Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Medical Marijuana, Inc.Respondent: Douglas J. Horn. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2012, Douglas J. Horn was involved in a car accident that caused injuries to his hip and right shoulder. While seeking alternative natural remedies, he discovered an advertisement for Dixie X CBD Dew Drops Tincture, which claimed to contain 0% THC and be compliant with federal law. As a commercial truck driver subject to random drug testing, Horn carefully investigated these claims before purchasing and consuming the product in October 2012. However, he subsequently failed a drug test and lost his job, wages, and benefits. Independent lab tests confirmed that Dixie X contained THC, contrary to the advertisement's claims. On August 6, 2015, Horn sued the companies who allegedly falsely marketed the product—Medical Marijuana, Inc., Dixie Holdings, LLC, and Red Dice Holdings, LLC—in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, which included a civil RICO claim and eight state law claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Horn lacked RICO standing because he sued for the loss of earnings, which was derivative of an antecedent personal injury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated, concluding that nothing in the text of RICO’s civil-action provision, or in its structure or history, supports a rule that bars plaintiffs from suing simply because their otherwise recoverable economic losses happen to have been connected to a non-recoverable personal injury. Question Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

Glossip v. Oklahoma Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 9, 2024. Petitioner: Richard Eugene Glossip.Respondent: Oklahoma. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent in support of the Petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Richard Glossip was sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of Barry Van Treese, the owner of the Oklahoma City motel where Glossip worked as a manager. Critical to Glossip’s conviction was testimony from Justin Sneed, a handyman at the hotel, who told jurors that Glossip paid him $10,000 to kill Van Treese. After Glossip’s conviction, he received information that Sneed had testified falsely about his mental health and whether he had seen a psychiatrist. Glossip asked the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to set aside his conviction, but the court rejected that request, and the state’s Pardon and Parole Board turned down Glossip’s request for clemency. All told, Glossip has spent 26 years behind bars, faced nine execution dates, and had multiple independent investigations that raised serious doubts about his conviction. Ahead of his execution date of May 18, 2023, Glossip asked the Supreme Court to stay his execution and consider whether Oklahoma violated Glossip’s constitutional rights when prosecutors suppressed evidence that their key witness was under a psychiatrist’s care; the Court granted his motion to stay and granted his petition, as well. Question May Oklahoma carry out the execution of Richard Glossip in light of the prosecutorial misconduct and other errors that affected his conviction and sentencing?

Lackey v. Stinnie Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2024. Petitioner: Gerald F. Lackey.Respondent: Damian Stinnie. Advocates: Erika L. Maley (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Brian D. Schmalzbach (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Under the so-called “American Rule,” each litigant pays their own attorney’s fees, regardless of whether they win or lose. However, certain statutes permit the payment of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the prevailing party” in litigation; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is one such statute, permitting the payment of attorney’s fees to parties that prevail in civil rights litigation. Several indigent Virginia residents challenged in federal court a state statute that required automatic suspension of the driver’s licenses of those who failed to pay certain court fines and fees. Finding the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their case, the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the state to remove the plaintiffs’ suspensions. The state did not appeal the injunction, so the plaintiffs were able to drive again. Before the case could go to trial, the Virginia legislature repealed the statute. The plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under Section 1988, but the district court rejected that request, citing a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit holding that a grant of a preliminary injunction does not render a plaintiff a “prevailing party.” The plaintiffs appealed. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but, on rehearing, the en banc 4th Circuit reversed.   Question Is a party who obtains a preliminary injunction a “prevailing party” for purposes of being entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C § 1988?

Garland v. VanDerStok Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2024. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland.Respondent: Jennifer VanDerStok. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners) Peter A. Patterson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) ATF, created in 1972, is responsible for regulating firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA). The GCA requires federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to conduct background checks, record firearm transfers, and serialize firearms when selling or transferring them. The GCA’s regulation of firearms is based on the definition of “firearm,” which includes the “frame or receiver.” However, ATF’s 1978 definition of “frame or receiver” became outdated due to changes in modern firearm design, such as the AR-15 and Glock pistols. Furthermore, the rise of privately made firearms (PMFs) or “ghost guns” posed challenges to law enforcement because they were not regulated under the GCA and did not require serialization. In response, ATF issued a Final Rule in 2022, updating the definitions of “frame,” “receiver,” and “firearm” to better capture modern firearm designs and regulate PMFs. The Final Rule took effect on August 24, 2022. The respondents in this case challenged the Final Rule’s redefinition of “frame or receiver” and “firearm,” arguing that it exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and vacated the Final Rule in its entirety. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the two provisions exceeded ATF’s statutory authority. Question Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?

Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2024. Petitioner: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc.Respondent: Anastasia Wullschleger. Advocates: Katherine B. Wellington (for the Petitioners) Ashley C. Keller (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Anastasia Wullschleger filed a class-action complaint in Missouri state court against Royal Canin and Nestle Purina, alleging that their requirement for a prescription for specialized dog food was misleading and led to higher prices. The defendants removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court, and then they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which determined that the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims raised substantial federal issues and belonged in federal court. Upon returning to the district court, Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove references to federal law, dropped the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims, and added a civil-conspiracy claim. Despite these changes, the district court exercised federal-question jurisdiction and ultimately granted the manufacturers’ motion to dismiss, leading to a second appeal. Reviewing the case de novo, the Eighth Circuit concluded that amending a complaint to eliminate the only federal questions destroys subject-matter jurisdiction and thus returned the case to state court. Question Can a plaintiff whose state-court lawsuit has been removed by the defendants to federal court seek to have the case sent back to state court by amending the complaint to omit all references to federal law?

