Supreme Court Oral Arguments

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2019.Decided on Jun 15, 2020. Petitioner: R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc..Respondent: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.. Advocates: David D. Cole (for respondent Aimee Stephens) John J. Bursch (for the petitioner) Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent EEOC, supporting reversal) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home’s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated. Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes. The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home’s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Question Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination against transgender employees based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)? Conclusion An employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.  Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).

Bostock v. Clayton County Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2019.Decided on Jun 15, 2020. Petitioner: Gerald Lynn Bostock.Respondent: Clayton County, Georgia. Advocates: Pamela S. Karlan (for the petitioner in 17-1618 and the respondent in 17-1623) Jeffrey M. Harris (for the respondent in 17-1618 and the petitioner in 17-1623) Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance in 17-1618 and reversal in 17-1623) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting  procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision. This case is consolidated for oral argument with Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1623. Question Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompass discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation? Conclusion An employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.  Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).

Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2019.Decided on Dec 12, 2019. Petitioner: Laura Peter, Deputy Director, Patent and Trademark Office.Respondent: NantKwest, Inc.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner) Morgan Chu (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2001, Dr. Hans Klingemann filed a patent application with the US Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) describing a method for treating cancer using natural killer cells. Dr. Klingemann assigned his application to NantKwest Inc., and in 2010, the examiner rejected the application as obvious. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirmed the rejection. When the Board affirms an examiner’s rejection of a patent application, the applicant may either appeal directly to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or challenge the Board’s decision in district court (under 35 U.S.C. § 145). Pursuant to § 145, NantKwest challenged the Board’s decision by filing a complaint in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The court granted the PTO’s motion for summary judgment, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. After its victory on the merits, PTO filed a motion for reimbursement of “the expenses of the proceedings” under § 145, including almost $80,000 in attorney’s fees and over $33,000 in expert witness fees. Applicants who invoke § 145 are required by statute to pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the PTO in defending the Board’s decision, regardless of the outcome. Historically, the PTO has used this requirement to recover payment for expenses such as travel, printing, and expert witnesses. The district court denied PTO’s motion with respect to attorney’s fees, citing the American Rule—a “bedrock principle” in this country that “each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose” unless there is an “express grant from Congress.” A panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, and then the circuit voted to hear the appeal en banc. After requesting briefing on the single question whether § 145 authorizes award of attorney’s fees, the en banc Federal Circuit concluded that it does not, affirming the district court. Question Does the phrase “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” in 35 U.S.C. § 145 include attorneys’ fees? Conclusion The Patent and Trademark Office cannot recover the salaries of its legal personnel as “expenses” in civil actions brought by patent applicants pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Under the “American Rule,” there is a presumption that each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. That presumption is particularly important in the context of proceedings challenging the rejection of a patent application because allowing the agency to recover fees from a prevailing party would be a “radical departure” from the norm. The plain text—use of the word “expenses”—does not provide adequate basis from departing from the strong presumption that the American Rule applies. Nor does the history of the Patent Act support such an expansive reading of the term.

Kahler v. Kansas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2019.Decided on Mar 23, 2020. Petitioner: James K. Kahler.Respondent: Kansas. Advocates: Sarah Schrup (for the petitioner) Toby Crouse (for the respondent) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed. In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife’s grandmother’s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler’s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “completely lost control.” Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions.” The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Question May a state abolish the insanity defense without violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Yes; due process does not require Kansas to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his crime was morally wrong. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for a 6-3 majority of the Court. The Court acknowledged that for hundreds of years, judges have recognized that a criminal defendant’s insanity at the time of the commission of a criminal act can relieve criminal responsibility. And while the Kansas law at issue does make irrelevant the question of moral incapacity, it still permits mental illness as a defense to culpability if it prevented a defendant from forming the criminal intent required for commission of the crime. The Court has repeatedly declined to adopt one particular version of the insanity defense, and it declined to do so in this case, as well. No single version of the insanity defense has become so ingrained in American law as to be “fundamental,” and states retain the authority to define the precise relationship between criminal culpability and mental illness. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that Kansas did not merely redefine the insanity defense; it “eliminated the core” of a defense “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” He provided several hypotheticals to illustrate his point that Kansas’s version of the insanity defense “requires conviction of a broad swath of defendants who are obviously insane and would be adjudged not guilty under any traditional form of the defense.” As such, he would conclude that Kansas’s law violates a “fundamental precept of our criminal law” and thus is unconstitutional.

Ramos v. Louisiana Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2019.Decided on Apr 20, 2020. Petitioner: Evangelisto Ramos.Respondent: State of Louisiana. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner) Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Evangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Ramos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review. Question Does the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict against the states? Conclusion The Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states, requires that a jury find a criminal defendant guilty by a unanimous verdict. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the primary opinion. In Part I, Justice Neil Gorsuch (writing for a majority: himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Brett Kavanaugh) noted that the original public meaning of the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury, as well as its history, support an interpretation that it requires guilt be determined by a unanimous jury. Because this right is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” it is incorporated against the states (that is, it applies to state governments as well) by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in state court. In Part II-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the same majority, explained how the Court’s jurisprudence came to allow Oregon and Louisiana to permit non-unanimous jury verdicts, describing the fractured plurality opinions in those cases (Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana) with a fifth vote from Justice Lewis Powell that was “neither here nor there” but effectively permitted those states to proceed with non-unanimous jury verdicts. In Part II-B, Justice Gorsuch wrote for a plurality of the Court (himself, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor), describing the confusion surrounding the Apodaca decision and the apparent conflict in the Court’s precedent as to whether the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts. In Part III, Justice Gorsuch, again writing for the majority, rejected Louisana’s arguments for non-unanimous jury verdicts, finding that the drafting history of the Sixth Amendment is ambiguous at best, the Apodaca plurality’s reasoning was “skimpy,” and most importantly, that the Apodaca plurality “subjected the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” In Part IV-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for a plurality (himself and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer), addressed the dissent’s argument that the principle of stare decisis required the Court to stand by its decision in Apodaca and uphold Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury law. Justice Gorsuch argued that under no view can the plurality opinion in Apodaca be controlling on today’s Court. Writing again for a majority in Part IV-B-1, Justice Gorsuch noted that even if the Court accepted the premise that Apodaca established a precedent, no one on the Court today would say it was rightly decided, and “stare decisis isn’t supposed to be the art of methodically ignoring what everyone knows to be true.” For the four-justice plurality (Justice Kavanaugh did not join this part), Justice Gorsuch in Part IV-B-2 addressed the reliance interest Louisiana and Oregon have in the security of their final criminal judgments. Justice Gorsuch minimized the significance of the state’s reliance interests and pointed instead to the reliance interests of the American people in having a just criminal jury that uniformly requires a unanimous verdict for a finding of guilt. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part IV-A, writing separately to raise three points: “First, overruling precedent here is not only warranted, but compelled. Second, the interests at stake point far more clearly to that outcome than those in other recent cases. And finally, the racially biased origins of the Louisiana and Oregon laws uniquely matter here.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote an opinion concurring in part to explain his view of how stare decisis applies in this case, laying out seven factors, which he argued, support overruling Apodaca in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas noted from the outset that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury includes protection against non-unanimous jury verdicts and would thus resolve the question there. He would further find that the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, but would find that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates it against the states. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, and which Justice Elena Kagan joined as to all but Part III-D. Justice Alito argued that stare decisis requires following Apodaca and that in overruling that case, the majority “cast[] aside an important and long-established decision with little regard for the enormous reliance the decision has engendered.” In the part of the dissent that Justice Kagan did not join, Justice Alito argued that the reliance in this case “far outstrips” the reliance interests in other recent cases where the dissenters in those cases claimed reliance interests.

Quarles v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2019.Decided on Jun 10, 2019. Petitioner: Jamar Alonzo Quarles.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeremy C. Marwell (for the petitioner) Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months’ incarceration. Under federal law, a generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles’s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent-upon-entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third-degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary. Question Does the generic definition of burglary, established by the US Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), require proof that intent to commit a crime was present at the time of unlawful entry or first unlawful remaining, or only that the defendant formed such intent while “remaining in” the building or structure? Conclusion The generic definition of burglary in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) includes, if state law permits it, any unlawful “remaining in” presence in a building or structure “when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court first looked to the ordinary usage of the phrase “remaining in,” finding that it refers to a continuous activity. Additionally, a majority of state burglary statutes encompassed the “remaining in” concept at the time the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was passed, and all five of the state appellate courts that had addressed the question of timing had embraced the “at any time” position. Finally, the Court considered the purpose of the ACCA—to require enhanced imprisonment terms for repeat “armed career criminals”—would be frustrated if the Court adopted the narrower interpretation requiring intent to be present at the time of the unlawful entry. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurrence to reiterate his view that the Court should revisit its “categorical approach” to the enumerated-offenses clause of the ACCA.

Taggart v. Lorenzen Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2019.Decided on Jun 3, 2019. Petitioner: Bradley Weston Taggart.Respondent: Shelley A. Lorenzen, et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the petitioner) Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, “[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.” Petitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman. Emmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC’s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys’ fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees. In November 2009, shortly before the case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings. After the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart’s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart’s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys’ fees, which led to yet more complicated litigation in state and federal courts. Brown, the attorney for Emmert and Jehnke, filed a petition for attorneys’ fees in state court on behalf of SPBC, Emmert, and Jehnke, against both Berman and Taggart, but limiting fees against Taggart to those incurred after the date of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge. The petition notified the court of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge but argued he could still be liable for attorneys’ fees on the theory that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” While the attorneys’ fee petition was pending in state court, Taggart sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court. Once reopened, Taggart asked the court to hold Brown, Jehnke, Emmert, and SPBC (collectively the “Creditors”) in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge by seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against him in the state court action. The state court ruled that Taggart had “returned to the fray” as a matter of law, so he could be held liable for attorneys’ fees incurred after his bankruptcy. Taggart timely appealed the state-court determination. Subsequently, the bankruptcy court denied Taggart’s motion for contempt, agreeing with the state court that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” On appeal, the district court reversed, finding that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus the discharge injunction barred the claim against him for attorneys’ fees. The district court remanded for a determination whether the Creditors had “knowingly violated the discharge injunction in seeking attorneys’ fees.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found they had knowingly violated the discharge injunction and thus held them in contempt. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) reversed the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt, finding they had a good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorneys’ fee claim. Back in state court, the state appellate court found that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus reversed the state trial court as to its ruling on attorneys’ fees. As a result, the federal district court and the state appellate court both agreed that the Creditors could not pursue attorneys’ fees against Taggart, and the BAP’s ruling freed them from being held in contempt for knowingly violating the discharge injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s opinion, holding that the Creditors did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction and thus could not be held in contempt because they had a subjective good-faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their state-court claim for attorneys’ fees. Question Does the bankruptcy code preclude a finding of civil contempt where a creditor’s believes in good faith that the discharge injunction does not apply? Conclusion The bankruptcy code allows a court to hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The bankruptcy code states that a discharge order “operates as an injunction” and that a court may issue any “order” or “judgment” that is “necessary or appropriate” to “carry out” other bankruptcy provisions. In other, non-bankruptcy contexts, the Court has held that civil contempt is inappropriate where there is “a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.” The Court found no reason that this principle should not apply equally in a bankruptcy context. Thus, civil contempt is appropriate only if the creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order. Because the Ninth Circuit below applied a different standard in determining whether civil contempt was appropriate, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Department of Commerce v. New York Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2019.Decided on Jun 27, 2019. Petitioner: United States Department of Commerce, et al..Respondent: State of New York, et al.. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for Petitioners) Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of Respondents, New York, et al.) Dale E. Ho (on behalf of Respondents, New York Immigration Coalition, et al.) Douglas N. Letter (on behalf of the United States House of Representatives, as amicus curiae, in support of the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could cause a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions. As part of its challenge, the challengers sought—and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized—depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross’s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue. On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government’s previous stay application without prejudice, “provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken.” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high-ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed. The government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact-finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below. Before the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction. Question Did the district court err in enjoining the Secretary of Commerce from reinstating a question about citizenship to the 2020 census questionnaire? In an action seeking to set aside agency action, may a district court order discovery outside the administrative record to probe the mental processes of the agency decision maker—including by compelling the testimony of high-ranking Executive Branch officials—when there is no evidence that the decision maker disbelieved the objective reasons in the administrative record, irreversibly prejudged the issue, or acted on a legally forbidden basis? Conclusion The Secretary of Commerce did not violate the Enumeration Clause or the Census Act in deciding to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 census questionnaire, but the District Court was warranted in remanding the case to the agency where the evidence tells a story that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the divided Court. As to the question of standing, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the district court’s finding that reinstating a citizenship question on the census would likely result in noncitizen households responding to the census at lower rates, causing them to be undercounted and subsequently to lose federal funds, constituted a concrete and imminent injury. Writing for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Enumeration Clause permits Congress, and by extension the Secretary of Commerce, to inquire about citizenship on the census questionnaire. In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted the “long and consistent historical practice” of Congress to exercise “broad authority” over the census. Then, the Chief Justice, writing for a 6-3 majority (Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan), held that the Secretary’s decision is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While The Census Act gives “broad authority” to the Secretary to administer the census, his discretion is not without limits. The APA exempts from judicial review agency actions that are discretionary, but “the taking of the census is not one of those areas.” Because the Census Act provides general requirements for agency decisionmaking, the Secretary’s decision is subject to judicial review. Writing for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion in deciding to reinstate the citizenship question. The Chief Justice noted that the Secretary conducted an analysis weighing the value of obtaining more complete and accurate citizenship data against the uncertain risk that reinstating a citizenship question would result in a lower response rate. Because his decision to reinstate the question was reasonable and reasonably explained, it was not “arbitrary and capricious.” Again writing for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Secretary did not violate the Census Act, reversing the district court’s ruling to the contrary. Section 6 of the Census Act authorizes the Secretary to acquire administrative records from other federal agencies and state and local governments and requires him to use that data rather than conducting direct inquiries, to the extent possible. Assuming that § 6 applied, the Chief Justice found that the Secretary complied with it for the same reasons he found the Secretary’s decision not “arbitrary and capricious”—that is, administrative records were insufficient to provide the requested citizenship data. Even if he had not complied with it, his decision would constitute harmless error because “he fully informed Congress of, and explained, his decision.” Finally, writing for himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Chief Justice affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the action to the agency. A court generally is limited to the existing administrative record, but it may inquire into “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers upon a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.” Although the district court was premature in invoking that exception, the Chief Justice agreed with its ultimate conclusion that the decision to reinstate a citizenship question “cannot adequately be explained.” The Chief Justice pointed to evidence “that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision,” and given these “unusual circumstances,” concluded that the district court correctly remanded the action to the agency. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas criticized the Court for its holding, in his characterization, that “the Secretary’s stated rationale did not factor at all into his decision.” Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the Secretary’s decision to add the citizenship question was arbitrary and capricious and therefore violated the APA, regardless of whether the decision was pretextual. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely criticizing the Court for getting involved in the policy question whether a citizenship question should be included on the census and whether the reasons given by the Secretary were his only reasons or his real reasons. He argued that the Court has “no authority to decide whether the Secretary’s decision was rendered in compliance with the . . . APA.”

Mitchell v. Wisconsin Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2019.Decided on Jun 27, 2019. Petitioner: Gerald P. Mitchell.Respondent: State of Wisconsin. Advocates: Andrew R. Hinkel (for the Petitioner) Hannah S. Jurss (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222. Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts. Mitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it. Question Does a statute that authorizes a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provide an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement? Conclusion A four-justice plurality of the Court concluded that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant. Justice Samuel Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion. Writing for himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Alito noted that blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment. As such, a warrant is generally required before police may conduct a BAC test, unless an exception applies. The “exigent circumstances” exception allows the government to conduct a search without a warrant “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” The Court has previously held that the fleeting nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone does not automatically qualify BAC tests for the exigent circumstances exception, but additional factors may bring it within the exception. For example, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that “the dissipation of BAC did justify a blood test of a drunk driver whose accident gave police other pressing duties, for then the further delay caused by a warrant application would indeed have threatened the destruction of evidence.” Similarly, a situation involving an unconscious driver gives rise to exigency because officials cannot conduct a breath test and must instead perform a blood test to determine BAC. Under the exigent circumstances exception, a warrantless search is allowed when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” The plurality pointed to three reasons such a “compelling need” exists: highway safety is a “vital public interest,” legal limits on BAC serve that interest, and enforcement of BAC limits requires a test accurate enough to stand up in court. The plurality suggested that on remand, Mitchell can attempt to show that his was an unusual case that fell outside the exigent circumstances exception (perhaps because police conceded that they had time to get a warrant to draw his blood). Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment but would have applied a per se rule under which “the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk, regardless of whether the driver is conscious.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plurality “needlessly casts aside the established protections of the warrant requirement in favor of a brand new presumption of exigent circumstances.” Established precedent should determine the outcome in this case: unless there is too little time to do so, police officers must get a warrant before ordering a blood draw. The dissent also argued that the state statute “cannot create actual and informed consent that the Fourth Amendment requires.”

Rehaif v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2019.Decided on Jun 21, 2019. Petitioner: Hamid Mohamed Rehaif.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Rosemary T. Cakmis (for the petitioner) Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased. A federal grand jury charged Rehaif with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both. At trial, the government requested a jury instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.” The government also requested the instruction that “[t]he alien’s status becomes unlawful upon the date of the status violation”; Rehaif requested instead the instruction that “[a] person admitted to the United States on a student visa does not become unlawfully present until an Immigration Officer or an Immigration judge determines that [he] ha[s] violated [his] student status.” The district court instructed the jury as requested by the government and overruled Rehaif’s objection. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, citing binding circuit precedent holding that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, as well as precedents from other circuits and lack of action by Congress to alter the law (suggesting the common judicial construction of the law was what Congress intended). Question Does the “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) apply to both the possession and status elements of a § 922(g) crime, or only to the possession element? Conclusion The “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) applies to both the possession and status elements of a § 922(g) crime, under which it is a criminal offense for a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” to possess “any firearm or ammunition.” That is, to convict a defendant of this crime, the government must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he belonged to the relevant class of persons when he possessed it. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. There is a longstanding presumption that “Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Courts apply this presumption of mental state, or “scienter,” even in the absence of any scienter in the statute. The text of § 924(a)(2) provides that “whoever knowingly violates” certain subsections “shall be” subject to certain penalties. Thus, using “ordinary English grammar,” the Court read the statutory term “knowingly” as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime. The Court found further support for its interpretation in the basic principle of criminal law that criminal intent separates wrongful from innocent acts. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Alito criticized the majority for manipulating the statutory text in an unnatural manner to apply the scienter requirement—“knowingly”—to the status element of the crime. Justice Alito argued that the Court has never inferred that Congress intended to impose a mental culpability requirement on an element that concerns the defendant’s own status and should not do so in this case.