Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 16, 2024. Petitioner: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp., et al.Respondent: Moab Partners, L.P., et al. Advocates: Linda T. Coberly (for the Petitioners) David C. Frederick (for the Respondent) Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) For years, Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. had been lauded as a “total return opportunity” thanks to its strong dividend history, diversified business operations, and favorable growth rates. One of its most significant assets, International-Matex Tank Terminals (“IMTT”), was a substantial driver of its profit, with a major focus on storing No. 6 fuel oil. However, Macquarie and its leadership allegedly hid crucial information from investors, specifically about IMTT’s heavy reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, a commodity facing stringent upcoming regulations and declining demand. Even after international regulations on sulfur levels in fuel were confirmed to drastically affect the market for No. 6 fuel oil, the company continued to misrepresent its exposure, allegedly misleading investors about IMTT's flexibility and downplaying the impending effects on revenue. On February 21, 2018, Macquarie first announced a sharp decline in IMTT utilization, earnings falling short of analysts’ expectations, and a 31% cut to the company’s dividend. The company admitted for the first time that it would need to spend hundreds of millions to repurpose IMTT's storage tanks due to the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil. As a result, the stock price plummeted, and Macquarie’s management faced a credibility crisis. Questions arose about the company’s transparency and honesty, harming investor trust and the company’s overall reputation. On behalf of a class of plaintiffs, Moab Partners, L.P., sued Macquarie, alleging that it made material omissions and false and misleading statements about IMTT in violation of various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that while many of the alleged misstatements are not actionable, the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded material omissions and facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. Question May a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K support a private claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even in the absence of an otherwise misleading statement?

Devillier v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 16, 2024. Petitioner: Richard Devillier.Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Robert J. McNamara (for the Petitioners) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Devillier and others own property in Texas along Interstate Highway 10 (IH-10). The State of Texas, through the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), elevated IH-10 and installed a solid concrete median barrier, which acted as a “weir” to obstruct natural water flow and led to the flooding of the petitioners’ properties. Despite being aware of the potential for flooding, the State proceeded with the construction and even extended the barrier, causing extensive damage to the petitioners’ properties. The petitioners sued the state, directly invoking the Taking Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which they argued applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied Texas’s motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated, finding the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against the state. Question May a party sue a state directly under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Smith v. Arizona Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2024. Petitioner: Jason Smith.Respondent: State of Arizona. Advocates: Hari Santhanam (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Alexander W. Samuels (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In December 2019, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Jason Smith's father's property, which had multiple structures. They detected a strong odor of marijuana from a shed, where they found Smith and later discovered various drugs and paraphernalia. Smith was charged with multiple felonies related to drug possession. During the trial, a forensic scientist testified that the seized substances were indeed illegal drugs. Smith's defense argued he was merely at the property to care for his ill father and was not involved in any illegal activities. Smith was found guilty on several counts, including possession of marijuana for sale, and was sentenced to four years in prison. Smith appealed the decision, claiming, among other things, that the admission of drug-analysis testimony violated his confrontation rights because the testifying expert relied on data generated by a non-testifying expert. The appellate court affirmed. Question Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permit the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst?

Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2024. Petitioner: George Sheetz.Respondent: County of El Dorado, California. Advocates: Paul J. Beard II (for the Petitioner) Aileen M. McGrath (for the Respondent) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The County of El Dorado, California, has a Traffic Impact Mitigation (TIM) Fee Program that imposes a traffic-impact fee on any property owner applying for a building permit. The fee consists of two components: the “Highway 50 Component” and the “Local Road Component,” and is determined by the geographic zone in which the project is located and the type of construction proposed. The fee is mandatory regardless of the actual impact the project may have on existing or future roads. The TIM Fee Program stipulates that new developments bear the full cost of road construction and widening, even though these roads are used and benefitted from by existing residents and non-residents alike. In 2012, the County Board passed a resolution establishing new TIM Fee rates, which were subsequently applied to George Sheetz’s project. Sheetz applied for a building permit in July 2016 to construct a 1,854-square-foot manufactured house for his family. The County required him to pay $23,420 in traffic-mitigation fees based on the type and location of his project, even though no individualized assessment was made to correlate the fee with the project’s actual impact on local or state roads. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and later filed a legal action against the County, alleging the fee was an unconstitutional condition under the Nollan and Dolan standards and seeking a refund of the fee paid. Under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, “the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.” The U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan (1987) and Dolan (1994) recognized that land-use permit applicants “are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits.” Under those cases, the government may condition approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s dedication of property to public use if the government can prove that an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” exist between the demanded property and the impacts of the owner’s project. The superior court ruled against Sheetz, concluding that legislative exactions are exempt from Nollan/Dolan review. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Question Is a monetary exaction imposed by a local government as a condition for a building permit exempt from the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements established in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, simply because the exaction is authorized by local legislation?

Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2024. Petitioner: Office of the United States Trustee.Respondent: John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, et al. Advocates: Masha G. Hansford (for the Petitioner) Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the U.S., bankruptcy proceedings are administered through two systems: the Trustee Program managed by the Department of Justice for 88 judicial districts, and the Bankruptcy Administrator Program for six districts in Alabama and North Carolina, overseen directly by the courts. This dual system originated in 1978, with Alabama and North Carolina eventually gaining a permanent exemption from the Trustee Program in 2000. Both programs have different funding models, with the Trustee Program financed primarily through debtor fees and the Administrator Program funded through the general judicial budget. Over the years, Congress has enacted various amendments to balance the fee structures between the two systems, but disparities have remained, most notably with the 2017 Amendment which significantly raised fees in Trustee districts. Seventy-six Chapter 11 debtors associated with John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts (Debtors) filed for bankruptcy in the District of Kansas, a Trustee district, in June 2016. Their cases were still pending when a 2017 Amendment took effect in January 2018, which significantly increased their quarterly Chapter 11 disbursement fees. By the end of December 2019, they had paid over $2.5 million more in fees than they would have if they had filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district, such as those in North Carolina and Alabama. The Debtors challenged the fee increase in bankruptcy court, arguing it was unequally applied and retroactive without clear congressional intent. The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. Question Must the U.S. Trustee issue refunds for the extra fees paid by debtors in certain districts to address the lack of uniformity identified in Siegel v. Fitzgerald?

Campos-Chaves v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 8, 2024. Petitioner: Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Charles L. McCloud (for the United States) Easha Anand (for the Petitioner in 22-674 and the Respondent in 22-884) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Moris Campos-Chaves, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States illegally on January 24, 2005, and was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) on February 10, 2005. He was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). When Campos-Chaves did not appear for his hearing, he was ordered removed in absentia. Years later, on September 18, 2018, Campos-Chaves moved to reopen his case, arguing that the NTA he had initially received was defective. The immigration judge concluded that the NTA was not defective, and Campos-Chaves had actually received both the NTA and the Notice of Hearing. Thus, the immigration judge denied his petition for review and also denied all pending motions. The Board of Immigration Appeals issued a final order of removal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for rehearing. Question Does the government provides adequate notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information?

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 8, 2024. Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.Respondent: Yonas Fikre. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners) Gadeir Abbas (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010, Yonas Fikre, a U.S. citizen of Eritrean descent, was placed on the FBI’s No Fly List while he was traveling to Sudan. FBI agents questioned him about his ties to a mosque in Portland, Oregon, and informed him he was a flight risk. Fikre was offered removal from the list in exchange for becoming an FBI informant, an offer he declined. Subsequently, Fikre was imprisoned and tortured in the United Arab Emirates, allegedly at the request of the FBI. Unable to return to the U.S., Fikre sought asylum in Sweden, but was ultimately denied and returned to Portland via private jet after his petition to be removed from the No Fly List was also denied. While still in Sweden, Fikre filed a lawsuit against the FBI, claiming violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. While the lawsuit was pending, the FBI removed him from the No Fly List. A federal district court in Oregon dismissed Fikre's case as moot, given that he had been removed from the No Fly List. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the lawsuit, stating that under the voluntary cessation doctrine, it was not “absolutely clear” that Fikre would not be placed back on the list for the same reasons. The case returned to the district court where an FBI official filed a declaration that Fikre would not be put back on the list based on current information. Despite this declaration, the court once again dismissed the case. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that the FBI’s declaration did not indicate a change in the policies or procedures that put Fikre on the list in the first place. Question Are respondent’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List moot, given that he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he “will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information”?

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2023. Petitioner: Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow.Respondent: City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. Advocates: Brian Wolfman (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sergeant Muldrow, initially assigned to the Intelligence Division where she worked on various high-profile cases and was deputized by the FBI, was transferred to the Fifth District by Interim Police Commissioner Lawrence O'Toole's appointee, Captain Deeba. This change led to a different work schedule, responsibilities, and loss of special FBI-related privileges including a potential $17,500 in annual overtime pay. After her transfer, Sergeant Muldrow was asked to return FBI-issued equipment, which she did, and her Task Force Officer status was revoked. She filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba, later filing an action in Missouri state court alleging Title VII violations. The case was removed to federal court, where the district court granted summary judgment against her Title VII claims and dismissed her state law claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the employment decisions she alleged did not constitute “adverse employment action” and thus did not establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII, nor were they “materially adverse action” as required for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. Question Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a signification disadvantage?

Moore v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 5, 2023. Petitioner: Charles G. Moore and Kathleen F. Moore.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Andrew M. Grossman (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2005, the Moores invested $40,000 in KisanKraft, an Indian company that supplies tools to small farmers, in exchange for 11% of the common shares. KisanKraft is a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), meaning it is majority-owned by U.S. persons but operates abroad. Prior to 2017, U.S. shareholders of CFCs were typically taxed on foreign earnings only when those earnings were repatriated to the United States, according to a provision called Subpart F. However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 significantly changed this, introducing a one-time Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) that retroactively taxed CFC earnings after 1986, regardless of repatriation. This increased the Moores’ 2017 tax liability by approximately $15,000 based on their share of KisanKraft’s retained earnings. The Moores challenged the constitutionality of this tax, but the district court dismissed their suit, holding that the MRT taxed income and, although it was retroactive, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the 16th Amendment authorize Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states?

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2023. Petitioner: William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2.Respondent: Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner) Gregory G. Garre (for Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.) Pratik A. Shah (for Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Sackler family, who purchased Purdue Pharma in the 1950s, heavily influenced the company’s direction and was instrumental in the development and marketing of OxyContin. Despite initial claims of low addiction risk, growing evidence of widespread abuse led to legal battles across the United States, with multiple stakeholders including individuals, state governments, and federal agencies suing Purdue. In 2004, the board of Purdue entered into an expansive Indemnity Agreement to protect its directors and officers from financial liability related to lawsuits. This protection was especially broad, extending even after their official tenure at Purdue, but contained a bad faith carveout. From 2007 onwards, the Sacklers began shielding assets, anticipating litigation against them personally. By 2019, Purdue faced weakened financial prospects, and the Sacklers had stepped down from the board. In the same year, the DOJ brought criminal and civil charges against Purdue, resulting in a plea agreement in 2020 that prioritized the DOJ’s claims in Purdue’s bankruptcy proceedings. The plea stipulated a $2 billion forfeiture judgment but allowed for the release of $1.775 billion if certain conditions were met. Although Purdue declared bankruptcy in 2019, the Sacklers did not, and litigation against both parties was temporarily halted. The estate of Purdue is estimated to be around $1.8 billion, while claims against both Purdue and the Sacklers are estimated to exceed $40 trillion. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed a proposed bankruptcy plan on September 17, 2021. This plan included a “shareholder release” that, in effect, permanently enjoined certain third-party claims against the Sacklers. Several parties objected to the plan, but the bankruptcy court rejected their claims. On appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the district court overturned the bankruptcy court's confirmation, holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the forced release of direct claims against non-debtors. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit nonconsensual third-party releases of direct claims, and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the plan. Question Does the Bankruptcy Code authorize a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by non-debtors against non-debtor third parties, without the claimants’ consent?