Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 29, 2023. Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission.Respondent: George R. Jarkesy, Jr., et al. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner) S. Michael McColloch (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) George Jarkesy established two hedge funds, with Patriot28 as the investment adviser, managing $24 million in assets from over 100 investors. The SEC initiated an investigation in 2011, eventually bringing an in-house action alleging fraud under multiple acts. Jarkesy challenged the SEC’s proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, citing constitutional infringements, but both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the injunction, finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction. After an evidentiary hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Jarkesy was found guilty of securities fraud. Jarkesy sought review by the Commission, and while that petition was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, holding that SEC ALJs were improperly appointed. Jarkesy, however, waived his right to a new hearing. The Commission affirmed the fraud findings, imposed penalties, and rejected several constitutional arguments. He then filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed and remanded, finding multiple constitutional violations. Question Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U.S. Constitution?

Wilkinson v. Garland Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2023. Petitioner: Situ Kamu Wilkinson.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Jaime A. Santos (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Situ Wilkinson, originally from Trinidad and Tobago, overstayed his tourist visa in the U.S., built a life, and fathered a U.S.-citizen son. In 2019, after being arrested for selling crack cocaine, he faced deportation proceedings. Wilkinson conceded his deportability but sought either cancellation or withholding of removal based on the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” it would cause his son and the threat to his own life or freedom if he returned to Trinidad due to his “membership in a particular social group,” specifically people who have filed complaints against Trinidadian police. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected both of Wilkinson's claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the hardship claim because was discretionary. The Third Circuit also concluded that Wilkinson’s claim of belonging to a “particular social group” did not meet the requirements for withholding of removal, as it was not socially distinct within Trinidadian society. Therefore, the Third Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part Wilkinson’s petition for review. Question Is an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or instead a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)?

McElrath v. Georgia Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2023. Petitioner: Damian McElrath.Respondent: Georgia. Advocates: Richard A. Simpson (for the Petitioner) Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2017, a Georgia jury found Damien McElrath guilty but mentally ill as to felony murder but not guilty by reason of insanity as to malice murder after an encounter between McElrath and his mother. The trial court did not recognize the verdicts as repugnant and accepted them, but the Georgia Supreme Court held that the verdicts were repugnant and vacated the verdicts, remanding McElrath’s case for retrial. On remand, McElrath alleged that retrial was precluded on double jeopardy grounds, but the trial court denied his motion. On a second appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, McElrath argued that the court should have reversed rather than vacated his felony murder conviction in his previous appeal. He also challenges the trial court’s ruling on his double jeopardy claim, arguing that retrial on all of the counts is barred because the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice murder count. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. Question Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?

Brown v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 27, 2023. Petitioner: Justin Rashaad Brown.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner Justin Rashaad Brown) Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner Eugene Jackson) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Justin Rashaad Brown was indicted in York County, Pennsylvania, for multiple counts, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Brown pleaded guilty to one charge of drug possession and distribution as well as the § 922(g) offense. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced him to concurrent terms of 180 months’ imprisonment due to prior convictions triggering the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Brown appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that his prior state marijuana convictions should not serve as predicates under the ACCA because those crimes are no longer a categorical match to their federal counterpart. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Question Does the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporate the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense?

Rudisill v. McDonough Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2023. Petitioner: James R. Rudisill.Respondent: Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The case involves the interpretation of education benefits under two different programs for veterans: the Montgomery GI Bill enacted in 1984 and the Post-9/11 GI Bill enacted in 2008. Both programs offer a maximum of 36 months of education benefits. Congress has implemented various provisions to limit the benefits under these two programs, including a 48-month cap for benefits generally and the prohibition against receiving benefits from both programs concurrently. James Rudisill, who served three periods of active-duty service, initially used the Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate education. Later, he applied for Post-9/11 benefits to attend Yale Divinity School. The VA granted him only the remaining Montgomery benefits, and he appealed that decision to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Board denied the appeal, so Rudisill appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, where a split panel held that § 3327(d)(2) does not apply to veterans with multiple periods of service. ruled in his favor, finding the statute ambiguous. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs appealed the Veterans’ Court decision to the Federal Circuit, where a split panel affirmed, but then the court sitting en banc reversed, holding that the plain language of § 3327(d)(2) applies to veterans with multiple periods of service. Question Is a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit?

