Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Kousisis v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2024. Petitioner: Stamatios Kousisis.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioners) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The U.S. Department of Transportation provides funds to state agencies for transportation projects, requiring recipients to set participation goals for disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs). Kousisis, Frangos, and their companies, Alpha and Liberty Maintenance, were awarded contracts for two Philadelphia projects with DBE requirements. They committed to working with Markias, Inc., a certified DBE, claiming they would obtain millions in paint supplies from the company. However, the defendants submitted false documentation about Markias’s role in the projects. Instead of Markias supplying products or performing a commercially useful function as required, it served merely as a pass-through. The defendants arranged for actual suppliers to send invoices to Markias, which then issued its own invoices with a 2.25% fee added. This scheme allowed the defendants to appear compliant with DBE requirements, a condition for receiving payments and avoiding penalties. The jury convicted Kousisis and Alpha of false statements, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and wire fraud. The district court calculated the loss based on the defendants’ “ill-gotten profits,” determining that this was an appropriate measure of loss when the actual loss to the government was not measurable at the time of sentencing. This calculation led to a 20-point sentencing enhancement corresponding to a loss between $9.5 million and $25 million. Kousisis and Alpha appealed their convictions and the calculation of the loss for sentencing purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the loss calculation. Question Can deception to induce a commercial exchange constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme?

Feliciano v. Department of Transportation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2024. Petitioner: Nick Feliciano.Respondent: Department of Transportation. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller for the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve officer, performed active duty from July to September 2012 under 10 U.S.C. § 12302, receiving differential pay. His service was extended to July 2013 without differential pay. From July 2013 to September 2014, he served again under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) to support various operations, followed by medical treatment until February 2017 under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(h). In 2018, he filed an appeal alleging a hostile work environment and later amended it to include claims about denied differential pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538. The Board denied his request for differential pay, citing Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, 3 F.4th 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021), which required service in a statutory contingency operation for eligibility. Mr. Feliciano appealed this decision. Question Is a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

In this discussion, Elizabeth B. Prelogar, a Supreme Court advocate, leads a compelling examination of Tennessee's SB1 law restricting gender-affirming treatments for minors, stressing its implications under the Equal Protection Clause. J. Matthew Rice, representing the opponents, argues on the violation of equal protection rights, while Chase B. Strangio highlights the mental health benefits of allowed treatments. The conversation dives into the legal complexities surrounding parental rights, the impact on transgender youth, and the necessity for judicial scrutiny of discriminatory regulations.

Republic of Hungary v. Simon Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2024. Petitioner: Republic of Hungary.Respondent: Rosalie Simon. Advocates: Joshua S. Glasgow (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case arises from the Hungarian government’s confiscation of Jewish-owned property during the Holocaust. In 1944, Hungary rapidly exterminated over half a million Jews and seized their property. Fourteen Holocaust survivors sued Hungary and its agency, Magyar Államvasutak Zrt., seeking compensation for this seized property. To overcome Hungary’s sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs invoked the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation exception, asserting they were either stateless or Czechoslovakian nationals at the time of the takings, not Hungarian nationals. This claim was made in response to the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Fed. Republic of Germany v. Philipp that a country’s taking of property from its own nationals is generally excluded from the FSIA’s expropriation exception. The case has a complex litigation history, with multiple appeals focusing on the plaintiffs’ nationality status and FSIA jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to shift the burden of proof to Hungary to disprove, contrasting with the Second Circuit’s decision that plaintiffs must demonstrate a link between the expropriated property’s funds and U.S. commercial activity. Question 1. Does historical commingling of assets suffice to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act? 2. Must a plaintiff make out a valid claim that an exception to the FSIA applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference? 3. Does a sovereign defendant bear the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the FSIA?  

United States v. Miller Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2024. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: David L. Miller. Advocates: Yaira Dubin (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, All Resorts Group, Inc. paid $145,138.78 to the Internal Revenue Service to cover personal tax debts of two of its principals. The company filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2017. Subsequently, the United States Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against the United States to avoid these transfers, relying on Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The United States did not contest the substantive elements required to establish a voidable transfer but argued that sovereign immunity would bar an actual creditor from avoiding the tax payments outside of bankruptcy. This prevented the Trustee from satisfying the "actual creditor requirement" of Section 544(b)(1). The Trustee countered that the sovereign immunity waiver in Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code applied not only to the adversary proceeding but also to the underlying state law cause of action. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Trustee, and both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question May a bankruptcy trustee avoid a debtor’s tax payment to the United States under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy?

FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C. Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2024. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration.Respondent: Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner) Eric N. Heyer (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, requiring FDA approval for new tobacco products, including e-cigarettes. FDA issued guidance on the application process, stating that long-term studies were not necessary and emphasizing the importance of marketing plans to prevent youth access. Manufacturers were encouraged to use existing data and observational studies. In January 2020, FDA announced it would prioritize enforcement against flavored, cartridge-based e-cigarette products due to their popularity among youth. Wages and White Lion Investments (Triton Distribution) and Vapetasia, manufacturers of flavored nicotine liquids for refillable e-cigarette systems, submitted applications in September 2020. Their applications included existing studies on e-cigarettes generally and detailed marketing plans to restrict youth access. However, in August 2021, FDA unexpectedly announced a new requirement for randomized controlled trials or longitudinal cohort studies specific to flavored products. Shortly after, FDA denied the applications of Triton and Vapetasia, citing a lack of evidence that their flavored products would benefit adult users enough to outweigh risks to youth. The manufacturers challenged this decision, arguing that FDA had changed its requirements without notice and refused to consider their marketing plans. Question Was the Food and Drug Administration’s orders denying respondents’ applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act?

NVIDIA Corporation v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 13, 2024. Petitioner: NVIDIA Corporation.Respondent: E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioners) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) NVIDIA, a major producer of graphics processing units (GPUs), experienced a surge in demand for its gaming GPUs due to cryptocurrency mining, particularly for Ethereum, during 2017-2018. This mirrored a previous crypto-driven boom and bust cycle experienced by NVIDIA’s rival, AMD. Despite introducing specialized crypto mining GPUs (Crypto SKUs) and reporting their sales separately, NVIDIA continued to see substantial crypto-related purchases of its gaming GPUs. However, the company’s executives, particularly CEO Jensen Huang and CFO Colette Kress, repeatedly downplayed the impact of crypto mining on their gaming segment revenues when questioned by analysts and investors. As cryptocurrency prices began to decline in 2018, NVIDIA’s GPU sales dropped. On August 16, 2018, the company lowered its revenue guidance, which was followed by a more significant miss in November. On November 15, 2018, NVIDIA disclosed that post-crypto channel inventory was taking longer than expected to sell through, with Huang referring to it as a “crypto hangover.” This revelation led to a sharp decline in NVIDIA's stock price, dropping 28.5% in two trading days. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that during the class period (May 10, 2017, to November 14, 2018), NVIDIA's executives knowingly or recklessly misled investors about the company's exposure to crypto volatility by understating the impact of crypto-related purchases on their gaming segment revenues. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that, during the Class Period, Huang made false or misleading statements and did so knowingly or recklessly. Question What is the proper pleading standard to show knowledge or intent for Private Securities Litigation Reform Act claims that rely on internal company documents?

Delligatti v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Salvatore Delligatti.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the Genovese Crime Family, was convicted of various charges, including attempted murder in aid of racketeering (under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)). Delligatti had organized a plot to murder Joseph Bonelli, a neighborhood bully who had been stealing from a local gas station owner and was suspected of cooperating against bookies associated with the Genovese Crime Family. Delligatti paid another man to coordinate the murder with gang members, providing them with a gun and a car. The murder attempts were ultimately unsuccessful due to the presence of potential witnesses and the arrest of the would-be murderers by law enforcement. On appeal, Delligatti argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses, including the attempted murder charge, were not “crimes of violence” under the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that attempted murder in aid of racketeering qualifies as a crime of violence, as it necessarily involves the attempted use of physical force, and therefore upheld Delligatti's firearms conviction. Question Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?

Velazquez v. Garland Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Hugo Abisai Monsalvo Velazquez.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Gerard J. Cedrone (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Mr. Velázquez, a Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2005. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him and served a deficient Notice to Appear that lacked time and place details. In 2013, Velázquez admitted to unlawful entry and sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In March 2019, an Immigration Judge denied these requests but granted voluntary departure within 60 days. Velázquez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal in October 2021 and reinstated the 60-day voluntary departure period. On December 13, 2021, Velázquez filed a motion to reopen his case to apply for cancellation of removal, arguing he had accrued 10 years of continuous presence due to his deficient Notice to Appear. The BIA denied this motion, finding Velázquez had not asserted “new facts” and that the motion was untimely, filed after the 60-day voluntary departure period. Velázquez then filed a motion to reconsider, challenging only the timeliness determination, which the BIA also denied. Velázquez filed a petition for review in federal court, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied review, concluding that Mr. Velázquez failed to voluntarily depart or file an administrative motion within 60 calendar days, the maximum period provided by statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2). Question When a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)?

Facebook v. Amalgamated Bank Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2024. Petitioner: Facebook, Inc., et al.Respondent: Amalgamated Bank, et al. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondents) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Facebook, the world’s largest social media platform, faced scrutiny in 2018 when news broke that Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm, had improperly harvested personal data from millions of unwitting Facebook users. The data originated from a personality quiz integrated on Facebook by Aleksandr Kogan, who gained access to users’ data and their Facebook friends’ data without consent. Although only about 270,000 users took the quiz, Kogan harvested data from over 30 million users. Cambridge Analytica used this data to create personality profiles of American voters, which were allegedly used to benefit political campaigns, including Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Facebook learned of Cambridge Analytica’s misconduct in 2015 but failed to inform affected users. The company continued to investigate the data usage and negotiated a confidential settlement with Kogan in 2016. Despite assurances that the data had been deleted, Facebook discovered in 2016 that Cambridge Analytica was still using the data. The scandal became public in March 2018, leading to significant drops in Facebook's stock price. Shortly after, it was revealed that Facebook had been sharing user data with dozens of whitelisted third parties without express user consent, contradicting previous statements about data control and privacy. These revelations, along with subsequent privacy concerns and regulatory actions, led to further stock price declines and reduced revenue growth for Facebook. Shareholders filed a securities fraud action against Facebook and its executives, alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act's implementing regulations. The district court dismissed the shareholders’ claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that under the heightened standard of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the shareholders adequately pleaded falsity as to some of the challenged risk statements. Question Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?