Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2021.Decided on Mar 4, 2022. Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al..Respondent: Yassir Fazaga, et al.. Advocates: Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioners) Catherine M.A. Carroll (for the Agent Respondents) Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for Respondents Fazaga, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Respondents Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, Ali Uddin Malik, and Yasser AbdelRahim are three Muslim residents of Southern California who regularly attended religious services at the Islamic Center of Irvine. They filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the FBI had used a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program for at least fourteen months to gather information at the Islamic Center based solely on their Muslim religious identity. Their claims included violations of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Fourth Amendment; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1810; and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346. The U.S. Attorney General asserted the state secrets privilege with respect to evidence in the case and moved to dismiss the discrimination claims based on that privilege. It did not move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment or FISA claims based on privilege, but on other grounds. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims on the basis of the state secrets privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence in camera to determine whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful under FISA. The appellate court then denied a petition for a rehearing en banc. Question Does Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 displace the state-secrets privilege and authorize a district court to resolve the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence? Conclusion Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) does not displace the state secrets privilege. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. First, the text of FISA lacks any reference to the state secrets privilege, suggesting that its passage did not alter the privilege at all. Regardless of whether the privilege arises from common law or the Constitution, Congress could not have abrogated it without clear statutory language. Second, § 1806(f), which provides a procedure under which a trial-level court may consider the legality of electronic surveillance conducted under FISA, is not incompatible with the state secrets privilege. They involve different inquiries, award different forms of relief, and different procedures.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2022. Petitioner: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., et al..Respondent: Kevin P. Bruen, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of New York State Police, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Barbara D. Underwood (for the Respondents) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The state of New York requires a person to show a special need for self-protection to receive an unrestricted license to carry a concealed firearm outside the home. Robert Nash and Brandon Koch challenged the law after New York rejected their concealed-carry applications based on failure to show “proper cause.” A district court dismissed their claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Does New York's law requiring that applicants for unrestricted concealed-carry licenses demonstrate a special need for self-defense violate the Second Amendment? Conclusion New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. The right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense is deeply rooted in history, and no other constitutional right requires a showing of “special need” to exercise it. While some “sensitive places” restrictions might be appropriate, Manhattan is not a “sensitive place.” Gun restrictions are constitutional only if there is a tradition of such regulation in U.S. history. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion arguing that the effect of guns on American society is irrelevant to the issue. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, noting that many state restrictions requiring background checks, firearms training, a check of mental health records, and fingerprinting, are still permissible because they are objective, in contrast to the discretionary nature of New York’s law. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion noting two methodological points the Court did not resolve. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that states should be able to pass restrictions in an effort to curb the number of deaths caused by gun violence, and the Court’s decision “severely burdens the States’ efforts to do so.”

Badgerow v. Walters Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2021.Decided on Mar 31, 2022. Petitioner: Denise A. Badgerow.Respondent: Greg Walters, et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Denise Badgerow was employed as an associate financial advisor with REJ Properties, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, from January 2014 until July 2016, when she was terminated. During her employment with REJ, Badgerow signed an agreement to arbitrate any disputes that may arise between her and the three principals of the corporation. After her termination, Badgerow initiated an arbitration proceeding against the three principals before an arbitration panel of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), seeking damages for tortious interference of contract and for violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower law. The panel dismissed all of her claims with prejudice. Badgerow then brought a new action in Louisiana state court, asking the court to vacate the dismissal because the whistleblower claim was obtained by fraud. The principals removed the action to federal court, and Badgerow filed a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to vacate and denied remand. On the merits, the court found no fraud and denied vacatur of the FINRA arbitration panel’s dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Circuit affirmed. Question Do federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question? Conclusion Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award because the “look-through” approach recognized in the context of Section 4 does not apply in the context of Sections 9 and 10. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), the Court recognized that in the context of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a federal court may “look through” the petition for arbitration to the “underlying substantive controversy” to decide whether it has jurisdiction. Its decision in that case relied on “distinctive” language in Section 4 that directed the “look through” approach. Sections 9 and 10, at issue in this case, do not contain that same language, so the “look through” approach does not apply. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority’s narrow focus on the statute’s literal words “creates unnecessary complexity and confusion,” while consideration of the statute’s purposes would lead to a better and clearer outcome.

