Supreme Court Oral Arguments

ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: ZS Automotive US, Inc., et al..Respondent: Luxshare, Ltd.. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners in 21-401) Joseph T. Baio (for the Petitioners in 21-518) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Andrew R. Davies (for the Respondent in 21-401) Alexander A. Yanos (for the Respondent in 21-518) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2017, Luxshare entered into a large-scale business deal with ZF Automotive US, and the deal closed in April 2018. Luxshare allegedly discovered that ZF fraudulently concealed certain material facts, inflating the purchase price. The parties’ purchase agreement required that all disputes be settled by three arbitrators in Germany, and Luxshare intended to bring claims for the losses as a result of ZF’s allegedly wrongful conduct. However, it first sought to obtain discovery from ZF and its senior officers and asked a federal district court to compel discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a). Question Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), which gives federal district courts authority to order litigants subject to their jurisdiction to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a foreign or international tribunal,” apply to private commercial arbitral tribunals? Conclusion Although 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) permits a district court to order discovery “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body may qualify as such a tribunal, and the arbitration panels in these cases are not such adjudicative bodies. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The word “tribunal” in the context of § 1782, with modifiers “foreign or international” is best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority. The statute’s history confirms this understanding, as does analogy to the Federal Arbitration Act. The adjudicative bodies in these cases are not governmental or intergovernmental and thus are not subject to § 1782(a).

Golan v. Saada Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Narkis Aliza Golan.Respondent: Isacco Jacky Saada. Advocates: Karen R. King (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Richard Min (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Isacco Saada and Narkis Golan married in Italy in 2015 and had a son. From the very start of their relationship, Saada was violently abusive toward Golan, including in front of their son (though allegedly not toward the son). In 2018, Golan and their son traveled to the United States and remained there. Saada asked a court to return their son under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court found that Italy was the child’s country of habitual residence for the purposes of the Hague Convention. However, it also found that returning the child to Italy would subject him to a grave risk of psychological harm based on Saada’s abuse of Golan. Under binding precedent, the district court was also required to determine whether there were any ameliorative undertakings it could impose on Saada that would mitigate the risk of harm in returning the child to Italy. The district court ordered Saada to stay away from Golan, to pay her $30,000, and to visit their son only with Golan’s consent. After the district court coordinated with an Italian court to enforce the orders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, musts courts consider all measures that might mitigate the grave risk of harm if the child were to return to their country of habitual residence? Conclusion A court is not required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention gives a court the discretion to grant or deny return of a child to a foreign country if it finds that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm. Nothing in the Convention’s text either forbids or requires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising this discretion.

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2022.Decided on May 23, 2022. Petitioner: Robyn Morgan.Respondent: Sundance, Inc.. Advocates: Karla A. Gilbride (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In September 2018, Robyn Morgan sued Sundance, Inc. for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that Sundance failed to pay her for overtime work. The district court denied Sundance’s motion to dismiss. Sundance then answered Morgan's complaint but did not assert its right to arbitrate Morgan's claims. After filing its answer, Morgan participated in a settlement mediation with plaintiffs in another similar lawsuit in Michigan. The Michigan case settled, but Morgan's case moved forward. Nearly eight months after the filing of Morgan's complaint, Sundance moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding Sundance's participation in the litigation waived its right to arbitration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Question Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate the Supreme Court’s instruction that lower courts must “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts”? Conclusion Federal courts may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Outside of the arbitration context, a federal court assessing whether a party has waived a right does not generally ask about prejudice. Rather, waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” It focuses on the actions of the person who held the right, not the effects on the opposing party. Although the FAA may express policy favoring arbitration, that policy does not authorize federal courts to invent special arbitration-preferring procedural rules. Federal courts thus may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule requiring that a party show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim of waiver.

Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2022.Decided on Jun 23, 2022. Petitioner: Philip E. Berger.Respondent: North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al.. Advocates: David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners) Elisabeth S. Theodore (for the NAACP Respondents) Sarah Boyce (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP challenged a North Carolina voter-ID law, arguing that it violates the Constitution and the federal Voting Rights Act. Although the state attorney general, a Democrat, is already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court, Republicans Phil Berger, president pro tempore of the state senate, and Tim Moore, speaker of the state house representatives, sought to intervene to also represent the interests of the State. The district court twice rejected their requests to intervene, and the full (en banc) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also rejected their request. Question Do the two North Carolina legislators have a right to intervene in this case to defend a state voter-ID law? Conclusion North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that one has a right to intervene in litigation if they have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and are “so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede” their ability to protect their interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. When a State chooses to divide its sovereign authority among different officials and authorize their participation in a suit challenging state law, full consideration of the state’s interests may require the involvement of various officials. Intervention by the legislators neither violates the North Carolina Constitution nor gives them authority beyond what the law already provides them. The existing parties do not adequately represent the legislators’ interest, as the presumption of adequate representation applies only in cases where interests fully overlap, which is not the case here. Thus, the legislators have a right to intervene in the litigation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court erroneously presumed that a State is inadequately represented in federal court unless whomever state law designates as a State’s representative is allowed to intervene and incorrectly implied that the attorney general’s defense of the constitutionality of the voting law at issue here fell below a minimal standard of adequacy.

Egbert v. Boule Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2022.Decided on Jun 8, 2022. Petitioner: Erik Egbert.Respondent: Robert Boule. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Felicia H. Ellsworth (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Erik Egbert, a Customs and Border Patrol Agent, went to the Smugglers Inn, which sits at the U.S.-Canada border, and approached a car carrying a guest from Turkey. The inn’s owner, Robert Boule, asked Egbert to leave, and when Egbert refused to do so, Egbert pushed Boule to the ground. After Boule complained to Egbert’s supervisors, Egbert suggested to the IRS that it investigate Boule. Boule filed a Bivens lawsuit (so called because of the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which first recognized the right of plaintiffs to sue federal officials for damages arising from violations of their constitutional rights) against Egbert arguing that the agent had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court ruled against Boule, finding his claims beyond the scope of those permitted under Bivens. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the full (en banc) Ninth Circuit denied Egbert’s petition for rehearing. Question Does a plaintiff have a right to sue federal officers for First Amendment retaliation claims or for allegedly violating the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights while engaging in immigration-related functions? Conclusion A plaintiff does not have a right to sue Border Patrol officers engaged in immigration-related functions for First Amendment retaliation claims or for alleged excessive force. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court. Although Bivens permits suits against federal officials for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, its application to Border Patrol officers raises national security concerns. Thus, “judicial intrusion” would be harmful or inappropriate in this arena. As to the First Amendment, Boule’s claim is a novel concept and no factors weigh in favor of judicial extension of Bivens to that claim. Moreover, for both claims, Congress is better suited to authorize a damages remedy. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch would overrule Bivens entirely. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, concurring in the judgment as to the First Amendment claim but dissenting as to the Fourth Amendment claim. Justice Sotomayor argued that Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim was squarely within the scope of Bivens and only his First Amendment claim was in a new context.

Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2022.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan, et al..Respondent: DaVita, Inc., et al.. Advocates: John J. Kulewicz (for the Petitioners) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal) Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) DaVita is the leading provider of dialysis treatment in the United States. Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan is a self-funded plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Patient A is an anonymous individual with end-stage renal disease who is a member of the plan and has been receiving treatment by DaVita since April 15, 2017. The Plan defines three tiers of reimbursement, and dialysis providers are categorically in the lowest tier and are considered out of network, entitling them to the lowest level of reimbursement relative to all other providers. DaVita challenged the Plan as violating the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which prohibits health plans from treating individuals with kidney failure differently in eligibility or access to benefits. The district court dismissed all of DaVita’s claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that DaVita had plausibly alleged that the Plan engaged in unlawful discrimination. Question Did the Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan violate the Medicare Secondary Payer Act’s non-discrimination provisions through its reimbursement structure for dialysis providers? Conclusion The Marietta Plan’s coverage terms for outpatient dialysis do not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C) because those terms apply uniformly to all covered individuals, and the Medicare Secondary Payer statute does not authorize disparate-impact liability. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. Section 1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii) prohibits a plan from differentiating in benefits between individuals with and without end-stage renal disease. The language of the provision cannot fairly be read to authorize liability for disparate-impact claims. Because the Marietta Plan provides the same outpatient dialysis benefits to all Plan participants, whether or not they are eligible for Medicare, it does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C). Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that because outpatient dialysis is an almost perfect proxy for end-stage renal disease, differentiation on the basis of one is equivalent to differentiation on the basis of the other.

