Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2023.Decided on May 11, 2023. Petitioner: Leon Santos-Zacaria.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Paul W. Hughes (for the Petitioner) Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Santos is a native and citizen of Guatemala seeking asylum in the United States based on the likelihood of persecution due to her sexual orientation and transgender identity. An immigration judge denied her application for withholding removal, finding one prior assault was insufficient to establish past persecution. The immigration judge also denied her claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Santos appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed her appeal. Although the Board concluded her past assault was sufficient to establish past persecution and thus a presumption of future persecution, the government had rebutted that presumption. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s determination that Santos had not established eligibility for relief under the CAT. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Santos’s petition to review the Board’s determination that she was not eligible for relief under CAT and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the adequacy of the Board’s analysis because she failed to raise that argument in a motion for reconsideration. Question Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) bar a court of appeals from reviewing an immigrant’s claim that the Board of Immigration Appeals had engaged in impermissible factfinding because the immigrant had not exhausted that claim through a motion to reconsider? Conclusion Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not a jurisdictional provision; it does not require an immigrant to seek a motion to reconsider, which is a discretionary form of review, only remedies available as a matter of right. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court. The language of § 1252(d)(1) is substantially different from jurisdictional provisions found elsewhere. Absent a clear statement that Congress intended the forfeiture rule to be jurisdictional, courts should not interpret such rules as jurisdictional because of the potentially harsh consequences of doing so. Thus, § 1252(d)(1) is best understood to require a noncitizen to exhaust only those remedies available as of right. Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.

Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2023.Decided on May 11, 2023. Petitioner: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.Respondent: Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.. Advocates: Mark D. Harris (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Sarah M. Harris (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Centro de Periodismo Investigativo (“CPI”) is a nonprofit media organization based in Puerto Rico. It seeks disclosure of documents relating to Puerto Rico’s fiscal situation from the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (“the Board”). The Board has declined to release the requested documents, and CPI asked the district court to compel production. The Board asked the district court to dismiss the litigation, arguing that it is immune from suit pursuant to both the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”). The district court disagreed with the Board, finding PROMESA abrogated any possible Eleventh Amendment immunity the Board might have enjoyed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question Does the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)’s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims? Conclusion Nothing in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico enjoys from legal claims. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. If Congress wishes to abrogate sovereign immunity, it must do so using “unmistakably clear” language in the statute. The Supreme Court has found such language only in two types of situations: when a statute expressly states that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity, and when a statute creates a cause of action and authorizes a lawsuit against a government based on that cause of action. There is no such language in PROMESA, nor does it create a cause of action for use against the Board or Puerto Rico. Even § 2126(a)—which provides that “any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise arising out of [PROMESA] . . . shall be brought” in the Federal District Court for Puerto Rico—does not amount to a clear intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Puerto Rico lacks state sovereign immunity, which would make the question of abrogation superfluous.

Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2023.Decided on Jun 1, 2023. Petitioner: Glacier Northwest, Inc..Respondent: International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Darin M. Dalmat (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Glacier Northwest is a Washington corporation that sells and delivers ready-mix concrete to businesses in the state. It employs approximately 80-90 truck drivers to deliver concrete, and Local 174 is the exclusive union representative for Glacier’s truck drivers in King County. In 2017, during negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Glacier truck drivers went on strike, resulting in the loss of some of Glacier’s concrete. Glacier sued Local 174 in state court for six tort claims arising from Local 174’s alleged role that resulted in Glacier’s loss of concrete. The trial court dismissed the claims arising before the CBA was reached, finding they were preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act, and it granted summary judgment dismissal of the remaining claims primarily on state law grounds. The appellate court reversed as to the pre-CBA claims, finding the NLRA did not preempt those claims. The state supreme court reversed as to the preemption issue. Question Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt a state-court lawsuit against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property during a labor dispute? Conclusion The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not preempt Glacier’s state-court lawsuit alleging that the union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor dispute. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The position of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is that while the NLRA generally recognizes the right of workers to strike, it does not protect from liability strikers who fail to take “reasonable precautions” to protect their employer’s property from foreseeable harms caused by the sudden cessation of work. At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true. Accepting the allegations here as true, the Union failed to take reasonable precautions to protect Glacier’s property, as the Union knew that concrete is highly perishable and, if left to harden in a truck’s drum, will cause significant damage to the truck. Because the Union knew of this risk—and indeed intended that result—the strike went beyond the conduct protected by the NLRA. Because the strike was not protected by federal law, the state tort claims were not preempted. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas would reach the same conclusion that the state-court claims are not preempted based on adherence to the Court’s decision in ___. He wrote separately to emphasize the “oddity” of the “broad pre-emption regime” in the case the majority relied on—San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)—and suggesting that the Court reassess its holding in that case. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which both Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would reach the same conclusion based solely on the Court’s longstanding position that the NLRA does not immunize strikers who engage in trespass or violence against the employer’s property. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, pointing out that the test in Garmon is only whether the conduct at issue is “arguably” protected by the NLRA, as determined by the Board. She criticized the Court for stepping in to make that determination instead of allowing the Board to do so.

