Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Delligatti v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Salvatore Delligatti.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the Genovese Crime Family, was convicted of various charges, including attempted murder in aid of racketeering (under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)). Delligatti had organized a plot to murder Joseph Bonelli, a neighborhood bully who had been stealing from a local gas station owner and was suspected of cooperating against bookies associated with the Genovese Crime Family. Delligatti paid another man to coordinate the murder with gang members, providing them with a gun and a car. The murder attempts were ultimately unsuccessful due to the presence of potential witnesses and the arrest of the would-be murderers by law enforcement. On appeal, Delligatti argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses, including the attempted murder charge, were not “crimes of violence” under the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that attempted murder in aid of racketeering qualifies as a crime of violence, as it necessarily involves the attempted use of physical force, and therefore upheld Delligatti's firearms conviction. Question Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?

Velazquez v. Garland Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Hugo Abisai Monsalvo Velazquez.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Gerard J. Cedrone (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Mr. Velázquez, a Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2005. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him and served a deficient Notice to Appear that lacked time and place details. In 2013, Velázquez admitted to unlawful entry and sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In March 2019, an Immigration Judge denied these requests but granted voluntary departure within 60 days. Velázquez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal in October 2021 and reinstated the 60-day voluntary departure period. On December 13, 2021, Velázquez filed a motion to reopen his case to apply for cancellation of removal, arguing he had accrued 10 years of continuous presence due to his deficient Notice to Appear. The BIA denied this motion, finding Velázquez had not asserted “new facts” and that the motion was untimely, filed after the 60-day voluntary departure period. Velázquez then filed a motion to reconsider, challenging only the timeliness determination, which the BIA also denied. Velázquez filed a petition for review in federal court, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied review, concluding that Mr. Velázquez failed to voluntarily depart or file an administrative motion within 60 calendar days, the maximum period provided by statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2). Question When a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)?

Facebook v. Amalgamated Bank Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2024. Petitioner: Facebook, Inc., et al.Respondent: Amalgamated Bank, et al. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondents) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Facebook, the world’s largest social media platform, faced scrutiny in 2018 when news broke that Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm, had improperly harvested personal data from millions of unwitting Facebook users. The data originated from a personality quiz integrated on Facebook by Aleksandr Kogan, who gained access to users’ data and their Facebook friends’ data without consent. Although only about 270,000 users took the quiz, Kogan harvested data from over 30 million users. Cambridge Analytica used this data to create personality profiles of American voters, which were allegedly used to benefit political campaigns, including Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Facebook learned of Cambridge Analytica’s misconduct in 2015 but failed to inform affected users. The company continued to investigate the data usage and negotiated a confidential settlement with Kogan in 2016. Despite assurances that the data had been deleted, Facebook discovered in 2016 that Cambridge Analytica was still using the data. The scandal became public in March 2018, leading to significant drops in Facebook's stock price. Shortly after, it was revealed that Facebook had been sharing user data with dozens of whitelisted third parties without express user consent, contradicting previous statements about data control and privacy. These revelations, along with subsequent privacy concerns and regulatory actions, led to further stock price declines and reduced revenue growth for Facebook. Shareholders filed a securities fraud action against Facebook and its executives, alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act's implementing regulations. The district court dismissed the shareholders’ claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that under the heightened standard of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the shareholders adequately pleaded falsity as to some of the challenged risk statements. Question Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?

Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Becerra Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2024. Petitioner: Advocate Christ Medical Center, et al.Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services. Advocates: Melissa Arbus Sherry (for the Petitioners) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves the calculation of Medicare reimbursements to hospitals under the “disproportionate share hospital” (DSH) adjustment, which provides additional compensation to hospitals serving a high percentage of low-income patients. The adjustment is based on two formulas: the Medicare fraction and the Medicaid fraction. The Medicare fraction, which is at the center of this dispute, represents the percentage of a hospital's Medicare patients who are also entitled to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. Over 200 hospitals are challenging the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) interpretation of who counts as “entitled to supplementary security income benefits” for the Medicare fraction calculation. HHS considers only patients who qualify for the monthly SSI cash payment during their hospital stay, while the hospitals argue that all patients enrolled in the SSI program should be included, even if they don't receive a payment that month. The hospitals also dispute HHS’s matching process and seek access to detailed SSI payment codes for their patients. After being denied relief by HHS’s internal review board and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the hospitals sought judicial review, but the district court granted summary judgment to HHS. The U.S. Circuit Court for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Question Does the phrase “entitled… to benefits” include all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received?

E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2024. Petitioner: E.M.D. Sales, Inc.Respondent: Faustino Sanchez Carrera. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Lauren E. Bateman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) E.M.D. Sales Inc. (EMD) is a distributor of Latin American, Caribbean, and Asian food products to grocery stores in the Washington, D.C. area. Three of EMD’s sales representatives—Faustino Sanchez Carrera, Magdaleno Gervacio, and Jesus David Muro—sued EMD and its CEO, Elda Devarie, in 2017 for allegedly violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by denying them overtime wages. The plaintiffs claimed they worked about 60 hours per week, paid on commission without overtime compensation. The sales representatives were assigned routes of stores, spending most of their time servicing chain stores and some independent groceries. Their duties included restocking shelves, managing inventory, and submitting orders for EMD products. While they could make some sales to independent stores, their ability to make sales at chain stores was limited, as high-level negotiations between EMD management and corporate buyers typically determined product placement. EMD argued that the sales representatives were exempt from overtime pay under the FLSA’s “outside sales” exemption. The case went to a bench trial, where the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs’ primary duty was making sales, qualifying them for the exemption, or if their work was primarily incidental to sales made by others. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that EMD failed to prove the outside sales exemption applied, awarded both unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages, but limited the damages to a two-year period after concluding that EMD's violation was not willful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence?

Wisconsin Bell, Inc. cv. United States, ex rel. Heath Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2024. Petitioner: Wisconsin Bell, Inc.Respondent: United States, ex rel. Todd Heath. Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner) Tejinder Singh (for the Respondent) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1996, Congress created the E-rate program to help schools and libraries afford telecommunications services. The program provides federal subsidies on a sliding scale, and service providers must follow the “lowest-corresponding-price” rule, offering schools and libraries the lowest price charged to similarly situated non-residential customers. Wisconsin Bell, aware of this rule since its inception, provided services to hundreds of eligible schools and libraries under the E-rate program. Despite knowing about the rule, Wisconsin Bell did not train its sales representatives or implement compliance mechanisms until 2009. The company admitted to treating pricing contracts for schools and libraries the same as other customers, often instructing sales representatives to offer the highest prices possible. In 2009, following a settlement by its parent company with the Department of Justice and FCC, Wisconsin Bell developed a compliance plan. In 2008, Todd Heath filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Wisconsin Bell submitted false claims and certifications related to the E-rate program. After initial dismissal and subsequent appeal, the case proceeded to discovery, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Bell. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Heath identified enough specific evidence of discriminatory pricing to allow a reasonable jury to find that Wisconsin Bell, acting with the required scienter, charged specific schools and libraries more than it charged similarly situated customers. Question Do reimbursement requests submitted to the Federal Communications Commission's E-rate program qualify as “claims” under the False Claims Act?

Bufkin v. McDonough Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2024. Petitioner: Joshua E. Bufkin.Respondent: Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Melanie L. Bostwick (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton were each denied benefits despite evidence that appeared to be in “approximate balance.” The benefit-of-the-doubt rule, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), provides that, “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” However, in reviewing the Veterans Court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Section 7261(b)(1), which requires the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to “take due account of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ application of that rule “does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond” performing the usual review of the underlying factual findings for clear error—a basic procedural requirement that was already in place before enactment of the Veterans Benefits Act. Question Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1)?

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2024. Petitioner: City and County of San Francisco, California.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Tara M. Steeley (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The city of San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects both sewage and stormwater runoff. During heavy rains, the system can exceed its capacity, resulting in combined sewer overflows (CSOs) that discharge pollutants into the Pacific Ocean. The Clean Water Act requires cities like San Francisco to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for such discharges. San Francisco has been implementing a CSO control plan since the late 1960s and completed construction of its current CSO control facilities in 1997. In 2019, the EPA and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a new NPDES permit for San Francisco's Oceanside treatment facility. San Francisco is challenging two provisions in this permit: (1) narrative prohibitions against violating water quality standards, and (2) a requirement that San Francisco update its long-term CSO control plan. San Francisco argues that these provisions are inconsistent with the Clean Water Act and EPA regulations. The EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board denied San Francisco's administrative appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied San Francisco’s petition for review, holding that the Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to include in the Oceanside NPDES permit the challenged provisions, and that EPA's decision to do so was rationally connected to evidence in the administrative record. Question Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform?

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Medical Marijuana, Inc.Respondent: Douglas J. Horn. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2012, Douglas J. Horn was involved in a car accident that caused injuries to his hip and right shoulder. While seeking alternative natural remedies, he discovered an advertisement for Dixie X CBD Dew Drops Tincture, which claimed to contain 0% THC and be compliant with federal law. As a commercial truck driver subject to random drug testing, Horn carefully investigated these claims before purchasing and consuming the product in October 2012. However, he subsequently failed a drug test and lost his job, wages, and benefits. Independent lab tests confirmed that Dixie X contained THC, contrary to the advertisement's claims. On August 6, 2015, Horn sued the companies who allegedly falsely marketed the product—Medical Marijuana, Inc., Dixie Holdings, LLC, and Red Dice Holdings, LLC—in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, which included a civil RICO claim and eight state law claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Horn lacked RICO standing because he sued for the loss of earnings, which was derivative of an antecedent personal injury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated, concluding that nothing in the text of RICO’s civil-action provision, or in its structure or history, supports a rule that bars plaintiffs from suing simply because their otherwise recoverable economic losses happen to have been connected to a non-recoverable personal injury. Question Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Amina Bouarfa.Respondent: Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security. Advocates: Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, submitted Form I-130 to petition for her husband, Ala’a Hamayel, to be classified as her immediate relative under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Secretary approved the petition in 2015 but later notified Bouarfa of an intent to revoke the approval, stating that Hamayel had entered into a previous marriage solely to evade immigration laws. Despite Bouarfa’s response, the Secretary revoked the approval, and Bouarfa’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was unsuccessful. Bouarfa sued in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the officials’ actions as arbitrary and capricious. The Secretary and Director moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the revocation decision was unreviewable because it was a discretionary action. The district court granted the motion, concluding that while the action was based on nondiscretionary criteria, the action itself was discretionary and thus that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question May a visa petitioner obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria?