Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2025. Petitioner: Oklahoma, et al.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al. Advocates: Mithun Mansinghani (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1067) Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1068) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) strengthened its national air quality standards for ozone, requiring states to submit implementation plans that would prevent their emissions from significantly impacting other states’ air quality. In February 2023, the EPA issued a final rule disapproving the plans submitted by 21 states, including Oklahoma and Utah, after evaluating them using a four-step framework designed to address interstate pollution. Oklahoma and Utah, along with various industry groups, challenged the EPA’s disapproval of their plans in their respective regional circuit courts. The EPA responded by moving to transfer these cases to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing that because the disapprovals were published together in a single Federal Register notice and used a consistent analytical approach, they must be reviewed by the D.C. Circuit rather than regional courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the EPA that the challenged rule is nationally applicable, so it granted the EPA’s motions to transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit. Question Does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have exclusive jurisdiction to review an Environmental Protection Agency action that affects only one state or region, simply because the EPA published that action alongside actions affecting other states in a single Federal Register notice?

Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2025. Petitioner: Environmental Protection Agency.Respondent: Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Seth P. Waxman (for Respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (for Respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress amended the Clean Air Act to establish the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, which requires refiners and importers of transportation fuel to blend increasing amounts of renewable fuels into their products each year. To comply, these companies must either blend renewable fuels themselves or purchase credits called Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) from other companies that do the blending. Recognizing that this might create hardship for small refineries (those processing less than 75,000 barrels of crude oil daily), Congress created three exemptions: an initial blanket exemption through 2011, extensions based on a Department of Energy study, and case-by-case exemptions that small refineries could petition for based on “disproportionate economic hardship.” In 2022, the EPA issued two decisions denying multiple small refinery exemption petitions. The April 2022 decision denied 36 petitions for the 2018 compliance year (including some that had previously been granted in 2019), and the June 2022 decision denied 69 petitions covering the years 2016 through 2021. These denials were based on EPA’s new interpretation that required hardship to be caused solely by RFS compliance costs and its “RIN passthrough” economic theory. The affected refineries challenged these denials as impermissibly retroactive, contrary to law, and arbitrary and capricious. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the EPA’s adjudications, denied a change of venue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and remanded, based on its conclusion that the denial was (1) impermissibly retroactive; (2) contrary to law; and (3) counter to the record evidence. Question Should challenges by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program be heard exclusively in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit because the agency’s denial actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”?

Riley v. Bondi Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2025. Petitioner: Pierre Yassue Nashun Riley.Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General. Advocates: Keith Bradley (for the Petitioner) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent in support of the Petitioner) Stephen J. Hammer (court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Riley entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 1995. In 2006, he was indicted and later convicted of marijuana distribution and firearm charges, receiving a 25-year sentence. After being granted compassionate release in January 2021, immigration authorities took him into custody and ordered his removal due to his aggravated felony conviction. Though Riley expressed fear of returning to Jamaica, leading to various proceedings regarding potential persecution and torture claims, he ultimately was only eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While an immigration judge initially granted this relief, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the decision in May 2022 and ordered Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Riley petitioned for review, and his case was temporarily held pending the resolution of Martinez v. Garland. In Martinez, the U.S. Court Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an order denying CAT relief is not a final order of removal for purposes of § 1252(a)(1). Relying on Martinez, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Question 1. Is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited?  2. Can a person obtain review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision?

Louisiana v. Callais Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2025. Appellant: Louisiana.Appellee: Phillip Callais, et al. Advocates: J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Appellant in No. 24-109) Stuart C. Naifeh (for the Appellants in No. 24-110) Edward D. Greim (for the Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map, specifically focusing on District 6, alleging that the map is an impermissible racial gerrymander. The map was created in response to a previous lawsuit, Robinson v. Ardoin, where plaintiffs argued that the prior map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority votes. To address these issues, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new map (Senate Bill 8) that included a second majority-Black district. However, the plaintiffs in this case claimed that this new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prioritizing race in its creation. A three-judge panel concluded that District 6 of the new map did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, leading the court to issue an injunction against using this map in future elections. Question Does Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district constitute unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, even when drawn in response to a federal court finding that the state’s prior single majority-Black district likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 5, 2025. Petitioner: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.Respondent: Texas. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1300) Brad Fagg (for the Petitioner in No. 23-1312) David C. Frederick (for Respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.) Aaron L. Nielson (for Respondents Texas, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The United States has grappled with nuclear waste storage since the 1940s, initially from weapons development and later from commercial nuclear power. While spent nuclear fuel was originally intended to be reprocessed, this proved impractical, leading Congress to pass the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982. The Act designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the nation’s permanent underground repository and required the Department of Energy to begin accepting waste from states by 1998. However, amid strong opposition and delays, the Obama administration halted work on Yucca Mountain and established a Blue Ribbon Commission, which recommended a consent-based approach to siting storage facilities. Following that shift in policy, Waste Control Specialists (as Interim Storage Partners) applied to build a nuclear waste storage facility in Andrews County, Texas. Despite opposition from Texas's governor and legislature, which passed a law prohibiting such storage, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a license in September 2021. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the license, holding that neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the Nuclear Waste Policy Act authorized the Commission to license private interim storage facilities. Question 1. Can a nonparty challenge a federal agency’s “final order” under the Hobbs Act’s judicial review provision?  2. Do federal nuclear laws allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private companies to store spent nuclear fuel at off-reactor sites?

Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 4, 2025. Petitioner: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc.Respondent: Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners) Catherine E. Stetson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Mexican government sued several U.S. gun manufacturers in federal court, alleging their practices facilitated illegal gun trafficking to Mexican drug cartels, causing harm to Mexico. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was barred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which prohibits certain lawsuits against gun manufacturers. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the PLCAA applied and barred Mexico's claims. Mexico appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that while the PLCAA does apply to lawsuits by foreign governments for harm suffered abroad, Mexico’s lawsuit falls within the statute’s “predicate exception” for claims alleging knowing violations of laws applicable to gun sales. The court found Mexico adequately alleged that the defendants aided and abetted illegal gun trafficking in violation of U.S. laws, and that this proximately caused harm to Mexico. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the causal chain was too attenuated, finding Mexico plausibly alleged direct harm from having to combat well-armed cartels. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Mexico's lawsuit to move forward. Question Can U.S. gun manufacturers be held liable for violence in Mexico under theories of proximate causation and aiding and abetting, based on their domestic production and sale of firearms that are later trafficked to Mexican cartels?

CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2025. Petitioner: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited.Respondent: Antrix Corp. Ltd. Advocates: Aaron M. Streett (for the Petitioner in No. 24-17) Matthew D. McGill (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1201) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves an agreement between two Indian corporations, Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. and Antrix Corp. Ltd. After a dispute arose, Devas obtained an arbitration award from the International Chamber of Commerce against Antrix. Devas then sought to confirm this award in a U.S. district court. Antrix challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction, but the district court confirmed the award, concluding that a minimum contacts analysis was unnecessary under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Antrix appealed the confirmation order, arguing that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction without conducting a minimum contacts analysis. Meanwhile, a group of intervenors, including CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. and others, moved to register the judgment in the Eastern District of Virginia. Both Antrix and Devas challenged this registration order. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plaintiff must prove minimum contacts, and its failure to do so meant it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Antrix. Question Must plaintiffs prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2025. Petitioner: BLOM Bank SAL.Respondent: Michal Honickman. Advocates: Michael H. McGinley (for the Petitioner) Michael J. Radine (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves victims and family members of HAMAS terrorist attacks who sued BLOM Bank SAL for allegedly aiding HAMAS by providing financial services to customers affiliated with the terrorist organization. The plaintiffs brought their case under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), claiming BLOM Bank was liable for aiding and abetting terrorism through these financial services. The plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in January 2019, which the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but clarified that the district court had applied the wrong legal standard for aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA. The plaintiffs then returned to the district court and moved to vacate the dismissal and amend their complaint. The district court denied their motion, and the Second Circuit concluded that the district court had erred by not properly balancing the competing principles of judgment finality (Rule 60(b)) and liberal pleading standards (Rule 15(a)). Question Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)’s stringent standard apply to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint?

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2025. Petitioner: Marlean A. Ames.Respondent: Ohio Department of Youth Services. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioner) Ashley Robertson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) T. Elliot Gaiser (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Ohio Department of Youth Services hired Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, in 2004 and promoted her to Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) in 2014. In 2017, Ames was assigned a new supervisor, Ginine Trim, who is gay. Trim reported to Assistant Director Julie Walburn, and in 2019, Ryan Gies was appointed as the Department's Director. Both Walburn and Gies are heterosexual. In December 2018, Trim gave Ames a generally positive performance evaluation. In April 2019, Ames applied for the position of Bureau Chief of Quality but was not selected. Shortly after, Trim suggested that Ames consider retirement. On May 10, 2019, Ames was demoted from her PREA Administrator position, resulting in a significant pay cut. The Department then promoted Alexander Stojsavljevic, a 25-year-old gay man, to the PREA Administrator position. Later that year, Yolanda Frierson, a gay woman, was chosen as Bureau Chief of Quality. Following these events, Ames filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then sued the Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation and sex. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, holding that Ames lacked evidence of “background circumstances” necessary to establishing her prima facie case for her claim based on sexual orientation, and that Ames lacked evidence of pretext for purposes of her sex-discrimination claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a plaintiff who belongs to a majority group need to demonstrate “background circumstances suggesting that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Esteras v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2025. Petitioner: Edgardo Esteras.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Christian J. Grostic (for the Petitioner) Masha G. Hansford (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In January 2020, Edgardo Esteras began a six-year term of supervised release following imprisonment for drug trafficking offenses. Three years into his supervised release, in January 2023, his probation officer reported violations including domestic violence and firearm possession, though the related criminal charges were dismissed at the victim's request. At a violation hearing, Judge Pearson found that Esteras had possessed a firearm while on supervised release. Concerned that previous sentences had failed to deter him, she imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release with special conditions including anger management and location monitoring. Though Esteras objected to the court’s consideration of certain statutory factors related to punishment, Judge Pearson maintained that she also weighed deterrence and public safety, while acknowledging that some supervision conditions had both punitive and rehabilitative aspects. On appeal, Esteras challenged his sentence on the ground that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question When revoking supervised release and imposing a prison sentence, may a district court consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—namely, “the seriousness of the offense,” “promot[ing] respect for the law,” and “just punishment”—even though these factors are not explicitly referenced in the supervised release statute?