Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Rudisill v. McDonough Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2023. Petitioner: James R. Rudisill.Respondent: Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The case involves the interpretation of education benefits under two different programs for veterans: the Montgomery GI Bill enacted in 1984 and the Post-9/11 GI Bill enacted in 2008. Both programs offer a maximum of 36 months of education benefits. Congress has implemented various provisions to limit the benefits under these two programs, including a 48-month cap for benefits generally and the prohibition against receiving benefits from both programs concurrently. James Rudisill, who served three periods of active-duty service, initially used the Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate education. Later, he applied for Post-9/11 benefits to attend Yale Divinity School. The VA granted him only the remaining Montgomery benefits, and he appealed that decision to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Board denied the appeal, so Rudisill appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, where a split panel held that § 3327(d)(2) does not apply to veterans with multiple periods of service. ruled in his favor, finding the statute ambiguous. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs appealed the Veterans’ Court decision to the Federal Circuit, where a split panel affirmed, but then the court sitting en banc reversed, holding that the plain language of § 3327(d)(2) applies to veterans with multiple periods of service. Question Is a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit?

United States v. Rahimi Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2023. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Zackey Rahimi. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) J. Matthew Wright (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between December 2020 and January 2021, Zackey Rahimi was involved in a series of violent incidents in Arlington, Texas, including multiple shootings and a hit-and-run. Rahimi was under a civil protective order for alleged assault against his ex-girlfriend, which explicitly prohibited him from possessing firearms. Police searched his home and found a rifle and a pistol, leading to Rahimi’s indictment for violating federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it unlawful for someone under a domestic violence restraining order to possess firearms. Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds but was denied, as his argument was foreclosed by United States v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020). Rahimi pleaded guilty but continued his constitutional challenge on appeal. As the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 579 U.S. __ (2022). Rahimi argued that Bruen overruled McGinnis and thus that § 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violate the Second Amendment?

Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2023. Petitioner: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service.Respondent: Reginald Kirtz. Advocates: Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Petitioner) Nandan M. Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1970, Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to regulate credit reporting and protect consumer privacy. The Act was amended in 1996 to impose additional obligations on entities like creditors and lenders that furnish information to credit reporting agencies. These amendments allowed consumers to dispute inaccuracies in their credit files and mandated furnishers to investigate and correct such inaccuracies. Reginald Kirtz filed a lawsuit in 2020 against Trans Union, AES, and the USDA, alleging both negligent and willful violations of the FCRA. Kirtz claimed that despite his loans being closed with a zero balance, both AES and the USDA continued to report him as “120 Days Past Due,” damaging his credit score. While Trans Union and AES responded to the lawsuit, the USDA sought dismissal, citing sovereign immunity. The district court granted the USDA’s motion, reasoning that the FCRA did not clearly express Congress’s intent to waive sovereign immunity, despite the Act’s language stating that it applies to “any person,” including government agencies. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that when Congress has clearly expressed its intent, as through the FCRA, even when the meaning is implausible, courts may neither second-guess its choices nor decline to apply the law as written. Question Do the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States?

Vidal v. Elster Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2023. Petitioner: Katherine K. Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office.Respondent: Steve Elster. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2018, Steve Elster attempted to register the phrase “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on various types of shirts, intending the mark to serve as political commentary on President Donald Trump and his policies. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiner rejected the application, citing two sections of the Lanham Act: Section 2(c), which prohibits registering a mark that identifies a living individual without their consent, and Section 2(a), which bars marks that falsely suggest a connection with living or dead persons. Elster appealed, arguing that the provisions infringed on his First Amendment rights and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Board upheld the examiner's decision based solely on Section 2(c), asserting that the statute is constitutional and serves compelling government interests, including the protection of individual rights and consumer protection. Elster appealed the decision, and the Federal Circuit reversed. Question Does the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2023. Petitioner: Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff, et al.Respondent: Christopher Garnier, et ux. Advocates: Hashim M. Mooppan (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Pamela S. Karlan (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Christopher and Kimberly Garnier are parents of children in the Poway Unified School District in the city of Poway, California, just north of San Diego. The Garniers frequently posted comments critical of the District’s Board of Trustees on the social media pages of the Trustees, including Respondents Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T.J. Zane. For their school-board campaigns, O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane created personal Facebook and Twitter pages, which they updated with their official titles once elected and continued to use to post about school-district business and news. The Trustees began to hide or delete the critical and often repetitive comments by the Garniers, and then around October 2017, they blocked the Garniers from their social media pages. After the Trustees blocked the Garniers, the Garniers sued them, arguing that their social media pages constitute public fora and that by blocking them, the Trustees violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the Garniers but found that the Trustees’ had qualified immunity from the damages claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a public official engage in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official’s personal social media account, which the official uses to communicate about job-related matters with the public?

