Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 4, 2023. Petitioner: Acheson Hotels, LLC.Respondent: Deborah Laufer. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Deborah Laufer, a prolific litigant with physical disabilities and vision impairments, sued Acheson Hotels for failing to publish information about their accessibility on their website, which is required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that Laufer lacked standing to sue because had no plans to visit the hotel and thus suffered no injury as a result of the lack of information on the website. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that Laufer’s lack of intent to book a room at the hotel operated by Acheson does not negate the fact of injury. Question Does an ADA “tester” have Article III standing to challenge a hotel’s failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she has no plans to visit the hotel?

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2023. Petitioner: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al..Respondent: Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, et al.. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners) Noel J. Francisco (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In response to the financial crisis around 2007, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which, among other things, authorized the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve. The CFPB was tasked with writing and enforcing rules for financial institutions, examining financial institutions, monitoring and reporting on markets, and tracking consumer complaints. In 2017, the CFPB adopted a rule that prohibited lenders from further attempting to withdraw funds from borrowers’ bank accounts after two consecutive attempts failed for lack of funds. A group of lenders sued the CFPB over that rule, arguing that the agency’s funding scheme was unconstitutional. Instead of receiving money allocated to it each year by Congress, as most agencies do, the CFPB receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, which collects fees from member banks. The district court concluded the funding scheme was not unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Question Does the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution?

Pulsifer v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 2, 2023. Petitioner: Mark E. Pulsifer.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Mark Pulsifer pleaded guilty to distributing at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), Pulsifer asked the district court for a sentence lower than the otherwise applicable statutory minimum term of imprisonment. That provision, permits a district court to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum upon finding that the defendant does not have: “(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” It was undisputed that Pulsifer had a criminal history that meets the criteria in subsections (A) and (B), due to having more than four criminal history points and a prior three-point offense. The district court concluded that this history alone made him ineligible for sentencing under § 3553(f), notwithstanding that he did not also have a prior two-point violent offense that would meet the condition in subsection (C). It therefore denied his request under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Pulsifer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding the statutory word “and” means a defendant must not have any of the criteria, not that he must not have all of them. Question Must a defendant show he does not meet any of the criteria listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to qualify for a sentence lower than the statutory minimum?

Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2023.Decided on May 25, 2023. Petitioner: Geraldine Tyler.Respondent: Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al.. Advocates: Christina M. Martin (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Geraldine Tyler owned a condominium in Minneapolis. She stopped paying her property taxes and accrued a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000, retaining the net proceeds from the sale. Tyler sued the County, arguing that its actions violated her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Tyler’s case for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question 1. Does taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause? 2. Is the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment? Conclusion Taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Tyler plausibly alleged that Hennepin County’s actions violated the Takings Clause and thus that her claim can go forward. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property without “just compensation.” This does not prevent the government from collecting taxes, or from taking action to enforce the collection of taxes. However, the government may not, as Minnesota purported to do by statute in 1935, extinguish a property owner’s interest in property when she falls behind on her property taxes. English law, from which the U.S. Constitution derives much meaning, has long proscribed the taking of more from a taxpayer than she owes. Moreover, Supreme Court precedents and Minnesota law itself, in other contexts, recognize the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to the surplus in excess of the debt owed. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, addressing the second question presented, which the majority declined to address. In Justice Gorsuch’s view, Hennepin County’s actions likely also violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.

Yegiazaryan v. Smagin Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2023.Decided on Jun 22, 2023. Petitioner: Ashot Yegiazaryan.Respondent: Vitaly I. Smagin, et al. . Advocates: Vincent Levy (for the Petitioners) Nicholas O. Kennedy (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Vitaly Smagin, a Russian citizen who resides in Russia, sued Ashot Yegiazaryan, a Russian citizen who resides in California, and eleven other defendants, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Smagin alleged that Yegiazaryan and the other defendants illegally attempted to avoid paying a judgment Smagin won against them in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for engaging in a series of fraudulent transactions between 2003 and 2009 in to steal Smagin’s shares in a joint real estate investment in Moscow, Russia. The district court dismissed Smagin’s RICO claim, finding he did not suffer a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that Smagin did allege a domestic injury. Question Does a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States state a cognizable claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act when it suffers an injury to an intangible property? Conclusion A plaintiff alleges a “domestic injury” for purposes of filing a private civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The “domestic injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits comes from the Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. However, the RJR Nabisco Court did not explicitly define a “domestic injury,” so the Court adopted a context-specific approach that considers the injury's circumstances—an approach consistent with that case. Applying this approach to Smagin’s case, the Court found his injury to be domestic. The majority of the alleged racketeering activities that prevented Smagin from collecting his judgment occurred in the U.S., targeting a California judgment.  Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the writ of certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.

Dupree v. Younger Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2023.Decided on May 25, 2023. Petitioner: Neil Dupree.Respondent: Kevin Younger. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Amy M. Saharia (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kevin Younger was a pretrial detainee at a state prison in Baltimore, Maryland. One morning, three guards attacked Younger and other inmates at the direction of Neil Dupree, an intelligence lieutenant at the prison. Younger sued Dupree under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Dupree violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court rejected Dupree’s argument that Younger’s suit was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Dupree appealed that conclusion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Dupree was precluded from challenging the district court’s decision because Dupree raised the claim in a pretrial motion for summary judgment but did not raise it again in a post-trial motion. Question To preserve the issue for appellate review, must a party reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment? Conclusion A post-trial motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 is not required to preserve for appellate review a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. In Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011), the Court held that a party whose sufficiency-of-the evidence challenge was rejected at the summary judgment stage must reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it for appeal. That decision was based on the reasoning that the factual record developed at trial supersedes the record existing at the time of summary judgment. When the motion for summary judgment is based on a purely legal question—rather than on the factual record—no subsequent proceedings in the trial court supersede conclusions of law. Thus, when a pure question of law is resolved in an order denying summary judgment, the party need not reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it on appeal. The Court did not decide whether the issue Dupree raised on appeal is purely legal, so it remanded the case for the Fourth Circuit to answer that question.

Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2023.Decided on Jun 15, 2023. Petitioner: Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, et al..Respondent: Brian W. Coughlin. Advocates: Pratik A. Shah (for the Petitioners) Gregory G. Rapawy (for the Respondent) Austin L. Raynor (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In July 2019, Brian W. Coughlin took out a $1,100 payday loan from Lendgreen, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (“Band”). Later that year, he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the District of Massachusetts and listed his debt to Lendgreen as a nonpriority unsecured claim. When he filed his petition, the Bankruptcy Code imposed an automatic stay enjoining “debt-collection efforts outside the umbrella of the bankruptcy case.” Despite the stay, Lendgreen repeatedly contacted Coughlin seeking repayment of his debt. Coughlin moved to enforce the automatic stay against Lendgreen, and in response, the Band asserted tribal sovereign immunity and moved to dismiss the enforcement proceeding. The bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. Question Does the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogate tribal sovereign immunity? Conclusion The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, including federally recognized Indian tribes. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court. To abrogate sovereign immunity, Congress must make its intent to abrogate “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” The statute at issue here contains such unmistakably clear language. First, 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) expressly abrogates the sovereign immunity of “governmental unit[s]” for certain enumerated purposes. Section 101(27), defines “governmental unit” as “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States . . . , a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.” This definition “exudes comprehensiveness from beginning to end,” and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code support this understanding as well. Federally recognized tribes are “indisputably” governments, so the § 106(a) unequivocally abrogates their sovereign immunity. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas reiterated an argument he has made before that to the extent that tribes possess sovereign immunity at all, that immunity does not extend to “suits arising out of a tribe’s commercial activities conducted beyond its territory.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s clear-statement rule requires the statute to expressly mention Indian tribes in order to abrogate their sovereign immunity. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not, he would hold that it does not abrogate federally recognized Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity.

