Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2024. Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.Respondent: San Carlos Apache Tribe. Advocates: Caroline A. Flynn (for the Petitioners) Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Respondent in 23-253) Lloyd B. Miller (for the Respondent in 23-250) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Indian Health Service (IHS) manages healthcare for Native tribes, billing Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance for services and retaining the revenue. To enhance tribal sovereignty, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), allowing tribes to administer their healthcare programs. These programs were funded by the IHS, equivalent to what IHS would spend on tribal healthcare. However, tribes faced financial challenges in running these programs due to the lack of bureaucratic and legal support available to the federal government. To address this, Congress mandated IHS to provide tribes with contract support costs (CSC), ensuring they could offer services at par with IHS. Despite this assistance, tribes still struggled with parity issues with IHS, primarily due to slow billing processes and imperfect remittance of funds by IHS. To remedy this, Congress permitted tribes to bill outside insurers directly and retain the third-party revenue, which the Tribe was required to spend on healthcare. The San Carlos Apache Tribe, exercising its sovereignty in Arizona, managed its healthcare programs and billed outside insurers directly. However, the Tribe encountered difficulties in funding the additional healthcare services from third-party revenue without corresponding CSC from IHS. The Tribe sued the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, IHS, and the United States, for the CSC for the years 2011–2013. The district court dismissed the Tribe’s claim for the third-party-revenue-funded portions of the Tribe’s healthcare program from CSC reimbursement, and the Tribe appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statutory text of 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a) warranted a reversal of the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, highlighting ongoing challenges in achieving true parity and financial sustainability for tribal healthcare programs under the existing legislative framework. Question Must the Indian Health Service pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties?

Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2024. Petitioner: Texas.Respondent: New Mexico and Colorado. Advocates: Frederick Liu (for the United States) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas) Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for New Mexico) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This is a continuation of an action involving a dispute over the waters of the Rio Grande Basin and Elephant Butte. The Supreme Court previously held that the United States may intervene in the action, which it did. When the Special Master filed the Third Interim Report, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico moved for entry of a proposed "Consent Decree" that would resolve the dispute without the consent of the United States. The United States claims that the Court should deny the motion because (1) a court's approval of a consent decree cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors—i.e., the United States in this case; (2) the consent decree would impose obligations on a party, to wit, the United States, without that party's consent; and (3) the consent decree would be "contrary to the Compact." Question May a court enter a consent decree among Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding the Rio Grande Compact without the consent of the United States, who intervened in the action?

Gonzalez v. Trevino Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2024. Petitioner: Sylvia Gonzalez.Respondent: Edward Trevino, II, et al. Advocates: Anya A. Bidwell (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sylvia Gonzalez, a resident of Castle Hills, Texas, was elected to the city council in 2019. During her campaign, she learned of widespread dissatisfaction with the current city manager. After taking office, she organized a nonbinding petition calling for the manager's removal. The petition was presented at a contentious council meeting, after which Mayor Edward Trevino questioned Gonzalez about the petition's location, found in her binder. Two days later, Trevino initiated a criminal complaint against Gonzalez for allegedly stealing the petition. Despite an atypical legal process involving Chief-of-Police John Siemens and special detective Alex Wright, Gonzalez was arrested and spent a night in jail. She is no longer on the council and has refrained from public political activity. Gonzalez sued Trevino, Siemens, Wright, and the city (collectively, the Defendants) for violating her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She argued that the arrest was in retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment, but she conceded that there was probable cause for the arrest. In support of her retaliation claim, she cited a decade-long review of misdemeanor and felony data in Bexar County that showed no similar cases.   The Defendants moved to dismiss her lawsuit on grounds of the independent-intermediary doctrine and qualified immunity, but the district court allowed Gonzalez’s claims to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the outcome was controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett, holding that, in general, the existence of probable cause will defeat a retaliatory arrest claim. The Fifth Circuit noted that Gonzalez’s facts did not trigger the narrow exception recognized in Nieves, under which a plaintiff need not plead lack of probable cause “where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.” Question 1. Can the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened? 2. Is Nieves limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests?

Diaz v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 19, 2024. Petitioner: Delilah Guadalupe Diaz.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On August 17, 2020, Delilah Guadalupe Diaz was returning to California from Mexico. At the border, a “crunch-like sound” was heard when she rolled down the car window, leading the border agent to call for backup and check the car's door panels using a density measuring device. Inspectors found 27.98 kilos of methamphetamine hidden in these panels. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs in the car, explaining that she had initially traveled to Mexico with her daughter, who returned early. Diaz stayed back to visit her boyfriend, and used his car to return home. She stated her boyfriend had told her he would retrieve the car from her in a few days. The government charged Diaz with importation of methamphetamine in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. One of the elements of that offense is that the defendant knew she was transporting drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1). To prove that element, the government called an expert to testify that “narcotic traffickers do not entrust large and valuable quantities of narcotics to unknowing couriers.” Diaz sought to exclude the expert evidence, arguing that it would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by providing “a direct comment on the ultimate issue—Ms. Diaz’s knowledge.” However, the district court allowed the evidence, the jury found Diaz guilty, and the district court sentenced her to seven years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), may a governmental expert witness testify that couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters to prove that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs?

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 19, 2024. Petitioner: Truck Insurance Exchange.Respondent: Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., et al. Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) C. Kevin Marshall (for the debtor respondents) David C. Frederick (for the claimant respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, allows a Chapter 11 debtor with significant asbestos liabilities to channel all current and future asbestos claims into a trust funded by the debtor. This provision aims to treat future claimants equitably, given the long latency period of some asbestos-related illnesses, while also enabling the debtor to exit bankruptcy as a viable economic entity. To obtain relief under this section, the debtor must meet several criteria designed to protect the due process rights of claimants, especially future ones. These criteria include the appointment of a representative for future claimants and court determination that the plan is fair to both current and future claimants. Additionally, 75% of current claimants must vote to approve the plan. In the face of over 38,000 asbestos-related lawsuits since 1978, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., and Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc., collectively known as the "Debtors," filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016. As part of their proposed reorganization Plan, the Debtors negotiated with multiple parties—including insurance companies, creditors, government agencies, and representatives of both current and future asbestos claimants—to establish a § 524(g) trust. This trust aimed to channel both existing and future asbestos-related claims away from the Debtors. The trust's financial viability heavily depended on primary liability insurance policies issued by Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck") between the 1960s and 1980s, which obligated Truck to investigate and defend each asbestos claim against the Debtors up to a per-claim limit of $500,000. The Debtors would assign their rights under these Truck policies to the § 524(g) trust as part of the Plan's funding. Truck opposed the Plan, arguing it failed to provide anti-fraud measures for insured claims that would be litigated in the tort system, thereby potentially exposing Truck to fraudulent claims. Despite Truck's objections, the bankruptcy court recommended confirmation of the Plan, finding it to be "insurance neutral" and therefore not impacting Truck's rights or obligations under the existing policies. The district court upheld this decision, confirming the Plan and thereby nullifying Truck's objections. Importantly, 100% of the asbestos personal-injury claimants had approved the proposed Plan, making Truck the sole objector. The district court confirmed the Plan over Truck’s objections, finding Truck lacked standing to challenge the Plan because it was not a “party in interest” under § 1109(b). The U.S. Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?

National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 18, 2024. Petitioner: National Rifle Association of America.Respondent: Maria T. Vullo. Advocates: David D. Cole (for the Petitioner) Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2017, following a referral from the New York County District Attorney's Office, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), under the leadership of Maria T. Vullo, initiated an investigation into NRA-endorsed insurance programs suspected of violating New York law. This scrutiny resulted in three insurance companies acknowledging their fault through consent decrees in 2018. Concurrently, after the Parkland school shooting, Vullo issued guidance and statements encouraging banks and insurers to assess and potentially end their affiliations with gun promotion organizations like the NRA, citing reputational risks. The fallout led to several firms cutting ties with the NRA, prompting the association to file a lawsuit against Vullo and other state officials, asserting violations of its free speech and equal protection rights. The district court dismissed most of the claims but allowed the First Amendment allegations against Vullo to proceed, citing unresolved factual questions about her qualified immunity. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court reasoned that while the First Amendment protects against the abridgment of free speech by government officials, these officials also have the responsibility to address public concerns. Here, the NRA failed to show that Vullo’s conduct sought to coerce, rather than merely to convince. Furthermore, even if her actions were coercive, Vullo’s conduct as a regulator and public official did not infringe upon any clearly established law, as she appeared to act reasonably and in good faith in performing her duties. Question Does a New York regulator’s discouragement of companies from doing business with the National Rifle Association after the Parkland school shooting constitute coercion in violation of the First Amendment?

Murthy v. Missouri Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 18, 2024. Appellant: Vivek H. Murthy, U.S. Surgeon General, et al.Appellee: Missouri, et al. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners) J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Multiple plaintiffs, including epidemiologists, consumer and human rights advocates, academics, and media operators, claimed that various defendants, including numerous federal agencies and officials, have engaged in censorship, targeting conservative-leaning speech on topics such as the 2020 presidential election, COVID-19 origins, mask and vaccine efficacy, and election integrity. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants used public statements and threats of regulatory action, such as reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, to induce social media platforms to suppress content, thereby violating the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The States of Missouri and Louisiana also alleged harm due to the infringement of the free speech rights of their citizens. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the federal government from meeting with social media companies or otherwise seeking to influence their content-moderation policies. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the government’s motion for an emergency stay and granted certiorari to review the case on the merits. Question Did the federal government’s request that private social media companies take steps to prevent the dissemination of purported misinformation transform those companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and thus violate users’ First Amendment rights?

Garland v. Cargill Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 28, 2024. Petitioner: Michael Cargill.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners) Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) For over a decade, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) maintained that bump stocks were not machineguns as defined by statute, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), and issued interpretation letters confirming this position. Following the October 1, 2017 Las Vegas shooting, where a shooter used bump stocks in a massacre, public demand for a ban on bump stocks surged, leading to proposed legislation. Before Congress could act, the ATF, responding to the tragedy and public sentiment, reversed its stance in 2018, reclassifying bump stocks as machineguns and exposing owners to criminal liability. Respondent Michael Cargill surrendered his bump stocks due to this new regulation and filed a lawsuit challenging the ATF regulations, arguing that the ATF exceeded its authority in defining bump stocks as machineguns. The district court for the government, finding that the government’s new interpretation of “machinegun” is the best interpretation of the statute. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed. The en banc court found the definition of "machinegun" as unambiguously not applying to bump stocks, but even if it were ambiguous, the rule of lenity would compel a construction of the statute in Cargill’s favor. Question Is a bump stock device a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)?

Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 28, 2024. Petitioner: David Suski, et al.Respondent: Coinbase, Inc. Advocates: Jessica L. Ellsworth (for the Petitioner) David J. Harris (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In June 2021, Coinbase, an online cryptocurrency exchange, launched a Dogecoin Sweepstakes that required participants to opt into "Official Rules" with a forum selection clause stipulating exclusive jurisdiction of California courts for related disputes. Respondent David Suski and three other users, who had agreed to the “Coinbase User Agreement” containing an arbitration provision when they created their accounts, entered the sweepstakes. Subsequently, they filed a lawsuit against Coinbase and Marden-Kane, Inc., the company engaged by Coinbase for the sweepstakes management, alleging violations of California’s False Advertising Law, Unfair Competition Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. Coinbase sought to compel arbitration based on the User Agreement, but the district court denied Coinbase’s motion, interpreting the contractual documents to conclude that the Sweepstakes’ Official Rules, with their forum selection clause, took precedence over the User Agreement’s arbitration clause. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the dispute should be resolved within the California court system as per the Official Rules of the Sweepstakes, not through arbitration as Coinbase had sought. Question When parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, does an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 27, 2024. Petitioner: Alex Cantero, et al.Respondent: Bank of America, N.A. Advocates: Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) established a dual banking system in the United States, allowing both federal and state governments to charter and regulate banks. National banks are subject to federal authority and have broad powers, including the ability to make real estate loans and provide escrow services. Alongside the NBA, other significant federal statutes regulate national banks: The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) limits the amount banks can require borrowers to deposit into escrow accounts related to home mortgages; the Dodd-Frank Act sets the standards for when state consumer financial laws are preempted by federal law; and it also amends the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to require the creation of escrow accounts for certain mortgages and mandates interest payment on those accounts if prescribed by state or federal law. The state law in question, New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, mandates a minimum interest rate for escrow accounts held by mortgage institutions, which was later adjusted in 2018 to create “parity” between state-chartered and national banks. Alex Cantero purchased a house in Queens Village, New York, with a mortgage from Bank of America (BOA) in August 2010. His mortgage required him to deposit money into an escrow account for property taxes and insurance premiums, and BOA paid no interest on these funds. Cantero’s mortgage specified that it is governed by federal law and the law of the property’s jurisdiction. Cantero alleged that BOA refused to pay interest on escrow funds, contrary to New York State law. The district court determined that New York's General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, was not preempted by the NBA based on its minimal “degree of interference” with national banking powers. Citing Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as supportive of this compatibility, the court denied BOA’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, asserting that both federal and state laws could be read “harmoniously.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the NBA does preempt New York’s GOL because the minimum-interest requirement would exert control over a banking power granted by the federal government, thereby impermissibly interfering with national banks’ exercise of that power. Question Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?