Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Barnes v. Felix Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Janice Hughes Barnes.Respondent: Roberto Felix, Jr. Advocates: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Charles L. McCloud (for the Respondents) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, supporting Respondent Felix) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix Jr. fatally shot Ashtian Barnes during a traffic stop on the Harris County Tollway. After spotting Barnes’s Toyota Corolla, which had been flagged for toll violations, Felix initiated a stop and Barnes pulled over to the median. When Felix requested documentation, Barnes, who was driving a car rented in his girlfriend’s name, could not produce it and began “digging around” in the car. Claiming he smelled marijuana, Felix questioned Barnes, who then turned off the vehicle and suggested checking the trunk for documentation. Dash cam footage shows that after Barnes opened the trunk and exited the vehicle at Felix’s request, the car’s blinker came back on and the vehicle began to move. Felix, with his weapon drawn, stepped onto the moving car and pressed his gun against Barnes’s head. While holding onto the car frame with his head above the roof—leaving him unable to see inside the vehicle—Felix fired two shots. Barnes’s vehicle stopped, and he was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:57 p.m. Though both the Houston Police Department and Harris County Precinct 5 Constable's Office investigated the incident, a grand jury found no probable cause for an indictment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, focusing exclusively on the two seconds before the shooting when Barnes’s car began moving with Felix holding onto it. The court ruled that because Felix reasonably feared for his life in that moment, his use of deadly force was justified regardless of his previous actions, such as jumping onto the moving vehicle. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?

Mr. Wessler represents McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, while Mr. Palmore and Mr. Garnieri stand for McKesson Corporation. They dive deep into the complexities of the Hobbs Act and its implications for judicial review of agency actions. The discussion highlights the tension between agency interpretations and the need for judicial independence. Intriguing case analyses illustrate the challenges faced by consumers in navigating legal compliance. They also explore significant legal ramifications of FCC rules and the nuances of judicial authority in relation to agency decisions.

Neal Katyal, a prominent Supreme Court litigator, represents R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co., while Elizabeth Prelogar serves as the Solicitor General of the United States, defending the FDA. They dive into the complexities of the Tobacco Control Act, particularly concerning venue restrictions and the standing of retailers in challenging regulatory actions. The conversation highlights the nuanced legal definitions of being 'adversely affected' and the implications for product approvals within the fast-evolving market of e-cigarettes, underscoring both marketing interests and regulatory compliance.

Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 15, 2025. Petitioner: Free Speech Coalition, Inc.Respondent: Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas. Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Texas enacted H.B. 1181, a law regulating commercial entities that publish or distribute material on internet websites, including social media platforms, where more than one-third of the content is sexual material harmful to minors. The law requires these entities to implement age verification methods to limit access to adults and display specific health warnings on their landing pages and advertisements. It defines sexual material harmful to minors using a modified version of the Miller test for obscenity. Shortly after the law was enacted but before it took effect, plaintiffs sued, claiming H.B. 1181 violates their First Amendment rights and, for some plaintiffs, conflicts with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The district court issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim and suffer irreparable harm. The court ruled that the age-verification requirement and health warnings fail strict scrutiny—that is, that it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means to achieve that interest—and that Section 230 preempts H.B. 1181 for certain plaintiffs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that rational basis review—i.e., rationally related to a legitimate government interest—was the proper standard of review and thus vacated the injunction against the age-verification requirement but affirmed as to the health warnings. Question Is a Texas law that requires any website that publishes content one-third or more of which is “harmful to minors” to verify the age of each of its users before providing access subject to “rational basis” review or “strict scrutiny”?

Thompson v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2025. Petitioner: Patrick D. Thompson.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Chris C. Gair (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Patrick Thompson took out three loans from Washington Federal Bank for Savings between 2011 and 2014, totaling $219,000. In late 2017, Washington Federal failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became its receiver, hiring Planet Home Lending to service the loans. Thompson received an invoice showing a loan balance of $269,120.58, which included interest. In subsequent phone calls with Planet Home and FDIC contractors in February and March 2018, Thompson disputed the higher balance. He acknowledged borrowing money but claimed he had only borrowed $110,000, omitting mention of the two additional loans. When the contractors found out about Thompson’s 2013 and 2014 loans shortly thereafter, they called Thompson back on March 5, 2018, he again expressed doubt over the accuracy of the higher loan balance. Eventually, Thompson and the FDIC agreed to settle his debt for $219,000—the amount Thompson owed without interest in December 2018. In April 2021, a grand jury charged Thompson with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014—a statute that criminalizes making a “false statement . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action” of the FDIC or a mortgage lending business. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Thompson of both counts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Does the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1014 on making a “false statement” for the purposes of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies include making statements that are misleading but not false?