Counterman v. Colorado Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2023.Decided on Jun 27, 2023. Petitioner: Billy Raymond Counterman.Respondent: The People of the State of Colorado. Advocates: John P. Elwood (for the Petitioner) Philip J. Weiser (for the Respondent) Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Billy Raymond Counterman repeatedly contacted a person over Facebook in 2014, sending her “creepy” messages from numerous different accounts even after she repeatedly blocked him. Some of the messages implied that Counterman was watching her and saying that he wanted her to die or be killed. She reported Counterman to law enforcement, who arrested him in 2016. He was charged with one count of stalking (credible threat), one count of stalking (serious emotional distress, and one count of harassment; before trial, the prosecution dismissed the count of stalking (credible threat). Counterman claimed that the remaining charges, as applied to his Facebook messages, would violate his right to free speech under the  First Amendment because they were not “true threats.” The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, and a jury found him guilty of stalking (serious emotional distress). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Question To establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, must the government show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement? Conclusion To establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature, based on a showing no more demanding than recklessness. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, it allows for restrictions of so-called “true threats.” A true threat is determined by the recipient’s perception, not the speaker’s intent. However, to prevent chilling protected speech, there must be a subjective mental-state requirement. This means that the speaker’s understanding of the threat is crucial. A recklessness standard—where a person consciously disregards a significant risk that their words might harm another—is the appropriate measure for true threats because it strikes a balance between safeguarding free speech and addressing genuine threats. In Counterman’s case, the government used only an objective standard, without considering Counterman’s understanding of his statements as threatening, in violation of the requirements of the First Amendment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part. Justice Sotomayor would not reach the question whether recklessness is sufficient for true-threats prosecutions generally. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority for relying on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan instead of applying the First Amendment as it was understood at the time of the Founding.   Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that true threats do not enjoy First Amendment protection, and nearly every other category of unprotected speech may be restricted using an objective standard.

Groff v. DeJoy Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 18, 2023.Decided on Jun 29, 2023. Petitioner: Gerald E. Groff.Respondent: Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General. Advocates: Aaron M. Streett (for the Petitioner) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gerald Groff is a Christian and U.S. Postal Service worker. He refused to work on Sundays due to his religious beliefs. USPS offered to find employees to swap shifts with him, but on numerous occasions, no co-worker would swap, and Groff did not work. USPS subsequently fired him. Groff sued USPS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming USPS failed to reasonably accommodate his religion because the shift swaps did not fully eliminate the conflict. The district court concluded the requested accommodation would pose an undue hardship on USPS and granted summary judgment for USPS. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Question Is inconvenience to coworkers an “undue burden” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 such that it excuses an employer from providing an accommodation requested for religious exercise? Conclusion Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for the unanimous Court. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on religion, and subsequent regulations issued by the EEOC required employers to make reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs unless doing so would cause “undue hardship” to the employer. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require an employer who uses a seniority system to assign shifts to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee’s religious practices. The Hardison decision also inadvertently established a “more than de minimis” test for hardship; courts interpreted that decision to mean that any cost or hardship “more than de minimis” justifies denying a religious accommodation. Revisiting that interpretation, the Court rejected the “de minimis cost” standard and adopted instead a “substantial increased costs” standard consistent with the spirit and language of Title VII. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.  

U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 18, 2023.Decided on Jun 1, 2023. Petitioner: Unites States of America, Ex. Rel. Schutte, et al..Respondent: SuperValu Inc., et al.. Advocates: Tejinder Singh (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) SuperValu owned or operated approximately 2,500 grocery stories with over 800 in-store pharmacies between 2006 and 2016. To compete with other pharmacies, SuperValu stores implemented a prescription price-matching program, under which it would match lower prescription prices of competitors. However, SuperValu did not report its price-match program prices as its usual and customary price, in violation of Medicaid regulations. Tracy Schutte and Michael Yarberry (the “Relators”) sued SuperValu under the False Claims Act on behalf of the federal government and several states. They alleged that SuperValu knowingly caused false payment claims to be submitted to government healthcare programs between 2006 and 2016 by incorrectly reporting their drug prices. The federal government did not intervene in the case. The district court concluded that the Relators had failed to prove the “scienter” element of their FCA claim—that is, they failed to show SuperValu that SuperValu’s interpretation of the reporting requirement was objectively unreasonable at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Is a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding about the lawfulness of its conduct relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act? Conclusion The False Claims Act’s scienter element refers to a defendant’s knowledge and subjective beliefs, not to what an objectively reasonable person may have known or believed. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. Both the text and common-law origins of the False Claims Act support an understanding of the scienter as focusing on the subjective knowledge of the defendant. It describes a three-part definition of the word “knowingly” that largely tracks the common-law concept of scienter for fraud: actual knowledge, deliberate indifference, or recklessness. Each of these concepts pertains to the defendant’s lack of an honest belief in the statement’s truth when making the claim, not what a defendant might have thought afterward.