Supreme Court Oral Arguments

E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2024. Petitioner: E.M.D. Sales, Inc.Respondent: Faustino Sanchez Carrera. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Lauren E. Bateman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) E.M.D. Sales Inc. (EMD) is a distributor of Latin American, Caribbean, and Asian food products to grocery stores in the Washington, D.C. area. Three of EMD’s sales representatives—Faustino Sanchez Carrera, Magdaleno Gervacio, and Jesus David Muro—sued EMD and its CEO, Elda Devarie, in 2017 for allegedly violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by denying them overtime wages. The plaintiffs claimed they worked about 60 hours per week, paid on commission without overtime compensation. The sales representatives were assigned routes of stores, spending most of their time servicing chain stores and some independent groceries. Their duties included restocking shelves, managing inventory, and submitting orders for EMD products. While they could make some sales to independent stores, their ability to make sales at chain stores was limited, as high-level negotiations between EMD management and corporate buyers typically determined product placement. EMD argued that the sales representatives were exempt from overtime pay under the FLSA’s “outside sales” exemption. The case went to a bench trial, where the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs’ primary duty was making sales, qualifying them for the exemption, or if their work was primarily incidental to sales made by others. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that EMD failed to prove the outside sales exemption applied, awarded both unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages, but limited the damages to a two-year period after concluding that EMD's violation was not willful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence?

Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Becerra Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2024. Petitioner: Advocate Christ Medical Center, et al.Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services. Advocates: Melissa Arbus Sherry (for the Petitioners) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves the calculation of Medicare reimbursements to hospitals under the “disproportionate share hospital” (DSH) adjustment, which provides additional compensation to hospitals serving a high percentage of low-income patients. The adjustment is based on two formulas: the Medicare fraction and the Medicaid fraction. The Medicare fraction, which is at the center of this dispute, represents the percentage of a hospital's Medicare patients who are also entitled to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. Over 200 hospitals are challenging the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) interpretation of who counts as “entitled to supplementary security income benefits” for the Medicare fraction calculation. HHS considers only patients who qualify for the monthly SSI cash payment during their hospital stay, while the hospitals argue that all patients enrolled in the SSI program should be included, even if they don't receive a payment that month. The hospitals also dispute HHS’s matching process and seek access to detailed SSI payment codes for their patients. After being denied relief by HHS’s internal review board and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the hospitals sought judicial review, but the district court granted summary judgment to HHS. The U.S. Circuit Court for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Question Does the phrase “entitled… to benefits” include all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received?

Wisconsin Bell, Inc. cv. United States, ex rel. Heath Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2024. Petitioner: Wisconsin Bell, Inc.Respondent: United States, ex rel. Todd Heath. Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner) Tejinder Singh (for the Respondent) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1996, Congress created the E-rate program to help schools and libraries afford telecommunications services. The program provides federal subsidies on a sliding scale, and service providers must follow the “lowest-corresponding-price” rule, offering schools and libraries the lowest price charged to similarly situated non-residential customers. Wisconsin Bell, aware of this rule since its inception, provided services to hundreds of eligible schools and libraries under the E-rate program. Despite knowing about the rule, Wisconsin Bell did not train its sales representatives or implement compliance mechanisms until 2009. The company admitted to treating pricing contracts for schools and libraries the same as other customers, often instructing sales representatives to offer the highest prices possible. In 2009, following a settlement by its parent company with the Department of Justice and FCC, Wisconsin Bell developed a compliance plan. In 2008, Todd Heath filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Wisconsin Bell submitted false claims and certifications related to the E-rate program. After initial dismissal and subsequent appeal, the case proceeded to discovery, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Bell. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Heath identified enough specific evidence of discriminatory pricing to allow a reasonable jury to find that Wisconsin Bell, acting with the required scienter, charged specific schools and libraries more than it charged similarly situated customers. Question Do reimbursement requests submitted to the Federal Communications Commission's E-rate program qualify as “claims” under the False Claims Act?

Bufkin v. McDonough Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2024. Petitioner: Joshua E. Bufkin.Respondent: Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Melanie L. Bostwick (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton were each denied benefits despite evidence that appeared to be in “approximate balance.” The benefit-of-the-doubt rule, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), provides that, “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” However, in reviewing the Veterans Court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Section 7261(b)(1), which requires the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to “take due account of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ application of that rule “does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond” performing the usual review of the underlying factual findings for clear error—a basic procedural requirement that was already in place before enactment of the Veterans Benefits Act. Question Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1)?

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2024. Petitioner: City and County of San Francisco, California.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Tara M. Steeley (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The city of San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects both sewage and stormwater runoff. During heavy rains, the system can exceed its capacity, resulting in combined sewer overflows (CSOs) that discharge pollutants into the Pacific Ocean. The Clean Water Act requires cities like San Francisco to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for such discharges. San Francisco has been implementing a CSO control plan since the late 1960s and completed construction of its current CSO control facilities in 1997. In 2019, the EPA and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a new NPDES permit for San Francisco's Oceanside treatment facility. San Francisco is challenging two provisions in this permit: (1) narrative prohibitions against violating water quality standards, and (2) a requirement that San Francisco update its long-term CSO control plan. San Francisco argues that these provisions are inconsistent with the Clean Water Act and EPA regulations. The EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board denied San Francisco's administrative appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied San Francisco’s petition for review, holding that the Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to include in the Oceanside NPDES permit the challenged provisions, and that EPA's decision to do so was rationally connected to evidence in the administrative record. Question Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform?

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Medical Marijuana, Inc.Respondent: Douglas J. Horn. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2012, Douglas J. Horn was involved in a car accident that caused injuries to his hip and right shoulder. While seeking alternative natural remedies, he discovered an advertisement for Dixie X CBD Dew Drops Tincture, which claimed to contain 0% THC and be compliant with federal law. As a commercial truck driver subject to random drug testing, Horn carefully investigated these claims before purchasing and consuming the product in October 2012. However, he subsequently failed a drug test and lost his job, wages, and benefits. Independent lab tests confirmed that Dixie X contained THC, contrary to the advertisement's claims. On August 6, 2015, Horn sued the companies who allegedly falsely marketed the product—Medical Marijuana, Inc., Dixie Holdings, LLC, and Red Dice Holdings, LLC—in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, which included a civil RICO claim and eight state law claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Horn lacked RICO standing because he sued for the loss of earnings, which was derivative of an antecedent personal injury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated, concluding that nothing in the text of RICO’s civil-action provision, or in its structure or history, supports a rule that bars plaintiffs from suing simply because their otherwise recoverable economic losses happen to have been connected to a non-recoverable personal injury. Question Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Amina Bouarfa.Respondent: Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security. Advocates: Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, submitted Form I-130 to petition for her husband, Ala’a Hamayel, to be classified as her immediate relative under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Secretary approved the petition in 2015 but later notified Bouarfa of an intent to revoke the approval, stating that Hamayel had entered into a previous marriage solely to evade immigration laws. Despite Bouarfa’s response, the Secretary revoked the approval, and Bouarfa’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was unsuccessful. Bouarfa sued in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the officials’ actions as arbitrary and capricious. The Secretary and Director moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the revocation decision was unreviewable because it was a discretionary action. The district court granted the motion, concluding that while the action was based on nondiscretionary criteria, the action itself was discretionary and thus that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question May a visa petitioner obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria?

Glossip v. Oklahoma Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 9, 2024. Petitioner: Richard Eugene Glossip.Respondent: Oklahoma. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent in support of the Petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Richard Glossip was sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of Barry Van Treese, the owner of the Oklahoma City motel where Glossip worked as a manager. Critical to Glossip’s conviction was testimony from Justin Sneed, a handyman at the hotel, who told jurors that Glossip paid him $10,000 to kill Van Treese. After Glossip’s conviction, he received information that Sneed had testified falsely about his mental health and whether he had seen a psychiatrist. Glossip asked the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to set aside his conviction, but the court rejected that request, and the state’s Pardon and Parole Board turned down Glossip’s request for clemency. All told, Glossip has spent 26 years behind bars, faced nine execution dates, and had multiple independent investigations that raised serious doubts about his conviction. Ahead of his execution date of May 18, 2023, Glossip asked the Supreme Court to stay his execution and consider whether Oklahoma violated Glossip’s constitutional rights when prosecutors suppressed evidence that their key witness was under a psychiatrist’s care; the Court granted his motion to stay and granted his petition, as well. Question May Oklahoma carry out the execution of Richard Glossip in light of the prosecutorial misconduct and other errors that affected his conviction and sentencing?

Lackey v. Stinnie Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2024. Petitioner: Gerald F. Lackey.Respondent: Damian Stinnie. Advocates: Erika L. Maley (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Brian D. Schmalzbach (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Under the so-called “American Rule,” each litigant pays their own attorney’s fees, regardless of whether they win or lose. However, certain statutes permit the payment of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the prevailing party” in litigation; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is one such statute, permitting the payment of attorney’s fees to parties that prevail in civil rights litigation. Several indigent Virginia residents challenged in federal court a state statute that required automatic suspension of the driver’s licenses of those who failed to pay certain court fines and fees. Finding the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their case, the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the state to remove the plaintiffs’ suspensions. The state did not appeal the injunction, so the plaintiffs were able to drive again. Before the case could go to trial, the Virginia legislature repealed the statute. The plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under Section 1988, but the district court rejected that request, citing a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit holding that a grant of a preliminary injunction does not render a plaintiff a “prevailing party.” The plaintiffs appealed. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but, on rehearing, the en banc 4th Circuit reversed.   Question Is a party who obtains a preliminary injunction a “prevailing party” for purposes of being entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C § 1988?

Garland v. VanDerStok Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2024. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland.Respondent: Jennifer VanDerStok. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners) Peter A. Patterson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) ATF, created in 1972, is responsible for regulating firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA). The GCA requires federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to conduct background checks, record firearm transfers, and serialize firearms when selling or transferring them. The GCA’s regulation of firearms is based on the definition of “firearm,” which includes the “frame or receiver.” However, ATF’s 1978 definition of “frame or receiver” became outdated due to changes in modern firearm design, such as the AR-15 and Glock pistols. Furthermore, the rise of privately made firearms (PMFs) or “ghost guns” posed challenges to law enforcement because they were not regulated under the GCA and did not require serialization. In response, ATF issued a Final Rule in 2022, updating the definitions of “frame,” “receiver,” and “firearm” to better capture modern firearm designs and regulate PMFs. The Final Rule took effect on August 24, 2022. The respondents in this case challenged the Final Rule’s redefinition of “frame or receiver” and “firearm,” arguing that it exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and vacated the Final Rule in its entirety. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the two provisions exceeded ATF’s statutory authority. Question Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?