Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Perttu v. Richards Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2025. Petitioner: Thomas Perttu.Respondent: Kyle Brandon Richards. Advocates: Ann M. Sherman (for the Petitioner) Lori Alvino McGill (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Richards, an inmate at Michigan’s Baraga Correctional Facility, sued Resident Unit Manager Thomas Perttu for sexual harassment and retaliation. Richards alleged that Perttu destroyed multiple grievances he attempted to file regarding Perttu's sexual abuse. Additionally, Richards claimed Perttu threatened to kill him if he continued trying to file grievances and wrongfully placed him in administrative segregation. After Perttu moved for summary judgment arguing the inmates failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and Richards cross-moved raising constitutional claims, the district court denied both motions due to factual disputes. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and recommended finding that Perttu proved the inmates failed to exhaust remedies. The district court adopted this recommendation and dismissed the case. Richards appealed, and after requesting supplemental briefing on whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury for exhaustion disputes intertwined with case merits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that it does and reversed the judgment of the district court. Question In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

Gutierrez v. Saenz Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2025. Petitioner: Ruben Gutierrez.Respondent: Luis Saenz. Advocates: Anne E. Fisher (for the Petitioner) William F. Cole (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1998, Ruben Gutierrez was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the robbery and killing of Escolastica Harrison. After multiple appeals and habeas corpus petitions, Gutierrez sought DNA testing of evidence from the crime scene under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 64. Texas courts repeatedly denied his requests, in part because Chapter 64 does not authorize testing when exculpatory results might only affect punishment or sentencing. In 2019, Gutierrez filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cameron County District Attorney Luis V. Saenz and others challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures. Gutierrez argued that Chapter 64 improperly limited the rights granted in another Texas statute (Article 11.071) governing successive habeas applications for death row inmates. The district court agreed, ruling that the interaction between these laws violated procedural due process by making the right to bring a successive habeas application to claim innocence of the death penalty “illusory.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Gutierrez had no standing to make this claim and vacated the district court’s judgment. Question Does a Texas death-row inmate have standing to sue the state over its refusal to grant access to DNA testing under a law that allows such testing only when the person can demonstrate that exculpatory results would have prevented their conviction?

Cunningham v. Cornell University Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Casey Cunningham.Respondent: Cornell University. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioners) Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Cornell University administered two retirement plans for its employees: the Retirement Plan and the TDA Plan. As of 2016, these defined-contribution plans had over 30,000 participants and nearly $3.4 billion in combined net assets. Cornell delegated administrative responsibilities to its Vice President for Human Resources and established the Retirement Plan Oversight Committee (RPOC) to oversee the plans. The plans offered approximately 300 investment options and incurred investment management and recordkeeping fees, with TIAA-CREF and Fidelity Investments serving as both investment providers and recordkeepers. Plaintiffs, representing a class of plan beneficiaries, sued Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries in federal district court, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), including failure to adequately monitor the plans, resulting in the retention of underperforming investment options and excessive fees, as well as engaging in prohibited transactions under 29 U.S.C. § 1106. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims, and the parties reached a settlement on the remaining claim before the court entered final judgment. The plaintiffs challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment on two counts, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court. Question Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA’s provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?

Barnes v. Felix Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Janice Hughes Barnes.Respondent: Roberto Felix, Jr. Advocates: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Charles L. McCloud (for the Respondents) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, supporting Respondent Felix) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix Jr. fatally shot Ashtian Barnes during a traffic stop on the Harris County Tollway. After spotting Barnes’s Toyota Corolla, which had been flagged for toll violations, Felix initiated a stop and Barnes pulled over to the median. When Felix requested documentation, Barnes, who was driving a car rented in his girlfriend’s name, could not produce it and began “digging around” in the car. Claiming he smelled marijuana, Felix questioned Barnes, who then turned off the vehicle and suggested checking the trunk for documentation. Dash cam footage shows that after Barnes opened the trunk and exited the vehicle at Felix’s request, the car’s blinker came back on and the vehicle began to move. Felix, with his weapon drawn, stepped onto the moving car and pressed his gun against Barnes’s head. While holding onto the car frame with his head above the roof—leaving him unable to see inside the vehicle—Felix fired two shots. Barnes’s vehicle stopped, and he was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:57 p.m. Though both the Houston Police Department and Harris County Precinct 5 Constable's Office investigated the incident, a grand jury found no probable cause for an indictment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, focusing exclusively on the two seconds before the shooting when Barnes’s car began moving with Felix holding onto it. The court ruled that because Felix reasonably feared for his life in that moment, his use of deadly force was justified regardless of his previous actions, such as jumping onto the moving vehicle. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?

Mr. Wessler represents McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, while Mr. Palmore and Mr. Garnieri stand for McKesson Corporation. They dive deep into the complexities of the Hobbs Act and its implications for judicial review of agency actions. The discussion highlights the tension between agency interpretations and the need for judicial independence. Intriguing case analyses illustrate the challenges faced by consumers in navigating legal compliance. They also explore significant legal ramifications of FCC rules and the nuances of judicial authority in relation to agency decisions.

Neal Katyal, a prominent Supreme Court litigator, represents R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co., while Elizabeth Prelogar serves as the Solicitor General of the United States, defending the FDA. They dive into the complexities of the Tobacco Control Act, particularly concerning venue restrictions and the standing of retailers in challenging regulatory actions. The conversation highlights the nuanced legal definitions of being 'adversely affected' and the implications for product approvals within the fast-evolving market of e-cigarettes, underscoring both marketing interests and regulatory compliance.

Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 15, 2025. Petitioner: Free Speech Coalition, Inc.Respondent: Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas. Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Texas enacted H.B. 1181, a law regulating commercial entities that publish or distribute material on internet websites, including social media platforms, where more than one-third of the content is sexual material harmful to minors. The law requires these entities to implement age verification methods to limit access to adults and display specific health warnings on their landing pages and advertisements. It defines sexual material harmful to minors using a modified version of the Miller test for obscenity. Shortly after the law was enacted but before it took effect, plaintiffs sued, claiming H.B. 1181 violates their First Amendment rights and, for some plaintiffs, conflicts with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The district court issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim and suffer irreparable harm. The court ruled that the age-verification requirement and health warnings fail strict scrutiny—that is, that it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means to achieve that interest—and that Section 230 preempts H.B. 1181 for certain plaintiffs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that rational basis review—i.e., rationally related to a legitimate government interest—was the proper standard of review and thus vacated the injunction against the age-verification requirement but affirmed as to the health warnings. Question Is a Texas law that requires any website that publishes content one-third or more of which is “harmful to minors” to verify the age of each of its users before providing access subject to “rational basis” review or “strict scrutiny”?

Thompson v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2025. Petitioner: Patrick D. Thompson.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Chris C. Gair (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Patrick Thompson took out three loans from Washington Federal Bank for Savings between 2011 and 2014, totaling $219,000. In late 2017, Washington Federal failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became its receiver, hiring Planet Home Lending to service the loans. Thompson received an invoice showing a loan balance of $269,120.58, which included interest. In subsequent phone calls with Planet Home and FDIC contractors in February and March 2018, Thompson disputed the higher balance. He acknowledged borrowing money but claimed he had only borrowed $110,000, omitting mention of the two additional loans. When the contractors found out about Thompson’s 2013 and 2014 loans shortly thereafter, they called Thompson back on March 5, 2018, he again expressed doubt over the accuracy of the higher loan balance. Eventually, Thompson and the FDIC agreed to settle his debt for $219,000—the amount Thompson owed without interest in December 2018. In April 2021, a grand jury charged Thompson with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014—a statute that criminalizes making a “false statement . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action” of the FDIC or a mortgage lending business. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Thompson of both counts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Does the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1014 on making a “false statement” for the purposes of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies include making statements that are misleading but not false?

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2025. Petitioner: Gary Waetzig.Respondent: Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Advocates: Vincent Levy (for the Petitioner) Matthew D. McGill (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2020, Gary Waetzig sued his former employer Halliburton for age discrimination but voluntarily dismissed his suit without prejudice due to a contractual obligation to arbitrate. After an arbitrator granted summary judgment to Halliburton, Waetzig returned to federal court. Instead of filing a new complaint under the Federal Arbitration Act, he moved to reopen his original case and vacate the arbitration award. The district court agreed to reopen the case using Rule 60(b), citing Mr. Waetzig’s mistaken dismissal and an intervening Supreme Court case that affected his ability to refile. The court then vacated the arbitrator’s order, finding the arbitrator had exceeded her powers, and remanded for further proceedings before a new arbitrator. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Waetzig’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not a “final proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b). Question Is a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Federal Rule 60(b)?

Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2025. Petitioner: Karyn D. Stanley.Respondent: City of Sanford, Florida. Advocates: Deepak Gupta (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jessica C. Conner (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Karyn Stanley, a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, retired due to Parkinson's disease in 2018 after serving for about 19 years. When she joined in 1999, the City's policy provided free health insurance until age 65 for employees retiring due to disability. However, in 2003, the City changed its plan, limiting the health insurance subsidy for disability retirees to 24 months post-retirement. Unaware of this change, Stanley filed suit in April 2020, shortly before her subsidy was set to expire, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Florida Civil Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause, and Florida Statutes section 112.0801. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the City, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on (and reaffirming) binding precedent within that circuit that “a Title I plaintiff must ‘hold[ ] or desire[ ]’ an employment position with the defendant at the time of the defendant's allegedly wrongful act.” Question Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee — who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed — lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?