Williams v. Washington Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2024. Petitioner: Nancy Williams, et al.Respondent: Fitzgerald Washington, Alabama Secretary of Labor. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioners) Edmund G. LaCour, Jr. (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dissatisfied with the Alabama Department of Labor’s handling of their unemployment benefits applications, 26 plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion for injunctive relief against Secretary Fitzgerald Washington and the Department. The plaintiffs, each having filed applications for benefits, alleged various grievances against the Department’s processing methods. Subsequently, Secretary Washington and the Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, which resulted in the omission of several initial claims and the exclusion of the Department as a defendant. The remaining allegations in the suit were federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing Secretary Washington of implementing policies and procedures that violated both the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including multiple permanent and preliminary injunctions to expedite the handling of unemployment compensation applications and improve communication clarity, as well as attorney fees. Secretary Washington again moved to dismiss the case, citing reasons such as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, absence of a private cause of action, and the substantive meritlessness of the claims. The court granted the dismissal without stating the basis for it. The plaintiffs moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, but the court denied their motion. They then appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted mandatory administrative remedies. Question Does a Section 1983 claim brought in state court require the plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative remedies?

Trump v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2024. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Former President Donald Trump was indicted in August 2023 on four counts arising from Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation into the January 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Capitol. Trump claimed that he cannot be prosecuted for his official acts as president and that a former president cannot be prosecuted unless he has first been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate. U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan initially set Trump’s trial for March 4, 2024, but later vacated this date pending resolution of Trump’s immunity claims. Judge Chutkan denied Trump’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, and Smith asked the Supreme Court directly to expedite review and bypass a decision by the D.C. Circuit. The Court declined, deferring instead to the D.C. Circuit’s judgment. On February 6, the D.C. Circuit upheld Chutkan’s decision, and Trump requested a stay of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided to expedite the case. Question Does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office, and if so, to what extent?

Moyle v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2024. Petitioner: Mike Moyle, et al.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Joshua N. Turner (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2022, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, the Biden administration brought a legal challenge to a restrictive Idaho abortion law. The Biden administration argued that the state law, which criminalizes providing an abortion except in a few narrow circumstances, including to save the life of the mother, is preempted by a federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires hospitals receiving Medicare funding to offer “necessary stabilizing treatment” to pregnant women in emergencies. The district court ruled in favor of the Biden administration and barred Idaho from enforcing its law to the extent that it conflicted with EMTALA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to stay the district court's ruling while the state appealed. Question Does the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempt an Idaho law that criminalizes most abortions in that state?

Department of State v. Munoz Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2024. Petitioner: Department of State, et al.Respondent: Sandra Munoz, et al. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners) Eric T. Lee (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, an El Salvadoran citizen, in 2010. They have a U.S. citizen child. Asencio-Cordero, who arrived in the U.S. in 2005 and has multiple tattoos, applied for an immigrant visa after Muñoz filed an approved immigrant-relative petition and waiver for his inadmissibility. In 2015, he returned to El Salvador for his visa interview, denying any gang affiliations. However, in December 2015, the U.S. Consulate denied his visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), suggesting his potential involvement in unlawful activities. Muñoz sought intervention from Congresswoman Judy Chu, but the State Department upheld the decision. A declaration from a gang expert, Humberto Guizar, stated that Asencio-Cordero’s tattoos were not gang-related. Despite this and further appeals, including to the State Department's Office of Inspector General, the decision remained unchanged, with authorities confirming the inadmissibility and indicating no grounds for appeal. Following the government’s denial of Asencio-Cordero’s immigrant visa application, the plaintiffs sought judicial review, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, invoking the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to prevent judicial scrutiny of the visa decision. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the government failed to provide the constitutionally required notice within a reasonable time after the visa application was denied. As a result, the appellate court determined that the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and vacated the district court's decision. Question Does the denial of a visa to the non-citizen spouse of a U.S. citizen infringe on a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, if so, did the government properly justify that decision in this case?

Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2024. Petitioner: Starbucks Corporation.Respondent: M. Kathleen McKinney. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In early January 2022, Nikki Taylor, a supervisor at a Memphis Starbucks, initiated union-organizing efforts, contacting Buffalo, New York, Starbucks employees and the Union for guidance. Conversations with colleagues about unionizing led to managerial scrutiny and disciplinary actions against Taylor for alleged insubordination and a dress code violation. Despite this, Taylor and coworkers held a meeting with Union representatives and drafted a letter to Starbucks's CEO announcing their intent to unionize. On January 18, following the public release of the unionization letter, the Memphis store was closed early by management under the pretext of understaffing, coinciding with a media event covering the unionization efforts. Subsequent investigations by Starbucks led to the February 8 firing of seven employees, including key organizing committee members, for policy violations during the media event. These terminations led to a reduced display of union support among the remaining staff and increased anxiety about unionizing in other Starbucks locations. However, the Memphis store voted to join the Union in June. The Union filed charges against Starbucks for unfair labor practices. Following an investigation, a district court ordered a temporary injunction, demanding the reinstatement of the terminated employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the NLRB satisfied its burden of showing “‘reasonable cause’ to believe that employers engaged in unfair labor practices and that an injunction protects the Board’s remedial power.” Question What test must courts use to evaluate requests for injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act?