Lindke v. Freed Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2023. Petitioner: Kevin Lindke.Respondent: James R. Freed. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Victoria R. Ferres (for the Respondent) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) James Freed created a private Facebook profile that was originally intended to connect with family and friends. Eventually, he grew too popular for Facebook's 5,000-friend limit on profiles. So Freed converted his profile to a "page," which has unlimited "followers" instead of friends and is public so that anyone may "follow" it. Freed designated the page category as "public figure." In 2014, Freed was appointed city manager for Port Huron, Michigan, so he updated his Facebook page to reflect that new title. On his page, he shared both personal updates about himself and his family and professional updates, including directives and policies he initiated in his official capacity. Kevin Lindke came across Freed’s page and did not approve of how Freed was handling the pandemic. He posted criticism of Freed in response to Freed’s Facebook page, and Freed deleted the comments and ultimately “blocked” Lindke. Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights by deleting his comments and blocking him. The district court granted summary judgment to Freed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question When does a public official’s social media activity constitute state action subject to the First Amendment?

Culley v. Marshall Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 30, 2023. Petitioner: Halima Tariffa Culley, et al.Respondent: Steven T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, et al. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners) Edmund G. LaCour, Jr. (for the Respondents) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On February 17, 2019, Halima Tariffa Culley’s son was pulled over by police while driving a car registered to his mother. Police arrested him, charged him with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and seized the vehicle. Culley unsuccessfully tried to retrieve the vehicle, and on February 27, 2019, the State of Alabama filed a civil asset forfeiture action in state court. After 20 months, the state court granted Culley summary judgment, finding that she was entitled to the return of her vehicle under Alabama’s innocent-owner defense. Culley filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the failure of the state and local officials to provide a prompt post-deprivation hearing violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court ruled for the defendants, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed as to those claims that were not moot. Question What test must a district court apply when determining whether and when a post-deprivation hearing is required under the Due Process Clause?

Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 11, 2023. Appellant: Thomas C. Alexander, in His Official Capacity as President of the South Carolina Senate, et al..Appellee: The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al.. Advocates: John M. Gore (for the Appellants) Leah C. Aden (for the Appellees) Caroline A. Flynn (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) After the 2020 Census, South Carolina’s Republican-controlled legislature adopted a new congressional map that moved tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, effectively making the district a safe seat for Republicans. The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP sued, and a three-judge panel concluded that the district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The legislators appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the map was actually a political gerrymander (which is permissible) that merely had a racial effect. Question Does the South Carolina legislature’s redistricting map, which has the effect of moving tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, constitute an impermissible racial gerrymander, even if the legislators’ purported intent was merely a political gerrymander?

Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 10, 2023. Petitioner: Trevor Murray.Respondent: UBS Securities, LLC, et al.. Advocates: Easha Anand (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Eugene Scalia (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2011, UBS hired Trevor Murray as a strategist in its commercial mortgage-backed securities business. Under Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, Murray was required to certify that his reports were produced independently and that they accurately reflected his own views. According to Murray, two leaders at UBS improperly pressured him to skew his research. Murray repeatedly reported this conduct to his supervisor, who declined to take action. UBS terminated Murray in 2012. Murray sued UBS in 2014 alleging that his former employer terminated him in response to his complaints about fraud on shareholders in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's antiretaliation provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The district court ruled for Murray, and UBS appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that Murray had to prove UBS's retaliatory intent to prevail on his section 1514A claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with UBS and vacated the judgment of the district court.  Question Under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief?

Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 10, 2023. Petitioner: Great Lakes Insurance SE.Respondent: Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioner) Howard J. Bashman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Raiders Retreat Realty Co., a Pennsylvania company, insured a yacht for up to $550,000 with Great Lakes Insurance (GLI), a company headquartered in the United Kingdom. In June 2019, the yacht ran aground, incurring at least $300,000 in damage. Raiders submitted a claim to GLI for loss of the vessel, but GLI rejected it, claiming that, although none of the damage was due to fire, the entire policy was void because Raider had failed to timely recertify or inspect the yacht's fire-extinguishing equipment. GLI asked the district court for a declaratory judgment that Raiders’ omission voided the policy, and Raiders raised five counterclaims based on Pennsylvania law. The district court dismissed those counterclaims, finding that ​​the policy’s choice-of-law provision required the application of New York law. The court also rejected Raiders’ argument that the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable under the Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), which held that under federal admiralty law, a forum-selection provision is unenforceable “if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding The Bremen controlled the outcome in this case. Question Is a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract unenforceable if enforcement would conflict with the “strong public policy” of the state whose law is displaced?