Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 8, 2024. Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.Respondent: Yonas Fikre. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners) Gadeir Abbas (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010, Yonas Fikre, a U.S. citizen of Eritrean descent, was placed on the FBI’s No Fly List while he was traveling to Sudan. FBI agents questioned him about his ties to a mosque in Portland, Oregon, and informed him he was a flight risk. Fikre was offered removal from the list in exchange for becoming an FBI informant, an offer he declined. Subsequently, Fikre was imprisoned and tortured in the United Arab Emirates, allegedly at the request of the FBI. Unable to return to the U.S., Fikre sought asylum in Sweden, but was ultimately denied and returned to Portland via private jet after his petition to be removed from the No Fly List was also denied. While still in Sweden, Fikre filed a lawsuit against the FBI, claiming violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. While the lawsuit was pending, the FBI removed him from the No Fly List. A federal district court in Oregon dismissed Fikre's case as moot, given that he had been removed from the No Fly List. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the lawsuit, stating that under the voluntary cessation doctrine, it was not “absolutely clear” that Fikre would not be placed back on the list for the same reasons. The case returned to the district court where an FBI official filed a declaration that Fikre would not be put back on the list based on current information. Despite this declaration, the court once again dismissed the case. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that the FBI’s declaration did not indicate a change in the policies or procedures that put Fikre on the list in the first place. Question Are respondent’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List moot, given that he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he “will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information”?

Campos-Chaves v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 8, 2024. Petitioner: Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Charles L. McCloud (for the United States) Easha Anand (for the Petitioner in 22-674 and the Respondent in 22-884) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Moris Campos-Chaves, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States illegally on January 24, 2005, and was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) on February 10, 2005. He was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). When Campos-Chaves did not appear for his hearing, he was ordered removed in absentia. Years later, on September 18, 2018, Campos-Chaves moved to reopen his case, arguing that the NTA he had initially received was defective. The immigration judge concluded that the NTA was not defective, and Campos-Chaves had actually received both the NTA and the Notice of Hearing. Thus, the immigration judge denied his petition for review and also denied all pending motions. The Board of Immigration Appeals issued a final order of removal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for rehearing. Question Does the government provides adequate notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information?

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2023. Petitioner: Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow.Respondent: City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. Advocates: Brian Wolfman (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sergeant Muldrow, initially assigned to the Intelligence Division where she worked on various high-profile cases and was deputized by the FBI, was transferred to the Fifth District by Interim Police Commissioner Lawrence O'Toole's appointee, Captain Deeba. This change led to a different work schedule, responsibilities, and loss of special FBI-related privileges including a potential $17,500 in annual overtime pay. After her transfer, Sergeant Muldrow was asked to return FBI-issued equipment, which she did, and her Task Force Officer status was revoked. She filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba, later filing an action in Missouri state court alleging Title VII violations. The case was removed to federal court, where the district court granted summary judgment against her Title VII claims and dismissed her state law claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the employment decisions she alleged did not constitute “adverse employment action” and thus did not establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII, nor were they “materially adverse action” as required for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. Question Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a signification disadvantage?

Moore v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 5, 2023. Petitioner: Charles G. Moore and Kathleen F. Moore.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Andrew M. Grossman (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2005, the Moores invested $40,000 in KisanKraft, an Indian company that supplies tools to small farmers, in exchange for 11% of the common shares. KisanKraft is a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), meaning it is majority-owned by U.S. persons but operates abroad. Prior to 2017, U.S. shareholders of CFCs were typically taxed on foreign earnings only when those earnings were repatriated to the United States, according to a provision called Subpart F. However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 significantly changed this, introducing a one-time Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) that retroactively taxed CFC earnings after 1986, regardless of repatriation. This increased the Moores’ 2017 tax liability by approximately $15,000 based on their share of KisanKraft’s retained earnings. The Moores challenged the constitutionality of this tax, but the district court dismissed their suit, holding that the MRT taxed income and, although it was retroactive, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the 16th Amendment authorize Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states?

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2023. Petitioner: William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2.Respondent: Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner) Gregory G. Garre (for Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.) Pratik A. Shah (for Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Sackler family, who purchased Purdue Pharma in the 1950s, heavily influenced the company’s direction and was instrumental in the development and marketing of OxyContin. Despite initial claims of low addiction risk, growing evidence of widespread abuse led to legal battles across the United States, with multiple stakeholders including individuals, state governments, and federal agencies suing Purdue. In 2004, the board of Purdue entered into an expansive Indemnity Agreement to protect its directors and officers from financial liability related to lawsuits. This protection was especially broad, extending even after their official tenure at Purdue, but contained a bad faith carveout. From 2007 onwards, the Sacklers began shielding assets, anticipating litigation against them personally. By 2019, Purdue faced weakened financial prospects, and the Sacklers had stepped down from the board. In the same year, the DOJ brought criminal and civil charges against Purdue, resulting in a plea agreement in 2020 that prioritized the DOJ’s claims in Purdue’s bankruptcy proceedings. The plea stipulated a $2 billion forfeiture judgment but allowed for the release of $1.775 billion if certain conditions were met. Although Purdue declared bankruptcy in 2019, the Sacklers did not, and litigation against both parties was temporarily halted. The estate of Purdue is estimated to be around $1.8 billion, while claims against both Purdue and the Sacklers are estimated to exceed $40 trillion. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed a proposed bankruptcy plan on September 17, 2021. This plan included a “shareholder release” that, in effect, permanently enjoined certain third-party claims against the Sacklers. Several parties objected to the plan, but the bankruptcy court rejected their claims. On appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the district court overturned the bankruptcy court's confirmation, holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the forced release of direct claims against non-debtors. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit nonconsensual third-party releases of direct claims, and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the plan. Question Does the Bankruptcy Code authorize a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by non-debtors against non-debtor third parties, without the claimants’ consent?

