Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Denezpi v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Merle Denezpi.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Michael B. Kimberly (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Merle Denezpi, a member of the Navajo tribe, pleaded guilty to an assault charge in the Court of Indian Offenses. That court is a trial court that exercises jurisdiction over Native Americans where there are no tribal courts to do so. Six months later, a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi on a charge of aggravated sexual assault based on the same underlying events. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Denezpi challenged his prosecution in federal court, arguing that it violated the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause because the Court of Indian Offenses is a federal agency. The district court ruled against Denezpi, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a prosecution in the Court of Indian Offenses trigger the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause? Conclusion The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit prosecuting a person twice “for the same conduct or actions,” but for the same “offence.” Under the dual-sovereignty principle, two offenses arising from the same act can therefore be separately prosecuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause, even if they have identical elements and could not be separately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. Denezpi’s single act constituted assault and battery under the Ute Mountain Ute Code and aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country under the U.S. Code. His prosecution for both crimes does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined in part, arguing that the same prosecuting authority charged the same defendant twice for the same crime—the very definition of double jeopardy proscribed by the U.S. Constitution.

Concepcion v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 19, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2022. Petitioner: Carlos Concepcion.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Charles L. McCloud (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2008, Carlos Concepcion pleaded guilty to crack cocaine charges, and in 2009 he was sentenced to 228 months in prison. While he was serving his sentence, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the statutory penalties for most federal crimes involving crack cocaine. In 2018, Congress made these changes retroactive, and Concepcion moved for resentencing. The district court denied his motion, and Concepcion appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the district court was not obligated to update and reevaluate the sentencing factors. Question Must or may a district court consider intervening legal and factual developments when deciding whether to “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018? Conclusion The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. District courts enjoy substantial discretion to consider all relevant information at a sentencing hearing. That discretion extends to subsequent hearings modifying sentencing, as well. The First Step Act preserves this discretion, allowing the district court to reduce sentences based not only on the changes to sentencing ranges, but also on other legal or factual changes that have occurred since the original sentencing. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the text of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to reduce sentences based only on changes to the crack-cocaine sentencing ranges, not on other unrelated changes that have occurred since the original sentencing.  

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 19, 2022.Decided on May 16, 2022. Petitioner: Federal Election Commission.Respondent: Ted Cruz for Senate, et al.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Appellant) Charles J. Cooper (for the Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The day before Election Day in 2018, Senator Ted Cruz loaned Ted Cruz for Senate (“Cruz Committee”) two campaign finance loans totaling $260,000. After Election Day, the Cruz Committee used the funds it had on hand to pay vendors and meet other obligations instead of repaying the loans to Senator Cruz. Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations place a $250,000 limit on the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to pay back a candidate's pre-election loans more than 20 days after Election Day. After 20 days had elapsed, the balance of those loans that exceeded BCRA's $250,000 statutory cap on post-election contributions ($10,000)—converted into a campaign contribution. The Cruz Committee filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations as violating constitutional and administrative laws. A three-judge court ruled for Cruz, finding that the restrictions place a burden on political speech without adequate justification. Question Do appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j), and does the limit unconstitutionally burden political speech without justification? Conclusion Appellees have standing to challenge Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and that section—which limits the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to repay a candidate who lends money to his own campaign—violates the First Amendment rights of candidates and their campaigns to engage in political speech. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. As to standing, appellee’s injuries are directly inflicted by the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC’s) threatened enforcement of the provisions at issue. That appellees intentionally triggered the application of the provisions does not undermine their standing to challenge them. Additionally, although the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court is limited to actions challenging the enforcement of a statute (as opposed to a regulation), the enforcement is traceable to the operation of the statute itself. Thus, the appellees may challenge the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the loan-repayment limitation through its implementing regulation. As to the merits, the loan-repayment limitation burdens candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. By seeking to deter candidates from loaning money to their campaigns, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry thus abridging political speech. The Government fails to describe how the limitation furthers a permissible interest—namely, the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. Although the Government argues that the types of contributions at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to repay a candidate’s personal loans, it does not identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption as a result of these types of contributions. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan argued that the majority overstates the the First Amendment burdens Section 304 imposes and understates the anticorruption values Section 304 serves. Because the regulated transactions personally enrich those already elected to office, they threaten both corruption and the appearance of corruption, “bring[ing] this country’s political system into further disrepute.”

Shurtleff v. Boston Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 18, 2022.Decided on May 2, 2022. Petitioner: Harold Shurtleff, et al..Respondent: City of Boston, Massachusetts, et al.. Advocates: Mathew D. Staver (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal) Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The City of Boston owns and manages three flagpoles in front of City Hall, the seat of Boston’s municipal government. Ordinarily, the City raises the United States flag and the POW/MIA flag on one flagpole, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts flag on the second flagpole, and its own flag on the third flagpole. Upon request and after approval, the City will occasionally fly another flag for a limited period of time instead of its own flag. Gregory T. Rooney, Commissioner of Boston’s Property Management Department, reviews applications for flag-raising events to ensure the flag is consistent with the City’s message, policies, and practices. The City has approved 284 flag-raising events over a 12-year period, and Rooney had never denied a flag-raising application. Camp Constitution is an organization that seeks “to enhance the understanding of the country’s Judeo-Christian moral heritage” and applied to fly a “Christian flag” for its event. Rooney denied Camp Constitution’s flag-raising request, finding it was the first time any entity or organization had requested to fly a religious flag. Camp Constitution sued, and the district court found for the City. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question Does Boston’s refusal to fly a private religious organization’s flag depicting a cross on a city flagpole violate the organization’s First Amendment rights? Conclusion Boston’s flag-raising program does not constitute government speech, so its refusal to fly the private religious organization’s flag violates the organization’s First Amendment rights. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court first considered whether Boston’s flag-raising program is government speech. The test for government speech is a holistic inquiry that considers, among other things, the history of the expression at issue, the public’s perception as to who is speaking, and the extent to which the government has controlled the expression. Although the history of flag displays favors Boston, the other two factors outweigh the first factor. The public would not necessarily associate a flag’s message with the City, and, most importantly, the City has exercised almost no control over flag content. In fact, the City has no record of denying a request until the Petitioner’s in this case. Thus, on balance, the flag-raising program is not government speech. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment disallows the government from engaging in “impermissible viewpoint discrimination.” When it is not speaking for itself, the government may not exclude speech based on “religious viewpoint.” Thus, Boston’s refusal to allow Shurtleff and Camp Constitution to raise their flag based on “religious viewpoint” violated the First Amendment. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to reiterate that the government does not violate the Establishment Clause when it treats religious persons or organizations equally with secular persons or organizations, but it does violate the Free Speech Clause when it excludes religious persons or organizations. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, disclaiming the three-factor test used by the majority. Rather, when faced with a question whether speech constitutes government speech, Justice Alito would ask “whether the government is actually expressing its own views or the real speaker is a private party and the government is surreptitiously engaged in the ‘regulation of private speech.’” Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined, criticizing the so-called Lemon test the Court adopted for resolving Establishment Clause disputes. Justice Gorsuch argued that Boston erroneously relied on the now-abandoned Lemon test, leading it to believe that flying the flag would violate the Establisment Clause.

Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 18, 2022.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: David Cassirer.Respondent: Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation. Advocates: David Boies (for the Petitioners) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Thaddeus J. Stauber (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Cassirer and others filed a lawsuit to recover a painting by French Impressionist painter Camille Pissarro, which was stolen from their ancestors by the Nazi regime in 1939. The district court originally granted summary judgment in favor of Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC), but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the court needed to determine, as a threshold matter, whether TBC had actual knowledge the painting was stolen. If it had such knowledge, then it could be an accessory after the fact under Spanish Civil Code Article 1956. On remand, the district court determined that TBC did not have actual knowledge that the painting was stolen when it purchased the painting in 1993. Cassirer again appealed, arguing among other things the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision erred in holding that Spanish law governs the substantive claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding no factual or legal developments that would justify revisiting its original holding. Question Should a federal court hearing state law claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules or federal common law to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue? Conclusion A federal court hearing state-law claims under the FSIA should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion holding that, in this case, that means applying the forum state’s choice-of-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. Although the FSIA generally recognizes foreign sovereign immunity absent a statutory exception, it does not affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state when the entity is not immune from suit. Rather, in that situation, the foreign state is subject to the same substantive law as a private party. In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-of-law rule.

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 12, 2022.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: Boechler, P.C..Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Advocates: Melissa Arbus Sherry (On behalf of the Petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (On behalf of the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On June 5, 2015, the Internal Revenue Service sent Boechler, P.C., a letter noting a discrepancy between prior tax document submissions. After not receiving a response, the IRS imposed a 10% intentional disregard penalty, which Boechler did not pay. The IRS mailed Boechler a notice of intent to levy. Boechler timely responded but failed to establish grounds for relief. On July 28, 2017, the Office of Appeals mailed a determination sustaining the levy to Boechler's last known address in Fargo, North Dakota. The notice of determination, delivered on July 31, stated that Boechler had 30 days from the date of determination, i.e. until August 28, 2017, to submit a petition for review. Boechler mailed a petition for a CDP hearing on August 29, 2017, one day after the 30-day filing deadline had expired. The Tax Court received Boechler's untimely petition, and the IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Boechler argued that the 30-day time limit in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, the time limit should be equitably tolled, and calculating the time limit from issuance rather than receipt violates due process. The tax court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and Boechler appealed. Question Is the 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the commissioner of internal revenue in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling? Conclusion The 30-day time limit of 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. A procedural requirement is jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” it is. Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a “person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” Thus, the meaning of this provision turns on the meaning of “such matter.” Because the phrase “such matter” in that sentence lacks a clear antecedent, the text does not “clearly” mandate a jurisdictional reading. Nonjurisdictional limitations periods are presumptively subject to equitable tolling, and nothing in the facts of this case rebuts that presumption.

Garland v. Gonzalez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al..Respondent: Esteban Aleman Gonzalez, et al.. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners) Matthew H. Adams (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Gutierrez Sanchez are natives and citizens of Mexico who reside in the United States. The federal government had initiated removal proceedings against them, but asylum officers determined that each had a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico. Gonzalez and Sanchez both requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge after they had been detained for 180 days, but both requests were denied. Question Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond? Conclusion District courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion reversing the judgment of the lower court. Section 1252(f)(1) generally strips lower courts of “jurisdiction or authority” to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Although that section includes one exception, to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” the relevant statutory provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated,” that exception does not apply to claims on behalf of an entire class. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, dissenting from the Court’s holding as to the interpretation of Section 1252(f)(1) but concurring in the judgment insofar as it concludes the government prevails on the merits.

Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..Respondent: Antonio Arteaga-Martinez. Advocates: Austin L. Raynor (for the Petitioners) Pratik A. Shah (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection. In May 2018, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested and detained him and initiated removal proceedings. Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding and deferral of removal based on fear of violence in Mexico. Six months after the start of his detention, he requested a bond hearing and challenged his continued detention without one. Question Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond? Conclusion The Government is not required to provide noncitizens detained for six months with bond hearings in which the Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. No plausible construction of the text of 9 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) requires the Government to provide bond hearings with the procedures mandated by the Third Circuit. It says nothing about bond hearings before immigration judges or burdens of proof. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurrring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, he would hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause does not apply to removal of noncitizens, and Zadvydas v. Davis should be overruled. Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that Zadvydas control the outcome in this case.

Gallardo v. Marstiller Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2022.Decided on Jun 6, 2022. Petitioner: Gianinna Gallardo, an Incapacitated Person, By and Through her Parents and Co-Guardians Pilar Vassallo and Walter Gallardo.Respondent: Simone Marstiller, In Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. Advocates: Bryan S. Gowdy (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Henry C. Whitaker (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gianinna Gallardo suffered catastrophic injuries when she was hit by a truck after getting off her school bus, and she remains in a persistent vegetative state. She eventually recovered $800,000 in a court-approved settlement, which applied to her past medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, and other damages. However, the settlement amount covered only a fraction of each type of damages. Medicaid had paid $862,688.77 toward her past medical expenses, so in an attempt to recover reimbursement for its payments, pursuant to Florida law, the State of Florida asserted a lien over the compensation for past medical expenses, which Medicaid had paid, as well as the compensation for future medical expenses. Gallardo’s counsel filed a lawsuit asking the court to enjoin the state from asserting its lien over the portion of her tort recovery compensating for future medical expenses and to declare that Florida’s reimbursement statute violates the Medicaid Act. The district court ruled for Gallardo, finding that the Medicaid Act preempted the Florida law to the extent that the law allows the State to satisfy its lien for past medical expenses from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Question Does the federal Medicaid Act provide for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid’s payment of a beneficiary’s past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses? Conclusion The Medicaid Act permits a state to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion. Section 1396p(a)(1) of the Medicaid Act prohibits states from recovering medical payments from a beneficiary’s “property,” that is, from settlement amounts other than those allocated for past medical care paid for by Medicaid. But that provision does not apply to state laws expressly authorized under the Act. Florida’s Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act falls squarely within this exception to Section 1396p(a)(1). The plain text of the provision, as well as the statutory context, support this interpretation. The language granting rights to payment of “any medical care” includes both past medical payments and future medical payments. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority “read[s] one statutory provision in isolation while giving short shrift to the statutory context, the relationships between the provisions at issue, and the framework set forth in precedent. As such, Justice Sotomayor argued, its holding “is inconsistent with the structure of the” Medicaid program and will cause needless unfairness and disruption.

Biden v. Missouri Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 7, 2022.Decided on Jan 13, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden.Respondent: Missouri, et al.. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (On behalf of the Applicants) Jesus A. Osete (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A240) Elizabeth Murrill (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A241) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question Does the Department of Health and Human Services have the authority to enforce a rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption? Conclusion The Department of Health and Human Services has the authority to enforce its rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the applications to stay the two injunctions barring the Secretary of Health and Human Services from enforcing the regulation. The Court reasoned that a core function of HHS is to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients’ health and safety, and the interim rule at issue here seeks to do precisely that. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. The dissenters found no statutory support for such an exercise of authority.