Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Lamone v. Benisek Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2019.Decided on Jun 27, 2019. Appellant: Linda H. Lamone, et al..Appellee: O. John Benisek, et al.. Advocates: Steven M. Sullivan (for the appellant) Michael B. Kimberly (for the appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes before the Supreme Court. In Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. __ (2018), the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court’s decision under a lenient standard—abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court’s ruling (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable. After the Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. __ (2018)—holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering—the district court in the Maryland case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court. Question Are the various legal claims articulated by the three-judge district court unmanageable? Did the three-judge district court err in granting the plaintffs’ motion for summary judgment? Did the three-judge district court abuse its discretion in entering an injunction despite the plaintiffs’ years-long delay in seeking injunctive relief? Conclusion Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion (consolidated under Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422). Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the Court for sidestepping a critical question involving the violation of “the most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” Justice Kagan argued that by not intervening in the political gerrymanders, the Court effectively “encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction” that “may irreparably damage our system of government.” She argued that the standards adopted in lower courts across the country do meet the contours of the “limited and precise standard” the majority demanded yet purported not to find.

PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2019.Decided on Jun 20, 2019. Petitioner: PDR Network, LLC, et al..Respondent: Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.. Advocates: Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners) Glenn L. Hara (for the respondent) Rachel P. Kovner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner PDR Network is a company that “delivers health knowledge products and services” to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the Physicians’ Desk Reference, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network sent by fax to Carlton & Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 Physicians’ Desk Reference. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer “because you are a member of the PDR Network.” On behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton & Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send “unsolicited advertisement[s].” Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender “willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages. As a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of “unsolicited advertisement” for the FCC’s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (“2006 FCC Rule”), the court found that PDR Network’s fax was not an unsolicited advertisement because it lacked a “commercial aim.” Moreover, the court found that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, the fax would not be an “unsolicited advertisement.” For this reason, the district court granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss. Carlton & Harris appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that the Hobbs Act disallows district courts from considering the validity of orders like the 2006 FCC Rule, and that the district court’s interpretation of the rule is at odds with the plain meaning of its text. Question Does the Hobbs Act require the district court in this case to accept the Federal Communication Commission's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act? Conclusion The extent to which a 2006 order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is binding on a district court turns on two preliminary questions: (1) whether the order is the equivalent of a “legislative rule” with the “force and effect of law”; and (2) whether the subject of the rule (in this case, PDR Network) had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the order. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court that was unanimous in its judgment. Whether an agency’s order is binding on courts depends on two preliminary considerations. First, the order must be equivalent to a “legislative rule” with the “force and effect of law,” as opposed to an “interpretive rule,” which merely “advises the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” Second, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency action be subject to judicial review except “to the extent that a prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law.” The Hobbs Act requires certain challenges to FCC final orders to be brought in a court of appeals, so a court should determine whether this provision afforded PDR Network a prior and adequate opportunity for judicial review. The Court declined to resolve these questions, instead vacating the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanding for consideration of these preliminary questions. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas’s concurrence highlights, in his view, the Court’s mistaken understanding of the relationship between federal statutes and the agency orders interpreting them. Justice Thomas argues that federal courts cannot disregard the text of the governing statute when considering whether or not to treat agency orders as controlling law. Justice Brett Kavanaugh concurred in the judgment, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Kavanaugh criticizes the majority for answering a question other than the one presented in this case. Rather than resolving a different question, Justice Kavanaugh would conclude that the Hobbs Act does not bar a defendant in an enforcement action from arguing that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is wrong. He suggests that the Fourth Circuit on remand (and other courts, when the issue arises) can employ the analysis set forth in his separate concurrence.

The Dutra Group v. Batterton Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2019.Decided on Jun 24, 2019. Petitioner: The Dutra Group.Respondent: Christopher Batterton. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner) David C. Frederick (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Respondent Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a vessel owned and operated by the the petitioner, Dutra Group. While Batterton was working on the vessel, a hatch cover blew open and crushed his hand. The hatch cover blew open because the vessel lacked a particular exhaust mechanism, the lack of which made the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law. The district court denied Dutra Group’s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  In Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that “punitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness,” as distinguished from Jones Act claims, where punitive damages are unavailable. Dutra Group argues that Evich is implicitly overruled by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), which holds that loss of society damages are unavailable in a general maritime action for wrongful death and lost future earnings are unavailable in a general maritime survival action. The Ninth Circuit found unpersuasive Dutra Group’s argument, finding that the Court in Miles considered only damages for loss of society and of future earnings, not punitive damages. While Miles does limit recovery for “pecuniary loss,” punitive damages are not “pecuniary loss,” which means simply loss of money. Thus, Miles left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Evich. Question Are punitive damages available to a seaman in a personal injury lawsuit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel? Conclusion A plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a maritime claim of unseaworthiness. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court first needed to reconcile two seemingly conflicting precedents. In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the Court held that non-economic damages were unavailable in a general maritime-law wrongful death action because such relief was unavailable under the Jones Act. But in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), the Court held under maritime law that a plaintiff may seek punitive damages for an employer’s willful and wanton disregard of its obligation to pay maintenance and cure. The Court distinguished Atlantic Sounding based on the finding in that case that there was significant “historical evidence” that punitive damages had been available in maintenance-and-cure cases. In contrast, punitive damages were unavailable under the Jones Act, and there was “overwhelming historical evidence” that punitive damages were unavailable in general maritime-law unseaworthiness actions for personal injuries. The Court found “practically dispositive” the absence of recovery of punitive damages in maritime cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Ginsburg argued that by default, punitive damages are available in maritime cases, and Miles exemplified the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, the Jones Act had expanded the remedies available to seamen and did not bar punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions.

Flowers v. Mississippi Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2019.Decided on Jun 21, 2019. Petitioner: Curtis Giovanni Flowers.Respondent: State of Mississippi. Advocates: Sheri Lynn Johnson (for the petitioner) Jason Davis (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers’s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the guilt phase. In the sixth trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders. Flowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers’s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), where it held that the defendant in a capital case had shown intentional discrimination in the selection of jurors. On remand to the state supreme court, the court again upheld the ruling for the state. Flowers again sought review by the US Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari as to the question whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986). Question Did the Mississippi Supreme Court err in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky in this case? Conclusion The trial court at Flowers’s sixth murder trial committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of a particular black prospective juror was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion. Under Batson v. Kentucky, once the defendant has made a prima facie case of discrimination, the State must provide race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. The trial court judge must then determine whether the provided reasons actually motivated the peremptory strikes or instead were simply pretext for unlawful race discrimination. The Court found four categories of evidence present in Flowers’s sixth trial that the State’s peremptory strike of one juror in particular—Carolyn Wright—was based on racial discrimination. First, the Court found that the State’s history of peremptory strikes in Flowers’s first four trials strongly supported the conclusion that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in his sixth trial was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. The State appeared “relentless” in trying to strike all black jurors to have an all-white jury try Flowers. Second, the Court noted that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in the sixth trial followed the same pattern as in the first four trials. Third, the Court observed that the State spent far more time questioning the black prospective jurors than the accepted white jurors—an indicator (though not dispositive) of discriminatory intent. Fourth and finally, the Court found significant differences between the jurors who were struck and not struck. The State asked extensive questions of Carolyn Wright, a black juror who was struck, about her knowledge of the facts, witnesses, and Flowers’s family, but did not ask three white prospective jurors about their comparable connections to witnesses. The Court found these four factors, plus the overall context to support the determination that the trial court had committed clear error in concluding the State’s peremptory strike was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full but filed a concurring opinion to note how extraordinary the circumstances in this case are and that although he agrees with the Court’s judgment here, he would be disinclined to do so in the majority of cases that are “less unusual” in their facts. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissent in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, criticizing the majority for ignoring the race-neutral reasons the State gave for striking Carolyn Wright. Both Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court should not have even granted the case, but having done so, it decided wrongly on the merits. Justice Thomas (alone) criticized Batson, arguing that it “requires that a duly convicted criminal go free because a juror was arguably deprived of his right to serve on the jury.”

Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 19, 2019.Decided on May 13, 2019. Petitioner: Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al..Respondent: United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt. Advocates: Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the petitioners) Earl N. Mayfield III (for the respondent) Matthew Guarnieri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts—including forgery, deception, and threats—to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward. From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup. Several years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors’ fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison. After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a qui tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt’s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of (1) “6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed” or (2) “3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances….” The district court granted the contractors’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt’s claim would be time-barred. Reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt (the relator) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim. Question May a relator in a False Claims Act qui tam action rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in a suit in which the United States has declined to intervene, and, if so, does the relator constitute an “official of the United States” for purposes of that section? Conclusion A relator in a False Claims Act qui tam action may rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in a suit in which the United States has declined to intervene, but the relator does not constitute an “official of the United States” for purposes of that section. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Section 3731(b) establishes two limitations periods that apply to “civil action[s] under section 3730,” and both government-initiated suits and relator-initiated suits are “civil action[s] under section 3730.” Thus, the plain text of the statute imposes both limitations periods on both types of actions. To interpret the statute otherwise would violate the principle that “a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning.” Having resolved the first question, the Court then turned to whether the relator constitutes an “official of the United States” in this circumstance, finding that he does not. The relator is a private party, neither appointed as an officer nor employed by the United States, and nothing in the statute suggests an expansive interpretation of “the official” that would include such a private party.

Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 18, 2019.Decided on Jun 17, 2019. Appellant: Virginia House of Delegates, et al..Appellee: Golden Bethune-Hill, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the appellants) Morgan L. Ratner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party) Toby J. Heytens (Solicitor General of Virginia, for Appellees Virginia State Board of Elections et al.) Marc E. Elias (for Appellees Golden Bethune-Hill et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This civil action first arose in 2014, when 12 Virginia voters alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case ultimately went before the US Supreme Court, and in 2017, the Court held that a lower court had applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the challengers’ claims of racial gerrymandering. The Court upheld one of the districts and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the districting in the remaining 11 districts. In June 2018, the lower court struck down the 11 districts as unconstitutional, finding that race was the main factor used to determine the boundaries for the districts. The court found that the legislature failed to prove that the districts as drawn, which attempted to put the exact same percentage of African American adults in each district, were necessary to comply with federal voting-rights laws. The Virginia House of Delegates appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to review the case, as well as the preliminary question whether the House of Delegates has judicial standing to appeal. Question Did the district court err in holding that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence that race predominated over traditional districting factors in the construction of the 11 remaining challenged districts? Did the district court err in holding that the Virginia House of Delegates did not satisfy its burden to show that the legislature’s use of race was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of compliance with Section 5 of the VRA, 52 U.S.C. § 10304? Does the Virginia House of Delegates have standing to file this appeal with the Court? Conclusion The Virginia House of Delegates lacks standing to file this appeal, either representing the state’s interests or in its own right. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for a 5-4 majority. To bring a suit (or appeal) in federal court, the litigant must have judicial standing. That is, the litigant must show (1) a concrete and particularized injury, that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. To appeal a decision that the primary party does not challenge, as here, an intervenor must independently demonstrate standing. Here, the primary party, Virginia, does not appeal the decision of the district court, but an intervenor, the House of Delegates, does. As such, the House of Delegates must demonstrate standing, which it does not. First, the Court considered whether the House of Delegates had standing to represent the state’s interests. Under Virginia law, the authority for representing the state’s interests in civil litigation lies exclusively with the state attorney general. Thus, the House of Delegates cannot and does not displace this authority. Then, the Court considered whether the House of Delegates had standing in its own right, concluding again that it does not. The Court has never recognized that a judicial decision invalidating a state law inflicts a cognizable injury on the parts of the state government that were involved in the law’s passage, and it declined to do so here. Given that the state manifests an intent to end the litigation—as evidenced by its decision not to appeal the district court’s decision—the House of Delegates alone cannot carry on the litigation against the will of the state. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh joined. The dissent would find that the House of Delegates does have standing because the new redistricting plan would inflict harm on the House by changing each representative’s constituents.

Smith v. Berryhill Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 18, 2019.Decided on May 28, 2019. Petitioner: Ricky Lee Smith.Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill. Advocates: Michael B. Kimberly (for the petitioner) Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of reversal and remand) Deepak Gupta (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1987, Ricky Lee Smith filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) resulting from disability. The following year, an administrative law judge (ALJ) approved his application, and Smith received benefits until 2004, when he was found to be over the resource limit. Smith filed another application for SSI in August 2012, alleging additional medical conditions as a result of his original disability. The claim was initial denied, and denied again upon reconsideration. Smith filed a timely request for a hearing before an ALJ, and after the hearing, an ALJ denied Smith’s claim on March 26, 2014. Smith claims to have mailed a written request for review before the Appeals Council on April 24, 2014, and followed up by fax on September 21, 2014. A claims representative spoke with Smith on October 1, 2014, to inform him that his request may not have been received and that his request was filed as of that day, October 1, 2014. The Appeals Council dismissed the request for review as untimely, as Smith proffered no evidence showing the request for was sent within the appropriate time. Smith filed a civil action seeking review of the Appeals Council’s dismissal. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Appeals Council’s dismissal did not constitute a final decision subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Question Is the decision of the Appeals Council dismissing a disability claim on the grounds that it is untimely constitute a “final decision” subject to judicial review under the Social Security Act? Conclusion A decision of the Appeals Counsel dismissing a disability claim on timeliness grounds is a “final decision” for purposes of determining whether judicial review is available. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The plain language of the statute supports the interpretation that dismissal for untimeliness is a “final decision” because such a dismissal is a terminal event. Moreover, that interpretation finds support in the greater statutory context because the dismissal is an agency action that determines the rights and obligations of the parties, which, in most administrative law contexts, is the event that triggers judicial review.

The American Legion v. American Humanist Association Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 27, 2019.Decided on Jun 20, 2019. Petitioner: The American Legion, et al..Respondent: American Humanist Association, et al.. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner in No. 18-18) Michael A. Carvin (for the petitioners in No. 17-1717) Jeffrey B. Wall (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Monica L. Miller (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations. Several non-Christian residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission’s display and maintenance of the cross violates the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the district court found that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not have a primary effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. Question Is the display and maintenance of the cross unconstitutional? Under what test should the constitutionality of a passive display incorporating religious symbolism be assessed? Does the expenditure of funds to maintain the cross amount to the government’s excessive entanglement with religion? Conclusion The Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Elena Kagan joined the majority opinion in part. The Court explained that although the cross originated as a Christian symbol, it has also taken on a secular meaning. In particular, the cross became a symbol of World War I as evidenced by its use in the present controversy. The Lemon test, which the Court first articulated in 1971 as a way to discern Establishment Clause violations, does not serve its intended purpose, particularly as applied to religious symbols or monuments. Thus, when the question arises whether to keep a religious monument in place (as opposed to a question whether to put up a new one), there should be a presumption that the monument is constitutional. Applying this presumption rather than the Lemon test, the Court found the Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause because it has historical importance beyond its admittedly Christian symbolism. Justice Breyer joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full but wrote a separate concurrence joined by Justice Kagan to highlight his belief that there is no single test for Establishment Clause violations. Rather, a court asked to resolve such questions must consider “the basic purposes that the Religion Clauses were meant to serve: assuring religious liberty and tolerance for all, avoiding religiously based social conflict, and maintaining that separation of church and state that allows each to flourish in its separate sphere.” Justice Kavanaugh also joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full and also wrote his own concurring opinion. He even more harshly criticized the Lemon test, arguing that “the Court’s decisions over the span of several decades demonstrate that the Lemon test is not good law and does not apply to Establishment Clause cases in any of” five categories, which he enumerated. Justice Kagan joined most of Justice Alito’s opinion but wrote a separate concurrence to note that, although “rigid application of the Lemon test does not solve every Establishment Clause problem,” courts should still focus on the purpose and effect of government action in deciding whether it violates the Constitution. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but based on entirely different reasoning. Justice Thomas does not believe the Establishment Clause applies to state and local governments, and even if it did, it applies only to prevent coercive action by the government. Justice Thomas would overrule the Lemon test in all contexts. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch would dismiss the lawsuit for lack of standing, arguing that simply being offended by the cross’s presence is insufficient to meet the injury requirement of Article III standing. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the cross “is the foremost symbol of the Christian faith,” and using it as a war memorial doesn’t change that. Maryland’s decision to maintain that Christian symbol on public land “elevates Christianity over other faiths, and religion over nonreligion.” Justice Ginsburg additionally pointed out that an appropriate remedy for an Establishment Clause violation is not necessarily to destroy the memorial, as the majority suggests, but to transfer title to the land on which it sits to a private entity—in fact, a private entity owned the land when the cross was first erected.

United States v. Haymond Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2019.Decided on Jun 26, 2019. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Andre Ralph Haymond. Advocates: Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner) William D. Lunn (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Andre Ralph Haymond was convicted by a jury of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 38-months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Two years into his supervised release, probation officers conducted a surprise search of Haymond’s apartment and seized several devices. After conducting a forensic examination of the devices, officers found evidence that the devices had recently contained child pornography. Based on these findings, Haymond’s probation officer alleged that Haymond had committed five violations of his supervised release, the relevant one of which was the possession of child pornography, in violation of the mandatory condition that Haymond not commit another federal, state, or local crime. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had possessed child pornography, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Haymond challenged the district court’s findings, arguing, among other things, that the statute violates his constitutional rights by subjecting him to imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond’s constitutional arguments. It affirmed the district court’s revocation of his supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for sentencing. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing a mandatory minimum punishment on a criminal defendant upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in certain criminal conduct during supervised release? Conclusion In a 5-4 decision, the Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered an opinion for a four-justice plurality of the Court, in which he concluded that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) in this case violated Haymond’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment but based on different reasoning. Justice Gorsuch reasoned that at the time the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were adopted, judges’ power to sentence criminal defendants was limited by the jury’s finding of facts. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Court held unconstitutional a sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on the judge’s finding of new facts by a preponderance of the evidence. And in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the Court held that the same principle applies when a judge finds additional facts to increase the mandatory minimum. Those two cases mandate the outcome in this case: that the statutory scheme violated Haymond’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Justice Gorsuch suggested that on remand, the Tenth Circuit consider whether its remedy—declaring the last two sentences of §3583(k) “unconstitutional and unenforceable”—sweeps too broadly. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, characterizing the provision at issue as “less like ordinary supervised-release revocation and more like punishment for a new offense,” which requires that jury—not judge—find facts of criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Justice Breyer would reach the same conclusion without relying on Apprendi. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito argued that the terms of the Sixth Amendment and the original understanding of the scope of the jury trial, coupled with the Court’s precedents with respect to supervised-release revocation proceedings, militate toward the opposite conclusion of the plurality. 

Mont v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2019.Decided on Jun 3, 2019. Petitioner: Jason J. Mont.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Vanessa F. Malone (for the petitioner) Jenny Ellickson (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017. While on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont’s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont’s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions. Mont challenged the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction. Question Is the term of supervised release for one offense paused by imprisonment for another offense? Conclusion Pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction tolls (pauses) a supervised-release term under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), even if the court must make the tolling calculation retrospectively, after learning whether the time will be credited. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 5-4 majority opinion affirming the lower court. Section 3624(e) provides that a “term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” In interpreting this provision, the Court looked first to the dictionary definition of “imprisoned,” finding that definition to include pretrial detention. Then the Court noted the expansive phrase “in connection with,” giving rise to a sufficient nexus between the pretrial detention and the conviction because the pretrial detention is credited toward the sentence for that same conviction. Although under this interpretation, Section 3624(e) would require courts to retrospectively assess whether a period of pretrial detention tolls a term of supervised release, the Court determined that this retroactive crediting would not cause undue uncertainty for defendants like Mont. Finally, the Court found that “statutory context” supported this interpretation as well, given that supervised release is intended to facilitate a prisoner’s transition back into the community and a period in prison does not serve this purpose. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent argued that the plain text of the statute cannot authorize tolling when the defendant is in pretrial detention and a conviction is merely a possible future event. The present tense used in the statute precludes the majority’s interpretation. Moreover, the purpose of pretrial confinement is to ensure the defendant shows up for trial, not to punish the defendant for a crime.