United States v. Rahimi Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2023. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Zackey Rahimi. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) J. Matthew Wright (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between December 2020 and January 2021, Zackey Rahimi was involved in a series of violent incidents in Arlington, Texas, including multiple shootings and a hit-and-run. Rahimi was under a civil protective order for alleged assault against his ex-girlfriend, which explicitly prohibited him from possessing firearms. Police searched his home and found a rifle and a pistol, leading to Rahimi’s indictment for violating federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it unlawful for someone under a domestic violence restraining order to possess firearms. Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds but was denied, as his argument was foreclosed by United States v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020). Rahimi pleaded guilty but continued his constitutional challenge on appeal. As the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 579 U.S. __ (2022). Rahimi argued that Bruen overruled McGinnis and thus that § 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violate the Second Amendment?

Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2023. Petitioner: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service.Respondent: Reginald Kirtz. Advocates: Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Petitioner) Nandan M. Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1970, Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to regulate credit reporting and protect consumer privacy. The Act was amended in 1996 to impose additional obligations on entities like creditors and lenders that furnish information to credit reporting agencies. These amendments allowed consumers to dispute inaccuracies in their credit files and mandated furnishers to investigate and correct such inaccuracies. Reginald Kirtz filed a lawsuit in 2020 against Trans Union, AES, and the USDA, alleging both negligent and willful violations of the FCRA. Kirtz claimed that despite his loans being closed with a zero balance, both AES and the USDA continued to report him as “120 Days Past Due,” damaging his credit score. While Trans Union and AES responded to the lawsuit, the USDA sought dismissal, citing sovereign immunity. The district court granted the USDA’s motion, reasoning that the FCRA did not clearly express Congress’s intent to waive sovereign immunity, despite the Act’s language stating that it applies to “any person,” including government agencies. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that when Congress has clearly expressed its intent, as through the FCRA, even when the meaning is implausible, courts may neither second-guess its choices nor decline to apply the law as written. Question Do the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States?

Vidal v. Elster Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2023. Petitioner: Katherine K. Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office.Respondent: Steve Elster. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2018, Steve Elster attempted to register the phrase “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on various types of shirts, intending the mark to serve as political commentary on President Donald Trump and his policies. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiner rejected the application, citing two sections of the Lanham Act: Section 2(c), which prohibits registering a mark that identifies a living individual without their consent, and Section 2(a), which bars marks that falsely suggest a connection with living or dead persons. Elster appealed, arguing that the provisions infringed on his First Amendment rights and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Board upheld the examiner's decision based solely on Section 2(c), asserting that the statute is constitutional and serves compelling government interests, including the protection of individual rights and consumer protection. Elster appealed the decision, and the Federal Circuit reversed. Question Does the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2023. Petitioner: Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff, et al.Respondent: Christopher Garnier, et ux. Advocates: Hashim M. Mooppan (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Pamela S. Karlan (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Christopher and Kimberly Garnier are parents of children in the Poway Unified School District in the city of Poway, California, just north of San Diego. The Garniers frequently posted comments critical of the District’s Board of Trustees on the social media pages of the Trustees, including Respondents Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T.J. Zane. For their school-board campaigns, O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane created personal Facebook and Twitter pages, which they updated with their official titles once elected and continued to use to post about school-district business and news. The Trustees began to hide or delete the critical and often repetitive comments by the Garniers, and then around October 2017, they blocked the Garniers from their social media pages. After the Trustees blocked the Garniers, the Garniers sued them, arguing that their social media pages constitute public fora and that by blocking them, the Trustees violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the Garniers but found that the Trustees’ had qualified immunity from the damages claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a public official engage in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official’s personal social media account, which the official uses to communicate about job-related matters with the public?

Lindke v. Freed Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2023. Petitioner: Kevin Lindke.Respondent: James R. Freed. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Victoria R. Ferres (for the Respondent) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) James Freed created a private Facebook profile that was originally intended to connect with family and friends. Eventually, he grew too popular for Facebook's 5,000-friend limit on profiles. So Freed converted his profile to a "page," which has unlimited "followers" instead of friends and is public so that anyone may "follow" it. Freed designated the page category as "public figure." In 2014, Freed was appointed city manager for Port Huron, Michigan, so he updated his Facebook page to reflect that new title. On his page, he shared both personal updates about himself and his family and professional updates, including directives and policies he initiated in his official capacity. Kevin Lindke came across Freed’s page and did not approve of how Freed was handling the pandemic. He posted criticism of Freed in response to Freed’s Facebook page, and Freed deleted the comments and ultimately “blocked” Lindke. Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights by deleting his comments and blocking him. The district court granted summary judgment to Freed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question When does a public official’s social media activity constitute state action subject to the First Amendment?