Supreme Court Oral Arguments

National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 7, 2022.Decided on Jan 13, 2022. Petitioner: National Federation of Independent Business, et al..Respondent: Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Advocates: Scott A. Keller (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A244) Benjamin M. Flowers (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A247) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (On behalf of the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question Did the Occupational Safety & Health Administration exceed its authority in promulgating a rule mandating that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing? Conclusion The challengers to the OSHA rule requiring that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing are likely to succeed on the merits. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the application to stay the OSHA rule. Congress created OSHA to set workplace safety standards. The challenged rule goes well beyond that and is effectively a broad public health measure. Even the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic do not justify such an expansion in the agency's authority. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, reiterating that the States and Congress—not OSHA—have the authority to decide how to respond to the pandemic. Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan filed a joint dissent, arguing that the pandemic directly affects the safety of workplaces and thus that OSHA has the authority to issue regulations to curb the effects of the pandemic in workplaces. The dissenters argue that by granting the stay, the Court acted outside of its competence and without legal basis, displacing the judgments of officials who have the responsibility and expertise to respond to workplace health emergencies.

Carson v. Makin Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: David Carson, as Parent and Next Friend of O. C., et al..Respondent: A. Pender Makin. Advocates: Michael Bindas (for the Petitioner) Christopher C. Taub (for the Respondent) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The State of Maine relies on local school administrative units (SAUs) to ensure that every school-age child in the state has access to a free education. Not every SAU operates its own public secondary school. To meet the state requirements, an SAU without its own public secondary school may either (1) contract with a secondary school to provide school privileges or (2) pay the tuition of a secondary school at which a particular student is accepted. In either circumstance, the secondary school must be either a public school or an “approved” private school. To be an “approved” school, a private school must meet the state’s compulsory attendance requirements (which can be demonstrated by accreditation by a New England association of schools and colleges or by approval by the Maine Department of Education), and it must be “nonsectarian in accordance with the First Amendment.” The Carsons, Gillises, and Nelsons live in SAUs that do not operate a public secondary school of their own but instead provide tuition assistance to parents who send their children to an “approved” private school. The three families opted to send their children to private schools that are accredited but do not meet the nonsectarian requirement because they are religiously affiliated. Because the schools are not “approved,” they do not qualify for tuition assistance. The families filed a lawsuit in federal court arguing that the “nonsectarian” requirement violates the Constitution on its face and as applied. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to the State and denied judgment to the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, noting that it had twice before rejected similar challenges, and even though the U.S. Supreme Court had decided two relevant cases in the interim, those cases do not produce a different outcome here. Question Does a state law prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or “sectarian,” instruction violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments to parents who live in school districts that do not operate a secondary school of their own violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice Jonh Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. Two cases resolve the dispute in this case. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not permit Missouri to discriminate against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. And in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, the Court held that a provision of the Montana Constitution barring government aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination” violated the Free Exercise Clause because it prohibited families from using otherwise available scholarship funds at religious schools. Applying those precedents to this case, Maine may not choose to subsidize some private schools but not others on the basis of religious character. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the majority gives “almost exclusive” attention to the Free Exercise Clause while paying “almost no attention” to the Establishment Clause. In Justice Breyer’s view, Maine’s nonsectarian requirement strikes the correct balance between the two clauses. Justice Sotomayor dissented separately, as well, to highlight the Court’s “increasingly expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause” that “risks swallowing the space between the Religion Clauses.”

Shinn v. Ramirez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2021.Decided on May 23, 2022. Petitioner: David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry.Respondent: David Martinez Ramirez. Advocates: Brunn W. Roysden III (for the Petitioner) Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Ramirez was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death by a judge for the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, including the trial court’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and imposition of the death sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Ramirez filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court, alleging various claims, but did not claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state court denied his petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Ramirez then filed a petition for habeas relief in federal district court. The court substituted his counsel “due to concerns regarding the quality of representation” and allowed Ramirez to amend his petition to add the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, the court ultimately found the claim procedurally defaulted because Ramirez had not raised it earlier. In 2012, while Ramirez’s appeal was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan that a federal court cannot consider evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney failed to diligently develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, but “a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” In light of Martinez, the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration of whether post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness was cause to overcome the procedural default of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court again determined that Ramirez’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally barred and denied Ramirez’s request for more evidence. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Ramirez demonstrated cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Question Does the Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan render the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act inapplicable to a federal court’s merits review of a claim for habeas relief? Conclusion Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. Federal habeas relief is narrowly available because it overrides a state’s power to enforce criminal law and incurs certain costs. For example, a federal order to retry or release a state prisoner overrides the state’s power to enforce “societal norms through criminal law,” and federal intervention imposes significant costs on state criminal justice systems. Thus, federal habeas relief is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires state prisoners to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. The doctrine of procedural default generally prevents federal courts from hearing any federal claim not presented in state court according to the state’s own procedural rules. A federal court may excuse procedural default only in narrow circumstances: the prisoner must demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Attorney error cannot generally serve as such “cause.” Specifically, state postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the record is attributed to the prisoner, as there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court “guts” the reasoning of two key precedents establishing that a habeas petitioner is not at fault for any failure to bring a trial-ineffectiveness claim in state court and “arrogates power from Congress” by “reconfigur[ing] the balance Congress struck [in AEDPA] between state interests and individual constitutional rights.”

United States v. Taylor Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Justin Eugene Taylor. Advocates: Rebecca Taibleson (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Justin Eugene Taylor and a co-conspirator intended to rob a drug dealer, who ended up being shot during the transaction. The Government’s indictment charged Taylor on seven counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The indictment also alleged two predicate crimes of violence: the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and the attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” and the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Taylor was convicted of using a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On habeas review, Taylor asked the court to vacate his conviction and remand for resentencing based on the argument that the two predicate offenses are not “crimes of violence” under § 924(c). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s § 924(c) conviction, finding that because the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do not invariably require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” the offense does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). Question Does the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) exclude attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which may be completed through an attempted threat alone? Conclusion Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-2 majority opinion. To convict a defendant of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the prosecution must prove that the defendant intended to complete the offense and that the defendant completed a “substantial step” toward that end. Neither element requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force (even though, in many cases, force is present). As such, attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot constitute a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that under the facts of this case, Taylor did in fact threaten violence, so his attempted Hobbs Act robbery was a “crime of violence” even if that incomplete crime might not be a crime of violence in some other hypothetical situation. Justice Samuel Alito also dissented, rejecting the majority’s categorical approach as disregarding the real world.

Hughes v. Northwestern University Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2021.Decided on Jan 24, 2022. Petitioner: April Hughes, et al..Respondent: Northwestern University, et al.. Advocates: David C. Frederick (for the Petitioners) Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Northwestern University offers two employee investment plans that are at issue in this case, a Retirement Plan in which Northwestern makes a matching contribution and a Voluntary Savings plan in which the University does not match. Laura Divane and other plaintiffs are beneficiaries of one or both of the employee investment plans. The plaintiffs sued Northwestern University for allegedly breaching its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. The plaintiffs alleged that Northwestern breached its fiduciary duty by offering a stock account option with excessive fees and a history of underperformance. The district court found no breach, noting that participants could have avoided any problems with the undesirable funds by simply choosing other options. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Are allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)? Conclusion An allegation that fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry involves assessing the fiduciaries’ duty to monitor all plan investments and remove any imprudent ones, which the Seventh Circuit below failed to do. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for the unanimous (8-0) Court. ERISA imposes a duty of prudence on fiduciaries that includes, among other things, a duty to monitor investments and remove imprudent ones. The mere fact that participants could have chosen lower-priced investments neither refutes nor supports whether fiduciaries fulfilled their duty of prudence. The court of appeals’ reliance on investor choice in reaching its conclusion for the University failed to make the proper inquiry. Justice Amy Cony Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Patel v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2021.Decided on May 16, 2022. Petitioner: Pankajkumar S. Patel, et al..Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Mark C. Fleming (for the Petitioners) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent supporting reversal) Taylor A.R. Meehan (for the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Pankajkumar Patel is a citizen of India who entered the United States without inspection. In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security charged Patel as removable for being present without inspection. At a hearing, Patel conceded that he was removable but sought discretionary relief from removal on the grounds that he had an approved I-140 employment authorization document. To be eligible for discretionary relief from removal, a noncitizen must show, among other things, “clearly and beyond doubt” that he is not inadmissible. However, Patel’s admissibility is in doubt because, when he applied for a Georgia driver’s license in 2008, he falsely represented himself when he checked a box indicating he is a U.S. citizen. At his removal hearing, Patel argued that it was simply a mistake and was immaterial since citizenship was not required to obtain the driver’s license. The immigration judge (IJ) rejected Patel’s arguments and denied his application for adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding no clear error in the factual findings. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of the IJ, based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” for certain enumerated categories of discretionary relief, including the relief for which Patel applied. Question Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) preserve the jurisdiction of federal courts to review a nondiscretionary determination that a noncitizen is ineligible for certain types of discretionary relief? Conclusion Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of any judgment relating to the granting of discretionary-relief in immigration proceedings enumerated under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under § 1255. Best understood, the word “judgment” in that phrase refers to any authoritative decision relating to the granting or denying of discretionary relief. Although this interpretation prohibits review of some factual determinations made in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made elsewhere in removal proceedings, that distinction reflects Congress’s choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the majority’s opinion permits a bureaucratic factual mistake to have life-changing consequences for an immigrant applying for legal residency and is an assertion of “raw administrative power” that neither the agency nor the Executive Branch endorses.

Scott G. Stewart advocates for the Petitioners, while Julie Rikelman and Elizabeth B. Prelogar represent the Respondents and the U.S., respectively. They dive deep into the constitutional foundations of Roe v. Wade, the implications of the Mississippi law banning abortions after 15 weeks, and the evolving nature of viability as a legal standard. The conversation also touches on women's autonomy, the historical context of abortion rights, and the potential consequences of restrictive legislation on marginalized communities. Prepare for an insightful legal showdown!

Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2021.Decided on Apr 28, 2022. Petitioner: Jane Cummings.Respondent: Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.. Advocates: Andrew Rozynski (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jane Cummings has been deaf since birth and is legally blind. In 2016, she contacted Premier Rehab Keller to treat her chronic back pain and requested that Premier provide an ASL interpreter. Premier refused and told her she could communicate with her therapist using written notes, lipreading, gesturing, or provide her own ASL interpreter. Cummings ultimately went to another physical therapy provider but found the alternate provider “unsatisfactory.” Cummings sued Premier for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, and the Texas Human Resources Code § 121.003. In her complaint, she sought injunctive relief and damages. The district court granted Premier’s motion to dismiss, finding that “[t]he only compensable injuries that Cummings alleged Premier caused were ‘humiliation, frustration, and emotional distress,’" and emotional distress damages are unavailable under the statutes Cummings relied on. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the compensatory damages available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, include compensation for emotional distress? Conclusion Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. Pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress enacted statutes—including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Affordable Care Act—prohibiting recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of certain protected characteristics. The Supreme Court has recognized implied rights of action for private individuals seeking enforcement of those statutes, but because the rights of action are implied, the remedies available under the statutes are unclear. The Supreme Court uses the analogy of contract law to decide whether a remedy is available in these situations. Under this approach, a particular remedy is available “only if the funding recipient is on notice that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature.” Because damages for emotional distress are not usually available under contract law and serious emotional disturbance is not a particularly likely result of violation of these statutes, federal funding recipients have not consented to be subject to such damages. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, suggesting that the separation of powers principle, rather than contract law, is better suited for determining remedies for this implied cause of action. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the contracts most analogous to these anti-discrimination statutes did allow for recovery of emotional distress damages, as emotional disturbance is the likely result of invidious discrimination.  

American Hospital Association v. Becerra Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2021.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: American Hospital Association, et al..Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.. Advocates: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the Petitioners) Christopher G. Michel (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The federal government reimburses hospitals for providing outpatient care to patients insured by Medicare Part B. Until recently, the government reimbursed all hospitals at a uniform rate for providing covered drugs. In 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reduced the reimbursement rates for certain types of hospitals (known as “340B hospitals”) because those hospitals can obtain the covered drugs far more cheaply than other hospitals can. HHS reasoned that it should not reimburse hospitals more than they paid to acquire the drugs. Several 340B hospitals and hospital associations affected by the decision filed a lawsuit challenging HHS’s decision to lower reimbursement rates. The district court ruled that HHS had exceeded its statutory authority by reducing drug reimbursement rates for 340B hospitals, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that HHS’s decision is based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Question 1. Is the Department of Health and Human Services’ decision to lower drug reimbursement rates for certain hospitals based on a reasonable interpretation of the Medicare statute? 2. Does 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12) preclude the petitioners’ challenge to HHS’s adjustments? Conclusion The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 does not preclude judicial review of the reimbursement rates set by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for certain outpatient prescription drugs that hospitals provide to Medicare patients. Here, because HHS did not conduct a survey of hospitals’ acquisition costs in 2018 and 2019, its decision to vary reimbursement rates only for 340B hospitals in those years was unlawful. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. There is a general presumption that judicial review is available, and the relevant provision of the Medicare act contains nothing precluding judicial review. HHS may not vary the reimbursement rates only for certain hospitals and not others without a survey. Permitting it to do so is contrary to the text and structure of the statute. Thus, its decision to change reimbursement rates only for 340B hospitals without conducting a survey was unlawful. 

Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 29, 2021.Decided on Jun 24, 2022. Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services.Respondent: Empire Health Foundation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center. Advocates: Jonathan C. Bond (for the Petitioner) Daniel J. Hettich (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services promulgated a rule eliminating the word “covered” from 42 C.F.R. § 412.106(b)(2)(i), effectively amending HHS’s interpretation of the phrase “entitled to [Medicare]” in a subsection of the Medicare Act. This amendment affects the way HHS calculates its reimbursement to certain hospitals that serve low-income patients. Plaintiff Empire Health Foundation challenged the 2005 Rule as part of a larger challenge to HHS’s calculation of its 2008 reimbursement. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Empire based on a finding that HHS did not follow correct procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because of numerous mistakes that occurred during the notice-and-comment process. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, concluding that HHS did follow the correct procedures under the APA, but the rule is substantively invalid  because it directly conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the phrase “entitled to [Medicare] is unambiguous.” Question Did the Department of Health and Human Services follow the correct procedures when it promulgated a rule changing the way it calculates Medicare reimbursement rates for hospitals? Conclusion HHS followed the correct procedures; in calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The phrase “entitled to benefits” means the same thing as “qualifying for benefits.” By counting everyone who qualifies for Medicare benefits in the Medicare fraction—and no one who qualifies for those benefits in the Medicaid fraction—HHS is following the statutory procedures that seek to capture two different segments of a hospital’s low-income patient population. Thus, HHS is correct in counting everyone regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Kavanaugh focused on the text of the statute, arguing that a patient who, by statute, cannot have payment made by Medicare that day is not “entitled to” have payment made by Medicare for that day.