Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Pugin v. Garland Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2023.Decided on Jun 22, 2023. Petitioner: Jean Francois Pugin.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General) Martha Hutton (for the Petitioner in 22-23 (Pugin)) Mark C. Fleming (for the Respondent in 22-331 (Cordero-Garcia)) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jean Francois Pugin is a citizen of Mauritius who has lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for nearly 40 years. The government began deportation proceedings against Pugin after he was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact to a felony. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes removal upon conviction for an “aggravated felony,” including felonies relating to obstruction of justice. Despite Pugin’s argument to the contrary, the Board of Immigration appeals concluded that Virginia’s accessory after the fact to a felony constituted an offense relating to obstruction of justice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under the Immigration and Nationality Act? Conclusion Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony is an offense “relating to” obstruction of justice under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of an “aggravated felony.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. An offense can be categorized as “relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) without a requirement for an ongoing investigation or proceeding. This understanding is supported by dictionary definitions, federal and state laws, and the Model Penal Code. Obstruction of justice can occur even if no formal investigation or proceeding is active. The phrase “relating to” in the statute further broadens its applicability, ensuring it encompasses offenses connected to obstruction of justice, irrespective of a pending investigation. Even if certain provisions might require a pending investigation or proceeding, §1101(a)(43)(S) has a more expansive definition. Historical interpretations do not mandate a pending investigation for obstruction of justice. The rule of lenity, which favors defendants in ambiguous criminal laws, does not apply because traditional interpretation tools clearly defined the statute’s intent. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in full but concurred separately to note that when Congress inserted the phrase “offense relating to obstruction of justice” into §1101(a)(43)(S), it might well have been referencing a specific and previously designated category of offenses of obstruction, many of which do not have a pending-proceeding requirement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Court “subverts” the commonly understood meaning of “obstruction of justice.”

Slack Technologies v. Pirani Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2023.Decided on Jun 1, 2023. Petitioner: Slack Technologies, LLC, fka Slack Technologies, Inc., et al..Respondent: Fiyyaz Pirani. Advocates: Thomas G. Hungar (for the Petitioners) Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On June 20, 2019, tech company Slack went public through a direct listing, which, unlike an initial public offering (IPO), does not involve the company issuing new shares and instead involves only filing a registration statement to allow existing shareholders to sell their shares on the exchange. Shares made available by a direct listing are sold directly to the public and not through a bank. Fiyyaz Pirani purchased 30,000 Slack shares at $38.50 per share on the day it went public and went on to purchase another 220,000 over several months. Subsequently, the share price dropped below $25. On September 19, 2019, Pirani brought a class action lawsuit against Slack, alleging that Slack’s registration statement was inaccurate and misleading because it did not disclose information about its service disruptions and how it compensated customers for those disruptions. The district court held that Pirani had standing to sue Slack even though he could not prove that his shares were issued under the registration statement he said was inaccurate. On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed over one dissenting vote. Question Do Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading? Conclusion To state a claim under §11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must allege the purchase of “such security” issued pursuant to a materially misleading registration statement. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 authorizes an individual to sue for a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement when the individual has acquired “such security.” Normally, the word “such” refers to something that has already been described, but because there is no clear referent in Section 11, the Court looked for clues from the statutory context. First, the statute refers to “the” registration statement in imposing liability for false statements or misleading omissions. The definite article “the” suggests that the plaintiff must acquire the security. Second, the statute repeatedly uses the word “such” to narrow the law’s focus, suggesting “such security” refers to a specific security registered under the particular statement that allegedly has a falsehood or misleading omission. Still other provisions further support the understanding that “such security” means a security issued pursuant to the allegedly misleading security statement.

Polselli v. Internal Revenue Service Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2023.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: Hanna Karcho Polselli, et al..Respondent: Internal Revenue Service. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Remo Polselli underpaid his federal taxes for over a decade, with an outstanding balance of over $2 million. In pursuit of those unpaid liabilities, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued administrative summonses to the banks of Polselli’s wife and lawyers. The IRS did not notify Polselli’s wife or lawyers of the summonses, relying on the exception in the Internal Revenue Code § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i), which excludes from the notice requirement summonses issued “in aid of the collection” of tax assessments. The district court concluded that the summonses fell within the exception and that Polselli’s wife and lawyers were not entitled to notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the exception in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to the notice requirements for an Internal Revenue Service summons on third-party recordkeepers apply to a summons for anyone’s records whenever the IRS thinks that person’s records might somehow help it collect a delinquent taxpayer’s liability? Conclusion The exception to the notice requirements described in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies to a summons for anyone’s records, regardless of whether the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the accounts or records summoned. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The IRS has the power to pursue unpaid taxes and the people who owe them. In exercising that power, the IRS may issue a summons, including to third parties, to determine the liability of a taxpayer. In general, such summons require the IRS to give notice to any person identified in the summons. Anyone who is entitled to notice may bring a motion to quash the summons in federal district court, which ordinarily individuals may not do because of the sovereign immunity of the United States. The statute describes three conditions under which the IRS is exempt from having to provide notice of a summons: (1) the summons must be issued in aid of collection, (2) it must aid the collection of an assessment made or a judgment rendered, and (3) it must aid the collection of assessments or judgments “against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued.” The IRS’s summonses in this case satisfy these three conditions, so the IRS was not required to give notice to Polselli. Because Polselli was not entitled to notice, he also was not entitled to bring a motion to quash the summons. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his motion to quash. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, to emphasize that giving notice is the default rule and to caution that reading the exception too broadly would undermine the purpose of the notice-as-default system.