Houston Community College System v. Wilson Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2021.Decided on Mar 24, 2022. Petitioner: Houston Community College System.Respondent: David Buren Wilson. Advocates: Richard A. Morris (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Michael B. Kimberly (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Houston Community College (HCC) System operates community colleges throughout the greater Houston area. HCC is run by a Board of nine trustees, each of which is elected by the public to serve a six-year term without remuneration. David Wilson was elected to the Board as a trustee on November 5, 2013. Starting in 2017, Wilson criticized the other trustees, alleging that they had violated the Board’s bylaws, and made various other criticisms of the Board. As a result, the Board censured Wilson and barred him from holding officer positions on the Board or from receiving travel reimbursements. Wilson sued HCC, alleging that the censure violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled against him, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In holding for Wilson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment precludes community college boards from censuring members for their speech. Question Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member’s speech? Conclusion A purely verbal censure does not give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that Wilson lacked an actionable First Amendment claim against the Houston Community College System. The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech,” which includes a prohibition on “retaliatory actions” for engaging in protected speech. However, elected bodies have long exercised the power to censure their members, and the Court’s precedents affirm that mere censure does not afoul of the First Amendment. That Wilson was an elected official and that the censure itself was mere speech by other members within the same elected body support the conclusion that the censure was not a materially adverse action and thus did not give rise to a First Amendment claim.

United States v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2021.Decided on Dec 10, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Texas, et al.. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) Judd E. Stone, II (for the state Respondent) Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge, as did the federal government. A federal district court temporarily enjoined enforcement of the law, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the lower court's injunction. The Department of Justice asked the Court to reinstate the district court's judgment. Question Can the United States sue the State of Texas in federal court to prohibit enforcement of an unconstitutional abortion law? Conclusion The court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and denied the application to vacate the stay.

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2021.Decided on Dec 10, 2021. Petitioner: Whole Woman's Health, et al..Respondent: Austin Reeve Jackson, Judge, District Court of Texas, 114th District, et al.. Advocates: Marc A. Hearron (for the Petitioners) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge. Question Can the petitioners in this case pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to Texas Senate Bill 8 (SB 8), which prohibits providers from performing or inducing an abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected and which allows for direct enforcement of the law through private civil actions? Conclusion The petitioners in this case may proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage only as to the defendants who are state medical licensing officials. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.   Writing for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the petitioners cannot sue defendants Penny Clarkston and Austin Jackson (a state-court clerk and state-court judge, respectively) because states are generally immune from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment, and even the limited exception recognized in Ex Parte Young does not permit an ex-ante injunction preventing state courts from hearing cases. Additionally, state-court clerks and judges are not “adverse litigants” and thus a pre-enforcement challenge against those parties does not constitute a “case or controversy” as required under the Constitution. The same five Justices also concluded that the petitioners cannot sue Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton because the attorney general lacks authority to enforce the challenged law. All nine Justices agreed that the petitioners cannot sue the individual private defendant Mark Lee Dickson because they cannot establish an injury “fairly traceable” to his unlawful conduct, as required by the Constitution. All but Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that the petitioners may proceed in their lawsuit against the state licensing officials because each may or must take enforcement actions against the abortion providers if the providers violate SB 8. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that SB 8 has the purpose and effect of “nullify[ing]” the Court’s rulings and thus threatens the entire constitutional system. Writing on behalf of herself and Justices Breyer and Kagan, Justice Sotomayor extended the Chief Justice’s concerns, pointing out that the Court’s narrow ruling “effectively invites” other states to follow Texas’s example in nullifying constitutional rights.

