Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 27, 2024. Petitioner: Alex Cantero, et al.Respondent: Bank of America, N.A. Advocates: Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) established a dual banking system in the United States, allowing both federal and state governments to charter and regulate banks. National banks are subject to federal authority and have broad powers, including the ability to make real estate loans and provide escrow services. Alongside the NBA, other significant federal statutes regulate national banks: The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) limits the amount banks can require borrowers to deposit into escrow accounts related to home mortgages; the Dodd-Frank Act sets the standards for when state consumer financial laws are preempted by federal law; and it also amends the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to require the creation of escrow accounts for certain mortgages and mandates interest payment on those accounts if prescribed by state or federal law. The state law in question, New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, mandates a minimum interest rate for escrow accounts held by mortgage institutions, which was later adjusted in 2018 to create “parity” between state-chartered and national banks. Alex Cantero purchased a house in Queens Village, New York, with a mortgage from Bank of America (BOA) in August 2010. His mortgage required him to deposit money into an escrow account for property taxes and insurance premiums, and BOA paid no interest on these funds. Cantero’s mortgage specified that it is governed by federal law and the law of the property’s jurisdiction. Cantero alleged that BOA refused to pay interest on escrow funds, contrary to New York State law. The district court determined that New York's General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, was not preempted by the NBA based on its minimal “degree of interference” with national banking powers. Citing Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as supportive of this compatibility, the court denied BOA’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, asserting that both federal and state laws could be read “harmoniously.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the NBA does preempt New York’s GOL because the minimum-interest requirement would exert control over a banking power granted by the federal government, thereby impermissibly interfering with national banks’ exercise of that power. Question Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2024. Petitioner: Attorney General, State of Florida, et al.Respondent: NetChoice, LLC, et al. Advocates: Henry C. Whitaker (for the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Social-media platforms collect third-party posts, including text, photos, and videos, and distribute them to other users. Importantly, they are private enterprises, not governmental entities, and thus are not subject to constitutional requirements for free speech. Users have no obligation to consume or contribute to the content on these platforms. And unlike traditional media, social-media platforms primarily host content created by individual users rather than the companies themselves (although they do engage in some speech of their own, such as publishing terms of service and community standards). They are not merely conduits of that content, however; they curate and edit the content that users see, which involves removing posts that violate community standards and prioritizing posts based on various factors. The State of Florida enacted S.B. 7072 to address what it perceives as bias and censorship by large social media platforms against conservative voices. The legislation imposes various restrictions and obligations on social media platforms, such as prohibiting the deplatforming of political candidates and requiring detailed disclosures about content moderation policies. It aims to treat social media platforms like common carriers and focuses on those platforms that either have annual gross revenues exceeding $100 million or at least 100 million monthly individual participants globally. Enforcement mechanisms include substantial fines and the option for civil suits. NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (together, “NetChoice”)—are trade associations that represent internet and social-media companies like Facebook, Twitter, Google (which owns YouTube), and TikTok. They sued the Florida officials charged with enforcing S.B. 7072 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the law's provisions (1) violate the social-media companies’ right to free speech under the First Amendment and (2) are preempted by federal law. The district court granted NetChoice’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the provisions of the Act that make platforms liable for removing or deprioritizing content are likely preempted by federal law, specifically 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), and that the Act’s provisions infringe on platforms’ First Amendment rights by restricting their “editorial judgment.” The court applied strict scrutiny due to the Act's viewpoint-based purpose of defending conservative speech from perceived liberal bias in big tech. The court found that the Act does not survive strict scrutiny as it isn't narrowly tailored and doesn't serve a legitimate state interest. The State appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed these conclusions. Question Do Florida S.B. 7072’s content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment, and do the law’s individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment?

NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2024. Petitioner: NetChoice, LLC, et al.Respondent: Ken Paxton, In His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The State of Texas enacted HB 20 to regulate large social media platforms, such as Facebook, X (formerly known as Twitter), and YouTube. The law purports to prohibit large social media platforms from censoring speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker. NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association filed a lawsuit against the Attorney General of Texas, challenging two provisions of the law as unconstitutional: (1) Section 7, which prohibits viewpoint-based censorship of users’ posts, except for content that incites criminal activity or is unlawful. (2) Section 2, which requires platforms to disclose how they moderate and promote content, publish an "acceptable use policy," and maintain a complaint-and-appeal system for their users. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, holding that Section 7 and Section 2 are facially unconstitutional. The court argued that social media platforms have some level of editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment, and HB 20 interferes with that discretion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, rejecting the idea that large corporations have a “freewheeling” First Amendment right to censor what people say. It reasoned that HB 20 does not regulate the platforms’ speech but protects other people’s speech and regulates the platforms’ conduct. Question Do Texas HB 20’s provisions prohibiting social media platforms from censoring users’ content and imposing stringent disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment?

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 21, 2024. Petitioner: Warner Chappell Music, Inc., et al.Respondent: Sherman Nealy, et al. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Joe Wesley Earnhardt (for the Respondents) Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the early 1980s, Sherman Nealy and Tony Butler formed Music Specialist, Inc. (MSI), a Florida corporation involved in the music industry. Nealy, a newcomer to the sector, financed the operation while Butler, an experienced disc jockey, authored or co-authored the musical works at the heart of the case. MSI released an album and several singles from 1983 to 1986 before dissolving as a corporation, although its business activities continued until 1989. During Nealy’s subsequent incarceration for drug offenses, Butler formed a new company, 321 Music, LLC, and began licensing rights to MSI’s musical works. This included an agreement in 2008 with Atlantic to interpolate one of MSI’s works into a song by artist Flo Rida. Upon his release, Nealy discovered third-party usage of MSI’s catalog but took no decisive action. He was unaware of ensuing litigation over the works among various entities including Warner Chappell Music, Inc., Artist Publishing Group, LLC, Atlantic Recording Corporation, and Butler's 321 Music. It wasn't until post-release from a second prison term that he learned of the prior litigation and alleged unauthorized transfers of rights. Finally, in December 2018, Nealy and MSI filed a lawsuit alleging copyright infringement by Atlantic, Artist, and Warner for activities dating back to 2008. Following a pre-trial stipulation framing the case as an “ownership dispute,” the defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. On an interlocutory appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that when a copyright plaintiff has a timely claim under the discovery accrual rule for infringement that occurred more than three years before the lawsuit was filed, the plaintiff may recover damages for that infringement. Question Under the discovery accrual rule applied by the circuit courts and the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), may a copyright plaintiff recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit?

Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 21, 2024. Petitioner: Ohio, et al.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al. Advocates: Mathura J. Sridharan (for the State Applicants) Catherine E. Stetson (for the Industry Applicants) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Federal Respondents) Judith N. Vale (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question None

Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 20, 2024. Petitioner: Neal Bissonnette, et al.Respondent: LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, et al. Advocates: Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Petitioners) Traci L. Lovitt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Flowers Foods, Inc. is a holding company that owns subsidiaries responsible for producing and distributing baked goods like breads, buns, rolls, and snack cakes. Two of the independent distributors for Flowers in Connecticut are Neal Bissonnette and Tyler Wojnarowski. Both entered into Distributor Agreements with Flowers in 2017 and 2018, respectively. According to these agreements, they pick up baked goods from local warehouses and distribute them to stores and restaurants, earning the difference between the acquisition and selling prices. They are also responsible for sales promotion, stock management, and other operational tasks. While they can sell non-competitive products, they primarily work full-time for Flowers. The Distributor Agreement includes an appended Arbitration Agreement, which states that any disputes must be submitted to binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, except for certain specified issues. Pursuant to that arbitration agreement, the district court compelled arbitration. Bissonnette and Wojnarowski claimed that they are not subject to the FAA because they are “transportation workers” within the meaning of Section 1 of the FAA, which excludes contracts with “seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision ordering arbitration and dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendant for unpaid or withheld wages, unpaid overtime wages, and unjust enrichment, concluding that Bissonnette and Wojnarowski did not qualify as transportation workers because they were not employed by a company in the transportation industry. Question To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?

Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 20, 2024. Petitioner: Corner Post, Inc.Respondent: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Advocates: Bryan K. Weir (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The case concerns the interchange fees associated with debit card transactions, which generate billions of dollars in revenue for issuing banks. The regulatory agency, the Board of the Federal Reserve System, promulgated a rule (“Regulation II”) to govern these fees. Regulation II caps the fees that banks can charge for each debit card transaction. Petitioners in the case include Corner Post, a convenience store, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA), and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA), all of whom accept debit card payments and are thus affected by interchange fees. On April 29, 2021, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA) challenged Regulation II as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the Board moved to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations, NDRA and NDPMA amended their complaint to add Corner Post, Inc. as an additional plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the 2015 clarification to Regulation II did not reset the statute of limitations, that Corner Post's statute of limitations began in 2011 with the original publication of Regulation II, and that none of the plaintiffs’ claims warranted equitable tolling. The Merchants appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a plaintiff’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act “first accrue” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule, or when the rule first causes harm to the plaintiff?

Trump v. Anderson Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 8, 2024. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.Respondent: Norma Anderson, et al. Advocates: Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Petitioner) Jason C. Murray (for Respondents Anderson, et al.) Shannon W. Stevenson (for Respondent Griswold) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President, serving for four years. In the 2020 election, Joe Biden was elected as the 46th President, despite Trump's refusal to accept the results. The Electoral College confirmed Biden's victory with 306 votes to Trump's 232. Trump continued to challenge the outcome in court and media. On January 6, 2021, during a Congressional session to certify the election, Trump held a rally, claiming victory and urging supporters to protest at the Capitol. The next day, Vice President Pence certified Biden's win. Trump is currently seeking the Colorado Republican Party’s nomination for the 2024 presidential election. A group of Colorado electors, consisting of both registered Republicans and unaffiliated voters, filed a petition in the Denver District Court to prevent Trump from appearing on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. Citing Colorado’s Uniform Election Code, they requested the court to direct Secretary of State Jena Griswold to exclude Trump’s name. Their argument centered on Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming Trump was disqualified due to his involvement in the January 6, 2021, insurrection, violating his presidential oath to support the U.S. Constitution. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Trump engaged in insurrection as those terms are used in Section Three but that Section Three does not apply to the president. Thus, the court denied the petition. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that Section Three disqualifies Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus that it would be unlawful under Colorado law to list him on the ballot. Question Does Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualify Donald Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus from appearing on Colorado’s 2024 presidential primary ballot?

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2024. Petitioner: Loper Bright Enterprises, et al.Respondent: Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A group of commercial fishermen who regularly participate in the Atlantic herring fishery sued the National Marine Fisheries Service after the Service promulgated a rule that required industry to fund at-sea monitoring programs at an estimated cost of $710 per day. The fisherman argued that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 did not authorize the Service to create industry-funded monitoring requirements and that the Service failed to follow proper rulemaking procedure. The district court granted summary judgment for the government based on its reasonable interpretation of its authority and its adoption of the rule through the required notice-and-comment procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Question 1. Does the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorize the National Marine Fisheries Service to promulgate a rule that would require industry to pay for at-sea monitoring programs? 2. Should the Court overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council or at least clarify whether statutory silence on controversial powers creates an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?

Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2024. Petitioner: Relentless, Inc., et al.Respondent: Department of Commerce, et al. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Atlantic herring fishery is regulated by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), aimed at preventing overfishing and promoting conservation. The MSA sets up regional councils, including the New England Fishery Management Council, which oversees the Atlantic herring fishery. These councils create fishery management plans (FMPs) to set conservation measures, which must align with ten National Standards and other laws. The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), reviews and publishes these plans for public comment. In 2000, the New England Council established an FMP for Atlantic herring, updated with an industry-funded monitoring program in 2020. The program partially shifts the cost of at-sea monitoring to vessel owners but aims for a 50% target of monitored herring trips, which will cause reduced profits for the fishing industry and communities. Owners of two fishing vessels, Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC, challenged the Rule, arguing that the monitoring requirement disproportionately burdens them because of their longer trips and inability to qualify for exemptions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Agency, ruling that the MSA’s ambiguity on industry-paid monitors allows for agency interpretation under Chevron deference, that the Rule complies with the MSA’s National Standards and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and does not violate the Commerce Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question 1. Should Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council be overruled? 2. Does statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?