Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2019.Decided on Jun 24, 2019. Petitioner: Food Marketing Institute.Respondent: Argus Leader Media, d/b/a Argus Media. Advocates: Evan A. Young (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of Petitioner) Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA. Argus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to the contested data, and remanded the case back to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4—which covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”—applied to the information sought. For the purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of “confidential” different from the term’s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the source of the information. There is a circuit split as to what “substantial competitive harm” means. The district court in this case adopted the definition from the DC Circuit, which has held that “competitive harm may be established if there is evidence of ‘actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury.’”  Appling that definition to the facts at hand, the court found speculative the USDA’s claims of competitive injury and entered judgment for Argus. The USDA decided not to appeal the judgment, so petitioner Food Marketing Institute (FMI) intervened and filed the appeal. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Question Does the statutory term “confidential” in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 4, bear its ordinary meaning? Or, if it does not, what constitutes “substantial competitive harm” for the purpose of determining whether information falls within FOIA Exemption 4? Conclusion Where commercial or financial information is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of privacy, the information is “confidential” within the meaning of Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court first looked to whether the Food Marketing Institute had standing to appeal. The Institute would suffer financial injury as a result of disclosure, such injury would be the direct consequence of a judgment ordering disclosure, and a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court in this case would redress that injury. As such, the Court concluded the Institute has standing. At the time FOIA was enacted, the term “confidential” meant “private” or “secret.” For information that is communicated from one party to another, that means that (1) the information is customarily kept private, and (2) the party receiving it has provided some assurance that it will remain private. In this case, it is uncontested that retailers customarily keep private the type of information at issue. Thus, under the plain meaning of the term, the information is “confidential.” In giving the word “confidential” a different meaning in National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the DC Circuit inappropriately relied on legislative history rather than first going to the statute’s text and structure. The concept of “substantial competitive harm” that the DC Circuit developed is based not on statutory language but on testimony of witnesses in congressional hearings on a different bill that was never enacted. Additionally, while true that courts should “narrowly construe” FOIA exemptions, courts cannot arbitrarily constrict Exemption 4 by adding limitations found nowhere in its text. Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer articulated a third condition for finding confidentiality in addition to the two described by the majority: “release of such information must cause genuine harm to the owner’s economic or business interests.” While Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the “substantial competitive harm” rule from the DC Circuit is unworkable, he argued that the majority incorrectly interpreted Exemption 4 as having no harm requirement whatsoever. According to Justice Breyer, “the language permits, and the purpose, precedent, and context all suggest, an interpretation that insists upon some showing of harm.”

Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2019.Decided on Jun 3, 2019. Petitioner: Fort Bend County, Texas.Respondent: Lois M. Davis. Advocates: Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner) Raffi Melkonian (for the Respondent) Jonathan C. Bond (for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Lois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director’s resignation, her supervisor—who was a personal friend of the director—retaliated against her for making the complaint. Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “previous religious commitment,” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis submitted to the Commission an “intake questionnaire” in which she wrote in the word “religion” next to a checklist labeled “Employment Harms or Actions” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis’s religious discrimination claim with prejudice. Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement (which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived) or merely a prerequisite to suit (and thus subject to waiver). Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), in which the Court held that the Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Question Is Title VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, as three circuits have held, or a waivable claim-processing rule, as eight circuits have held? Conclusion Title VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is a waivable claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. Jurisdictional requirements are generally quite narrow and refer either to the classes of cases a court may hear (as in subject matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise its authority (personal jurisdiction). Claim-processing rules, in contrast, broadly require parties to take certain steps in or prior to litigation. The requirement in Title VII that the complainant exhaust all administrative remedies appears in provisions separate and distinct from the parts of that statute that confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear such claims. The administrative-exhaustion requirement is more similar to other types of rules that the Court has held nonjurisdictional, such as the directions to raise objections in an agency rulemaking procedure before asserting them in court or to follow copyright registration procedures before suing for infringement.

McDonough v. Smith Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2019.Decided on Jun 20, 2019. Petitioner: Edward G. McDonough.Respondent: Youel Smith. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner) Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, as amicus curiae) Thomas J. O'Connor (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) During the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged. After the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal on December 21, 2012. On December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim. The district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough’s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the precedent in that circuit established that the statute of limitations begins to run on a fabrication of evidence claim when the plaintiff has “reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” The Second Circuit acknowledged that Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held otherwise but expressly disagreed with those decisions. Question Was the Second Circuit correct in holding, contrary to the holdings of a majority of other circuits, that the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fabrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of the tainted evidence and its improper use? Conclusion Contrary to the holding of the Second Circuit, below, the statute of limitations for McDonough’s § 1983 fabricated evidence claim began to run when the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor—that is, when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The question of when a claim begins to accrue is presumptively when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. The claimed right here is a constitutional due process right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of a government official’s fabrication of evidence. To determine when accrual begins, the Court considered the analogous tort of malicious prosecution. Under common law, malicious prosecution accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, largely because (1) this policy for accrual avoids parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter (and the resulting possibility of conflicting judgments), and (2) it also avoids collateral civil attacks on criminal judgments. Both of these rationales hold true for McDonough’s fabricated-evidence claim and thus support applying the same accrual rule. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that because McDonough did not identify the specific constitutional right that was violated, the Court should have dismissed the case as improvidently granted.

United States v. Davis Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2019.Decided on Jun 24, 2019. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover. Advocates: Eric J. Feigin (for the petitioner) Brandon E. Beck (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause. Question Is the subsection-specific definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)—which applies only in the limited context of a federal criminal prosecution for possessing, using or carrying a firearm in connection with acts comprising such a crime—unconstitutionally vague? Conclusion Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which provides enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a “crime of violence,” is unconstitutionally vague. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The Court recently decided two cases in which it was asked to interpret so-called residual clauses. In Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), the Court held that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. In Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court held that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16 was also unconstitutionally vague. In both of those cases, the Court interpreted the statute to require courts to use a “categorical approach” to determine “whether an offense qualified as a violent felony or crime of violence.” This categorical approach prevented judges from considering how the defendant actually committed the offense and weigh instead only the crime’s “ordinary case.” The residual clause at issue here is nearly identical to the one held to require a categorical approach in Dimaya, and the Court found no good reason to interpret it differently. The phrase “by its nature” compels the categorical approach, and to understand the nearly identical language of 18 U.S.C. § 16 differently would “make a hash of the federal criminal code.” The history of the statute, too, supports this interpretation of the clause, and the Court has never invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance, as the government advocated, to expand the reach of a criminal statute to save it. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, and in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined in part. The dissenters argued that the residual clause in this case is fundamentally different from those struck down in Johnson and Dimaya because those cases involved sentencing based on prior convictions, whereas this one focuses only on current conduct during the presently charged crime. Justices Kavanaugh and Alito (without the Chief Justice) also warned of the dire consequences of the Court’s decision.

North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 16, 2019.Decided on Jun 21, 2019. Petitioner: North Carolina Department of Revenue.Respondent: The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust. Advocates: Matthew W. Sawchak (for the petitioner) David A. O'Neil (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice’s descendants as the primary beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice’s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“the Trust”), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed. The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “minimum contacts” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non-contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed. Question Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit states from taxing trusts based on trust beneficiaries’ in-state residency? Conclusion The Due Process Clause prohibits a state from taxing trust income based solely on its beneficiaries' in-state residency. If the income has not been distributed to the beneficiaries and the beneficiaries have no right to demand that income and are uncertain to receive it, the state has no power to tax the trust income. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Due Process Clause permits a state to collect taxes only if there is “some definite link, or some minimum connection” between the state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax. The crux of this question is whether the government’s taxation action is reasonable. In the context of a trust beneficiary, the answer turns on the extent to which the beneficiary controls or possesses the property to be taxed and the relationship of that property to the state. The trust income income at issue in this case does not meet the minimum connection necessary to support the state tax because the beneficiaries did not actually receive any income from the trust during the years in question, nor could they exercise control over it. Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito emphasized that the opinion in this case merely applies existing precedent and leaves unchanged the governing standard and the reasoning applied in earlier cases.

Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 16, 2019.Decided on Jun 10, 2019. Petitioner: Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd..Respondent: Brian Newton. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (for the Unted States, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioner) David C. Frederick (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Respondent Brian Newton worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California’s laws offered Newton no protections. A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal on the pleadings, finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is “applicable” and “not inconsistent” with federal law. California’s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims. Question Does the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act permit the application of state law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law, or whenever state law pertains to the subject matter of the lawsuit and is not preempted by inconsistent federal law? Conclusion The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) permits the application of state law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law; if federal law addresses the issue, state law is inapplicable. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The OCSLA extends “the Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States” to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) “to the same extent as if” the OCS were “an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.” Further, the OCSLA commands that state laws be adopted as federal law on the OCS “to the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” other federal law. Newton argued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that state law is “applicable” whenever it pertains to the subject matter at issue, and it is “inconsistent” only if it is incompatible with the federal scheme—that is, only if it would be preempted under the Court’s ordinary preemption principles. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, favoring instead Parker’s argument that state law is “applicable” only if there is a gap in federal law that needs to be filled and that state law may be “inconsistent” with federal law even if it is possible for a party to satisfy both sets of laws. For example, although the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) generally gives way to more protective state wage-and-hour laws, such state laws are inconsistent with the FLSA when adopting them as surrogate federal law would produce two different standards. The Court found this approach to preemption more persuasive because the two terms “applicable” and “not inconsistent” must be read together and interpreted “in light of the entire statute.” Under this standard, some of Newton’s claims fail for relying on California law rather than federal law. The Court remanded the remaining claims for further consideration in light of this standard.

Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2019.Decided on Apr 23, 2019. Petitioner: Emulex Corporation, et al..Respondent: Gary Varjabedian and Jerry Mutza. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the petitioners) Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae) Daniel L. Geyser (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Emulex Corp., a Delaware company that sold computer components, and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc., announced in February 2015 that they had entered into a merger agreement, with Avago offering to pay $8.00 for every share of outstanding Emulex stock, which was 26.4% higher than the value of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Emerald Merger Sub, Inc., initiated a tender offer for Emulex’s outstanding stock in April 2015. (A tender offer is a type of takeover bid in which the offeror publicly offers to purchase a specified amount of the target company’s stock, usually at a price higher than market value.) It is customary for the target company to issue a statement to shareholders recommending that they either accept or reject the tender offer. Before issuing such a statement, Emulex hired Goldman Sachs to determine whether the proposed merger agreement would be fair to shareholders. Goldman Sachs determined that it would be fair, despite a below-average merger premium, and Emulex issued a statement consistent with that determination. Some of the shareholders were unhappy with the merger’s terms and brought a class action lawsuit against Emulex, Avago, Merger Sub, and the Emulex Board of Directors, alleging violations of federal securities laws. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the lead plaintiff’s claim under Section 14(e) did not plead the requisite mental culpability for claims under that section, the separate claim under Section 14(d) failed because that section does not establish a private right of action for shareholders confronted with a tender offer, and its Section 20(a) claim because its first two claims were insufficient. Reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision as to the Section 14(e) claim (but affirmed as to the Section 14(d) claim). Citing the US Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the five other circuits that have interpreted Section 14(e). Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, claims under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) require a showing of negligence, not scienter (intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). Question Did the Ninth Circuit correctly hold, in contrast to the holdings of five other federal appellate courts, that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on the negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer? Conclusion The writ was dismissed as improvidently granted.

Iancu v. Brunetti Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2019.Decided on Jun 24, 2019. Petitioner: Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office.Respondent: Erik Brunetti. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the petitioner) John R. Sommer (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “fuct,” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter (the pronunciation of “fuct” sounds like a vulgar word) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, that section’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. Question Does Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion The Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks infringes the First Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. In Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. __ (2017), the Court held that a prohibition on registration of marks based on their viewpoint violates the First Amendment, and that a provision of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of “disparaging” marks was viewpoint based. A prohibition on the registration of marks that are “immoral” or “scandalous”—at issue in this case—is similarly viewpoint based and therefore violates the First Amendment. The prohibition distinguishes between ideas aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to them, which is the epitome of viewpoint-based discrimination. The Court rejected the government’s proposal that the statute is susceptible to a limiting construction that would remove its viewpoint bias. The language of the statute does not support such a reading and to interpret it as such would be to “fashion a new one.” Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence to highlight the importance of the Court continuing to affirm the principle that the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination. Justice Alito noted that Congress can adopt “a more carefully focused statute” that would prohibit the registration of “vulgar” marks without violating the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Chief Justice argued that while he agreed with the majority that the “immoral” portion of the statute was not susceptible to a narrowing construction but agreed with Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s argument in favor of such a construction with respect to the “scandalous” portion. Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed with the majority as to “immoral” but disagreed as to “scandalous.” Justice Breyer advocated against the categorical approach to First Amendment speech issues and for an approach that considers “whether the regulation at issue works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”  Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Breyer joined. While Justice Sotomayor conceded that the majority’s construction of the statute is a reasonable one, it is not the only reasonable one and erroneously treats “immoral and scandalous” as a “unified standard.” She argued for a narrowing construction of the prohibition on “scandalous” marks to address only “obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.” Such a construction would save the provision and avoid the “rush to register [vulgar, profine, and obscene] trademarks” that the Court’s decision makes probable.

Kisor v. Wilkie Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2019.Decided on Jun 26, 2019. Petitioner: James L. Kisor.Respondent: Robert L. Wilkie. Advocates: Paul W. Hughes (for the petitioner) Noel J. Francisco (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to “reopen” a denial by “submitting new and material evidence.” In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were not associated with his file. Notably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to “reconsider” a previously denied claim in the event that it “receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed. The VA’s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The VA found that the additional documents (Kisor’s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as “relevant” for purposes of this section because it did not “suggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.” In the VA’s view, records are not “relevant” when they are not “outcome determinative.” Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed as well. Question Should Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), be overruled? Conclusion Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)—which direct courts to give deference to an agency’s reasonable reading of its own genuinely ambiguous regulations—are not overruled. Justice Elena Kagan announced the judgment and delivered an opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined.  Chief Justice Roberts joined in part, forming a majority of the Court for those parts. Justice Kagan, writing for the 5-4 majority, first described the history of the case before it arrived before the Court. Then, writing for a four-justice plurality, she described other examples of ambiguous regulations and explained the history of the doctrine of Auer deference. She explained that Auer deference is “rooted in a presumption that Congress would generally want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory ambiguities” because agencies are best equipped to interpret the often-technical regulations at issue. Writing again for the majority, Kagan continued to outline the requirements that must be met for Auer deference to apply: First, a court should not afford an agency Auer deference unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, a determination the court can make only after it has exhausted all the traditional tools of construction. Second, the agency’s reading must be reasonable, under the text, structure, and history of the regulation. Notwithstanding some courts’ interpretation to the contrary, the language “plainly erroneous” from Seminole Rock does not mean that agency constructions of rules are entitled to greater deference than agency constructions of statutes. Third, the regulatory interpretation must be one actually made by the agency; that is, it must be the agency’s authoritative or official position, not merely an ad hoc statement. Fourth, the interpretation must in some way implicate the agency’s substantive expertise, and fifth, it must reflect “fair and considered judgment.” On behalf of the plurality, Kagan went on to address Kisor’s arguments. She explained that Auer is not inconsistent with the judicial review provision of the APA, nor does it circumvent the APA’s rulemaking requirements. Contrary to Kisor’s arguments, Kagan cited empirical evidence to support her position that Auer does not encourage agencies to issue vague and open-ended interpretations of those rules they prefer. Finally, she quickly dispensed of Kisor’s argument that it violates separation-of-powers principles. On behalf of the majority, Kagan wrote that the doctrine of stare decisis cuts strongly against Kisor’s position. There is no “special justification” to reverse Auer, and even if the Court were wrong about its presumption of what Congress would want, Congress can correct it. Applying the principles outlined in the opinion, a redo is necessary for two reasons: The Federal Circuit “jumped the gun” in declaring the regulation ambiguous, and it also “assumed too fast” that Auer deference should apply in the event of genuine ambiguity. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurrence in part to reiterate Justice Kagan’s assertion that overturning Auer and Seminole Rock was not warranted. He also noted that the cases in which Auer deference is appropriate largely overlap with cases in which it would be unreasonable for a court to be persuaded by an agency's interpretation of its own regulation. He pointed out that the gulf between the majority’s position and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is not so great as it may initially appear. Justice Neil Gorsuch penned a separate opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined and Justice Samuel Alito joined in part, concurring in the judgment but highly critical of Justice Kagan’s opinion. On behalf of himself and three other justices, Justice Gorsuch wrote a history of Auer deference, describing the decision and resulting doctrine “an accident.” He went on to explain that Auer is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and the separation of powers principle. On behalf of himself and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch responded to Justice Kagan’s public policy considerations and argued that while the majority gave lip service to stare decisis, it effectively changed the test set forth in precedents—which effectively overrules it in all but name. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. In his opinion, Justice Kavanaugh emphasizes two points: first, he reiterates the Chief Justice’s point that “the distance between” the two main opinions in this case “is not as great as it may initially appear,” and second, he expresses agreement with the Chief Justice that the decision in this case addresses only judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations, and not at all judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes.

Rucho v. Common Cause Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2019.Decided on Jun 27, 2019. Appellant: Robert A. Rucho, et al..Appellee: Common Cause, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the appellants) Emmet J. Bondurant, II (for the appellees, Common Cause, et al.) Allison J. Riggs (for the appellees, League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Question Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to pursue their partisan gerrymandering claims? Are the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable? Is North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander? Conclusion Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the Court for sidestepping a critical question involving the violation of “the most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” Justice Kagan argued that by not intervening in the political gerrymanders, the Court effectively “encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction” that “may irreparably damage our system of government.” She argued that the standards adopted in lower courts across the country do meet the contours of the “limited and precise standard” the majority demanded yet purported not to find. This case was consolidated with Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-726, and the Court released a single opinion resolving both cases.