United States v. Tsarnaev Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 13, 2021.Decided on Mar 4, 2022. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev. Advocates: Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner) Ginger D. Anders (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother detonated two homemade pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the race, killing three and injuring hundreds. He was sentenced to death for his role in the bombings, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit threw out his death sentences on the grounds that the district court should have asked potential jurors what media coverage they had seen about Tsarnaev’s case, and the district court should not have excluded from the sentencing phase evidence that Tsarnaev’s brother was involved in a separate triple murder. Question Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit err in vacating the death sentence for the district court’s failure to ask prospective jurors for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage they had seen, heard, or read, and for its exclusion of evidence at the sentencing phase of trial that Tsarnaev’s brother had been involved in different crimes two years before the bombing? Conclusion The First Circuit improperly vacated Tsarnaev’s capital sentences. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.  The district court did not abuse its discretion during jury selection when it declined to ask every prospective juror what they learned from the media about the case. The district court has substantial discretion during jury selection, and it was reasonable for the court to conclude that the proposed question wrongly emphasized what a juror knew before coming to court rather than revealing potential bias. The “supervisory authority” of federal courts does not allow them to “create prophylactic supervisory rules that circumvent or supplement legal standards” established by the Supreme Court. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded from sentencing the evidence that Tsarnaev’s brother was possibly involved in an unsolved triple homicide. A district court has the discretion to exclude evidence “when its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” The bare inclusion of this evidence risked producing a “confusing mini-trial” about an unsolved crime in which all witnesses were dead. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, noting her skepticism about the “supervisory authority” of federal courts of appeals. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the brother’s involvement in the unsolved triple homicide because, in his view, the record does not adequately support the court’s conclusions that the evidence lacks probative value, is insufficient to corroborate the brother’s role in the murders, is a waste of time, and would confuse the jury.

Babcock v. Kijakazi Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 13, 2021.Decided on Jan 13, 2022. Petitioner: David Bryon Babcock.Respondent: Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Babcock enlisted in the Michigan National Guard in 1970 and served for 3.5 years. After his service, Babcock went to flight school and received his pilot’s license, then returned to work as a National Guard dual-status technician, where he worked for over 33 years, including an active-duty tour in Iraq between 2004 and 2005. (Under 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1), a National Guard dual-status technician “is a Federal civilian employee” who “is assigned to a civilian position as a technician” while a member of the National Guard.) Babcock retired from his position in 2009, at which time he began receiving Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) payments and, separately, military retirement pay from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. He fully retired in 2014 and at that point, applied for Social Security retirement benefits. On his application, he confirmed that he was receiving monthly CSRS payments. The Social Security Administration (SSA) granted his application but reduced his benefits because of his CSRS pension. Babcock asked the SSA to reconsider the reduction, noting that members of a uniformed service were not generally subject to the reduction in benefits (under the Windfall Elimination Provision, or WEP), and that as a dual-status technician, he qualified for that exception. SSA refused to change its initial determination, an administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the determination, and then the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision. A federal district court entered judgment against Babcock, and the appellate court affirmed. Question Is a civil service pension received for federal civilian employment as a “military technician (dual status)” considered “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” for the purposes of the Social Security Act’s windfall elimination provision? Conclusion Civil-service pension payments based on employment as a dual-status military technician are not payments based on “service as a member of a uniformed service” for the purposes of the windfall elimination provision. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. While the National Guard of the United States is a uniformed service, prior to 1984, it hired technicians (including Babcock) as civil servants. These technicians possess characteristically civilian rights and were properly considered civilians rather than service members. Although Babcock did serve at other times as a member of the National Guard, his civil-service pension payments were not based on that service. Therefore, those payments are not payments based on “service as a member of” the National Guard and are thus not subject to the exception Social Security Act’s uniformed-services exception. Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented, arguing that National Guard technicians hold a unique position in federal employment because they must maintain membership in the National Guard and wear a Guard uniform, they should be considered “members.”