Samia v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2023.Decided on Jun 23, 2023. Petitioner: Adam Samia, aka Sal, aka Adam Samic.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Defendants Joseph Manuel Hunter, Carl David Stillwell, and Adam Samia were tried jointly and convicted on five counts: conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, murder-for-hire, conspiracy to murder and kidnap in a foreign country, causing death with a firearm during and relation to a crime of violence, and conspiracy to launder money. All three defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment. One piece of evidence used to convict the defendants was Stillwell’s redacted confession. Samia challenged the admission of that evidence, arguing that the redactions were insufficient because jurors would immediately infer that the confession’s references to “another person” referred to Samia himself. As such, Samia argued, his inability to cross-examine Stillwell violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s evidentiary ruling on that issue. Question Does admitting a codefendant’s redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on context violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment? Conclusion The admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause where the confession as modified did not directly inculpate the defendant but used the descriptor “other person” and the jury was instructed to consider the confession only as to the codefendant. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court. Historically, a non-testifying codefendant’s confession was permissible if the jury was instructed not to consider it against the nonconfessing defendant. The Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, recognized an exception to that general rule, holding “that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a non-testifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial,” even with a proper instruction. However, the Court established certain outer limits on the Bruton rule. For example, in Richardson v. Marsh, the Court did not extend the rule to confessions that do not name the defendant, although, in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, the Court clarified that some redacted confessions might still be directly accusatory if the redaction is evident. Here, the confession was redacted to avoid naming the defendant, aligning with the Bruton rule and differing from the confession in Gray. The Court declined to further extend the Bruton rule, reasoning that its extension would disrupt historical practices and necessitate extensive pretrial hearings, potentially leading to mandatory severance in joint trials when introducing a non-testifying codefendant's confession. This would undermine the role of joint trials and the significance of confessions in the legal system. Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined the majority opinion except the historical discussion, which, in her separate concurrence, she argues is beside the point. She would limit consideration to the meaning of the Confrontation Clause at the time of the founding and reach the same conclusion.   Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the non-testifying codefendant’s confession in this case inculpated the defendant in the same way that the Court recognized it would in other cases. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for “permit[ting] an end-run around [the Court’s] precedent and undermin[ing] a vital constitutional protection for the accused.”

Smith v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2023.Decided on Jun 15, 2023. Petitioner: Timothy J. Smith.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Timothy Smith is a software engineer who lives in Mobile, Alabama, and who is an avid fisherman. He used a web application called Fiddler to obtain the coordinates of private artificial reefs from a website, StrikeLines, that sells such coordinates for between $190 and $199. Smith informed the owners of StrikeLines that he accessed their reef coordinates but refused to tell them how he did it. After negotiations between the owners of StrikeLines and Smith broke down, the owners contacted law enforcement, who executed a search warrant on Smith’s home. A federal grand jury indicted Smith on three counts in the Northern District of Florida. Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss all counts for lack of venue because (1) he was a resident of Mobile, Alabama, which is in the Southern District of Alabama, and (2) StrikeLines’s servers, where the coordinate data is stored, are in Orlando, which is in the Middle District of Florida. Thus, venue in the Northern District of Florida was improper, even though StrikeLines was headquartered in Pensacola, which is within that district. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that venue was improper as to one count but that improper venue for one count does not require vacatur of the conviction for another count. Question Does a criminal trial’s improper venue as to one count require vacatur of the convictions for other counts? Conclusion The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. When a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may normally be retried, unless retrial would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Neither text nor precedent suggests that if a defendant is tried in the wrong venue (in violation of the Venue Clause), the appropriate remedy is an exception to the retrial rule. The purpose of the Venue Clause is not the convenience for the defendant, as Smith argued, but to be near the location of the alleged crimes. Similarly, a trial conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district (in violation of the Vicinage Clause) does not preclude retrial. The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights, and nothing about the Vicinage Clause suggests it should be treated differently. Smith’s situation does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. That Clause prohibits retrial of a criminal defendant when a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s “criminal culpability had not been established” but does not affect trials that terminate “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offence of which [the defendant] is accused.” Reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses is the latter type because it does not adjudicate the defendant’s culpability.