Ruan v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2022. Petitioner: Xiulu Ruan.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lawrence S. Robbins (for the Petitioner in 20-1410) Beau B. Brindley (for the Petitioner in 21-5261) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A federal jury in Alabama convicted Xiulu Ruan and several other pain management physicians of running a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of several federal statutes, including provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. Ruan allegedly prescribed medicines, including Schedule II drugs (many of which are opioids), outside the standard of care for his practice. At trial, prosecutors showed that Ruan and other physicians in his practice prescribed medications for their own financial gain rather than for the benefit of their patients. Ruan and other defendants challenged their convictions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question May a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) regardless of whether he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice? Conclusion The crime of prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, requires that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. In general, criminal law seeks to punish conscious wrongdoing. Thus, when a criminal statute is silent as to the mental state required, courts infer a requirement of knowledge or intent. When it is not silent, the general mental state provision applies to each term of the provision. Thus, the “knowingly or intentionally” requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841 applies to the phrase “except as authorized.” As such, once the defendant proves their conduct was “authorized,” the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Alito looked to the Harrison Act, which preceded the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Regarding the Harrison Act, the Court held that a registered physician acts “in the course of his professional practice” when the physician writes prescriptions “in good faith.” Justice Alito would thus hold that this rule applies under the CSA and vacate the judgments below and remand for further proceedings.

West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 28, 2022.Decided on Jun 30, 2022. Petitioner: West Virginia, et al..Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al.. Advocates: Lindsay S. See (for the state Petitioners) Jacob M. Roth (for the private Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Respondents) Beth S. Brinkmann (for the power company Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Trump administration repealed the 2015 Clean Power Plan, which established guidelines for states to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, and issued in its place the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, which eliminated or deferred the guidelines. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the ACE Rule as arbitrary and capricious. One of the challengers, North American Coal Corporation, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to so broadly regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Question Does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in virtually any industry, so long as it considers cost, non-air impacts, and energy requirements? Conclusion Congress did not grant the Environmental Protection Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act the authority to devise emissions caps based on the generation shifting approach the Agency took in the Clean Power Plan. Under the “major questions doctrine,” there are “extraordinary cases” in which the “history and the breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted,” and the “economic and political significance” of that assertion, provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress” meant to confer such authority. This is one such case, so the EPA must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the authority it claims. It cannot do so. The EPA has admitted that issues of electricity transmission, distribution, and storage are not within its traditional expertise, yet it claims that Congress implicitly tasked it with the regulation of how Americans get their energy. Without “clear congressional authorization” for the EPA to regulate in such a manner, the agency lacks authority to implement the Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined.

Arizona v. City and County of San Francisco Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Arizona, et al..Respondent: City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.. Advocates: Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the federal Respondents) Helen H. Hong (for the state Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Although federal immigration law uses the term “public charge,” referring generally to recipients of federal benefits, it lacks a precise and clear definition. Under the Clinton administration, it referred only to a noncitizen who received cash benefits (as opposed to other types of benefits). In 2019, the Trump administration issued a final rule defining “public charge” as a noncitizen who would likely need cash benefits and/or government-provided housing, food assistance, or medical insurance for more than twelve months. The rule was subject to legal challenges, and the Biden administration stopped defending the rule and dismissed all the cases challenging the rule. The federal government also took additional steps to revert the definition to that of the Clinton administration. Several states sought to intervene in the litigation and take up the defense of the rule where the federal government left off. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the states’ motion to intervene. Question Can states with interests intervene to defend a rule when the United States ceases to defend it? Conclusion Dismissed as improvidently granted.

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al..Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Brant C. Martin (for the Petitioners) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Lanora C. Pettit (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is a federally recognized tribe with a reservation near El Paso, Texas. Under the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, passed by Congress in 1987, the Pueblo agreed that its gaming activities would comply with Texas law. Another law, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, also regulates tribal gaming operations. The Pueblo engaged in gaming activity that violated state law but not the IGRA, and Texas filed a lawsuit to enjoin the tribe’s gaming operations. The district court ruled in favor of the State of Texas, finding that the more restrictive Restoration Act controlled and prohibited the gaming operations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Which federal law governs the legality of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s gaming operations, the Restoration Act or the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act? Conclusion The Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act applies to the case at hand and bans on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court Section 107 of the Restoration Act directly addresses gaming on the lands of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, providing that “gaming activities which are prohibited by [Texas law] are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.” Activities that Texas law merely regulates and does not prohibit are outside the scope of the Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh joined.