Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2018.Decided on Jan 22, 2019. Petitioner: Helsinn Healthcare S.A..Respondent: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner) Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) William M. Jay (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102. The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed. The district court upheld as valid Helsinn’s patents and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “overwhelming.”   Question Does an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualify as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention? Conclusion An inventor’s sale to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential constitutes invalidating prior art. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous (9–0) Court. The patent statute in force immediately before the America Invents Act (AIA) contained an “on-sale bar” which invalidated patents that had been on sale. Applying the presumption that when Congress reenacts the same language, it adopts the earlier judicial construction of the phrase, the Court found that the AIA consequently prohibits patents that had previously been on sale. Therefore, the commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the invention confidential falls within the on-sale bar of the AIA and invalidates the patent.

Biestek v. Berryhill Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2018.Decided on Apr 1, 2019. Petitioner: Michael J. Biestek.Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration. Advocates: Ishan Bhabha (for the petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ’s determination, and the district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert. Question During an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, does a vocational expert’s testimony count as “substantial evidence” of “other work” if the expert does not provide the underlying data on which that testimony is premised? Conclusion A vocational expert’s refusal to provide the underlying private data during a Social Security disability benefits hearing does not categorically preclude the testimony from counting as “substantial evidence” in federal court. In a 6–3 opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that whether testimony amounts to “substantial evidence” requires a case-by-case determination and cannot be subject to a categorical rule as Biestek proposed in this case. “Substantial evidence” is anything more than “a mere scintilla.” Under the categorical approach proposed by Biestek, the testimony of a vocational expert who refuses a request for supporting data would never constitute substantial evidence, which is an illogical result. If there is no demand for underlying data, the vocational expert’s testimony may count as substantial evidence even without supporting data. The mere addition of a request for that data should not render the expert’s testimony categorically inadequate. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the question presented in the case required considering not only the propriety of a categorical rule but also the narrower circumstances of Biestek’s case. In this case, Justice Sotomayor argued that the expert provided only conclusory testimony that cannot alone constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusions. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, arguing that the expert’s bottom-line testimony fails to satisfy the government’s statutory burden of substantial evidence. Justice Gorsuch argued that if “clearly mistaken evidence, fake evidence, speculative evidence, and conclusory evidence aren’t substantial evidence [and federal appellate jurisprudence says they are not], the evidence here shouldn’t be either.”

Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2018.Decided on Mar 27, 2019. Petitioner: Francis V. Lorenzo.Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission. Advocates: Robert Heim (for the petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up company named Waste2Energy Holdings (W2E). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology. The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in “debentures”—which is debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E’s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company’s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million. After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo’s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “several key points” about W2E’s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “3 layers of protection,” which were: $10 million in “confirmed assets”; purchase orders and LOIs for “over $43 [million] in orders”; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “at the request of [Lorenzo’s boss]” and the other stated it was sent “at the request of [another broker with the firm].” Lorenzo’s name and title were at the bottom of both emails. The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities-fraud provisions: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Lorenzo’s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ’s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission’s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b-5(b). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo’s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ultimate authority” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court’s definition of “maker” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011). Question Does a false statement by someone who does not retain “ultimate authority” over the statement nevertheless subject the person to a fraudulent-scheme claim under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5? Conclusion Dissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud falls within the scope of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements as defined by the Court’s precedent. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the 6–2 majority opinion of the Court. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful “(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact…, or (c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), the Court held that the “maker” of a statement under subsection (b) is the person with “ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” However, one does not need to be the “maker” of a statement to be subject to subsections (a) and (b) of this rule. The Court looked to the ordinary meaning of the terms in both subsections and found that Lorenzo’s actions fall well within those subsections notwithstanding the fact that he did not “make” the statements under subsection (b). Moreover, Lorenzo’s actions are a “paradigmatic example” of securities fraud that the rule contemplates and forbids. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that the majority “eviscerate[d]” the distinction between primary and secondary liability in fraudulent-misstatement cases and “misconstrue[d]” the securities laws and the Court’s precedent. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Dawson v. Steager Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2018.Decided on Feb 20, 2019. Petitioner: James Dawson, et ux..Respondent: Dale W. Steager, West Virginia State Tax Commissioner. Advocates: Lawrence D. Rosenberg (for the petitioners) Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Lindsay S. See (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) West Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (“Section 12(c)(6)”) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if “the taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.” James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson’s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption. The Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner’s denial of the Dawsons’ 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and reversed the Office of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court’s decision, and on appeal, the state supreme court reversed. Question Does the provision of the West Virginia Code that exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals, violate 4 U.S.C. § 111? Conclusion The West Virginia law that taxes the retirement income of federal marshal but exempts from taxation state and local law enforcement officers unlawfully discriminates against federal employees, in violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court found that the state law confers a benefit to state and local retirees that federal retirees cannot receive and that there are no “significant differences between the two classes” of employees that justify differential treatment. The Court found unpersuasive the state’s arguments that the law affects too few people to meaningfully interfere with federal government operations and that the statute is not intended to harm federal retirees. The prohibition on discrimination, 4 U.S.C. § 111, applies to any state tax, not only those that are cumbersome, and the state’s purpose in adopting the discriminatory tax is irrelevant. With no meaningful distinction between retired federal marshals and state law enforcement retirees, the state cannot treat the two classes of retirees differently for purposes of taxation.