Thompson v. Clark Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 12, 2021.Decided on Apr 4, 2022. Petitioner: Larry Thompson.Respondent: Pagiel Clark, et al.. Advocates: Amir H. Ali (for the Petitioner) Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) John D. Moore (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Camille Watson was staying with her sister and her sister’s husband, Larry Thompson, when she dialed 911 after seeing a diaper rash on the couple’s infant daughter and mistaking the rash for signs of abuse. In response, two Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) arrived at Thompson’s apartment building to investigate. The EMTs saw nothing amiss, and, unaware of Camille’s 911 call, Thompson told the EMTs that no one in his home had called 911. He asked the EMTs to leave, and they did. Four police officers followed up to investigate the alleged child abuse and insisted on seeing Thompson’s daughter. Thompson asked to speak to the officers’ sergeant, and after being denied that request, asked whether the officers had a warrant (which they did not). Nevertheless, they physically tried to enter Thompson’s home, and when Thompson attempted to block the doorway, the officers tackled and handcuffed him. He was arrested and taken to jail, where he spent two days. He was charged with resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration, and about three months later, the prosecution dropped the charges against him, stating that “People are dismissing the case in the interest of justice.” Thompson filed a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the police officers involved. A federal district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on Thompson’s malicious prosecution claim due to his failure to establish favorable termination of his criminal case, which is required under binding Second Circuit precedent. The appellate court affirmed. Question Must a plaintiff who seeks to bring a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process show that the criminal proceeding against him “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” or that the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence”? Conclusion A plaintiff wishing to bring a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that Thompson satisfied that requirement and reversing the judgment of the lower court. To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the suit or proceeding was instituted without probable cause, (2) the motive in instituting the suit was malicious—that is, for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice, and (3) the prosecution terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused. The purposes of this third element—favorable termination of the underlying criminal case—are: (a) to avoid parallel civil and criminal litigation, (b) to prevent inconsistent civil and criminal judgments, and (c) to prevent civil suits from being improperly used as collateral attacks on criminal proceedings. Most American courts have considered a favorable termination to mean simply a prosecution that ends without conviction and cannot be revived. Thus, if the prosecutor abandons the case or the court dismisses the case without stating a reason, these satisfy the third element of a malicious prosecution claim. Acquittal of the defendant is not required. Respondents’ claims to the contrary are not persuasive. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito argued that the majority’s analysis is cursory and erroneously relies on lower court cases “heavily influenced by a mistaken reading of the plurality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).”

Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 12, 2021.Decided on Mar 3, 2022. Petitioner: Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky.Respondent: EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al.. Advocates: Matthew F. Kuhn (for the Petitioner) Alexa Kolbi-Molinas (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dilation and extraction (D&E) is the standard method of abortion used in the second trimester of pregnancy, accounting for 95% of second-trimester abortions nationwide. Kentucky House Bill 454 requires patients to undergo a procedure to end potential fetal life before they may receive an abortion using the D&E method. Kentucky’s only abortion clinic and two of its doctors filed a lawsuit challenging the law, arguing that it violates patients’ constitutional right to abortion prior to fetal viability. All defendants except then-Secretary of Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Adam Meier, and Commonwealth Attorney Thomas B. Wine, were voluntarily dismissed prior to trial. After a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction. In the meantime, governor Matt Bevin was replaced by Andy Beshear and Meier was replaced by Eric Friedlander. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, and the new Health Secretary declined to continue defending the law. Daniel Cameron, the Kentucky attorney general, asked the Sixth Circuit for permission to intervene to defend the law, but the court declined. Question Should a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law? Conclusion The Kentucky attorney general should have been permitted to intervene on the Commonwealth’s behalf in litigation concerning Kentucky House Bill 454. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the opinion on behalf of the 6-3 majority. Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer concurred in the judgment but did not join the majority opinion. No provision of law limits the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts to allow intervention by a party who was not part of the litigation—the state attorney general in this case. Nor is there a mandatory claims-processing rule that precludes the attorney general’s intervention. Contrary to the conclusion of the court below, the attorney general’s motion to intervene was not “untimely,” as he filed as soon as the secretary for Health and Family Services decided not to defend the law. Finally, allowing the attorney general to intervene would not cause unfair prejudice to the parties, so the appellate court erred in denying the attorney general’s motion to intervene. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion making the additional point that the attorney general was not a “party” to the district court’s final judgment thus negating a premise of the respondents’ jurisdictional argument. Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment because, in their view, granting the attorney general’s motion to intervene would not be an “end-run around the timely-appeal rule” but a product of the timing of the litigation and a new need for the attorney general to enter the suit. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that while the majority acknowledges that courts have “sound discretion” to permit or disallow intervention, it “nonetheless bends over backward to accommodate the attorney general’s reentry into the case.” Justice Sotomayor expressed concern that the decision would broadly allow government officials to “evade the consequences of litigation decisions made by their predecessors of different political parties.”