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 29, 2023. Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission.Respondent: George R. Jarkesy, Jr., et al. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner) S. Michael McColloch (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) George Jarkesy established two hedge funds, with Patriot28 as the investment adviser, managing $24 million in assets from over 100 investors. The SEC initiated an investigation in 2011, eventually bringing an in-house action alleging fraud under multiple acts. Jarkesy challenged the SEC’s proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, citing constitutional infringements, but both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the injunction, finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction. After an evidentiary hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Jarkesy was found guilty of securities fraud. Jarkesy sought review by the Commission, and while that petition was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, holding that SEC ALJs were improperly appointed. Jarkesy, however, waived his right to a new hearing. The Commission affirmed the fraud findings, imposed penalties, and rejected several constitutional arguments. He then filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed and remanded, finding multiple constitutional violations. Question Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U.S. Constitution?

Wilkinson v. Garland Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2023. Petitioner: Situ Kamu Wilkinson.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Jaime A. Santos (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Situ Wilkinson, originally from Trinidad and Tobago, overstayed his tourist visa in the U.S., built a life, and fathered a U.S.-citizen son. In 2019, after being arrested for selling crack cocaine, he faced deportation proceedings. Wilkinson conceded his deportability but sought either cancellation or withholding of removal based on the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” it would cause his son and the threat to his own life or freedom if he returned to Trinidad due to his “membership in a particular social group,” specifically people who have filed complaints against Trinidadian police. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected both of Wilkinson's claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the hardship claim because was discretionary. The Third Circuit also concluded that Wilkinson’s claim of belonging to a “particular social group” did not meet the requirements for withholding of removal, as it was not socially distinct within Trinidadian society. Therefore, the Third Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part Wilkinson’s petition for review. Question Is an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or instead a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)?

McElrath v. Georgia Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2023. Petitioner: Damian McElrath.Respondent: Georgia. Advocates: Richard A. Simpson (for the Petitioner) Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2017, a Georgia jury found Damien McElrath guilty but mentally ill as to felony murder but not guilty by reason of insanity as to malice murder after an encounter between McElrath and his mother. The trial court did not recognize the verdicts as repugnant and accepted them, but the Georgia Supreme Court held that the verdicts were repugnant and vacated the verdicts, remanding McElrath’s case for retrial. On remand, McElrath alleged that retrial was precluded on double jeopardy grounds, but the trial court denied his motion. On a second appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, McElrath argued that the court should have reversed rather than vacated his felony murder conviction in his previous appeal. He also challenges the trial court’s ruling on his double jeopardy claim, arguing that retrial on all of the counts is barred because the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice murder count. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. Question Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?

Brown v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 27, 2023. Petitioner: Justin Rashaad Brown.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner Justin Rashaad Brown) Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner Eugene Jackson) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Justin Rashaad Brown was indicted in York County, Pennsylvania, for multiple counts, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Brown pleaded guilty to one charge of drug possession and distribution as well as the § 922(g) offense. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced him to concurrent terms of 180 months’ imprisonment due to prior convictions triggering the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Brown appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that his prior state marijuana convictions should not serve as predicates under the ACCA because those crimes are no longer a categorical match to their federal counterpart. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Question Does the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporate the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense?

Rudisill v. McDonough Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2023. Petitioner: James R. Rudisill.Respondent: Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The case involves the interpretation of education benefits under two different programs for veterans: the Montgomery GI Bill enacted in 1984 and the Post-9/11 GI Bill enacted in 2008. Both programs offer a maximum of 36 months of education benefits. Congress has implemented various provisions to limit the benefits under these two programs, including a 48-month cap for benefits generally and the prohibition against receiving benefits from both programs concurrently. James Rudisill, who served three periods of active-duty service, initially used the Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate education. Later, he applied for Post-9/11 benefits to attend Yale Divinity School. The VA granted him only the remaining Montgomery benefits, and he appealed that decision to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Board denied the appeal, so Rudisill appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, where a split panel held that § 3327(d)(2) does not apply to veterans with multiple periods of service. ruled in his favor, finding the statute ambiguous. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs appealed the Veterans’ Court decision to the Federal Circuit, where a split panel affirmed, but then the court sitting en banc reversed, holding that the plain language of § 3327(d)(2) applies to veterans with multiple periods of service. Question Is a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit?