Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Barrett v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Dwayne Barrett.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Matthew B. Larsen (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent, in support of the Petitioner) Charles L. McCloud (Court-appointed amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between August 2011 and January 2012, Dwayne Barrett and several co-conspirators carried out a string of armed robberies in New York, often using guns, knives, and threats of violence. On December 12, 2011, Barrett and two associates followed a minivan carrying the proceeds from a sale of untaxed cigarettes. While Barrett waited in the car, his accomplices held two men at gunpoint and stole the vehicle, which also contained $10,000 and a third victim, Gamar Dafalla. As he tried to discard some of the money during the getaway, Dafalla was fatally shot by one of the robbers. Later that day, Barrett took part in another robbery, threatening a victim’s life. He also helped dispose of the murder weapon and clean their vehicle with latex gloves and cleaning fluid to eliminate evidence. Barrett was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two substantive counts of Hobbs Act robbery (one involving Dafalla’s murder), and separate firearms offenses, including a murder charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). He was convicted in 2014 and originally sentenced to 90 years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated one firearms conviction under the Supreme Court’s then-new decision in United States v. Davis. Barrett was resentenced to 50 years in 2021. After further appellate proceedings, the Second Circuit affirmed most of his convictions and sentence but vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Lora v. United States, which held that § 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing under § 924(c). Question Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment permit two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j)?

Chiles v. Salazar Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Kaley Chiles.Respondent: Patty Salazar. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioner) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Shannon W. Stevenson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kaley Chiles is a licensed professional counselor practicing in Colorado Springs. She holds a master's degree in clinical mental health and provides talk therapy, specializing in clients dealing with addiction, trauma, sexuality, gender dysphoria, and other mental health concerns. Chiles identifies as a Christian and serves clients who often seek religiously informed care that aligns with traditional biblical understandings of sexuality and gender. Prior to the enactment of a 2019 Colorado law banning conversion therapy for minors, Chiles counseled clients, including minors, in accordance with their self-identified goals, which sometimes included diminishing same-sex attractions or aligning gender identity with biological sex. Since the law’s passage, Chiles has refrained from engaging in discussions with minors that she believes could be interpreted as conversion therapy and alleges that this has hampered her ability to provide full counseling services in line with her and her clients’ religious convictions. In September 2022, Chiles brought a pre-enforcement lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Colorado officials responsible for enforcing the statute. She alleged that the ban on conversion therapy for minors violates her rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Seeking a preliminary injunction, she asked the district court to block enforcement of the law against her. The court denied the motion but found she had standing to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in full, holding that Colorado’s law regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech and survived rational basis review. Question Does a Colorado law banning “conversion therapy”—i.e., attempts to “convert” someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity—violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Villarreal v. Texas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2025. Petitioner: David Asa Villarreal.Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Stuart Banner (for the Petitioner) Andrew N. Warthen (for the Respondent) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Asa Villarreal was charged with murder in Bexar County, Texas. During his trial, Villarreal took the stand in his own defense shortly before a planned midday recess. Because Villarreal was still in the middle of his direct examination when the court adjourned for an overnight recess, the trial judge instructed his attorneys not to confer with him regarding his ongoing testimony but permitted them to discuss other trial-related matters. Villarreal’s lead counsel objected to this limitation under the Sixth Amendment but otherwise indicated understanding of the court's directive. The next day, Villarreal resumed his testimony, and no further objections about the limitation were raised. Villarreal was ultimately convicted and sentenced to sixty years in prison. Following his conviction, Villarreal appealed, arguing that the trial court’s restriction violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A divided appeals court affirmed his conviction, and Villarreal petitioned for discretionary review, and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the trial judge’s limited no-conferral order did not violate Villarreal’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Question Does a trial court violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing the defendant and his lawyer from discussing the defendant’s testimony during an overnight break in the trial?

Berk v. Choy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2025. Petitioner: Harold R. Berk.Respondent: Wilson C. Choy. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Frederick R. Yarger (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Harold R. Berk injured his ankle and allegedly received negligent medical care from three healthcare providers: Dr. Wilson C. Choy, Beebe Medical Center, Inc., and Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Middletown, LLC. Believing he suffered harm due to their malpractice, Berk filed a lawsuit against them under Delaware law. Like many states, Delaware requires plaintiffs in medical negligence cases to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM)—a statement from a qualified expert certifying that the lawsuit has a reasonable basis—either with the complaint or within a short time after filing. Berk failed to submit an AOM with his complaint and did not request an extension before the deadline passed. Because the Delaware statute treats the AOM requirement as mandatory, the district court dismissed his case. Berk appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the Delaware AOM statute is substantive and therefore must be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity. Question Must a Delaware law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity?

Trump v. CASA Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on May 15, 2025. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.Respondent: CASA, Inc., et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Applicants) Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for the State and City Respondents) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org)   Question  

Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 30, 2025. Petitioner: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.Respondent: Gentner Drummond, Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioners in No. 24-394) Michael H. McGinley (for the Petitioner in No. 24-396) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gentner Drummond, the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, filed an action against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board and its members seeking to invalidate their contract with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School. St. Isidore, supported by the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa, aims to operate as a Catholic virtual charter school. In creating this contract, the Charter School Board recognized religious rights and entitlements for St. Isidore, which deviated from the standard expectation that charter schools remain nonsectarian under Oklahoma law. On June 5 and October 9, 2023, the Charter School Board approvingly voted for St. Isidore's application and contract, both by a 3-2 margin. The contract omitted standard provisions prohibiting religious affiliation while affirming St. Isidore’s religious mission, which the State contends violates the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, and the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. Consequently, the State requested a writ of mandamus to rescind the contract, arguing that the use of public funds for a sectarian institution contravenes legal and constitutional prohibitions. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and granted belated relief to the State, holding that the contract violated state and federal law, including constitutional provisions prohibiting government establishment of religion. Question 1. Are a privately owned and operated school’s educational decisions considered state action simply because the school has a contract with the state to provide free education to students?  2. Does the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause prohibit, or the Establishment Clause require, a state to exclude religious schools from its charter-school program?

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Luke Davis.Respondent: Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Julian Vargas, who is blind, encountered inaccessible check-in kiosks at LabCorp facilities. Vargas attempted to use these kiosks but was unable due to their lack of accessibility for visually impaired individuals. As a result, he had to wait for assistance from a staff member, which delayed his check-in and denied him equal access to services such as maintaining his spot in the queue or updating personal information privately. Vargas claimed that this lack of accessibility infringed on his rights under disability laws, leading to the lawsuit. The district court certified two classes: a California class for Unruh Civil Rights Act claims and a nationwide class for claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act. LabCorp appealed the class certification, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Question May a federal court certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury?

Martin v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Curtrina Martin.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the Petitioners) Frederick Liu (for the Respondents) Christopher E. Mills (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below on Question 1) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2017, six FBI agents, led by Special Agent Lawrence Guerra, mistakenly executed a no-knock search warrant at the home of Curtrina Martin and her family in Atlanta, Georgia. The intended target was a nearby home suspected to contain violent gang member Joseph Riley. Due to similarities between the two properties and issues with navigating to the correct address, the agents entered Martin’s home instead. The SWAT team, in full tactical gear, entered the house, causing fear and distress to its occupants. They later realized the mistake and promptly left the scene, later apologizing and assuring the family that the FBI would handle any damages. Martin and her family sued the U.S. government and the agents, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Georgia state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, ruling that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and that the Federal Tort Claims Act claims were barred by the Supremacy Clause and the discretionary function exception. Question 1. Does the Supremacy Clause prevent individuals from suing the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act when federal employees’ actions, even if negligent or wrongful, are related to carrying out federal policy and can be interpreted as following federal laws? 2. Is the discretionary-function exception, which usually protects the government from being sued for certain decisions made by its employees, always inapplicable when dealing with claims related to law enforcement officers’ actions that fall under the intentional torts category?

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279 Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: A.J.T.Respondent: Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A.J.T., a student with epilepsy, experiences seizures so severe in the morning that she cannot attend school until noon. Her parents repeatedly requested evening instruction from Osseo Area Schools to give her a school day length more comparable to her peers. Despite the District providing some accommodations, including one-on-one instruction, a slightly extended school day, and summer home instruction sessions, they denied the requests for evening instruction. The District’s Director of Student Services, responsible for Section 504 compliance, was unaware of the parents’ complaints and did not know that District policies allowed at-home schooling as an accommodation. A.J.T., through her parents, sued the District for disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education?

Soto v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: Simon A. Soto.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Tacy F. Flint (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran with a combat-related disability, was medically retired in 2006 with less than 20 years of service. Although he became eligible for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) in 2009 when he received his disability rating, he did not apply until 2016. The Navy used the Barring Act’s six-year limitation period to calculate his retroactive payments, giving him payments dating back only to 2010 instead of to 2008 when Congress had expanded CRSC eligibility to veterans with less than 20 years of service. Soto filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated veterans who received only six years of back payments, arguing that the CRSC statute’s own procedures should apply instead of the Barring Act’s six-year limit. The district court granted summary judgment to Soto’s class, holding that the CRSC statute was more specific and therefore superseded the Barring Act. The court also applied the pro-veteran canon of statutory interpretation, resolving any doubt in favor of the veterans. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. Question When disabled combat veterans claim past-due compensation, should the military use the CRSC statute's rules to calculate how far back they can be paid, or should it use the Barring Act's six-year limit?