Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Republic of Sudan v. Harrison Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2018.Decided on Mar 26, 2019. Petitioner: Republic of Sudan.Respondent: Rick Harrison, et al.. Advocates: Christopher M. Curran (for petitioner) Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner) Kannon K. Shanmugam (for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sailors and spouses of sailors injured in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen filed suit in 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1130, 1602, et seq., alleging that Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda, whom they alleged was responsible for the attack. In accordance with the plaintiffs’ request, the clerk of the court served the summons and complaint on Sudan by mailing the case documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received a return receipt. Sudan did not answer the complaint within the required time frame, and the clerk of the court therefore entered a default against Sudan. In 2012, the district court entered a default judgment against Sudan in the amount of approximately $314,000, and found that service had been proper. The clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default judgement to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received confirmation that it had been delivered.  The judgment was registered in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which in late 2013 and early 2014 issued three turnover orders directing particular banks to turn over assets of Sudan to the plaintiffs. After the third turnover order was issued, Sudan filed a notice of appearance, and on the same day, appealed the turnover orders to the Second Circuit. The appeals court affirmed the orders, holding that service of process had been proper under FSIA. In 2015, Sudan sought a rehearing en banc, and the United States filed an amicus brief in support of the petition. The Second Circuit denied Sudan’s request for a rehearing en banc. Question Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit err by holding – in direct conflict with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 5th and 7th Circuits and in the face of an amicus brief from the United States – that plaintiffs suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may serve the foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) by mail addressed and dispatched to the head of the foreign state's ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state's diplomatic mission in the United States, despite U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to preserve mission inviolability? Conclusion When civil process is served on a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) requires a mailing to be sent directly to the foreign minister’s office in the foreign state. In an 8–1 majority opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that the most natural reading of § 1608(a)(3) required that the Republic of Sudan be served by a mailing sent directly to its foreign minister’s office in Sudan, not to the Sudanese Embassy in the United States. A federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state in limited circumstances as described in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Relevant in this case is that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state only “where service has been made under section 1608.” That section, specifically § 1608(a)(3), allows for four methods of serving civil process, one of which—at issue in this case—is service “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched . . . to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” The Court found that “addressed” means having one’s name and address placed on the outside of a letter or package, and that an “address” means “a residence or place of business.” The foreign nation’s embassy in the United States is neither “a residence” nor its “place of business.” Moreover, to “dispatch” means to “send directly” to the address of the intended recipient. The Court then found that its interpretation of the meaning of the statute bolstered by other related provisions. The “addressed and dispatched” language is intended to be “reasonably calculated to give actual notice” to the recipient. Further, the Court found that its interpretation leads to other logical results. If mailing a service packet to a foreign state’s embassy in the United States were sufficient, then it would be easier to serve the foreign state itself than to serve a person in that foreign state under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is an illogical result. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion arguing that FSIA “neither specifies nor precludes the use of any particular address” and that, given “the unique role that embassies play in facilitating communications between states,” service by mailing to Sudan’s embassy in Washington, D.C., should comply with the requirements of FSIA.

BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2018.Decided on Mar 4, 2019. Petitioner: BNSF Railway Company.Respondent: Michael D. Loos. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for petitioner) Rachel P. Kovner (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner) David C. Frederick (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Loos worked as an employee of BNSF Railway Company until his termination in November 2012 for a series of attendance policy violations. Related to at least some of the attendance violations was an injury Loos sustained in 2010 when he fell in the train yard. After being terminated, Loos brought two claims against his former employer: a claim of retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and a claim of negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The district court found that Loos had not established a prima facie case of retaliation under FRSA and granted BNSF's motion for summary judgment on that claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The FELA negligence claim proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Loos—$30,000 for lost wages and $11,212.78 for medical expenses. BNSF moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to offset the lost wages award by the amount of Loos’s share of taxes owed under the RRTA. The district court denied the motion, finding no RRTA tax was owed on the award. The Eighth Circuit reviewed this determination de novo and found that the text of RRTA is unambiguous in not including damages for lost wages in its definition of compensation as money remuneration for services rendered. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling using alternate reasoning.   Question Are damages for lost wages "compensation" under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and thus subject to employment taxes? Conclusion Damages for lost wages are “compensation” under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) and thus are subject to employment taxes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the RRTA and the Court’s precedent require the finding that Loos must pay taxes on the portion of a jury award for compensating him for lost wages while he was unable to work due to his injury. The Railroad Retirement Act entitles railroad workers to various benefits in a scheme similar to that described by the Social Security Act. The Court held in Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946), that the term “wages” included pay for active service as well as pay for periods of absence from active service and that backpay for time lost due to “the employer’s wrong” counted as “wages.” Similarly, in United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U.S. 141 (2014), the Court held that severance payments qualified as taxable “wages” under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA). Drawing upon these interpretations comparable terms in comparable schemes, the Court found that the term “compensation” under the RRTA includes pay for periods of absence from active service, so long as the pay stems from the “employer-employee relationship.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, opining that the compensation to Loos was for injury, rather than for services not rendered, and thus was not taxable under the language of the RRTA.

Bucklew v. Precythe Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2018.Decided on Apr 1, 2019. Petitioner: Russell Bucklew.Respondent: Anne Precythe, et al.. Advocates: Robert N. Hochman (for petitioner) D. John Sauer (for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely cause him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood.” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state’s execution method “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers,” and failed to propose “an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain,” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew’s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties.” Reviewing the district court’s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court. Question Does the Eighth Amendment require an inmate with a unique and severe medical condition to prove an adequate alternative method of execution when raising an as-applied challenge to the state-authorized method of execution? What evidence is required for a court to determine whether an inmate’s proposed alternative method of execution significantly reduces the risk of severe pain as compared to the state’s method? May a court evaluating an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution assume that medical personnel on the execution team are competent to manage the inmate’s condition? Did the petitioner meet his burden in proposing an alternative execution method under Glossip v. Gross? Conclusion A death-row inmate alleging that the state’s method of execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, either on its face or as applied to that inmate, must show (1) a feasible and readily implemented alternative method that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain and (2) that the state refused to adopt the method without a legitimate penological reason. In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that Bucklew did not meet his burden. The Court first considered the proper test for challenges to lethal injection protocols as applied to a particular inmate. In Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), a plurality of the Court held that a state’s refusal to alter its lethal injection protocol could violate the Eighth Amendment only if an inmate first identified a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative procedure that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” Subsequently, in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. __ (2015), a majority of the Court clarified that the plurality opinion in Baze was controlling. The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a painless death—only punishments that “intensif[y] the sentence of death” with a “superaddition of terror, pain, or disgrace.” Anyone bringing an Eighth Amendment challenge must therefore satisfy the Baze-Glossip test. The Court rejected Bucklew’s argument that methods posing a substantial risk of suffering when applied to a particular inmate should be considered “categorically” cruel. Bucklew failed to show that Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would “superadd” to his death sentence. The Court then considered whether Bucklew satisfied the test, finding he had not. The majority identified two reasons Bucklew failed to show his proposed alternative—nitrogen hypoxia—was viable. First, he did not produce adequate evidence that nitrogen hypoxia could be “readily implemented,” and second, he failed to show that the state lacked a legitimate reason for declining to switch from its current method of execution to one that is “untried and untested.” Finally, the Court found that even if Bucklew had satisfied his burden of showing a viable alternative, he failed to show that the alternative would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but authored a concurring opinion reiterating the position he expressed in his concurring opinion in Baze that “a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a separate concurrence joining the majority in full but also underscoring the Court’s additional holding that the alternative method of execution need not be authorized under current state law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined as to all but Part III. First, Justice Breyer argued that Bucklew had provided sufficient evidence by which a fact finder could conclude execution by lethal injection would subject him to impermissible suffering. Because a genuine issue exists as to this material fact, summary judgment for the state was inappropriate. Second, even accepting that the Glossip majority opinion governs, Justice Breyer argued that the substantially different circumstances of the present case rendered the reasoning in Glossip inapplicable and that the majority’s holding unconstitutionally places a high burden on the prisoner to describe in detail an alternative method of execution. Finally, Justice Breyer expresses general concern that an expedient death penalty may be mutually exclusive of a reliable and fair death penalty. Justice Sotomayor filed a separate dissenting opinion, as well, to criticize and clarify as “troubling dicta” the majority’s “lament[ation]” of “late-arising death penalty litigation.”

Sturgeon v. Frost Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2018.Decided on Mar 26, 2019. Petitioner: John Sturgeon.Respondent: Bert Frost, in His Official Capacity as Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service, et al.. Advocates: Matthew T. Findley (for petitioner) Ruth Botstein (Assistant Attorney General for Alaska as amicus curiae supporting petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) John Sturgeon wanted to use his hovercraft on the Nation River, which runs through Alaska’s Yukon-Charley National Preserve conservation unit, designated as such by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., to reach moose hunting grounds. The State of Alaska would permit him to do so, whereas the federal government would not pursuant to National Park Service regulations. Sturgeon argued that the Nation River belonged to Alaska, and that the National Park Service could not regulate or prohibit the use of hovercraft on that portion of the river. Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. The district court and appellate court denied him relief, interpreting the statute as limiting the Park Service’s authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on inholdings but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations like the hovercraft rule. The US Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand from the US Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation River was public land for purposes of ANILCA and thus that it was subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service. Question Is Alaska’s Nation River public land and therefore subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service? Conclusion The Nation River is not public land, so it is exempt under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) from the National Park Service’s regulatory authority, as are all non-public lands and navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that Alaska’s Nation River is not a public land because the United States does not and cannot have “title” to the Nation River. Under 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (“Section 103(c)”) the Park Service may exercise its authority only on public lands, so non-public lands are outside its domain. Moreover, navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks are also exempt from the Park Service’s normal regulatory authority because ANILCA expressly defines “land” to mean “lands, waters, and interests therein.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, emphasizing certain “important regulatory pathways that the Court’s decision leaves open for future exploration.” Specifically, Justice Sotomayor points out that the Court’s holding does not preclude the Park Service from exercising any regulatory authority over the Nation River, only that it may not regulate the Nation River as if it were within Alaska’s federal park system.

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2018.Decided on Jun 17, 2019. Petitioner: Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al..Respondent: John Warren et al.. Advocates: Charles J. Cooper (for petitioners) Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioners) Toby J. Heytens (for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect. Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court’s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the federal Atomic Energy Act preempt a Virginia ban on non-federal uranium mining? Conclusion The federal Atomic Energy Act (AEA) does not preempt a Virginia state-law ban on non-federal uranium mining. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the three-justice plurality opinion. Looking first at the text of the AEA, the plurality found it notably lacking in any provision expressly preempting state law and in fact that it grants the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) extensive authority to regulate nearly every aspect of nuclear fuel except mining. Thus, states are free to regulate the mining of uranium. The plurality declined to speculate as to the legislative purpose behind the AEA and found Virginia Uranium’s arguments for preemption to go far beyond the statute’s text and structure. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg agrees that Virginia’s mining ban is not preempted but declines to join the plurality’s discussion of “the perils of inquiring into legislative motive.” Chief Justice John Roberts filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito joined. The dissent criticizes the plurality opinion for “set[ting] out to defeat an argument that no one made, reaching a conclusion with which no one disagrees.” The dissent would characterize the question as whether a state can purport to regulate a field that is not preempted as an indirect means of regulating other fields that are preempted, and to that question the dissent would answer in the negative.

Frank v. Gaos Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2018.Decided on Mar 20, 2019. Petitioner: Theodore H. Frank, et al..Respondent: Paloma Gaos, et al.. Advocates: Theodore H. Frank (for petitioners) Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party) Andrew J. Pincus (for respondent Google LLC) Jeffrey A. Lamken (for respondents Paloma Gaos et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In a group of consolidated class actions, three plaintiffs sued Google on behalf of internet users who claimed that their privacy was violated under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq., and California law by the company’s disclosure of their internet search terms to third party websites. The case went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement which they submitted to the district court for approval in July 2013.  Among the terms of the settlement were that Google would pay $5.3 million of the $8.3 million total to six cy pres recipients, provided that they agreed to dedicate the funds to promoting education and initiatives relating to internet privacy. The district court certified the class for settlement purposes, and preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice was sent out to the class in 2014, with 13 class members opting out and 5, including Thomas Frank, filing objections (“the Objectors”).  The district court approved the parties’ settlement in 2015, and with regard to the objections, found that: (1) the cy pres award was appropriate because the award was non-distributable, (2) Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement was not affected by whether the award was cy pres, (3) there was a substantial nexus between the cy pres recipients and the interests of the class members, and there was no evidence that the parties’ preexisting relationships with the recipients influenced the selection process, and (4) the amount of attorney fees was commensurate with the benefit to the class. The Ninth Circuit approved the district court’s ruling approving the settlement, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion with regard to any of the four findings described above.  Question Does a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides no direct relief to class members support class certification and comport with the requirement that a settlement binding class members must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and if so, in what circumstances? Conclusion Rather than answer the question presented, the Court issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion vacating the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court noted that there remain "substantial questions" about whether any of the named plaintiffs has standing to sue, in light of its decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. __ (2016).

Jam v. International Finance Corp. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2018.Decided on Feb 27, 2019. Petitioner: Budha Ismael Jam, et al..Respondent: International Finance Corporation. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for petitioners) Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioners) Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Budha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital.  The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not cause damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project. The plant’s construction and operation did cause harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC’s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance. The plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The president of the United States determines whether an organization is entitled to such immunity, and an executive order in 1956 designated the IFC as entitled to the “privileges, exemptions, and immunities” conferred by the statute. The Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the IFC is immune under IOIA and that it did not waive immunity for this suit. Question Does the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) give international organizations the immunity that foreign governments enjoyed at the time the law was passed, or the immunity that foreign governments have at present, as described in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976? Conclusion The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (IOIA) affords international organizations the same immunity from suit that foreign governments enjoy today under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), not what they enjoyed when the law was passed. In a 7–1 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the International Finance Corporation, an IOIA international organization, is immune from suit only to the extent that foreign sovereign governments are immune from suit. The Court interpreted the IOIA “same as” language as making international organization immunity and foreign sovereign immunity continuously equivalent. The Court found that this interpretation is bolstered by the “reference canon” of statutory interpretation, which provides that when a statute refers to a general subject, it adopts the law on that subject at the time a question arises, as opposed to when a statute refers to a statute by title, in which case it adopts the law as it existed at the time the statute was enacted. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which he gave greater weight to the IOIA’s “history, its context, its purposes, and its consequences” than to canons of statutory interpretation. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Garza v. Idaho Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 30, 2018.Decided on Feb 27, 2019. Petitioner: Gilberto Garza, Jr..Respondent: Idaho. Advocates: Amir H. Ali (for petitioner) Kenneth K. Jorgensen (for respondent) Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea—that is, a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers. Four months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza’s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. The district court dismissed Garza’s petition to open the appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. Under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel’s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant’s request is professionally unreasonable and therefore deficient, and most federal circuit courts interpret Flores-Ortega to mean that attorneys are ineffective when they do not file an appeal if the clients requested it, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights. The Idaho Supreme Court held contrary to the majority of federal circuit courts, finding that Flores-Ortega does not require an automatic “presumption of prejudice” when counsel declines to file an appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, the defendant must still show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Question Is a criminal defendant’s counsel presumptively ineffective if counsel declines to file an appeal of a conviction because the defendant already waived the right to appeal in his plea? Conclusion The presumption of prejudice for Sixth Amendment purposes recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), applies regardless of whether a defendant has signed an appeal waiver. In a 6–3 opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that Garza’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal despite Garza’s repeated requests. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must prove (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that the deficiency was “prejudicial to the defense.” In Flores-Ortega, the Court held that “prejudice is presumed” in certain contexts, including when counsel “deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.” Garza’s appeal waivers—and appeal waivers generally—are not an absolute bar to all appellate claims. Indeed, some appeals fall outside the scope of the waiver, and there is always a possibility that the government might forfeit or breach the agreement of which the waiver is part. Given these scenarios, Garza could have pursued an appeal had his trial counsel acceded to his requests and filed a notice of appeal. By failing to do so, Garza’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, and in which Justice Samuel Alito joined in part. The dissent opined that Garza’s counsel acted reasonably by declining to file an appeal on the grounds that doing so could jeopardize his plea bargain. The dissent characterized the majority’s holding as resulting in a “defendant-always-wins” rule that has no basis in the Court’s precedents or the Constitution.

Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 30, 2018.Decided on Mar 19, 2019. Petitioner: Washington State Department of Licensing.Respondent: Cougar Den, Inc.. Advocates: Noah Purcell (for petitioner) Ann O'Connell Adams (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioner) Adam G. Unikowsky (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways." Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department’s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department’s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe’s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing "any trade, traveling, and importation" by members of the Yakama tribe “that requires the use of public roads,” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state’s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes. Question Does the Yakama Treaty of 1855 create a right for tribal members to avoid state taxes on off-reservation commercial activities that make use of public highways? Conclusion The “right to travel” provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855 (between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians) preempts the state’s fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den’s importation of fuel by public highway for sale within the reservation. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered an opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. For this plurality of the Court, Justice Breyer agreed with the Washington Supreme Court below that a provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855 that guarantees the Yakama “the right . . . to travel upon all public highways” preempts a state tax triggered when motor fuel “enters into [Washington] state,” a tax exempted only for “bulk transfer,” such as pipeline or ship but not by ground transportation. A key component of the treaty was the right to travel with goods for sale or distribution, and the tax impermissibly burdened that treaty right. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the treaty was drafted by the United States in a language the Yakamas could not read, and the Yakamas relinquished large amounts of territory in exchange for their treaty rights. Under these circumstances, Justice Gorsuch argued, the treaty should be interpreted as the Yakama understood it. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the tax burdens possession, not travel, and that it would apply regardless of how the fuel entered the state. Under this interpretation, the tax does not impermissibly burden the treaty right. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the language of the treaty is best interpreted to mean that the Yakamas have the right to travel on public highways equal to the right that other U.S. citizens have. Thus, a state can apply any nondiscriminatory restrictions on travel without unduly burdening the treaty rights.

Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 29, 2018.Decided on Jan 8, 2019. Petitioner: Henry Schein, Inc., et al..Respondent: Archer and White Sales, Inc.. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for petitioners) Daniel L. Geyser (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, Archer & White Sales, Inc.—a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers—filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company—allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in a contract (“Dealer Agreement”) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein’s predecessor in interest. After a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement. The district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed to the Fifth Circuit. In the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, “the motion to compel arbitration should be granted in almost all cases,” except where “the argument that the claim at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is ‘wholly groundless.’” This standard requires consideration of whether there is a plausible argument for the arbitrability of the dispute. If there is no such plausible argument, “the district court may decide the ‘gateway’ issue of arbitrability despite a valid delegation clause.’” Reviewing the district court’s determinations de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. Question Does the Federal Arbitration Act permit a court to decline to enforce an agreement delegating questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator if the court concludes the claim of arbitrability is “wholly groundless”? Conclusion The “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, so the question of arbitrability should be resolved by an arbitrator, not a court. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court reiterated its prior decisions that parties to a contract have the ultimate say in whether to have an arbitrator or a court resolve disputes—not only the merits of disputes, but also questions of arbitrability. The Court found that in this contract, the parties had delegated to an arbitrator the question of arbitrability, so a court cannot override the contract and resolve such questions. The Court found unpersuasive Archer & White’s arguments to the contrary, holding that neither the text of the Act nor Congress’s intent in designing it supported a reading of the Act that empowers a court to resolve the question of arbitrability against the express wishes of the contracting parties. The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to consider the question whether the contract in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator.