Intelliserve violated federal and state employment laws by misclassifying them as independent contractors, failing to pay them required minimum and overtime wages, and failing to provide paid sick leave.” Intelliserve removed the case to federal court, then moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the case. While both parties agreed that, under the FAA, all claims were subject to mandatory arbitration, they disagreed on how the district court was supposed to handle the lawsuit. Intelliserve argued that Section 3 of the FAA permitted the district court to dismiss the action, while the plaintiffs argued that the FAA required the district court to stay the action pending arbitration. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act give district courts discretion to dismiss a lawsuit when all claims are subject to arbitration?

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2024. Petitioner: City of Grants Pass, Oregon.Respondent: Gloria Johnson, et al. Advocates: Theane D. Evangelis (for the Petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The city of Grants Pass in southern Oregon has a population of approximately 38,000, and of that population, somewhere between 50 and 600 persons are unhoused. Whatever the exact number of unhoused persons, however, it exceeds the number of available shelter beds, requiring that at least some of them sleep on the streets or in parks. However, several provisions of the Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibit them from doing so, including an “anti-sleeping” ordinance, two “anti-camping” ordinances, a “park exclusion” ordinance, and a “park exclusion appeals” ordinance. In September 2018, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Martin v. City of Boise, holding that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” While the Grants Pass Municipal Code provisions impose only civil penalties, they still can mature into criminal penalties. A district court certified a class of plaintiffs of involuntarily unhoused persons living in Grants Pass and concluded that, based on the unavailability of shelter beds, the City’s enforcement of its anti-camping and anti-sleeping ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Question Does a city’s enforcement of public camping against involuntarily homeless people violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment?

Thornell v. Jones Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2024. Petitioner: Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.Respondent: Danny Lee Jones. Advocates: Jason D. Lewis (for the Petitioner) Jean-Claude Andre (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In Bullhead City, Arizona, on March 26, 1992, Danny Lee Jones and Robert Weaver engaged in a day of drinking and using crystal methamphetamine. A violent altercation ensued, resulting in Jones fatally striking Weaver with a baseball bat. Jones also attacked Weaver’s grandmother, Katherine Gumina, and his seven-year-old daughter, Tisha, the latter of whom he also strangled or suffocated. Jones fled to Las Vegas but was arrested and indicted in Arizona on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. His public defender, inexperienced in capital cases, received limited funding for expert witnesses. Jones was convicted on all counts, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled. At sentencing, testimony revealed Jones’s troubled childhood, including substance abuse, head injuries, and abuse by his first stepfather. Dr. Jack Potts, a forensic psychiatrist, assessed Jones, citing a history of substance abuse, possible mood disorders, and susceptibility to aggression due to drug use. Potts’s report, submitted late due to delayed receipt of the Presentence Information Report, suggested Jones’s impaired capacity to conform to the law at the time of the offenses. Despite a request for a continuance for further psychological testing, the judge found multiple aggravating factors for the murders and sentenced Jones to death for both murders and an additional twenty-five years for the attempted murder. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, and Jones filed a federal petition for habeas relief. After protracted litigation and appeals, the district court dismissed Jones’s habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that application of the appropriate standards pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") meant that Jones was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Question What is the proper methodology for assessing prejudice, for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?

Fischer v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 16, 2024. Petitioner: Joseph W. Fischer.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On January 6, 2021, while Congress was convening to certify the results of the 2020 presidential election in favor of Joe Biden, thousands of supporters of the losing candidate, Donald Trump, converged on the United States Capitol to disrupt the proceedings. The Trump supporters swarmed the building, overwhelming law enforcement officers who attempted to stop them. The chaos wrought by the mob forced members of Congress to stop the certification and flee for safety. Congress was not able to resume its work for six hours. Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang, and Garret Miller were indicted for various offenses related to their involvement in the Capitol riot on January 6. All three were charged with felony offenses of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, and misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct in a Capitol building and in restricted grounds, involving the intent to disrupt congressional sessions and government functions. Additionally, each faced a count of obstruction of an official proceeding. The defendants challenged this obstruction charge, claiming that the statute does not prohibit their alleged conduct on that day. The district court agreed, holding that the statute does not apply to assaultive conduct, committed in furtherance of an attempt to stop Congress from performing a constitutionally required duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the natural, broad reading of that provision is that it applies to forms of obstructive conduct, not just those related to investigations and evidence. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

Snyder v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2024. Petitioner: James E. Snyder.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) James Snyder formerly served as mayor of Portage, Indiana. He was convicted of federal funds bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for soliciting and accepting $13,000 in connection with the city’s purchases of garbage trucks, among other federal crimes. Before, during, and after trial, Snyder argued that the evidence did not support a finding that there was an agreement to exchange money for the truck contracts before they were awarded. Without a prior quid pro quo agreement, he argued, § 666 cannot apply. Interpreting the plain language of the statute and Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court rejected his interpretation of that provision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions?

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2024. Petitioner: Jascha Chiaverini, et al.Respondent: City of Napoleon, Ohio, et al. Advocates: Easha Anand (for the Petitioners) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Megan M. Wold (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jascha Chiaverini, manager of the Diamond and Gold Outlet in Napoleon, Ohio, bought a men's ring and diamond earring from Brent Burns for $45. He recorded the transaction, including copying Burns' ID and photographing the items. Subsequently, David and Christina Hill contacted Chiaverini, claiming the jewelry was stolen from them. Chiaverini advised them to report to the police but denied buying their described items. After multiple calls, Chiaverini ended the conversation. Both parties contacted the police. Chiaverini expressed his suspicion about holding stolen property and requested police, not the Hills, to visit. When the police arrived, Chiaverini cooperated, providing information and photographs of the jewelry. The situation escalated when Chiaverini received a conflicting "hold letter" from the police, instructing him to keep the items as evidence but also to release them to the Hills. Chiaverini refused to release the items, citing legal concerns and advice from his counsel. His confrontation with Police Chief Weitzel revealed Chiaverini's lack of a precious-metal-dealer license, prompting a new investigation angle. Officer Steward updated the police report to include Chiaverini's suspicion about the stolen nature of the items, which Chiaverini disputed. Based on these developments, warrants were issued for Chiaverini's arrest and the search of his store, leading to his temporary detention. Although a court later dismissed the criminal case against Chiaverini, he filed a complaint against the officers and the city, alleging various legal violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, citing probable cause for Chiaverini's arrest and dismissing his claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.   Question May a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim proceed as to a baseless criminal charge so long as other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause?

Connelly v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2024. Petitioner: Thomas A. Connelly, as Executor of the Estate of Michael P. Connelly, Sr.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner) Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Brothers Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders of a corporation. The corporation obtained life insurance on each brother so that if one died, the corporation could use the proceeds to redeem his shares. When Michael died, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes on his estate, which included his stock interest in the corporation. According to the IRS, the corporation’s fair market value included the life insurance proceeds intended for the stock redemption. Michael’s estate argued otherwise and sued for a tax refund. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding that the stock-purchase agreement did not affect the valuation and furthermore, that a proper valuation of the corporation must include the life insurance proceeds used for redemption because they were a significant asset of the company. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Should the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax?

Erlinger v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2024. Petitioner: Paul Erlinger.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting the Petitioner) D. Nick Harper (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Paul Erlinger received a 15-year prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for illegally possessing a firearm. This sentence was based on his three prior convictions for violent felonies, all being Indiana burglaries. Erlinger challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, he argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary extends beyond the federal statute, making it non-applicable as a predicate offense under ACCA. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that Indiana's definition of burglary is “[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (1990) is no broader than the federal definition of general burglary, which is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Secondly, Erlinger argued that these burglaries did not occur on separate occasions, and claimed that the determination of this fact should be made by a jury, not a judge, as per the Sixth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States (2022). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that under binding circuit precedent, the government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions, only to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Question Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2024. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration, et al.Respondent: Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Petitioners) Jessica L. Ellsworth (for Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C) Erin M. Hawley (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Medication abortion in the U.S. is commonly conducted using a combination of mifepristone and misoprostol. Mifepristone was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in September 2000 and is used in over half of all U.S. abortions. Initially, its distribution was limited to hospitals and medical facilities under FDA regulations. The 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act introduced Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), reinforcing FDA's control over drug approvals. Despite REMS review in 2011, mifepristone's distribution remained restricted. In March 2016, the FDA expanded access, allowing medical practitioners to prescribe it and extending the usage period in pregnancy. In April 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA permitted mail distribution from certified sources, and in January 2023, approved pharmacies also began distributing it. However, following the Supreme Court's June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to abortion, several states sought to restrict mifepristone’s sale. The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other anti-abortion groups challenged the FDA’s approval, claiming inadequate consideration of evidence in 2000. In April 2023, a federal district court judge sided with the plaintiffs, suspending the FDA’s approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit partially stayed this decision, maintaining the original 2000 approval but striking down the 2016 REMS changes that eased access. After a hearing on the merits, in August 2023, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ban on changes made in 2016. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and stayed the lower court’s injunction. Question 1. Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use? 2. Were the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious? 3. Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief?

Harrow v. Department of Defense Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2024. Petitioner: Stuart R. Harrow.Respondent: Department of Defense. Advocates: Joshua P. Davis (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Stuart R. Harrow was a federal employee who was furloughed in 2013. He appealed the furlough decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but due to short staffing, the MSPB did not rule on Harrow’s appeal for more than five years, during which Harrow changed his email address. On May 11, 2022, the MSPB affirmed the agency’s furlough action and attempted to inform Harrow that he had 60 days to seek judicial review. However, because he had changed email addresses, Harrow did not learn of the MSPB’s denial until after 60 days had elapsed. On September 8, 2022, Harrow moved the Board for an extension of time to appeal, but the Board denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the timely filing of a petition from the Board's final decision is a jurisdictional requirement and “not subject to equitable tolling.” Question Is the 60-day filing deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling?