Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2021.Decided on Jul 1, 2021. Petitioner: Americans for Prosperity Foundation.Respondent: Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California. Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Aimee A. Feinberg (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The California Attorney General’s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists of their major donors with the California Attorney General’s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law. In response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state’s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations’ motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government’s filing demands were not the “least restrictive means” of obtaining the information and thus did not satisfy “strict scrutiny.” A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, based on its conclusion that “exacting scrutiny” rather than “strict scrutiny” was the appropriate standard, and “exacting scrutiny” requires that the government show that the disclosure and reporting requirements are justified by a compelling government interest and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc. Question Does the policy of the California attorney general’s office requiring charities to disclose the names and addresses of their major donors violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy is a type of restraint on freedom of association. Such a restraint is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Though the government-mandated disclosure regime need not be the “least restrictive means” of achieving the government’s interest, it must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve it. California’s disclosure requirement is “dramatically mismatch[ed]” to the state’s interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing, imposing an unjustifiable “widespread burden on donors’ associational rights.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas would apply strict scrutiny to the disclosure requirement, leading to the same conclusion that it is facially invalid. However, Justice Thomas took issue with the Court’s opinion that the statute is unconstitutional in all applications. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito disagreed with the majority that precedents establish that exacting scrutiny applies in these types of cases. He noted that the outcome is the same under either level of scrutiny, so he would not decide what level of scrutiny applies. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority accepts, without requiring the plaintiffs to show, an actual First Amendment burden. In effect, Justice Sotomayor argued, the majority allows regulated entities to avoid obligations “by vaguely waving toward First Amendment ‘privacy concerns.’”

Guam v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2021.Decided on May 24, 2021. Petitioner: Territory of Guam.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam’s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an “unincorporated territory of the United States.” In the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean. In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill. In 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011. In 2017, Guam sued the United States, alleging that the Navy was responsible for the Ordot Dump’s contamination and was thus responsible for the costs of closing and remediating the landfill. Guam’s claims rested on two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Section 107 allows for a “cost-recovery” action and Section 113(f) allows for a “contribution” action. The statute of limitations for the former action is six years, compared to only three for the latter. The district court concluded that Guam’s agreement with the EPA did not trigger section 113, so Guam could maintain its section 107 claim against the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. Question Can Guam sue the Navy under CERCLA Section 113(f) over its contribution to the environmental hazards arising from the Ordot Dump? Conclusion Guam can pursue its lawsuit against the federal government over the cleaning costs associated with the Ordot Dump. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Subsection 113(f) allows a party to seek contribution “from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA” and provides that “a person who has resolved its liability to the United States . . . may seek contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in § 113(F)(2).” The language and structure of this statute support the interpretation that the right of contribution is predicated on CERCLA liability. Because the statutory language is best understood only in reference to CERCLA, the most natural reading of the provision is that a party may seek contribution under CERCLA only after settling a CERCLA-specific liability, not resolving environmental liability under some other law. Thus, the agreement between the EPA and Guam did not trigger the statute of limitations for seeking contribution.

San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2021.Decided on May 27, 2021. Petitioner: City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities.Respondent: Hotels.com, L.P., et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) David B. Salmons (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “cost of occupancy” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties." The OTCs’ proposed order stated that "costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39." San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC’s proposed order. Then the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds.” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite. Question Do district courts have the discretion to deny or reduce appellate costs deemed “taxable” in district court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e)? Conclusion Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that Rule. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Rule 39 gives the courts of appeals discretion over the allocation of appellate costs, setting default rules that apply unless the court “orders otherwise.” These default rules and the language and structure of Rule 39 suggest that the appeals court makes all determinations as to the costs. This comprehensive scheme leaves no room for the district court to modify the appeals court’s allocation of costs, and indeed to read the Rule as giving the district court such power would undermine the authority of the appeals court to make the determination in the first place.  

Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2021.Decided on Jun 29, 2021. Petitioner: Minerva Surgical, Inc..Respondent: Hologic, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Robert N. Hochman (for the Petitioner) Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Matthew M. Wolf (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Hologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding. Both of the patents at issue list as an inventor Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States. Truckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic’s NovaSure system. In 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva’s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent’s seller from attacking the patent’s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company Minerva. The court of appeals affirmed as to the infringement. Question May a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the patent, have a defense of invalidity heard on the merits? Conclusion A defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent can be barred under the doctrine of assignor estoppel from asserting a defense of invalidity if, and only if, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations the assignor made in assigning the patent. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The doctrine of assignor estoppel dates back to late 18th-century England, and the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized and approved it in American jurisprudence in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924). The doctrine is grounded in a principle of fairness, that an inventor should not be able to assert invalidity of a patent he assigned but can merely argue about how to construe the patent’s claims. The Court refused to abandon the doctrine of assignor estoppel entirely, finding that doing so would have broad effects that contradict many of the Court’s precedents. Moreover, the principle of fairness that originally grounded the doctrine applies equally still. Specifically, when an inventor warrants that a patent claim is valid and then assigns it to another, his denial of the validity violates norms of equitable dealing. However, to fully serve that purpose of fairness, the doctrine has its limits. If the assignor did not make explicit or implicit representations that conflict with the invalidity defense, there is no ground for applying assignor estoppel. In this case, the Federal Circuit erred by not considering whether Hologic’s new claim was materially broader than the ones Truckai had assigned, which would mean that Truckai could not have warranted its validity when making the assignment. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority avoids answering the essential threshold question whether Westinghouse should be overruled and thus cannot answer the question presented in the petition in this case. Justice Alito would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the majority recrafted a rule of assignor estoppel entirely different from that in Westinghouse. Because the Patent Act of 1952 does not incorporate the doctrine of assignor estoppel, Justice Barrett would hold the doctrine no longer applies.

United States v. Gary Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2021.Decided on Jun 14, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Michael Andrew Gary. Advocates: Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the Petitioner) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2017, Michael Andrew Gary was driving with his cousin when police pulled them over for running a red light. Gary admitted he was driving on a suspended license, so he was placed under arrest. Upon a search of his car, police found a loaded gun. He was charged under state law with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Five months later, Gary had another encounter with police, and upon consenting to a search, police found him in possession of a stolen firearm which Gary admitted was his. Gary was arrested and charged under state law with possession of a stolen firearm. A federal grand jury indicted Gary on two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The state charges were dropped, and Gary pleaded guilty to the two federal charges. The district court advised Gary that if he proceeded to trial, the government would have to prove four elements, but did not mention that the government would also need to prove Gary was aware that he was a felon. Gary agreed with the prosecutor’s summary of the facts and entered a guilty plea. Gary then appealed his sentence but did not challenge the conviction itself. While the appeal was pending, in 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, holding that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. Gary then submitted a letter raising the relevance of the Rehaif decision. After receiving supplemental briefings from the parties on the relevance of Rehaif, the court of appeals vacated Gary’s convictions and remanded to the district court. Because Gary had not challenged the validity of his plea in the district court, the court of appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision for plain error. The court found not only that the error was plain, but also that it was structural and thus necessarily affected the outcome of the proceedings, even without a showing of as much. Question Is a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a), automatically entitled to plain-error relief if the district court did not advise him that one element of that offense is knowledge of his status as a felon, regardless of whether he can show that the district court’s error affected the outcome of the proceedings? Conclusion A federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion in the consolidated case, Greer v. United States, No. 19-8709.

Greer v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2021.Decided on Jun 14, 2021. Petitioner: Gregory Greer.Respondent: United States. Advocates: M. Allison Guagliardo (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “punishable as an Armed Career Criminal” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months’ imprisonment. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif. On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer’s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Question May a federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights or impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial. Conclusion A federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion. Rule 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant can preserve a claim of error “by informing the court” of the claimed error when the relevant “court ruling or order is made or sought.” Rule 52(b) allows an appellate court to review for “plain error” “even though it was not brought to the court’s attention” if it “affects substantial rights.” Thus, the defendant must show that, if the district court had correctly instructed the jury on the mental culpability element of a felon-in-possession offense, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted. If the defendant does not dispute the fact of his prior convictions, he has not met this burden. Such is the case here. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an appellate court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire record—not just the record from the particular proceeding where the error occurred. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor noted that the Court’s analysis does not extend to harmless-error review and that the knowledge-of-status element is an element just like any other, which the government must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, while defendants seeking relief based on Rehaif errors bear must prove only plain error. She joined the majority as to Greer’s case but as to Gary in the consolidated case would vacate the judgment below and remand so the Fourth Circuit below could address the question whether Gary can prove that the error affected his substantial rights.

Sanchez v. Mayorkas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2021.Decided on Jun 7, 2021. Petitioner: Jose Santos Sanchez, et al..Respondent: Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.. Advocates: Amy M. Saharia (for the Petitioners) Michael R. Huston (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status (TPS) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General. In 2014, Sanchez and his wife applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “statutorily ineligible” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255(a)’s requirement that an alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding  no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally. Question Does the conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255? Conclusion The conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a does not constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, so recipients of such status are not eligible to become lawful permanent residents. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Section 1255 provides a way for a “nonimmigrant”—that is, a foreign national who is lawfully present in the United States for a designated, temporary basis—to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR). One requirement for eligibility is an “admission” into the country, and “admission” is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Entering the country via a provision of humanitarian law that bypasses the inspection and authorization procedure does not meet the requirement for “admission,” so those who are present in the country by that means are not eligible to become lawful permanent residents.

Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2021.Decided on Jun 25, 2021. Petitioner: Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury.Respondent: Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, et al.. Advocates: Matthew Guarnieri (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Jeffrey S. Rasmussen (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) For over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy on recognition of Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs). In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to “help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.” ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” In 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any "Indian Tribe" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds. Six federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, arguing that ANCs are not “Indian Tribes” within the meaning of the CARES Act or ISDA. Although the government conceded that ANCs have not been historically recognized as eligible for special programs and services because of their status as Indians, it nevertheless argued that Congress expressly included ANCs within the ISDA definition. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that ANCs must qualify as Indian tribes to give effect to their express inclusion in the ISDA definition, even though no ANC has been recognized as an Indian tribe. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that ANCs are not eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act because they are not “recognized” as Indian tribes. Question Are Alaska Native regional and village corporations established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act “Indian Tribes” for purposes of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act? Conclusion Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) are “Indian tribe[s]” under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) and thus eligible for funding available to “Tribal governments” under Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The majority determined that under the plain meaning of the ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) is the only statute the ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, so eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the definition’s final “recognized-as-eligible” clause. The respondents failed to demonstrate that the phrase “Indian tribe” is a term of art that should exclude ANCs, and none of their other arguments for reading “Indian tribes” as exclusive of ANCs were persuasive.  Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the plain language and construction of the ISDA suggest that ANCs are not “Indian tribes,” supported by analogy to another statute with “nearly identical language in remarkably similar contexts,” and that the majority overlooked the critical statutory word “recognized.”

National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2021. Petitioner: National Collegiate Athletic Association.Respondent: Shawne Alston, et al.. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioners) Jeffrey L. Kessler (for the Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports. Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits,” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies.” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA’s interest in “preserving amateurism,” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law. Question Does the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)’s prohibition on compensation for college athletes violate federal antitrust law? Conclusion The NCAA’s rules restricting certain education-related benefits for student-athletes violate federal antitrust laws.  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch upheld the trial court’s ruling. The Court affirmed that the traditional “rule of reason” standard was appropriate in this case and rejected the NCAA’s call for a more deferential standard. Because the student-athletes who brought the lawsuit did not appeal the Ninth Circuit’s ruling upholding the NCAA’s rules “untethered to education,” the Court did not pass judgment on that aspect of the case.    In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Court clarified that a prior statement made in the 1984 case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma noting that the NCAA’s role in maintaining the “revered tradition of amateurism” was “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act” was not a shield against all challenges to compensation restrictions, as such rules were not even at issue in that case. Instead, there was nothing so unique about the NCAA or amateur sports to alter the traditional method of analysis applied to claims of antitrust violations. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that while other rules limiting student-athlete compensation unrelated to academics remain in place because they were not properly before the Court, this decision makes clear that the same traditional “rule of reason” analysis would apply. He concluded, “there are serious questions whether the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules can pass muster under ordinary rule of reason scrutiny.”

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2021.Decided on Jun 25, 2021. Petitioner: TransUnion LLC.Respondent: Sergio L. Ramirez. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Samuel Issacharoff (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2011, Sergio Ramirez went with his wife and father-in-law to purchase a car. When the dealership ran a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, it discovered that Ramirez was on a list maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), of people with whom U.S. companies cannot do business (i.e. “a terrorist list”). Ramirez and his wife still bought a car that day, but they purchased it in her name only. TransUnion, the company that had prepared the report, eventually removed the OFAC alert from any future credit reports that might be requested by or for Ramirez. On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ramirez TransUnion in federal court, alleging that the company’s actions violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The district court certified a class of everyone who, during a six-month period, had received a letter from TransUnion stating that their name was a “potential match” for one on the OFAC list, although only a fraction of those class members had their credit reports sent to a third party. The jury awarded each class member nearly $1,000 for violations of the FCRA and over $6,000 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of over $60 million. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory damages but reduced the punitive damages to approximately $32 million. TransUnion asked the Supreme Court to resolve two questions, of which the Court agreed to decide only the first. Question Does either Article III of the Constitution or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permit a damages class action when the majority of the class did not suffer an injury comparable to that of the class representative? Conclusion Only a plaintiff concretely harmed by a defendant’s violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act has Article III standing to seek damages against that private defendant in federal court. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion. To have Article III standing to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show that she suffered concrete injury in fact, that the injury was fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling by the court. To show a concrete injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the asserted harm is similar to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—i.e., a close historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury. Of the 8,185 class members, TransUnion provided third parties with credit reports containing OFAC alerts for only 1,853 individuals; these individuals have standing. The remaining 6,332 class members stipulated that TransUnion did not provide their credit information to any potential creditors during the designated class period and thus have failed to demonstrate concrete harm required for Article III standing. Mere risk of future harm is insufficient to establish standing. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Thomas argued that injury in law to a private right has historically been sufficient to establish “injury in fact” for standing purposes, and each class member in this case has demonstrated violation of their private rights. Justice Kagan authored a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor arguing that Congress expressly allowed these plaintiffs to bring their claim of violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, yet the majority disallows them from doing so. Justice Kagan noted her slightly different understanding of the “concrete injury” requirement for Article III standing that Justice Thomas described in his dissent but suggested such a difference would not lead to a different outcome.