Lora v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2023.Decided on Jun 16, 2023. Petitioner: Efrain Lora.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Lawrence D. Rosenberg (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Efrain Lora and three co-defendants ran an operation selling cocaine and cocaine base in the Bronx. Lora and the others allegedly conspired to murder a rival drug dealer in retaliation for threats the rival had made over drug territory. A federal grand jury returned an indictment for aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime causing the death of a person. The government obtained a superseding indictment against Lora that added a drug trafficking conspiracy charge and a charge for causing an intentional killing in furtherance of that conspiracy. The jury found Lora guilty of all three counts, and the district court sentenced him to a five-year term of imprisonment for the first count to run consecutively with a 25-year sentence on the second two counts. Lora appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the consecutive sentences. Question Does federal criminal sentencing law require a man who was convicted and sentenced for his role in a drug-trafficking-related murder to serve consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences? Conclusion The bar on imposition of concurrent sentences in 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not apply to a sentence for a §924(j) conviction; a §924(j) sentence can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584, a federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has the discretion to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, § 924(c) provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” Lora was convicted under § 924(j)(1), which penalizes “a person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” A violation of subsection (c) occurs when a person “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” The limitation of subsection (c) applies only to that subsection and not to subsection (j), and Congress could not have intended subsection (j) to incorporate subsection (c)’s penalties in addition to its own. Subsection (j) covers a more serious offense, so the resulting flexibility in sentencing is consistent with the statute’s design. The Court thus vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, which held that subsection (c)’s prohibition on concurrent sentences applies to violations of subsection (j).

Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2023.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: Amgen, Inc., et al..Respondent: Sanofi, et al.. Advocates: Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Amgen owns two patents that describe cholesterol-lowering drugs that share a common written description. In 2014, Amgen filed suit against Sanofi alleging infringement of multiple patents, including the two at issue in this case. Among the jury’s conclusions in that case was that the patents were not invalid for lack of written description and enablement. To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that a “skilled artisan” can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. To satisfy the enablement requirement, a patent specification must contain sufficient information that a “skilled artisan” would be enabled to make and use the claimed invention. The U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the jury instructions regarding enablement were erroneous. On remand, the court ruled in favor of Sanofi on the issue of lack of enablement and for Amgen on the issue of lack of written description. Amgen appealed, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted claims were invalid for lack of enablement. Question Do Amgen’s two patents satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause—that is, describing the invention with sufficient particularity that would enable a “skilled artisan” to “make and use” the claimed invention? Conclusion Amgen’s two patent applications—purporting to cover all antibodies that bind and block the PCSK9 receptor involved in LDL cholesterol metabolism—fail to satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court affirming the judgment below. It is well established that the enablement requirement means that if a patent claims an entire class of process, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, its specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. While the specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a claimed invention, it must not be too broad. Amgen’s specification fails to enable all that it has claimed, even allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. It described 26 antibodies by their amino acid sequences, but it claims to monopolize an entire class of antibodies not described. Thus, its claim is too broad.

United States v. Hansen Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2023.Decided on Jun 23, 2023. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Helaman Hansen. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner) Esha Bhandari (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Helaman Hansen ran an immigration-advising service charging undocumented immigrants for (incorrect) advice on how to achieve U.S. citizenship. Hansen was convicted and sentenced for, among other federal crimes, two counts of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i). Two years earlier, in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a Ninth Circuit decision striking down those two statutory provisions. Its reversal was based not on the merits of the constitutional challenge, but on the procedure the Ninth Circuit had used to entertain the challenge. Hansen’s case again raises the constitutional challenge. Question Does the federal prohibition on encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion The federal law criminalizing “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration—forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits a significant amount of protected speech compared to its legitimate applications. The federal laws at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) prohibit “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration, but in this context, they refer to the specialized legal terms of solicitation and facilitation, not their colloquial meanings. Because (A)(iv) targets only the intentional solicitation and facilitation of specific illegal acts, and these acts are generally non-expressive conduct, it is unlikely to stifle protected speech. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority’s opinion in full but wrote separate concurrence to criticize the facial overbreadth doctrine, which he argued “lacks any basis in the text or history of the First Amendment” and “distorts the judicial role.”  Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that the majority “departs from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation” to interpret the “encouraging or inducing” as meaning something much narrower than the words plainly mean.

Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products LLC Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 22, 2023.Decided on Jun 8, 2023. Petitioner: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc..Respondent: VIP Products LLC. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Bennett E. Cooper (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) VIP Products LLC, a company that manufactures dog toys, created a plastic toy that resembles Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle. Instead of “Jack Daniel’s,” the toy’s “label” says “Bad Spaniels”; and instead of “Old No. 7” and “Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” it says “The Old No. 2 on your Tennessee Carpet.” Jack Daniel’s sued the toy company alleging violation of its trademark. The district court held that the toy is a humorous parody entitled to First Amendment protection, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Is humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead entitled to heightened First Amendment protection? Conclusion The parodic use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, not the threshold Rogers test, and is not automatically excluded from a claim of trademark dilution. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Lanham Act creates federal causes of action for trademark infringement and trademark dilution. In a typical infringement case, the question is whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” In a typical dilution case, the question is whether the defendant “harm[ed] the reputation” of a famous trademark. However, even before answering these questions, courts apply a threshold test developed by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) Under the Rogers test, when a trademark infringement claim targets an expressive work, the claim must be dismissed unless the complainant can show either (1) that the challenged use of a mark “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work” or (2) that it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” The Rogers test is limited, however. It does not insulate from ordinary trademark scrutiny the use of trademarks as trademarks. A primary purpose of trademark law is to protect against consumer confusion about source, and the risk of consumer confusion is highest when someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark, as VIP did with Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle. The parodic nature of VIP’s use may affect the ultimate determination of the likelihood of consumer confusion, but it does not automatically shield the use from claims of dilution. Thus, dismissal of the infringement and dilution claims under the Rogers test was erroneous. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, to warn courts to view surveys, such as the one provided as evidence of consumer confusion in this case, with caution and as merely one piece of a multifaceted analysis of the likelihood of confusion. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Although the Court’s decision left the Rogers test intact, Justice Gorsuch warned lower courts to view it “with care” and expressed doubt that Rogers is “correct in all its particulars.”

Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2023.Decided on Jun 29, 2023. Petitioner: Abitron Austria GmbH, et al..Respondent: Hetronic International, Inc.. Advocates: Lucas M. Walker (for the Petitioners) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Matthew S. Hellman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Hetronic International, Inc., a U.S. company, manufactures radio remote controls heavy-duty construction equipment. By agreement, Abitron, a foreign corporation, distributed Hetronic’s products, mostly in Europe. The relationship deteriorated when Abitron decided that it, not Hetronic, owned the rights to Hetronic’s trademarks and other intellectual property. Abitron began manufacturing products identical to Hetronic’s and selling them under the Hetronic brand, mostly in Europe. Hetronic terminated their contractual relationship, but Abitron continued to manufacture and sell the products, making tens of millions of dollars. Hetronic sued Abitron, and a jury sitting in the Western District of Oklahoma awarded Hetronic over $100 million in damages based on infringement of Hetronic’s trademarks. The district court entered a worldwide injunction barring Abitron from selling the infringing products. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the court’s conclusion that the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially but limited the court’s injunction. Question Does the Lanham Act permit the owner of a U.S.-registered trademark to recover damages for the use of that trademark when the infringement occurred outside the United States and is not likely to cause confusion in the United States? Conclusion The Lanham Act extends trademark protection only to claims where the infringing “use in commerce” is domestic. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court. Unless Congress explicitly states otherwise, U.S. laws are generally presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This presumption helps avoid conflicts with other countries and is premised on the idea that Congress typically legislates with domestic matters in mind. To apply the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts apply a two-step framework. First, a court must ask whether Congress has explicitly indicated that the statute should apply to foreign conduct. If not, then the second step is to ask whether the lawsuit seeks a permissible domestic or impermissible foreign application of the law. Applying that two-step framework here, the Court concluded that the Lanham Act applies only to claims where the infringing use is domestic. First, neither § 1114(1)(a) nor § 1125(a)(1) explicitly indicates that the statute should apply to foreign conduct. They prohibit the use “in commerce” of protected marks that are likely to cause confusion. A mere reference to “foreign commerce” does not make a statute extraterritorial. Second, the focus of the statute is on the “use in commerce” that is likely to cause confusion, which is domestic conduct. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion to elaborate on what it means to “use a trademark in commerce.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, in her view the Lanham Act extends to activities carried out abroad when there is a likelihood of consumer confusion in the United States.