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2025. Petitioner: Gary Waetzig.Respondent: Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Advocates: Vincent Levy (for the Petitioner) Matthew D. McGill (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2020, Gary Waetzig sued his former employer Halliburton for age discrimination but voluntarily dismissed his suit without prejudice due to a contractual obligation to arbitrate. After an arbitrator granted summary judgment to Halliburton, Waetzig returned to federal court. Instead of filing a new complaint under the Federal Arbitration Act, he moved to reopen his original case and vacate the arbitration award. The district court agreed to reopen the case using Rule 60(b), citing Mr. Waetzig’s mistaken dismissal and an intervening Supreme Court case that affected his ability to refile. The court then vacated the arbitrator’s order, finding the arbitrator had exceeded her powers, and remanded for further proceedings before a new arbitrator. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Waetzig’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not a “final proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b). Question Is a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Federal Rule 60(b)?

Hewitt v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2025. Petitioner: Tony R. Hewitt.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Michael B. Kimberly (for the Petitioners) Masha G. Hansford (for the Respondent, supporting the Petitioners) Michael H. McGinley (in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2009, Corey Deyon Duffey, Jarvis Dupree Ross, and Tony R. Hewitt were convicted of multiple counts of conspiracy, attempted bank robbery, bank robbery, and using firearms in furtherance of these crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After appeals and resentencing, they received mandatory minimum sentences of 5 years for their first § 924(c) conviction and 25 years for each subsequent conviction, as per the law at that time which allowed “stacking” of these charges. In 2020, following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, the appellants successfully filed for habeas relief. The district court vacated their § 924(c) conspiracy convictions and ordered resentencing. Before their resentencing in 2022, the appellants argued that § 403 of the First Step Act of 2018, which eliminated sentence stacking for § 924(c) convictions, should apply to their cases. The government initially opposed this view but later changed its position to support the application of § 403. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected their challenges and affirmed the convictions. Question Does the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provision apply to a defendant whose original sentence was imposed before the Act’s enactment, but was later vacated and resentenced after the Act took effect?

Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2025. Petitioner: Karyn D. Stanley.Respondent: City of Sanford, Florida. Advocates: Deepak Gupta (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jessica C. Conner (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Karyn Stanley, a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, retired due to Parkinson's disease in 2018 after serving for about 19 years. When she joined in 1999, the City's policy provided free health insurance until age 65 for employees retiring due to disability. However, in 2003, the City changed its plan, limiting the health insurance subsidy for disability retirees to 24 months post-retirement. Unaware of this change, Stanley filed suit in April 2020, shortly before her subsidy was set to expire, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Florida Civil Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause, and Florida Statutes section 112.0801. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the City, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on (and reaffirming) binding precedent within that circuit that “a Title I plaintiff must ‘hold[ ] or desire[ ]’ an employment position with the defendant at the time of the defendant's allegedly wrongful act.” Question Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee — who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed — lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?

Neal Katyal, who represents TikTok, dives into the free speech challenges posed by the government's potential actions against the platform. Elizabeth Prelogar, the U.S. Solicitor General, discusses regulatory implications and national security concerns tied to TikTok's foreign ownership. Mark Fisher highlights the creators' perspectives amidst these legal complexities. The conversation intricately explores First Amendment rights, content moderation, and the balance between user privacy and legislative actions, questioning how to protect democracy in the digital landscape.

Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 11, 2024. Petitioner: Dewberry Group, Inc.Respondent: Dewberry Engineers Inc. Advocates: Thomas G. Hungar (for the Petitioner) Nicholas S. Crown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Elbert Lin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dewberry Engineers and Dewberry Group are two businesses in the real estate development industry that both use the “Dewberry” name. In 2006, they confronted each other over their competing brands, leading to a lawsuit that was settled in 2007 with a confidential settlement agreement (CSA). The CSA allowed Dewberry Engineers to use its registered marks freely while strictly limiting Dewberry Group’s use of “Dewberry.” It prohibited Dewberry Group from challenging Dewberry Engineers’ federal trademark registrations and required Dewberry Group to abandon pending applications for the “Dewberry Capital” mark. In 2017, Dewberry Group decided to rebrand, changing its name from “Dewberry Capital” to "Dewberry Group” and adopting several subbrands. Despite the CSA, Dewberry Group applied to register new “Dewberry” marks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for real estate-related services. The USPTO rejected these applications due to likelihood of confusion with Dewberry Engineers’ marks. Dewberry Engineers sent cease-and-desist letters to Dewberry Group, claiming trademark infringement and breach of the CSA. Dewberry Group refused to abandon its applications, arguing that the CSA allowed its use of “Dewberry” marks other than “Dewberry Capital” for non-architectural services. The district court ruled in favor of Dewberry Engineers and ordered Dewberry Group to pay almost $43 million in disgorged profits for infringing on Dewberry Engineers’ trademark. The district court also enjoined Dewberry Group from further violating its agreement with Dewberry Engineers and required Dewberry Group to pay Dewberry Engineers’ attorney fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Does an award of the “defendant's profits” under the Lanham Act allow a court to require the defendant to disgorge profits earned by legally separate, non-party corporate affiliates?