Timbs v. Indiana Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2018.Decided on Feb 20, 2019. Petitioner: Tyson Timbs.Respondent: Indiana. Advocates: Wesley P. Hottot (for the Petitioner) Thomas M. Fisher (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Tyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father’s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more miles on it than when he purchased it in January. The state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200. In addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied the state’s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under state law. Question Has the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause been incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the states. In an opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court found that the Excessive Fines Clause finds its origins in the Magna Carta, the historic English Bill of Rights, and state constitutions from the colonial era to the present day. As such, it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” As such, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Clause against—that is, applies to—the states with equal force as against the federal government. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion to acknowledge that, in his opinion, the appropriate vehicle for incorporation is the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than its Due Process Clause. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but expressly disagreeing with the majority’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to incorporate, instead finding that the Clause must be incorporated by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Carpenter v. Murphy Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 27, 2018. Petitioner: Mike Carpenter, Interim Warden.Respondent: Patrick Dwayne Murphy. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Ian H. Gershengorn (for the Respondent) Riyaz A. Kanji (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Patrick Dwayne Murphy, a member of the Creek Nation, was convicted in Oklahoma state court and sentenced to death for the 1999 murder of George Jacobs, who was a member of the same nation. Murphy’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Murphy then sought post-conviction relief on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), gave the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute murders committed by Indians in Indian Country, a term defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to include reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communities.  The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) ultimately rejected Murphy’s jurisdictional argument, ruling that the state’s jurisdiction was proper because the land where the crime occurred was not an allotment, and because Murphy had offered insufficient evidence that the land was part of a reservation or dependent Indian community. The OCCA acknowledged authority from the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals stating that the Creek Reservation still existed but reserving the matter of whether its 1866 boundaries remained intact, and declined to make a finding on the boundary question if the federal courts had not done so.  Murphy then sought habeas relief in federal district court, challenging Oklahoma’s jurisdiction on the theory that the crime had occurred in Indian Country because the land at issue was part of the Creek Reservation under § 1151(a), and because the land was an Indian allotment under § 1151(c). The district court rejected his claims, and Murphy appealed to the 10th Circuit. The federal appeals court reversed, ruling that the crime occurred on the Creek Reservation, and that the Oklahoma state courts lacked jurisdiction. As an initial matter, the court found that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the OCCA’s decisions in Murphy’s case were contrary to clearly established law, which was provided by Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). Next, applying Solem’s three-part test, the court concluded that Congress had not disestablished the Creek Reservation. The crime had therefore occurred in Indian country under § 1151(a), meaning that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction and Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction under § 1153(a). The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Murphy’s application for habeas relief under § 2254. Question Do the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)?

Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 27, 2018.Decided on Feb 26, 2019. Petitioner: Nutraceutical Corporation.Respondent: Troy Lambert. Advocates: John Hueston (for the Petitioner) Jonathan A. Herstoff (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Troy Lambert purchased an alleged aphrodisiac dietary supplement that was manufactured by Nutraceutical, but that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on the product’s labels, Lambert believed that the supplement would enhance his sexual performance, and had he known these claims were false, he would not have purchased the product.  Lambert believed that the product violated FDA regulations because it purported to increase sexual desire but had not been through clinical testing, and because it was not FDA-approved. He further alleged that the product illegally failed to prominently display this lack of FDA approval on its labeling, and that the labeling also failed to mention a potentially dangerous ingredient. Lambert filed a consumer class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(b)(3), alleging state law claims related to unfair competition, false advertising, and other violations. The district court granted class certification based on the full refund damages model, which applies when a product is useless and involves calculating the average retail price and the number of units sold. The judge hearing the case retired, and Lambert’s action was reassigned to a new judge. Discovery was completed, and Nutraceutical filed a motion for decertification. The new judge granted the motion, finding that Lambert had failed to provide essential evidence to apply his classwide damages model, meaning that common issues did not predominate as required under Rule 23(b)(3).  Ten days after the order was issued decertifying the class, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, and the court instructed him to file the motion within ten days, which was twenty days after the decertification order. In accordance with the court’s instructions, Lambert filed his motion for reconsideration ten days later, highlighting evidence from his class certification motion that could be used to support the full refund damages model. He also offered an alternative damages model for the first time, based on non-restitutionary engorgement.  Three months later, the court denied his motion for reconsideration, rejecting his proposed damages models. Lambert timely filed a petition under Rule 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s orders denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the motion for class decertification to the 9th Circuit, which conditionally granted his petition. A three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit held that Lambert’s Rule 23(f) petition for class certification had been timely filed with the appellate court. The court explained that because Rule 23(f)’s 14-day deadline was procedural rather than jurisdictional, equitable exceptions such as tolling could apply. It also held that filing a motion for reconsideration before the Rule 23(f) deadline would toll the deadline. The panel further held that other circumstances could toll the deadline. In this case, Lambert had informed the district court of his intention to file a motion for reconsideration within Rule 23(f)’s 14-day window, and had submitted the filing within the ten-day time frame set by that court. The panel concluded that under these circumstances the deadline should be tolled and Lambert’s motion for reconsideration should be considered timely filed with the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that a number of other circuits would likely reach the opposite conclusion. Question Did the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err when it ruled that equitable exceptions apply to mandatory claim-processing rules, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which sets a 14-day deadline to file a petition for permission to appeal an order granting or denying class-action certification, and can excuse a party’s failure to file timely within the deadline established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), in conflict with the rulings of the US Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits? Conclusion Rule 23(f) is a non-jurisdictional claim processing rule that is not subject to equitable tolling. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court first noted that the rule at issue is located within the rules of procedure, not in a congressionally enacted statute, which makes it a claim-processing rule. Then, the Court looked to the context of the governing rules, as well as to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and found that the relevant rules express clear intent that Rule 23(f) not be subject to equitable tolling.

Apple v. Pepper Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 26, 2018.Decided on May 13, 2019. Petitioner: Apple, Inc..Respondent: Robert Pepper, et al.. Advocates: Daniel M. Wall (for the Petitioner) Noel J. Francisco (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) David C. Frederick (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This lawsuit arose out of Apple’s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “closed system,” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “App Store.” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third-party developer, Apple receives 30% of the sale price. In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale. Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court’s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Under Illinois Brick, “only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick and thus have standing. Question May consumers sue for antitrust damages against anyone who delivers goods to them, even where they seek damages based on prices set by third parties who would be the immediate victims of the alleged offense? Conclusion Consumers who purchase goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices from an allegedly monopolistic retailer may sue the retailer under antitrust law. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court held that the plaintiff iPhone owners in this case, who purchased apps through Apple’s App Store, are direct purchasers under the Court’s precedential case Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and thus may sue Apple. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), provides that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue.” The Court has previously interpreted this provision to mean that “immediate buyers” from the alleged antitrust violators may sue the antitrust violators, but “indirect purchasers” (those who are two or more steps removed from the violator in a distribution chain) may not. The plaintiff iPhone owners in this case are not so distantly removed from Apple to foreclose a lawsuit; the Court found the absence of an intermediary between the consumers and Apple to be dispositive. This interpretation is consistent not only with the statutory text and the Court’s precedent, but also the policy behind antitrust law. To hold otherwise would “provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers” to evade antitrust law. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. The dissent argues that Illinois Brick broadly prohibits “pass on” theories of damages for antitrust violations, rather than the narrower reading based in contract embraced by the majority. As such, the dissent would find that the suit by the plaintiff consumers here is precisely the type of lawsuit proscribed in Illinois Brick.

Nieves v. Bartlett Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 26, 2018.Decided on May 28, 2019. Petitioner: Luis A. Nieves, et al..Respondent: Russell P. Bartlett. Advocates: Dario Borghesan (for the Petitioners) Jeffrey B. Wall (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Zane D. Wilson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Russell Bartlett was arrested by Alaska state troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight for disorderly conduct and harassment. Bartlett subsequently sued the officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, making claims including false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the retaliatory arrest claim, explaining that under its own precedent, a showing of probable cause did not preclude a claim of retaliatory arrest. The appellate court noted that in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had clarified that its decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff could not make a retaliatory prosecution claim if the charges were supported by probable cause, did not necessarily extend to retaliatory arrests. And since that time, the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff could make a retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting officers had probable cause. Question Does probable cause defeat a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? Conclusion The presence of probable cause for an arrest defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion. To prevail on a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, the plaintiff must show that the official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the motive was the “but-for” cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The Court looked to analogous situations to determine how to identify whether improper motive caused the injury: the torts of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Analysis of motive of these torts supports the conclusion that the presence of probable cause should defeat a retaliatory arrest claim, regardless of the subjective motive of the arresting officer. Thus, if the officer has probable cause, then even the presence of a retaliatory motive motive is irrelevant unless the plaintiff presents “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been” (an equal protection, rather than First Amendment, argument). Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion as to all but Part II-D (in which the Court described a narrow qualification for the situation in which officers have probable cause for an arrest but exercise discretion not to do so). He wrote separately to concur in part and concur in the judgment. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

Culbertson v. Berryhill Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2018.Decided on Jan 8, 2019. Petitioner: Richard Allen Culbertson.Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration. Advocates: Daniel R. Ortiz (for petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent, in support of reversal and remand) Amy L. Weil (Court-appointed amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Attorney Richard Culbertson represented four plaintiffs appealing denials of Social Security benefits. After successfully challenging all four denials, Culbertson asked the district court to award him attorney’s fees in those cases under 42 U.S.C. § 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) pertain to proceedings in court, and are statutorily limited to 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives. Fees awarded under § 406(a) pertain to administrative proceedings; that section does not explicitly limit the fee amount that the Social Security Commissioner can award in that context. In ruling on Culbertson’s fee requests, the district court relied on 11th Circuit precedent limiting the total fee amount awarded under both § 406(a) and 406(b) to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimants. This meant that in one case his fee award was limited to 25% of the past-due benefits, in two cases the district court declined to rule on the § 406(b) fee award until the Commissioner ruled on the §406(a) award (so as to not award him an amount that exceeded 25% of the past-due benefits), and that in the final case, the court granted his § 406(b) request but barred him from requesting any further fees under § 406(a), again seeking to prevent him from exceeding the 25% cap.  In his appeal, Culbertson contended that other circuits have not applied this 25% cap to the aggregate fee amount awardable under both § 406(a) and (b), but instead applied that limit only to § 406(b) fees. The 11th Circuit rejected this argument, applying its prior precedent to affirm the district court’s ruling. Question Do fees subject to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap related to the representation of individuals claiming Social Security benefits include only fees for representation in court, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have held, or do they also include fees for representation before the agency, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits have held? Conclusion In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap applies only to fees for court representation and not to the aggregate fees awarded under subsections (a) and (b). Section 406(b) authorizes a court rendering a favorable judgment to a claimant “represented before the court by an attorney” to award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent” of past-due benefits. By using the language “such representation,” the Court found, the statute refers only to the representation already described in that section—that is, representation before the court. The cap, therefore, applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency. Moreover, the Court opined that had Congress intended to cap fees for agency-stage representation, it would have included the same language that appears in § 406(b) in § 406(a). The Court found unpersuasive the argument that the agency’s pool of 25 percent of past-due benefits supported a reading of a cap on the aggregate fees. The language of the statute provides for two pools, and the agency chose to maintain only one.