In re Grand Jury Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2023.Decided on Jan 23, 2023. Petitioner: In re Grand Jury. Advocates: Daniel B. Levin (for the Petitioner) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A grand jury issued subpoenas to two parties—“Company” and “Law Firm”—requesting documents and communications related to a criminal investigation into the owner of Company and client of Law Firm. In response to the subpoenas, Company and Law Firm refused to disclose certain documents, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine because the primary purpose of the documents at issue was to seek legal advice, not to obtain tax advice. The government moved to compel production, and the district court granted the government’s motion in part. Company and Law Firm disagreed with the district court’s ruling and continued to withhold the documents. The district court then held Company and Law Firm in contempt. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the primary purpose of the communications was to obtain legal advice. Question If a communication involves both legal and non-legal advice, when is it protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege? Conclusion The Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.

The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2023.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department, et al..Respondent: Federal Labor Relations Authority, et al.. Advocates: Benjamin M. Flowers (for the Petitioners) Nicole F. Reaves (for the federal Respondent) Andres M. Grajales (for the union Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2016, the Ohio National Guard and its Adjutant General (the “Guard”) decided to end its 45-year-long relationship with the union that represents its technicians, who are civilian federal employees but are described as dual-status employees because of their hybrid civilian and military roles. As it was terminating the relationship, the Guard informed the union that it did not have Standard Form 1187s, which federal-sector bargaining-unit members are required to submit and which the Guard was obligated to maintain. The union filed four Unfair Labor Practice charges (ULPs) with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA’s regional general counsel investigated and found that the Guard had refused to negotiate in good faith. The Guard responded that it was not an “agency” and that the technicians were not “employees” within the meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. An administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed, and a three-member FLRA panel adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision in full. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the Guard’s petition for review, finding the FLRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the collective-bargaining dispute. Question Does the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 empower the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of state militias? Conclusion The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) had jurisdiction over this labor dispute because the state militia was acting as a federal agency when it hired and supervised dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), the FLRA has jurisdiction only over labor organizations and federal agencies. The FSLMRS defines “agency” to include the Department of Defense. Dual-status technicians are defined by statute to be employees of the Department of the Air Force or Department of the Army—both of which are components of the Department of Defense and thus plainly within the jurisdiction of the FLRA. By hiring and supervising these employees, the Ohio National Guard and its Adjutant General were acting as a federal agency. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that while the Guard may act as a federal agency, exercise the authority of such an agency, and function as an agency, is not actually an agency and thus is outside the jurisdiction of the FLRA.

Moore v. Harper Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2023. Petitioner: Timothy K. Moore, in His Official Capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, et al..Respondent: Rebecca Harper, et al.. Advocates: David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Private Respondents) Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the State Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) After the 2020 Census, in which North Carolina gained an additional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and thus required redistricting of the state, North Carolina’s Republican-majority state legislature passed a partisan gerrymander. The map was challenged in state court, and in February 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the map for violating the state constitution’s “free elections clause” and other provisions. The legislature proposed a second gerrymandered map, so the court ordered a special master to create a map for the 2022 congressional elections. The legislators asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review based on an argument that the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives state legislatures alone the authority to regulate federal elections—the so-called Independent State Legislature theory. Question Under the U.S. Constitution, does the state legislative body, independent of any constraints by state courts or other laws, have sole authority to regulate federal elections? Conclusion The Federal Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, the Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction to review the case. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to overrule its previous judgment did not moot the case because there remains a live dispute between the parties. Second, the Court concluded that the Elections Clause does not grant state legislatures exclusive authority to regulate federal elections. Judicial review has been an accepted practice since Marbury v. Madison, and under the Court’s precedents, the Elections Clause authority of state legislatures is subject to checks and balances provided by the state constitution. State legislatures are not wholly independent bodies, and they are bound by the constraints imposed by the state constitutions. Third, state courts have the authority to interpret state laws affecting federal elections, but they cannot sidestep federal law. The Court declined to decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court in this case overstepped its authority because that issue was not properly before it. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion noting that while the Court need not answer the question of which standard a federal court should employ to review a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause, there are three standards from which to choose that all convey the same point—deference but not abdication. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the question presented in the case was moot, and that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.

U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2022.Decided on Jun 16, 2023. Petitioner: United States, ex rel. Jesse Polansky, M.D., M.P.H..Respondent: Executive Health Resources, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for Respondent the United States) Mark W. Mosier (for Respondent Executive Health Resources, Inc.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dr. Jesse Polansky was an official at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) before consulting for Executive Health Resources (EHR). EHR is a company that provides review and billing certification services to hospitals and physicians that bill Medicare. While employed as a consultant, Polansky became concerned that EHR was systematically enabling its client hospitals to over-admit patients by certifying inpatient services that should have been provided on an outpatient basis. As a result, hospitals were billing the government for care that was not “reasonable and necessary,” in violation of CMS’s guidance and regulations. Polansky filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act, and it remained under seal for two years while the government investigated. The government ultimately decided it would not participate in the case, at which point the case was unsealed and Polansky proceeded as plaintiff. Seven years after the initiation of the proceedings, and after considerable time and resources by the court and parties, the government notified the parties that it intended to dismiss the entire action. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Question Does the government have the authority to dismiss a False Claims Act lawsuit brought by an individual on behalf of the government if it initially declined to take over the case, and if so, what standard applies? Conclusion In a qui tam action filed under the False Claims Act, the United States may move to dismiss under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) whenever it has intervened—whether during the seal period or later on; in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator’s objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. Section 3730(c)(2)(A) provides that “[t]he Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the [relator],” so long as the relator received notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Contrary to the government’s contention in this case, this does not mean that the government may dismiss the action without ever intervening in the case. Neither the text or subparagraph (2)(A) nor the broader context supports this understanding. But Polanksy’s contention—that the government may dismiss only if it intervenes during the seal period—also fails. Under § 3730(c)(3), the government can intervene either during the seal period or “at a later date upon a showing of good cause.” If the government successfully intervenes, then it becomes a party to the litigation with the attendant rights, including the right to dismiss. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the default rules in civil litigation, and nothing warrants a departure from those rules here. Thus, in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator’s objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation—Rule 41(a). Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined, calling upon the Court to consider, in an appropriate case, whether the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the FCA does not permit the government to dismiss a qui tam action after it has declined to take over the action from the relator at the outset.

Bartenwerfer v. Buckley Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2022.Decided on Feb 22, 2023. Petitioner: Kate M. Bartenwerfer.Respondent: Kieran Buckley. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Zachary D. Tripp (for the Respondent) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David and Kate Bartenwerfer renovated a house in San Francisco, California, and sold it to Kieran Buckley. After the sale, Buckley discovered defects in the house and sued the Bartenwerfers. A jury found for Buckley on several claims and awarded damages. The Bartenwerfers then filed for bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy court, Buckley initiated an adversary proceeding against the Bartenwerfers arguing that the state-court judgment could not be discharged in bankruptcy because the debt was obtained through fraud. The bankruptcy court agreed, finding that the Bartenwerfers had intended to deceive Buckley, that Mr. Bartenwerfer had actual knowledge of the factual misrepresentations, and that Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraudulent conduct could be imputed onto Mrs. Bartenwerfer because of their partnership relationship. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) remanded the imputed liability finding with the instructions that the bankruptcy court determine whether Mrs. Bartenwerfer “knew or should have known” of Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraud. On remand, the court held that Mrs. Bartenwerfer did not know of the fraud and thus was not liable for Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraudulent conduct, and the BAP affirmed. Buckley appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the bankruptcy court applied the incorrect legal standard for imputed liability in a partnership relationship. The correct standard, based on binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, is whether the fraud was performed “on behalf of the partnership and in the ordinary course of business of the partnership.” Question Can a bankruptcy debtor be held liable for another person’s fraud, even when they were not aware of the fraud? Conclusion A debtor who is liable for her partner’s fraud cannot discharge that debt in bankruptcy, regardless of her own culpability. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion for the unanimous Court holding that Mrs. Bartenwerfer could not discharge her partner’s debt even though she lacked knowledge of his fraud. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides an exception to discharge of “any debt…for money…to the extent obtained by…false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” The passive voice of that provision eliminates the significance of who engaged in the fraud, suggesting an “agnosticism” as to the identity of the wrongdoer. Neither the fact that neighboring provisions of the Code treat debtors differently nor the Court’s precedents support an alternative reading of that provision. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to balance multiple interests, and the preclusion of faultless debtors from discharging liabilities run up by their associates is but one of those. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, to clarify that the Court’s opinion depends upon the agency relationship between Mrs. Bartenwerfer and her partner and that its decision does not consider the applicability of the provision when no such agency or partnership relationship exists.

MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 5, 2022.Decided on Apr 19, 2023. Petitioner: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC.Respondent: Transform Holdco LLC. Advocates: Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sears formerly occupied a space in the Mall of America in Minneapolis, Minnesota, under a lease with MOAC. In 2019, the bankruptcy court permitted Transform to assign the Sears lease to its wholly-owned subsidiary. MOAC moved to stay assignment of the lease, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion. MOAC appealed to federal district court but did so without first obtaining from the district court a stay of the assignment pending resolution of the appeal. Transform challenged the district court’s review of the bankruptcy court’s assignment order, claiming that Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) “creates a rule of statutory mootness” barring appellate review of a sale “made to a good-faith purchaser” and not stayed pending appeal. Because MOAC had not obtained a stay, the district court dismissed as moot MOAC’s appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Does Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) limit the jurisdiction of appellate courts over an order approving the sale of a debtor’s assets or instead simply limit the remedies available on appeal from such an order? Conclusion Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code—which restricts the effects of certain successful appeals of judicially authorized sales or leases of bankruptcy-estate property—is not a jurisdictional provision. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Congressional statutes often contain restrictions and conditions on relief, but absent a “clear statement” that a provision is jurisdictional, courts must not treat these restrictions and conditions as jurisdictional. Jurisdictional provisions limit the power of the district court, whereas other limitations bear on the rights or obligations of the parties. Nothing in the limiting language of § 363(m)’s purports to “gover[n] a court’s adjudicatory capacity.” First, the text does not address a court’s authority or refer to the jurisdiction of district courts. Second, the structure of the Code and context of § 363(m) suggest it is not jurisdictional. The provision is separate from other provisions in the code that address federal courts’ jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters, and unlike other provisions, § 363(m) contains no “clear tie” to the jurisdictional provisions.

303 Creative LLC v. Elenis Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 5, 2022.Decided on Jun 30, 2023. Petitioner: 303 Creative LLC.Respondent: Aubrey Elenis, et al.. Advocates: Kristen Kellie Waggoner (for the Petitioners) Eric R. Olson (for the Respondents) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Lorie Smith is the owner and founder of a graphic design firm, 303 Creative LLC. She wants to expand her business to include wedding websites. However, she opposes same-sex marriage on religious grounds so does not want to design websites for same-sex weddings. She wants to post a message on her own website explaining her religious objections to same-sex weddings. The Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act (“CADA”) prohibits businesses that are open to the public from from discriminating on the basis of numerous characteristics, including sexual orientation. The law defines discrimination not only as refusing to provide goods or services, but also publishing any communication that says or implies that an individual’s patronage is unwelcome because of a protected characteristic. Even before the state sought to enforce CADA against her, Smith and her company challenged the law in federal court, alleging numerous constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for the state, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question Does application of the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs that convey messages with which the designer disagrees. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The First Amendment exists to protect an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas” and individual liberty, which means the government generally cannot compel a person to espouse its preferred messages. The wedding websites Lorie Smith seeks to create in this case are “protected First Amendment speech.” Colorado's law, intending to enforce non-discrimination, would compel her to express messages contrary to her beliefs. Although public accommodations play a key role in promoting civil rights, these laws must bow to constitutional imperatives and cannot be used to compel individuals to express messages they disagree with. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, lamenting that, “the Court, for the first time in its history, grants a business open to the public a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of a protected class.”